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Note on Language 
 
 
For all references to and mention of places and people in Korean that come from the files 
of the United States military or government at the time, I have kept the spelling of 
Korean and Chinese names according to the Romanized versions appearing in the 
archived documents for ease of possible later reference in the archives.  U.S. military 
Romanization of Korean did not consistently follow any format at this particular time, so 
spelling can be highly idiosyncratic and vary greatly. 
 
I have used the McCune-Reichauer system for the transliteration of the other references 
in Korean, with the noted exceptions of well-known figures like Syngman Rhee, who are 
often associated and referenced with particular renderings of their names. 
 
“Orientals” or “Asiatics” were terms commonly used in the United States to refer to East 
Asians, whether in Korea, Japan, or the United States.  Whenever archival material or an 
oral history employs such terms, I have kept the term intact.  However, I do employ 
“Japanese Americans” in my discussion of the POW interrogators and their history.  
Using “Japanese Americans” for this time period is indeed anachronistic, as the term 
“Asian American” would later be created by student movements in the 1960s as a term 
for expressing the political solidarity of students from different Asian backgrounds. 
Although “Japanese American” is awkward to use in a sense, the use of only “Oriental” 
within this chapter would replicate much of the conflation between the Asian citizen of 
the United States and the Asian subject of U.S. projects in East Asia.  As a result, I have 
decided to use “Japanese American” to help initially parse a divergent, but ultimately 
converging, history. 
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Abstract 
 
 
 During the Korean War, a particular figure of warfare took center stage at the armistice 
negotiations – the “prisoner of war.” This once-marginal actor of war became the site of such 
controversy that the signing of the ceasefire was effectively delayed for eighteen months. At 
stake was who would lay legitimate claim to determining the correct interpretation and 
application of the moral humanitarian principles embedded in the 1949 Geneva Conventions 
on the Treatment of Prisoners of War. My dissertation argues that the POW controversy 
reveals how the Korean War pushed to the fore an international struggle over the “laws of 
war” during formal decolonization. After 1945, what did it mean to engage in “war,” when so 
many conflicts began to bear the monikers of “police action,” “intervention,” and 
“occupation”? In response to this question, “Humanity Interrogated” examines a familiar 
narrative – the rise of the nation-state system in the mid-twentieth century – through more 
unexpected readings of the different constructions of sovereignty in intimate encounters, 
whether in U.S. military interrogation rooms, moments of POW capture, or closed armistice 
meetings at Panmunjom.  
Drawn from previously unstudied POW trial and investigation records and newly 
conducted oral history interviews with former prisoners of war and interrogators, “Humanity 
Interrogated” is at once a microhistorical study of encounters through interrogation, a history 
of multi-national and state policy-making over the POW, and an international story of how 
the Korean War heralded an era of reconfiguring warfare in front of decolonization, 
following two generations of people on both sides of the Pacific as they created and 
  xvii 
navigated multiple shifting systems of warfare, racial formations, and interrogation from 
World War II through the Korean War. The dissertation opens with Japanese American 
internment and the U.S. occupation of Korea, follows a thousand Japanese Americans to 
Korea as the U.S. drafted them as interrogators for the Korean War, and then traces the 
journeys of the Korean prisoners of war as they were subsequently shipped by the United 
Nations to India, Brazil, and Argentina in the year leading up to the 1954 Geneva Conference 
on Korea and Indochina.  
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Introduction 
 
The Prisoner of War, the Bureaucrat, and the Archive 
 
 
It is no small irony of history that the most identifiable marker of the Korean 
peninsula to people outside of Korea is an abstract line that cuts across the peninsula in 
most maps of Korea.  The 38th parallel, first drawn by two U.S. officials late at night on 
August 14, 1945 as the proposed line of division between the U.S. and Soviet military 
occupations on the Korean peninsula, had no correlation to any geographical or cultural 
boundary on the ground.1  What was supposed to have been a temporary measure in 1945 
has become one of the most militarized borders in the world, one that appears seemingly 
naturalized and even permanent due to the ritual war games and military security 
practices performed regularly around it.  But the 38th parallel plays a role in the conflicts 
and politics surrounding the Korean peninsula that is much more extensive than simply 
being a site for military war games.  It is the 38th parallel that has provided traction for 
the international public to imagine the shifting political conflicts on the Korean 
peninsula.  In the days following the northern Korean People’s Army’s crossing over the 
                                                
1 As Dean Rusk himself recollected in his memoir: “During a SWINK meeting on August 14, 1945, the 
same day of the Japanese surrender, Colonel Charles Bonesteel and I retired to an adjacent room late at 
night and studied intently a map of the Korean peninsula.  Working in haste and under great pressure, we 
had a formidable task: to pick a zone for the American occupation.  Neither Tic not I was a Korean expert, 
but it seemed to us that Seoul, the capital should be in the American sector.  We also knew that the U.S. 
Army opposed an extensive area of occupation.  Using a National Geographic map, we looked just north of 
Seoul for a convenient dividing line but could not find a natural geographic line.  We saw instead the thirty-
eighth parallel and decided to recommend that. […] SWINK’s choice of the thirty-eighth parallel, 
recommended by two tired colonels working late at night, proved fateful.”from Dean Rusk, As I Saw It, 1st 
ed. (New York: W.W. Norton, 1990). 
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38th parallel on June 25, 1950, the 38th parallel became the flashpoint for international 
public opinion on the war on the Korean peninsula.  And even sixty years after the 
ceasefire signing in July 1953, the existence of a militarized 38th parallel is a reminder 
that the Korean War still has not officially come to an end.   
The 38th parallel has had a surprisingly enduring hold on the imagination, given 
its official status as a temporary border from its inception as an arbitrary line to its current 
state as hypermilitarized ceasefire line.  On June 26, 1950, when President Harry Truman 
delivered a statement explaining his decision to mobilize U.S. troops on the Korean 
peninsula, he focused on the 38th parallel, lambasting the southward crossing of the 
northern Korean People’s Army [KPA] on June 25, 1950 as “an act of aggression” and a 
“[threat] to the peace of the world.”2  Responding to Truman’s statement with their own 
press release, Soviet officials accused the “South Korean puppet government” of 
provoking the June 25th attack over the 38th parallel, which in turn was clear evidence of 
the U.S. “imperialist warmongers.”3  According to these accusations, the 38th parallel 
functioned both as a sovereign line in the ground on the Korean peninsula, and a symbol 
of the borders of the global order. In his June 27, 1950 telegram to American diplomatic 
officers, Secretary of State Dean Acheson seized upon the northern KPA’s transgression 
of the 38th parallel as a pedagogical opportunity to give shape to the meaning of U.S. 
involvement on the Korean peninsula, and instructed the diplomatic officers to frame the 
“[i]mportance” of the “Korean situation” in terms of how “vital” it was as a “symbol [of] 
                                                
2 “Statement by the President on the Violation of the 38th Parallel,” dated 26 June 1950. Part of the Public 
Papers of the Presidents: Harry S. Truman, 1945-1953 of the Harry S. Truman Presidential Library, 
available at www.trumanlibrary.org/publicpapers, accessed 21 May 2011.  
3 Report on Soviet official press release; Dated June 27, 1950. From Mi Kungmubu Hanguk kungnae 
sanghwang kwallyŏn munsŏ: The US Department of State relating to the internal affairs of Korea (Seoul: 
Kukpangbu Kunsa Pʻyŏnchʻan Yŏnʾguso, 2000-2002), Volume 1. 
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strength and determination of West.”  The “Korean situation” was relevant to Asia, 
Europe, the Middle East, and “elsewhere,” according to Acheson.4  The 38th parallel, in 
the early days of the Korean War, had already become an abstract “symbol,” a border 
representative of all borders in the world that could be transgressed, elided, or challenged. 
The pedagogical force of the 38th parallel as a key trope in shaping the narrative 
of the Korean War has maintained a stunning resiliency over the years.  In U.S. 
historiography, the Korean War as a historical event, similar to the 38th parallel, holds 
significance for what it reveals “elsewhere” – in historical studies of U.S. militarization, 
the Korean War provided an opportunity for the development of the military-security 
complex in the United States, while in the annals of Cold War diplomatic history, the war 
heralded an important shift from rollback to containment diplomatic policy.5 Historian 
                                                
4 Outgoing Telegram from Department of State; To Certain American Diplomatic Officers; Dated June 27, 
1950; Sent by Acheson; To: Europe, Plus South Africa, Australia, and New Zealand, Canada. From Mi 
Kungmubu Hanguk kungnae sanghwang kwallyŏn munsŏ: The US Department of State relating to the 
internal affairs of Korea (Seoul: Kukpangbu Kunsa Pʻyŏnchʻan Yŏnʾguso, 2000-2002), Volume 1. 
5 For works on militarization and how the Korean War provided a key impetus in the making of the military 
industrial complex, see Michael J. Hogan, A cross of iron: Harry S. Truman and the origins of the national 
security state, 1945-1954 (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1998) and also Melvyn P. Leffler, 
A preponderance of power: national security, the Truman administration, and the cold war, Stanford 
nuclear age series (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1992).  For a broader historiographical view 
of the debates around the meaning of “Cold War” history, Hogan’s edited book still provides the best 
introduction: Michael J. Hogan, ed. The End of the Cold War: its meaning and implications (Cambridge 
[England]: Cambridge University Press, 1992).  Perhaps most relevant to the discussion at hand regarding 
the legitimacy of the “Cold War” frame for analysis are the essays by Hogan, Bruce Cumings, and John 
Gaddis included in this volume.  Located squarely in this discussion as a military historian, Allan Millett 
provides perhaps the best concise overview of works on the Korean War in his bibliographic overviews, 
and he is quite clear about his own judgments on the quality of the works themselves: Allan R. Millet, “The 
Korean War: A 50-Year Critical Historiography.,” Journal of Strategic Studies 24, no. 1 (March 2001): 188; 
Allan R. Millett, The Korean War: The Essential Bibliography (Potomac Books Inc., 2007).  Millett 
himself argues that June 25, 1950 should not be the starting point for understanding the war, and he begins 
his examination of the causes and dynamics leading up to war during post-1945 period: Allan Reed Millett, 
The war for Korea, 1945--1950: a house burning, Modern war studies (Lawrence, Kan.: University Press 
of Kansas, 2005).  However, Millet and also William Stueck offer scholarship on the war that primarily 
remains at the level of military and diplomatic action and decision-making.  Stueck in particular has 
worked towards framing the Korean War as an “international” conflict: William Stueck, “Cold War 
Revisionism and the Origins of the Korean Conflict: The Kolko Thesis,” Pacific Historical Review 42, no. 
4 (November 1, 1973): 537-560; William Whitney Stueck, The Korean War: an international history, 
Princeton studies in international history and politics (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1995); 
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Bruce Cumings effected a major paradigm shift with his work, The Origins of the Korean 
War, where he argued for scholarship that takes on-the-ground politics on the Korean 
peninsula seriously alongside an analysis of Washington politics.6 Cumings meticulously 
demonstrates through his research that the Korean War was also a civil war, whose 
fissure lines were exacerbated and manipulated by the U.S. preoccupations with a binary 
Cold War politics and adamant, ideological anti-communist stance.  Historians now agree 
the idea that the Korean War was both a postcolonial civil war and a conflict of the Cold 
War, but the 38th parallel has still been reified as the major axis along which historical 
change is affected.   
This study presents a Korean War that breaks through the historiographical 
impasse between the national telos of the civil war and the predetermined binary politics 
of the Cold War, where the story is usually concerned with territorial shifts both on the 
peninsula and globally, and the primary actors in history are those in the elite echelons of 
the state and military. What has been lost in the histories of the Korean War is the human 
terrain of war and politics, a way of defining the global order by determining the order of 
relations – between states, between states and individuals, and between individuals and 
the international community.  Rather than the 38th parallel, it is a different trope of 
warfare that is the focus of this study: the prisoner of war.  Instead of the usual 
battlefields, it is the intimate spaces of encounters, such as interrogation rooms, POW 
                                                
William Whitney Stueck, Rethinking the Korean War: A New Diplomatic and Strategic History (Princeton, 
N.J: Princeton University Press, 2002).  
6 Bruce Cumings, The Origins of the Korean War (Seoul, Korea: Yuksabipyungsa, 2002); Bruce Cumings, 
Child of conflict: the Korean-American relationship, 1943-1953, Publications on Asia of the School of 
International Studies, University of Washington.no. 37 (Seattle: University of Washingtion Press, 1983); 
Bruce Cumings, Korea’s place in the sun: a modern history (New York: W.W. Norton, 1997); Jon. 
Halliday and Bruce Cumings, Korea: the unknown war (London: Viking, 1988). 
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camps, and moments of surrender, that make up the landscape of my analysis.  And most 
importantly, war itself takes on a different character within the pages of this study.   
I historicize the discourses and practices of war by tracing the conflict, struggles 
and contradictions that manifested on the global stage of history as the demands for 
formal decolonization resulted in more and more newly independent nation-states.  In 
1950, “war” was not only a source of horror over the damages wrought by Western 
civilization – Western states also jealously guarded the right to engage in legitimate 
warfare.  The Korean War was a war that was not supposed to be a war, a “police action” 
of the United Nations and the United States.  After 1945, what did it mean to engage in 
“war,” when so many conflicts began to bear the monikers of “police action,” 
“intervention,” and “occupation”?  I argue that the Korean War, seen from the vantage 
point of the POW, reveals how “war” itself was a central site on which the rise of the 
nation-state system occurred, where  “war” was not simply about sovereignty in terms of 
territory and terrain, but rather fundamentally about sovereign power over making a 
subject for the new global order and decolonized nation-state. In other words, I argue that 
the Korean War was not simply a war about territory – it was also about subject-making.   
The controversy over the prisoner of war, which erupted at the negotiating tables 
at the Panmunjom armistice meetings located within the 38th parallel, eclipsed the debates 
over the 38th parallel during the Korean War.  In 1952, all items on the negotiating 
agenda – including the location of the ceasefire line, which became the 38th parallel – had 
been decided, except for Agenda Item 4: POW repatriation. In January 1952, the U.S. 
delegate representing the United Nations Command placed a new proposal on the 
negotiating table – voluntary POW repatriation.  In other words, the U.S. delegate was 
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proposing that each and every POW would be able to decide whether or not to “return” or 
“repatriate” to their home nation-state.  Opposing the proposal, the Chinese and North 
Korean delegates pointed out that the 1949 Geneva Conventions, drafted only a year 
before the outbreak of the Korean War, required mandatory repatriation.7 Who would lay 
legitimate claim to determining the correct interpretation and application of the moral 
humanitarian principles embedded in the 1949 Geneva Conventions on the Treatment of 
Prisoners of War?  Prisoner of war repatriation became the most controversial issue at the 
Panmunjom truce talks, and it captured the attention of the international press and media 
as the United Nations, the International Committee of the Red Cross, and the state 
governments of India, Mexico, and Brazil entered the debate.   
The prisoner of war, traditionally a rather marginal actor in war, became the site 
of such controversy that the signing of the ceasefire was effectively delayed for eighteen 
months.  However, the POW controversy – circling out from the POW camps to the 
negotiating tables at Panmunjom to the International Committee of the Red Cross and the 
United Nations – has usually been dismissed, footnoted, or shaken off by historians as a 
much-too-long propaganda ploy used by all sides of the armistice table.  I contend that 
there is a another necessary lens through which we must examine the issue: the POW 
issue during the Korean War could not have been manufactured earlier upon the world 
                                                
7 The key scholarly monograph centrally focused on the armistice talks during the Korea War is Rosemary  
Foot’s A Substitute for Victory: The politics of peacemaking at the Korean Armistice talks (Cornell 
University: Ithaca, NY, 1990). Foot does have one chapter that examines the POW repatriation debate, 
titled “Victims of the Cold War: The POW Issue.” In the collection Child of Conflict: The Korean-
American Relationship, 1943-1953, (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1983) edited by Bruce 
Cumings, Barton J. Bernstein also provides analysis of the negotiations over the POW issue.  His article is 
titled, “ “The Struggle over the Korean Armistice: Prisoners of Repatriation?,” and it provides a narrative 
overview of the different phases and choices made at the negotiating table regarding POWs. Also, Walter G 
Hermes, Truce Tent and Fighting Front (Washington, D.C: Center of Military History, United States Army, 
2005), which is volume two in the series by the United States Army on the Korean War, provides 
information on Panmunjom and Koje, in addition to a narrative of the different military strategies on the 
battlefields in tandem with the negotiating tactics. 
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stage because it heralded the particular contradictions and limitations in the “laws of war” 
as they faced formal decolonization. At stake in this debate over the figure of the POW 
was the question of who defined war, who would then in turn determine the issue of 
recognition in the rise of the nation-state system, as the fallen empires and the emerging 
nation-states demanded a different global ordering of power. This study argues that the 
“prisoner of war,” which previously was only a temporary wartime status or category of 
personhood, had become a contested political subject on the world stage. Indeed, the 
most fundamental challenge to the notion of “war” during the twentieth century came not 
in the form of horror over mass violence, but rather in the form of anti-colonial 
movements and formal decolonization.  The “great powers” faced an unanticipated 
quandary: to wage “war” with another entity implied a political recognition of its 
legitimacy, an act which the “great powers” wanted to defer as long as possible in front 
of its colonies and territories. Whoever could determine the legitimate subjecthood of the 
“prisoner of war” for the post-1945 global order would also lay claim to defining the 
legitimate parameters of warfare, and thus sovereignty.  
The key significance to the Korean War and to the POW issue was the 
proliferation of demands being made upon the decolonized individual subject as a way to 
reconfigure the nation-state system.  And the most-relied upon tool of the U.S. military 
for constructing, disciplining, and presenting the prisoner of war was the interrogation 
room.  If, as Frantz Fanon later writes in 1961, “[d]ecolonization is truly the creation of 
new men,” then wars over decolonization demanded the creation of a new interrogation 
room.8  At the heart of the POW controversy was the repatriation screening interrogation 
room – the U.S. delegate at Panmunjom proposed to have all Korean and Chinese POWs 
                                                
8 Frantz Fanon, The Wretched of the Earth, trans. Richard Philcox (New York: Grove Press, 2000), 2. 
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individually undergo “voluntary repatriation screening,” where each POW would be 
asked by a UNC military interrogator if he or she indeed wanted to repatriate, or not.  
Espousing the efficacy of such a bureaucratic approach, the U.S. delegate held up the 
“voluntary repatriation screening” interrogation room as exemplary of U.S. liberalism – 
the interrogation room was a space of democracy, freedom, and individual choice.   
In April 1952, when a compound of 5,600 south Korean civilian internees in the 
largest U.S.-run POW camp greeted U.S. military interrogation teams and accompanying 
U.S. Army battalions with homemade cudgels and north Korean military songs sung in 
unison, immediately caused a crisis – the south Korean civilian internees refused to enter 
the interrogation rooms.  Within hours, seventy-seven Korean civilian internees had died 
from wounds inflicted by concussion grenades used by the U.S. military and the south 
Korean ROKA soldiers.  Indeed, what was at stake in this struggle over the interrogation 
room for the U.S. camp commanders, the Korean prisoners of war, the Republic of Korea 
Army soldiers, the delegates at Panmunjom, and the state officials at the White House in 
Washington, D.C.? This was more than a struggle over whose interpretation of 
“international law” would be valid – this was a conflict over who could lay claim to 
knowing the subjectivity, the desires of the “prisoners of war” amidst competing notions 
of citizenship, human rights, and sovereignty in the age of three worlds. As this study will 
demonstrate, the U.S. military interrogation room has historically played a critical role in 
the project of universalizing the vision of a U.S. liberal geopolitical order not through the 
production of information, but rather through the production of subjects. The work of the 
interrogation room was neither marginal nor isolated.  It was, in fact, deeply embedded in 
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the struggles over fashioning subjectivities appropriate and desirous of particular political 
orders and systems. 
However, the U.S. military interrogation room that one encounters in this study 
was neither monolithic nor absolute in its hegemonic project.  Nor was it the sole form of 
interrogation that the Korean prisoner of war encountered in the years before, during, and 
after the three years of the Korean War.  This study reveals a matrix of the interrogation 
rooms invented, mobilized, and maintained by groups as varied as the U.S. military, anti-
communist rightist Korean youth groups, and even the India-led Neutral Nations 
Repatriation Commission.  The invention of multiple, different types of interrogation 
serves as the central framing for this study, and I examine how these historically 
configured interrogation rooms reveal, in turn, multiple visions and interpretations of the 
project of formal decolonization and its relation to another project - modern warfare.   
Beginning with the U.S. occupation of Korea in 1945, I trace how the policing 
practices over acts of language during the occupation affected and impacted the 
assumptions undergirding interrogation practices utilized by the U.S. military intelligence 
during the Korean War.  During the war, many of the U.S. interrogators of POWs were 
Nisei (second-generation) Japanese American men, who had spent their adolescence in 
the WWII internment camps and were later drafted or assigned to interrogate Korean 
prisoners of war – I reconstruct the types of interrogation rooms these Japanese-American 
interrogators invented, what they resisted, and what they re-interpreted.  Then, following 
Korean prisoners of war from their moment of surrender or capture to their often three-
year stint behind barbed-wire fences as POWs, I delineate an entire landscape of constant 
interrogation the Korean prisoner of war encountered, where anti-communist Korean 
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youth groups created their own political economy of interrogation and violence and 
communist Koreans mobilized their own methods of collective surveillance. Then I 
examine the “explanation room” that the Indian delegation had essentially invented and 
configured as a resolution to the negotiation impasse at Panmunjom over the topic of 
POW repatriation.  It was an interrogation room for “neutrality,” an early manifestation 
of nonalignment’s vision of an international nation-state system distilled into a moment 
of claiming a legitimate reading of the postcolonial Korean individual subject. 
Stepping into the interrogation rooms of the Korean POW, I have discovered, 
opens up other international historical conversations about the future of Korea, which 
have been duly overshadowed or collapsed by the usual binary Cold War understandings 
of the Korean War around the 38th parallel.  There were other interpretations of the 
significance of the northern KPA’s crossing over the 38th parallel on June 25, 1950, and 
the Department of State followed the wide-ranging spectrum of reactions and narratives 
of the conflict that was escalating on the Korean peninsula.  “Three of four Dehli English 
language papers ran prominent editorial comment on Korean situation June 27,” a 
telegraph from New Delhi addressed to the U.S. Secretary of State reported. The Indian 
News Chronicle stated, “The North Koreans have a cause to fight for – national unity and 
a Communist regime.  The Koreans in the south are called upon to fight in defense of 
American capital – and human freedom.  In these moves Moscow has scored over 
Washington.”  The telegram report further noted that the Hindustan Times voiced its 
opinion that the “[d]issolution of South Korea [would be] blow to UN prestige but [would 
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have] ‘saving grace on bringing about Korean unity.’”9  A different set of historical 
stakes in the future of Korea become apparent in these interpretations of the significance 
of the KPA crossing of the 38th parallel for the post-1945 global order.  From the vantage 
point of an independent India, the fate of the Korean peninsula held a great deal of weight 
in terms of the futures of newly independent Asian nation-states.  India had been a 
member of the United Nations Temporary Commission on Korea to oversee the 1948 
elections that ended up establishing the southern Republic of Korea – and it was India 
that had voiced reservations about ultimately failing to remove the 38th parallel as a line 
of division.  The question of how the U.S.-dominated Cold War vision would affect the 
postcolonial civil war on the Korean peninsula, not the 38th parallel per se, was the 
concern of the Indian government.  India’s commitment and involvement in the POW 
controversy during the Korean War was part and parcel of this longer historical concern 
about the nature of the international nation-state system, and what would be the 
underlying ideologies guiding it.   
Often, the histories of the Korean War stay within the parameters of a more 
typical top-down narrative analysis of the war’s events, personages, and consequences.  
The state officials, diplomats, and military personnel of those more familiar histories are 
within the pages of this study as well – however, the analytical frame of the interrogation 
room provides a unique opportunity to bring in a bottom-up history as well.  The different 
abstracted visions of either Secretary of State Dean Acheson, Indian President Jawaharlal 
Nehru, or north Korean President Kim Il Sung regarding Korea’s significance to the post-
1945 global order were contingent upon thousands of acts of interrogation, translation, 
                                                
9 Telegram from New Delhi to Secretary of State.  Date 1950, June 28. Sent by Henderson. From Mi 
Kungmubu Hanguk kungnae sanghwang kwallyŏn munsŏ: The US Department of State relating to the 
internal affairs of Korea (Seoul: Kukpangbu Kunsa Pʻyŏnchʻan Yŏnʾguso, 2000-2002), Volume 1. 
  12 
and disciplining of possible subjects.  It was interrogation that provided the proper 
narrative needed, that assured policy-makers of the availability of a willing, desirous 
subject. At the heart of this story are the prisoners of war themselves, the Republic of 
Korea Army (ROKA) military guards, the U.S. military troops and administrative 
personnel, and the U.S. military interrogators; on the Korean peninsula, President 
Syngman Rhee, the U.S. and United Nations Command military delegates at Panmunjom, 
along with the Chinese and North Korean delegates at the table; the governments and 
even the militaries of the United States, India, Brazil, Mexico, Argentina and other 
members of the United Nations, the International Committee of the Red Cross.  These 
were not strictly defined or separate fields of action, as POWs, civilians, soldiers, along 
with diplomats and delegates claimed a space on the stage of history. This study proposes 
to take seriously the notions of liberation and decolonization that the peasant farmer 
turned POW held in the years after 1945, to take seriously the notions of war-making and 
survival held by Japanese American interrogators who had only recently been also behind 
barbed-wire fences in the United States, and to take seriously the lived experiences of 
constant violence on the Korean peninsula by the Korean people in the years following 
official liberation from Japan on August 15, 1945.  War was not an abstract principal 
either within or without the interrogation room. 
From within the interrogation room, the cast of unexpected historical actors 
within this story multiplies – Japanese American young men, who had spent their 
adolescence in the internment camps of World War II, were often the translators for or 
first-level interrogators of the Korean prisoners of war, the Korean prisoners of war 
themselves were from both sides of the 38th parallel or even from the farther reaches of 
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the Korean diaspora, like Uzbekistan or northern regions of the Soviet Union. The 
vantage point of the interrogation room affords us a different time frame for the 
beginning and ending of this story of the Korean War.  I posit the significance of the 
Korean War not within the usual Cold War binary power struggle, nor simply within the 
postcolonial civil war binary of the anti-communist south versus the communist north. 
Rather, I place the Korean War within a longer history of Japanese colonial legacies and 
U.S. imperial ambitions within a trans-Pacific frame, as both projects converged on the 
Korean peninsula in the middle of the twentieth century. A history of the interrogation 
room critically becomes a study of projects of subject-making, racial formations, and 
claims to sovereignty in the wake of 1945, as the former colony of Korea, the former 
empire of Japan, and the self-disavowing empire of the United States navigated how to 
present themselves as nation-states.  
The dissertation opens with Japanese American internment and the U.S. 
occupation of Korea, follows a thousand Japanese Americans to Korea as the U.S. drafted 
them as interrogators for the Korean War, and then traces the journeys of the Korean 
prisoners of war as they were subsequently shipped by the United Nations to India, 
Brazil, and Argentina in the year leading up to the 1954 Geneva Conference on Korea 
and Indochina. The study follows two generations of people on both sides of the Pacific 
as they created and navigated multiple systems of warfare and interrogation from World 
War II through the Korean War.10   
                                                
10 Much of my own framing of the Korean War within a transnational, international landscape of the 
political comes from inquiries into the relationship between race, subjectivity, and imperialism in Asian 
Pacific Islander American Studies and also the tracings of the black political diaspora in U.S African 
American history, where the political solidarity imaginings of the Bandung Conference are taken seriously.  
For works in APIA studies, see the following scholarship that engages interdisciplinary methodology in the 
reading of texts: Jodi Kim, Ends of empire: Asian American critique and the Cold War, Critical American 
studies series (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2010); Colleen Lye, America's Asia: racial 
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 “Humanity Interrogated” presents a history of the Korean War through three 
distinct, but interconnected fields of action.  First, it is a microhistorical study of 
encounters through a particular practice of war, interrogation, on the Korean peninsula 
and the United States from 1945 through 1960.  Second, it is a history of multi-national 
and state policy-making over the prisoner of war as a site of struggle to claim the 
decolonizing subject.  And thirdly, it is an international story of how the Korean War 
heralded an era of what jurist Carl Schmitt had termed “wars over humanity” in 1950, 
where nation-states no longer made wars, but rather wars made nation-states.  
 
Interventions: War, Sovereignty, and the Political Subject 
I point out the overdetermined nature of the 38th parallel to question explicitly 
whether or not the 38th parallel has severe limitations in its explanatory power over the 
war’s whole significance.  To focus wholly on the 38th parallel as the pivotal point for the 
dynamics of the war, as much of Cold War historiography does, is to narrow one’s field 
of vision to only the stakes of geopolitical territory, whether framed as 
containment/rollback or national reunification/division.  It is a group of stakes that have 
traditionally been associated with Westphalian sovereignty, where the sanctity of borders 
became the unspoken treaty pact between nation-states.  What is crucially lost in this 
                                                
form and American literature, 1893-1945, Princeton paperbacks (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University 
Press, 2005); Sarita Echavez. See, The decolonized eye: Filipino American art and performance 
(Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2009).  Two particular anthologies have been useful in 
thinking about the global and the hemispheric: Lisa. Lowe and David LLoyd, The Politics of culture in the 
shadow of capital, Post-contemporary interventions (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 1997); Ann 
Laura. Stoler, Haunted by empire: geographies of intimacy in North American history, American 
encounters/global interactions (Durham: Duke University Press, 2006). For works that provide examples of 
narratives of international claims-making in front of the decolonizing world, see Penny M. Von Eschen, 
Race against empire: Black Americans and anticolonialism, 1937-1957 (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University 
Press, 1997); Kevin Kelly. Gaines, American Africans in Ghana: Black expatriates and the civil rights era, 
The John Hope Franklin series in African American history and culture (Chapel Hill: University of North 
Carolina Press, 2006); Gerald. Horne, Black and red: W.E.B. Du Bois and the Afro-American response to 
the Cold War, 1944-1963, SUNY series in Afro-American society. (Albany, N.Y.: State University of New 
York Press, 1986). 
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narrow frame is sovereign power, where the claims and authority of the sovereign are 
collapsed upon the individual subject.  This study’s focus on the issue of subject-making 
allows for an examination of how sovereignty itself became a fraught object of 
construction and claims-making at the crossroads of decolonization and war. I argue that 
nothing less than the question of decolonization was at stake in the debate over the 
prisoner of war during the Korean War. Nationalism, self-determination, and state-
building are all important to this study; however, rather than beginning from the premise 
of examining the Korean War as a struggle over the emergence of the nation-state on the 
Korean peninsula, I propose to approach the Korean War as a struggle over the politics of 
recognition that were informing the shape of the rise of the nation-state system in the 
mid-twentieth century. 11  In other words, this study is looking slightly askance at the 
usual narrative of the Korean War, where instead of the “nation” taking the central role 
within the analytical frame, the construction of “sovereignty” becomes the crux.12 A 
                                                
11 Although I do depart from examining only historical actors who participate within nationalist discourse, I 
do engage with much of the more recent scholarship that has emerged out of the international history frame: 
Mark. Bradley, Imagining Vietnam and America: the making of postcolonial Vietnam, 1919-1950, The new 
Cold War history (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina, 2000); Matthew James. Connelly, A 
diplomatic revolution: Algeria's fight for independence and the origins of the post-cold war era (Oxford ; 
New York: Oxford University Press, 2002); Erez. Manela, The Wilsonian moment: self-determination and 
the international origins of anticolonial nationalism (Oxford ; New York: Oxford University Press, 2007). 
Perhaps one of the most important scholars on U.S. empire and decolonization in the twentieth century is 
William Appleman Williams: William Appleman. Williams, The tragedy of American diplomacy (New 
York: W.W. Norton, 1988); William Appleman. Williams, America confronts a revolutionary world, 1776-
1976 (New York: Morrow, 1976).  Much of my own theoretical framing of “decolonization” has come 
from the shores of postcolonial studies – in particular see: Prasenjit. Duara, Decolonization: perspectives 
from now and then, Rewriting histories (London ; New York: Routledge, 2004). The writings of Frantz 
Fanon have, in particular, helped shape some of the methodological approach: Frantz Fanon, The Wretched 
of the Earth. Translated from the French by Richard Philcox ; Introductions by Jean-Paul Sartre and Homi 
K. Bhabha (New York: Grove Press, 2004). 
12 My particular use of “sovereignty” as a historical construction comes from two different bodies of 
scholarship: one of legal scholarship that has recently emerged on conceptions of legal warfare and 
international humanitarian law, and the other from works surrounding “states of emergency” and “states of 
exception.”  Much of the now-expanding scholarship on “states of exception” center upon this group of 
work: Carl Schmitt, The Concept of the Political, Expanded ed. (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 
2007); Carl Schmitt, Political Theology: Four Chapters on the Concept of Sovereignty, Studies in 
contemporary German social thought (Cambridge, Mass: MIT Press, 1985); Carl Schmitt, The Nomos of 
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nation-state’s sovereignty only exists if the larger system of nation-states recognizes its 
legitimacy.  Modern warfare and formal decolonization – two hallmarks of the twentieth 
century – challenged this particular ordering of the nation-state sytem. 
The meaning of “war” itself was precisely fragmented, splintered, and multiple at 
this historical moment in time.  I contend that over the course of the twentieth century 
alongside the move towards the criminalization and regulation of warfare (trends 
evidenced by the Kellogg-Briand Pact of 1928 or the periodic revisions of the Geneva 
Conventions), Western states attempted to preserve “war” as a privileged right that only 
legitimate states could claim.13   When confronted with the claims to self-determination 
and sovereignty being made in the colonies and territories, Western powers jealously 
guarded and circumscribed their language of “war.”   The most fundamental challenge to 
                                                
the Earth in the International Law of the Jus Publicum Europaeum (New York: Telos Press, 2003); Giorgio 
Agamben, Homo Sacer: Sovereign Power and Bare Life (Stanford, Calif: Stanford University Press, 1998); 
Giorgio Agamben, State of Exception (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2005); Michel. Bertani 
Foucault, "Society Must Be Defended": Lectures at the Collège De France, 1975-76 (New York: Picador, 
2003). I do depart from Agamben’s “state of exception” theoretical frame in that I insist that the 
interrogation room – or “state of exception” – was not an “extralegal” situation, but rather a “hyperlegal” 
one, where an extraordinary amount of labor was needed to maintain such a site.  For an excellent example 
of tracing the historical legacies of the “state of emergency” within the colonial context, see Nasser Hussain, 
The jurisprudence of emergency (University of Michigan Press, 2003).  
13 The historicization of the legal constructions of “war” has occurred more often in the province of jurists, 
than historians – with the noted exception of Geoffrey Best, War and Law Since 1945 (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 1996).  Perhaps the most famous jurist who tackled the question of shifting legitimacies 
in the aftermath of World War II regarding sovereignty and warfare is Carl Schmitt with his opus published 
in 1950: Carl Schmitt, The Nomos of the Earth in the International Law of the Jus Publicum Europaeum 
(New York: Telos Press, 2003). For an excellent historicization of Schmitt’s own assumptions within a 
longue durée intellectual history of international law and jurists, see Martti Koskenniemi, The Gentle 
Civilizer of Nations: The Rise and Fall of International Law, 1870-1960 (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge 
University Press, 2002).  The work of Nathaniel Berman also provides some key insights into the anxieties 
over shifting powers and hegemonies and their subsequent impact on the definitions of war: Nathaniel 
Berman, “But the Alternative is Despair”: European Nationalism and the Modernist Renewal of 
International Law. Harvard Law Review 106, no. 8 (June 1, 1993): 1792-1903; Nathaniel Berman, 
“Intervention in a ‘Divided World’: Axes of Legitimacy.” European Journal of International Law 17, no. 4 
(September 2006): 743. Historians and scholars have, however, certainly challenged the notion of European 
claims to “legitimate” violence, and have demonstrated how practices of war were indeed developed also in 
tandem with colonial practices: see Isabel V Hull, Absolute Destruction: Military Culture and the Practices 
of War in Imperial Germany (Ithaca, N.Y: Cornell University Press, 2005); Mark Mazower, Dark 
Continent: Europe’s Twentieth Century, 1st ed. (New York: A.A. Knopf, 1999); Hannah Arendt, The 
Origins of Totalitarianism (New York: Harcourt, Brace, 1951). 
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the notion of “war” during the twentieth century came not in the form of horror over mass 
violence, but rather in the form of anti-colonial movements and formal decolonization.  
The “great powers” faced an unanticipated quandary: to wage “war” with another entity 
implied a political recognition of its legitimacy, an act which the “great powers” wanted 
to defer as long as possible in front of its colonies and territories.  A historical 
convergence between the pressures of dealing with formal decolonization and the 
criminalization of “aggressive” war resulted in a peculiar lexical landscape for state-
sanctioned mass violence in the latter half of the twentieth century. War could no longer 
be conducted sheerly and solely out of a state’s interest.  Now, war would have to be 
conducted in the name of “humanity” – war itself had to be on the plane of the universal.  
War could now only be conducted as a disavowal of war itself. 
The case of Korea pushed the issue of sovereignty and recognition to the fore as 
the discourses over decolonization and warfare converged upon the Korean peninsula in 
1945 with the divided military occupations, and then again in 1950 with the outbreak of 
the Korean War. The fraught nature of sovereignty and political recognition was not a 
stranger to the Korean peninsula.  Although the inscription on the Korean War Memorial 
in Washington, D.C., built in 1992, states: “Our nation honors her sons and daughter who 
answered the call to defend a country they never knew and a people they never met,” the 
United States had been making military overtures to Korea as early as 1871.  Scholar 
Gordon Chang calls the 1871 event, “The 1871 American war against Korea,” an event 
that Chang notes as “one of the largest, if not the largest, and bloodiest uses of military 
force overseas by the United States in the fifty years between the Mexican-American War 
  18 
of 1846-1848 and the Spanish-American War of 1898.”14  U.S. Secretary of State, 
Hamilton Fish, had instructed Frederick F. Low, the U.S. minister of China, and the 
American fleet’s commander, Admiral John Rodgers, to execute an “opening” of Korea 
in the same manner that Matthew Perry had in terms of Japan.  The result of the 
expedition was the violent death of at minimum two hundred-fifty Koreans – and 
absolutely no Perry-like success in forcing the “opening” of Korea.  It would not be until 
1882 that Admiral Robert Shefeldt successfully brokered a treaty of “amity and 
commerce” between the United States and Korea.  However, the display of military 
power by the United States was most probably not the deciding factor in the change of 
Korea’s strategy vis-à-vis the insistent West.   
In a different re-enactment and remobilization of Perry’s opening of Japan, 
Japanese gunboats arrived at Kanghwa Island in 1875, purposefully entering an “area 
known to be off-limits to foreign ships.”  Exchange of artillery took place, and eventually 
400 Japanese troops landed on the shore after Chinese mediation failed.  And although 
some advisors advised Kojong to mobilize the military, King Kojong decided on a 
different move – on February 27, 1876, Kojong did sign a treaty with Japan.  As scholar 
Bruce Cumings notes, “Article 1 recognized Korea as an “autonomous” (chaju) state with 
sovereign rights the same as Japan’s. […] The article really meant that Japan no longer 
found any Chinese position in Korea worthy of its respect.”15  Korea had been a tributary 
state of China, a relationship that both granted a considerable amount of autonomy and 
                                                
14 Gordon Chang, “Whose ‘Barbarism’? Whose ‘Treachery’? Race and Civilization in the Unknown United 
States-Korea War of 1871,” The Journal of American History, Vol. 89, No. 4 (March 2003), 1333. 
“American officers claimed that they had killed some 250 Korean soldiers; the number may have been 
twice as high.” 
15 Other articles gave Japan rights to search for new ports in five Korean provinces, survey Korean waters, 
conduct business and trade without interference, and protect its merchants in Korean ports under 
extraterritorial privileges. See Bruce Cumings, Korea’s Place in the Sun: A Modern History (New York: 
W.W. Norton, 1997), 102.  
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also recognized Korea as part of a cosmology centered upon China.16  With Japan’s re-
interpretation of Korea’s putative autonomy, King Kojong of Korea then turned to the 
Western system of sovereignty – the putative fiction of equal nation-states – as a way to 
possibly contain Japan. 
With the defeat of China in 1895, Japan facilitated the sovereign status of Korea 
as a “nation-state” separate from China, but the fictive equivalence between “nation-
states” in the Western sovereignty system also produced a different ambiguity – one in 
which Japan could become the superior translator of Western rational international law of 
a “less enlightened” Korea.17 And in 1905, with the end of the Russo-Japanese War, 
Japan claimed Korea via international language of treaties – in the Portsmouth Treaty, 
Russia ceded to recognize that Japan could “protect its interests in Korea,” an agreement 
brokered by none other than President Theodore Roosevelt, for which he received the 
Nobel Peace Prize.  In a later meeting between Roosevelt’s Secretary of War William 
Howard Taft and Japanese Prime Minister Katsura Taro on July 29 1905, it was mutually 
agreed that the U.S. would not interfere in Japan’s interests in Korea, and in turn, Japan 
would recognize U.S. interests in the Philippines. By the end of 1905, again with the 
threat and presence of military forces, Japan achieved the Second Japan-Korea 
                                                
16 As historian Henry Em has succinctly put it  - “The Chosŏn state was a dynastic state, and also a tributary 
state […] The Chosŏn monarch observed ritual properties appropriate for a vassal vis-à-vis the Chinese 
emperor.  On the other hand, the Yi dynasty also laid claim to a distinct, and indigenous, history of 
legitimacy that reached far back into the mythic past, to the days of the Chinese sage kings Yao and Shun.” 
[Quote from unpublished book manuscript. Many thanks to Henry Em for helping with these insights.] 
17 The core of Em’s argument in his analysis of what he calls the “semantics of sovereignty” involved in the 
Japanese attempts at closing and controlling the space of ambiguity concerning Korean sovereignty lies in 
elucidating how the Japanese positioned itself as the “preeminent translator of the new semantics of 
sovereignty in East Asia.” 
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Agreement, which made Korea a Japanese protectorate and essentially “gave 
international legal precedent to Japan’s control over Korea’s foreign affairs.18  
In autumn of 1906, King Kojong sent three representatives to the Second 
International Conference on Peace at The Hague to protest the illegal nature of the 
protectorate agreement.  The three – Yi Sangsŏl, Yi Jun, and Yi Ŭijong – arrived in the 
Netherlands in June 1907, with a letter from King Kojong “detailing the invalidity of the 
protectorate and demanding international condemnation of Japan.”19 The forty-three 
members at The Hague – which included Japan -  ignored the demands of the three 
Korean representatives, and essentially rendered the possibility of a sovereign Korea an 
unimaginable prospect.  But the publicity generated by the three envoys was enough for 
the Japanese to force Kojong to abdicate his throne to his son, Sunjong.  The Korean 
military, disbanded by the Japanese, fought the Japanese troops in the streets of Seoul, 
and eventually joined “righteous armies” (ŭibyŏng) of guerrilla fighters. And on August 
29, 1910, Sunjong gave up his throne – and Korea became a colony of Japan. 
In 1943, when Korea actually came back within the purview of the United States, 
Britain, and China together at the Cairo Conference in 1943, Korea appeared as a colony, 
a part of the Japanese empire that had to be “dismembered.”  According to the Cairo 
Declaration of December 1, 1943: 
[…]Japan shall be stripped of all the islands in the Pacific which she has 
seized or occupied since the beginning fo the First World War in 1914, 
and that all the territories Japan has stolen from the Chinese, such as 
Manchuria, Formosa & the Pescadores, shall be restored to the Republic 
of China.  Japan will also be expelled from all other territories which she 
has taken by violence and greed.  The aforesaid three Great Powers, 
mindful of the enslavement of the people of Korea, are determined 
                                                
18 Alexis Dudden, Japan’s colonization of Korea: discourse and power (Honolulu: University of Hawai’I 
Press, 2005), 7.   
19 Ibid. 
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that in due course Korea shall become free and independent. [my 
emphasis]20 
 
Korea had been singled out in Roosevelt, Churchill, and Kai-shek’s characterization of 
Japan, and became the territory upon which the Allied forces would demonstrate their 
moral claims to the postwar order.21  And the interpretation of the clause “in due course 
Korea shall become free and independent” quickly took the shape of trusteeship under 
President Roosevelt.  And thus, Korea entered the Allied-dominated conversation over 
the postwar global order via a longer conversation – the question of disposing the 
colonial possessions of an enemy power, one that had already been in motion with the 
League of Nations, “mandates” and the end of World War I.   
In other words, Korea was about to move from the “enlightened” colonial practice 
of naisen ittai to the “enlightened” colonial/imperial practice of the international 
community – specifically, the League of Nations and the later United Nations, and 
mandates and later trusteeships.  The telos would be the United Nations and the United 
States, according to Roosevelt’s vision – one that still relied upon racial civilizational 
hierarchies and ideas about tutelage.  In January 1944, when Roosevelt spoke with his 
Pacific War Council about his vision for the dismembering of the Japanese empire, he 
spoke of placing Korea under a trusteeship for a “forty year tutelage.”22  When Roosevelt 
later spoke with Stalin on the afternoon of February 8, 1945 at Yalta, 
He [Roosevelt] said he had in mind for Korea a trusteeship composed of a 
Soviet, an American and a Chinese representative.  He said the only 
experience we had had in this matter was in the Philippines where it had 
                                                
20 Foreign Relations of the United States: 1943, Cairo and Tehran, 404. 
21 “The Cairo Declation did not end the territorial questions; it intensified them.  For the subject of 
internatinal trusteeship, the significance of the Cairo Declaration is clear and simple: Japan would be 
stripped of her Empire.” From William Roger Louis, Imperialism at bay: the United States and the 
decolonization of the British Empire 1941-1945 (Oxford [Eng.]: Clarendon Press, 1977), 274.  
22 From the Pacific War Council Minutes, 12 January 1944, Roosevelt Paper [Quote taken from Louis, 
Imperialism at Bay, 355.]  
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taken about fifty years for the people to be prepared for self-government.  
He felt that in the case of Korea the period might be from twenty to thirty 
years. Marshal Stalin said the shorter the period the better.23 
 
Korea was not only still within the “waiting room of history,” it had also become part of 
the American genealogy of overseas military projects and interests – one that included 
the U.S.-Philippines War and the previous negotiating with a different faltering empire – 
Spain – and its possessions. 
With the Japanese surrender on August 15, 1945 and the official end of World 
War II, the United States found itself in front of the large question of decolonization.  The 
United States government attempted to disavow its own imperial desires and structures 
by insisting on its own “nationness,” while simultaneously assigning itself the role of 
pedagogue to “teach” the Japanese empire to be a “nation,” and also “teach” the former 
colony of Korea to be a proper “nation.”  What was to be the normative “nation” form in 
the aftermath of World War II?  This lesson, as I demonstrate through this study, 
revolved around a reconceptualization of the “sanctity” of borders, a project achieved 
through the mobilization of the “state of emergency,” and thus the rise of the “national 
security state” as the normative actor within the international arena.   
 The Korean War begun on June 25, 1950, when troops of the northern Korean 
People’s Army of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea crossed the 38th parallel, a 
border that had originally been created by U.S. officials in 1945 to mark the division 
between the northern Soviet and the southern U.S. military occupations on the Korean 
peninsula upon its liberation from Japanese colonial rule with the Japanese official 
surrender in August 15, 1945.  By June 25, 1950, the 38th parallel had become a line 
                                                
23 Foreign Relations of the United States: 1945, Yalta, 770. 
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demarcating an ambiguous political state of a different nature – in 1948, two different 
regimes had been established on either side of the 38th parallel, the northern Democratic 
People’s Republic of Korea [DPRK] and the southern Republic of Korea [ROK].  
However, neither state garnered full political recognition from the early Cold War nation-
state community – for example, the United Nations, having sponsored elections in the 
southern half of the peninsula, did not recognize the DPRK as a legitimate, sovereign 
state. On June 26, 1950, when explaining his decision to mobilize U.S. military troops on 
the Korean peninsula, President Harry Truman rendered the 38th parallel as a sovereign 
border.  Referring to the northern Korean People’s Army’s crossing southwards over the 
38th parallel, President Harry Truman stated, “Those responsible for this act of aggression 
must realize how seriously the Government of the United States views such threats to the 
peace of the world.”24   
  War, it turned out, was a rather complicated affair.  In a press conference on June 
29, 1950, President Harry Truman had to present to the American public a war that was 
not a war when he explained his decision to send U.S. military troops to Korea. To 
declare a war would not only require waiting for approval from Congress and possibly 
elicit disapproval from a public already war-weary from World War II, but it would also 
confer a certain political legitimacy to the northern Democratic Republic of Korea.  So 
when asked by the press whether or not the United States was at war, Truman replied 
succinctly, “We are not at war.” He agreed with a later characterization of the military 
                                                
24 “Statement by the President on the Violation of the 38th Parallel,” dated 26 June 1950. Part of the Public 
Papers of the Presidents: Harry S. Truman, 1945-1953 of the Harry S. Truman Presidential Library, 
available at www.trumanlibrary.org/publicpapers, accessed 21 May 2011.  
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mobilization offered by a member of the press: a “police action under the United 
Nations.”25  The Korean War was, according to Truman’s logic, a war that was not a war.   
 The oddly fangled construction of the Korean War continued  - the United 
Nations became an official belligerent in the Korean War, a role the organization would 
not play again until 1991 with the First Gulf War.  In 1950, the United Nations had an 
intertwined history with the Korean peninsula already – the United Nations had its 
inception in 1945, the same year as the liberation of the Korean peninsula, and the United 
Nations also adopted the Korean question as its first test of formal decolonization with 
the creation of the United Nations Temporary Commission on Korea to oversee the U.S.-
supported elections in the south in 1948.  In other words, the legitimacy of the United 
Nations was intimately wrapped up in the Korean question as well. 
A post-colonial civil war in a nation divided at the 38th parallel by the occupying 
United States at the moment of liberation from Japanese colonialism, the Korean War had 
begun less than a year after the 1949 Geneva Conventions had drafted new “laws of war.” 
The figure of the prisoner of war – although far removed from the proceedings at the 38th 
parallel - loomed large on the negotiating table at Panmunjom, and thus on the landscape 
of war.  To dismiss the POW controversy as simple propaganda is to miss a much longer 
history of how sovereignty and warfare regarding the Korean peninsula had distilled into 
a question about sovereignty and the decolonized subject in a world of war.  The politics 
of recognition were still at stake, and it was not a history that began with the June 25, 
1950 transgression of the 38th parallel. 
 
                                                
25 “The President’s New Conference,” dated 29 June 1950. Part of the Public Papers of the Presidents: 
Harry S. Truman, 1945-1953 of the Harry S. Truman Presidential Library, available at 
www.trumanlibrary.org/publicpapers, accessed 21 May 2011. 
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Methodology: Language, Bureaucracy, and Violence 
The prisoner of war, I would like to propose, was a uniquely and emphatically 
bureaucratic figure of warfare.  It was the white identification tag and the attendant 
paperwork – in the case of many Korean POWs, repeated paperwork over a period of a 
minimum of three years – that made, maintained, and produced the “prisoner of war.”  I 
am arguing for an attentiveness to the significance of bureaucracy when analyzing the 
military archive.  Narratives of the U.S. military in the Korean War have primarily 
focused on the literal “military tactics” on the battlefield or the political diplomacy 
occurring at the highest levels – however, this story of the war is much more interested in 
the military man as bureaucrat, the interrogator as bureaucrat, and interrogation as a 
template of bureaucracy.  To step back and consider the vast reserves of archived papers 
the U.S. military has produced over the last half century, one can acknowledge the fact 
that the U.S. military has also become one of the largest bureaucratic institutions.  
Bureaucracy is crucial for our analysis in order to engage fully with the stakes involved 
and the multiple types of violence present – both literal and discursive – within and 
without the interrogation room.26   
Bureaucracy, it would turn out, became essential for the liberal empire the United 
States envisioned in the wake of 1945.  It would be both the soldier and the bureaucrat 
                                                
26 An eloquent and compelling work arguing for a consideration of the relationship between history-writing 
and the nature of the archive is Michel-Rolph Trouillot, Silencing the past: power and the production of 
history (Boston, Mass.: Beacon Press, 1995).  Much work within French cultural history provided ways to 
reflect methodologically on the nature of archive-making: Natalie Zemon Davis, Fiction in the archives: 
pardon tales and their tellers in sixteenth-century France (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 
1987) and Roger Chartier, Cultural history: between practices and representations (Cambridge: Polity 
Press, 1988) are two of many. Bureaucracy became a key pivot along which to examine the archival grain 
for this project.  Although my own particular rendering of bureaucracy does differ from those found in 
these texts, Thomas Richards, The imperial archive: knowledge and the fantasy of empire (London  ; New 
York: Verso, 1993) and C. A. Bayly, Empire and information: intelligence gathering and social 
communication in India, 1780-1870, Cambridge studies in Indian history and society  ;1 (Cambridge, 
[England]  ; New York: Cambridge University Press, 1996) are both notable texts on the subject.   
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that shaped the subjects on and off the battlefields; and it was the politician, the soldier, 
and the bureaucrat who became a part of articulating decolonization. As such, in my 
research, I followed the different paper trails – following the discussion on prisoners of 
war through the U.S. Army, the Department of State, the United Nations, the ICRC, and 
the meetings at Panmunjom, while also following the petitions, letters, and demands of 
the prisoners of war, all sent to the White House, the United Nations, the ICRC or 
different countries.  The POWs were clearly aware of the stakes embedded in the 
bureaucratic structures of the international community – the “politics of recognition” 
were also at the heart of this matrix of bureaucracies.  And the POW was constantly 
negotiating how to become strategically visible within this matrix.  
  A key group of interrogation transcripts and files in my research are three hundred 
investigation case files created by the U.S. military during the Korean War for incidents 
involving the prisoners of war in their custody, which have never been before examined 
by a scholar.  What makes this particular group of military papers rather different from 
the vast, seemingly infinite amount of papers from the Korean War housed at the 
National Archives is that these papers were created not only for the protocols demanded 
by the U.S. military, but also the “international community” housed in Geneva, 
Switzerland.  The International Committee of the Red Cross, which held oversight power 
over the camps, as stipulated in Article 121 of the 1949 Geneva Conventions - all injuries 
and deaths suffered by prisoners of war must be investigated by the protecting power, 
was to be the recipient of copies of all investigative case files.  How would the United 
States Army present its authority and control over the POWs to the ICRC?   
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The papers compiled in these files range from typescripts of written statements 
from U.S. Army personnel, to transcribed questioning or private interrogation of Korean 
POWs, handwritten statements in Korean signed with a red thumbprint from the POW, 
military doctor’s reports on the autopsies or injuries, photographs of certain scenes of the 
incidents, or even mugshots of the involved or suspected POWs.  What becomes 
strikingly clear from these over 300 case files is that although there was a standardized 
overall template eventually developed for investigating a POW incident case, there was 
constantly a great deal of variation in how “information” was obtained from a Korean 
POW, whether through statements, questioning, or even repeated interrogation, where the 
interrogators or board would bring in the same POW twice.27   
 At first glance, it appears that the anxiety over the development of a bureaucratic 
means of determining the “veracity” of the Korean POW’s words was central to the 
hundreds of files – an anxiety that perhaps looms even larger when we take into 
consideration the issue of language and translation.  Although most statements and 
questioning are presented in a straightforward English, Korean civilian interpreters or 
Japanese American military interrogators were the mediators and translators, their 
participation at times entirely unnoted in the record, and at other times, only their 
signature at the end of a translated document would mark their presence within the room.  
It becomes apparent that it is not the POW’s “veracity” per se that is the cause of anxiety, 
but rather that the POW is not offering the type of statement the board would like. 
Belying the neatly typed scripts and number investigation “findings” is another story of 
                                                
27 The citation for the case files is as follows: POW Incident Investigation Case Files, 1950-1953; Office of 
the Provost Marshall; Office of the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-1; Headquarter, US Army Forces, Far East, 
1952-1957; Record Group 554; National Archives at College Park, College Park, MD. 
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what occurs inside these interrogation rooms and questioning before the board – a 
moment of encounter that involves negotiation, exchange, and power. 
 The basis for my methodology in approaching these investigation files is to 
approach them as “acts of writing.”  In other words, rather than beginning with the 
finalized text, I am invested in gleaning what was at stake in the interrogation room for 
all parties involved – to have a sense of the gestures, actions, and choices made, and what 
was involved in the seemingly simple act of translation.  It is a methodology that 
challenges the presupposed, predetermined authority of the U.S. military’s bureaucratic 
language.28  A specific collapse takes place between the expressive meaning of language 
and the authority of law – language itself must be self-evident of authority. In many 
ways, I consider this project as an attempt to pry open this very collapse, as the 
interrogation room becomes not a site of scripted relations, but rather a historical, 
material experience where a myriad of actions and choices either inform or are elided by 
the transcription and the translation. The focus on the writing as an act allows me to place 
the activities of the interrogation room in dialogue or in tension with the activities that 
were occurring outside of the interrogation room – on the battlefield, within the barbed-
wire fence, on the negotiating table at Panmunjom.  The interrogation room in this story 
is not isolated, exceptional, or removed –it is entirely implicated within the larger matrix 
of social relations and dynamics of power.  
                                                
28 “Language is the sovereign who, in a permanent state of exception, declares that there is nothing outside 
of language and that language is always beyond itself.  The particular structure of law has its foundation in 
this presuppositional structure of human language,” writes Giorgio Agemben. “To speak [dire] is, in this 
sense, always to ‘speak the law,’ ius dicere.” Giorgio Agamben, Homo Sacer: Sovereign Power and Bare 
Life, ed. Werner Hamacher and David E. Wellbery, Meridian: Crossing Aesthetics (Stanford: Stanford 
University Press, 1995), 21. 
  29 
When we step out of the interrogation room, we also find that writing and its very 
material companion – paper – is surprisingly ubiquitous.  Another reason for my 
insistence on starting the analysis with the materiality of writing comes from a constant 
economy of paper, subjecthood, and violence in this landscape of war, which is not to say 
that paper was literally in ready supply because it was, in fact, quite scarce, but the 
importance of paper was undeniable.  The prisoners of war carried UN surrender leaflets 
with them; ROKA soldiers ripped up identification papers found on the POWs. When 
International Committee of the Red Cross [ICRC] delegate Frederic Bieri visited the 
camp on Koje-do, he noted in his report that the POWs requested more copies of the 
1949 Geneva Conventions to read and post in their compounds.  The POWs also asked 
for more writing utensils, more Japanese-English dictionaries, and more paper. When 
thirty Korean communist prisoners of war managed to capture the U.S. camp commander 
of UNC Camp #1 on Koje Island in early March 1952, one of their first requests was for 
1,000 sheets of paper.  The prisoners of war wrote essays, petitions, letters, sending these 
to President Eisenhower, the United Nations, and the ICRC.  Others kept their own 
writing projects – in Case #68, a twenty-four-year-old POW named Lee Pyong Man, who 
had been attending college at the outbreak of the war, complained that his “notebook that 
contained the communist history was confiscated” during a search of his compound.  And 
in Case #64, 200 leaflets had been allegedly picked up by the ROKA soldiers around the 
POW compounds before the Liberation Day incident.  Japanese American translators 
pored over thousands of pages of text, translating for the Allied Translator and Interpreter 
Service (ATIS).  The interrogator translated, created, and published for circulation his/her 
own interrogation transcript.  On the Korean peninsula, a bit further back from the front 
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lines, the interrogator processed the POW, and gave the POW the first significant marker 
of POW status – the white identification tag with the POW number written in with a thick 
black marker.29   
The stakes were high regarding how the POWs navigated and negotiated their role 
– and violence was not held in abeyance, but rather was a constant presence.  Their 
physical selves, their bodies, were always a part of the equation, and “life” became the 
thing held in abeyance. I have found that to write a history about the interrogation room, 
one must step outside of the interrogation room as much as possible.  Oral history 
interviews I conducted with Japanese American former interrogators, Korean former 
prisoners of war, and also Korean civilians who had lived in the surroundings of the 
POW camps during the war – these narratives became the basis for my decision to center 
questions of subject-making vis-à-vis the institutionalization of warfare. I attempted to 
mobilize different people’s accounts not as reserves of “truth,” but instead as reserves of 
“flashes” of experience and subjectivity that often exceeded the frame of the interrogation 
room and the bureaucrat’s pen.  
  
Chapter Outline 
 The study is divided into two parts.  The first part, “Part I: States of Emergency” 
provides the critical elements of what I call the “trans-Pacific” history of war in the mid-
                                                
29 For works that make writing as an act a central focus of the analysis, please see: JaHyun Kim. Haboush, 
Epistolary Korea: letters in the communicative space of the Chosŏn, 1392-1910 (New York: Columbia 
University Press, 2009); Jean Hébrard and Rebecca J. Scott, “The Writings of Moïse (1898-1985): Birth, 
Life, and Death of a Narrative of the Great War,” Comparative Studies in Society and History 44, no. 2 
(April 1, 2002): 263-292; Rebecca J. Scott, “Reclaiming Gregoria’s Mule: The Meanings of Freedom in the 
Arimao and Caunao Valleys, Cienfuegos, Cuba, 1880-1899,” Past & Present, no. 170 (February 1, 2001).  
A particularly animated analysis of bureaucracy and the materiality of paper can be found in Ben Kafka, 
“The Demon of Writing: Paperwork, Public Safety, and the Reign of Terror,” Representations, Vol. 98, No. 
1 (Spring 2007), 1-24.  
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twentieth century, bringing together a history of the template of the U.S. military 
interrogation room on the Korean peninsula during the occupation and a history of the 
cohort of Japanese American youth who became the U.S. military interrogators of the 
Korean War.  The second part, “Part II: The POW, War, and the Global Order,” 
specifically deals with the prisoner of war issue of the Korean War, tracing the debate, 
controversies, and stakes through histories of the different interrogation rooms and camps 
built and constructed for the prisoners of war. 
 Chapter One, “Manufacturing ‘Liberation’ through Counterintelligence: Defining 
Politics through the Long “State of Emergency” of Occupation and War, 1945-1953,” is 
the story of how “Korea” became a test case of U.S. Cold War decolonization via 
military occupation. How had sovereignty been constructed upon the Korean peninsula in 
the wake of liberation from Japanese colonialism in 1945?  I argue how the state of 
emergency declared by General MacArthur at the beginning of the occupation in 1945 
became the legal structure informing the entire occupation apparatus itself, as the 
Counterintelligence Corps becomes the organization that determined the application of 
U.S. military ordinances, while language – or more specifically, slander – becomes the 
act most egregious to the U.S. military government, punishable by death. Against this 
background, the interrogation of POWs conducted by the CIC during the Korean War is 
analyzed regarding how the constructions of “language” during the occupation were now 
in play regarding the evaluation of POW’s “choices” during interrogation. 
 Chapter Two, “The Babel of Interrogation: A history of Japanese Americans from 
‘Enemy Alien’ to ‘POW Interrogator,’ 1942-1953,” follows a cohort of Japanese 
Americans from their time in interment camps during World War II, experiences in 
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wartime Japan as a result of a “hostage exchange,” recruitment as interrogators in 
postwar Japan, and later draftees or volunteers working in POW interrogation during the 
Korean War.  On the broader scale, this chapter analyzes the negotiations between two 
empires – the U.S. and Japan – vis-à-vis two products of 1945: racial liberalism as 
personified by the Japanese Americans, and decolonization as personified by the Korean 
peninsula. This chapter explores how ultimately interrogation encompasses the changing 
racial formations as the supposed product of racial liberalism – the Japanese American – 
must evaluate the reliability of the product of American military occupation and 
decolonization – the Korean. The interrogation room reveals dynamics of power not 
previously examined: the element of persuasion in interrogation rooms, as interrogators 
try to convince the interrogated to occupy a specific subject-position vis-à-vis the United 
States; the dependence of the U.S.’s legitimacy on the decolonized subject to articulate a 
desire for the U.S. form of political subjectivity and free-market capitalism; the 
negotiations on the part of Korean prisoners of war and also Japanese American 
interrogators that locates the encounter within longer historical frames of occupation, 
war, and imprisonment.   
 Chapter Three, “Making a Prisoner for War: Practices of War and Decolonization 
in the POW Controversy of the Korean War,” demonstrates how the Korean War 
effectively brought the 1949 Geneva Conventions to a crisis through the figure of the 
prisoner of war.  The chapter begins on the ground with the construction of the largest 
POW camp run under U.S. military auspices – the camp on the island of Koje was to hold 
almost 170,000 prisoners of war.  Charting and analyzing the different practices of 
violence within and without the barbed-wire fence of the camp, I illustrate the presence 
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of three different conflicts on the Korean peninsula in 1950 – a postcolonial civil war, a 
Cold War turn from rollback to containment, and an anti-imperial revolution – all three of 
which confounded the imaginaries of war embedded in the assumptions of the 1949 
Geneva Conventions.  As the battle raged on within the camps to determine a prisoner for 
each of these wars, the newly created Psychological Strategy Board created the proposal 
for voluntary repatriation as a way for the United States to lay claim on the principles of 
the Geneva Conventions in the face of decolonization.  This chapter is both the story of 
the prisoner of war as a historical actor experiencing multiple wars, and the story of the 
prisoner of war as a discursive figure of warfare. 
 Chapter Four, “A Mutiny of Sovereignty: The kidnapping of Brigadier Francis 
Dodd by Korean communist prisoners of war,” examines the most explosive event within 
the POW controversy and camps during the Korean War – on May 7, 1952, thirty Korean 
communist prisoners of war kidnapped Brigadier Francis Dodd, the camp commander at 
Koje Island, the largest POW camp run under U.S. military auspices.   This chapter 
moves from the negotiating tents at Panmunjom to Compound 76 at United Nations 
Command Camp #1 on the island of Koje.  A close reading and microhistorical study of 
the Panmunjom negotiations over POWs and the Dodd incident itself reveal that the 
conversation and conflict effectively revolved around the structural legacies of the 1945 
division of Korea at the 38th parallel and the subsequent foreign occupations on the 
peninsula by the United States and the Soviet Union.  The stakes were about the 
meanings of effective postcolonial liberation and sovereignty as the legitimacy of the 
1948 elections held in the north and south respectively was forced onto the table of war 
by both the POWs at Koje and the negotiators at Panmunjom.  The chapter is also 
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simultaneously about the fashioning of the “fanatic Oriental Communist” and the 
development of the “uncontested control” policy within the U.S. camp command, as a 
marked shift in military practices of violence takes place within the camp on Koje Island. 
Chapter Five, “An ‘Experiment in Neutrality’ for Decolonization: The POW, 
India, and the Global Geopolitics of the Unending Korean War,” focuses on the final 
iterations of the POW camp and interrogation room created during the Korean War – in 
the form of the repatriation POW camp and explanation rooms at the 38th parallel. The 
debate over POW repatriation at the armistice negotiation table only subsided when three 
agreements were made: 1) the POWs would be given “explanations” on why they should 
repatriate or not by representatives of both the southern Republic of Korea and the 
northern Democratic People’s Republic of Korea; 2) there would be an overseeing 
committee made up of representatives from Swiss, Sweden, Czechoslovakia, and Poland 
– with a representative from India presiding over this “neutral nations repatriation” 
oversight committee; 3) the POW would have a third option aside from North and South 
Korea – they could choose a “neutral country,” although the country itself had not been 
determined. This chapter examines the multiple imaginaries of possible decolonized 
futures present at the 38th parallel in 1953, which came out in full force in the struggles 
over defining, practicing, and even embodying “neutrality” at a site that was also the 
frontline of the global Cold War, the 38th parallel.  Moving from inside the explanation 
rooms to tracing the journeys of seventy-six Korean prisoners of war who had chosen a 
“neutral country,” this chapter tells the story of diasporic imaginings of decolonization, as 
POWs eventually find their way to Argentina, Mexico, Brazil, and India. 
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What follows is a story about the Korean War that breaks from the old narratives 
of the Cold War and the civil war.  In this story, the notions of war, sovereignty, and the 
global order are not merely the stuff of conversations, policy-making, and backroom 
negotiations.  Instead, it is the thousands upon thousands of human encounters – 
sometimes over a military negotiating table, sometimes in front of the barrel of a gun, 
other times inside an interrogation room - that have become the terrain upon which 
people must struggle for the legitimacy of their ideas.  The site of this struggle is at once 
bigger and smaller than the usual “Korea” serving simply as the backdrop for the war in 
most Cold War histories; the decisions of the United Nations, the International 
Committee of the Red Cross, and the Indian government are implicated in the choices 
made by Korean prisoners of war, Japanese American interrogators, and American 
military personnel in the POW camps and interrogation rooms of the war.  It is a tale of 
the Korean War where global history converges with the microhistorical encounter. 
This story of the Korean War begins with the 38th parallel, but with a decided 
twist.  This story has two beginnings, in fact.  One begins in the year 1946 with a Korean 
peasant farmer named Sung Sum Chang and his plot of land located within the area of the 
38th parallel.  The other beginning takes place in the year 1942 with a young Japanese 
American boy named Sam Miyamoto living in southern California at the time of 
President Roosevelt’s “Day of Infamy” speech after Pearl Harbor.  These two beginnings 
bring together two projects of the twentieth-century within the same field of vision – war-
making and formal decolonization – with which to examine the implications and 
significance of the Korean War.  The 38th parallel in this story is more than a border; it is 
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someone’s land, an ideological marker, and even now, a reminder of the most pressing 
questions of modern history – how to end a war and how to achieve decolonization.   
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Part I: States of Emergency 
 
Chapter One 
 
Manufacturing “Liberation” through Counterintelligence: 
Defining Politics through the Long “State of Emergency” of Occupation and War, 
1945-1953 
 
 
  
During April 1946, the U.S. Counterintelligence Corps [CIC] was concerned 
about a Korean farmer named Sung Sum Chang and his home, which was in the village 
of San Su Nai Bi in the province of Mak Chang Dong – or, in other words, the 38th 
parallel.30 According to a CIC intelligence report dated April 19, 1946, Chang had posted 
a sign over his house that declared in Korean, English, and Russian: “Beyond this house 
is South Korea.”  Two groups of visitors came to Chang’s home after he put up the sign.  
The first group consisted of a soldier from the Soviet Union and four north Korea 
soldiers.  Stopping in front of Chang’s home, this group called out to Chang, who was 
working in his fields, farming. “Hearing their call,” narrated the report, “[Chang] went to 
the house and the Russians asked him, Why are you taking this American rice ration?  
Don’t you know they are going to take over Korean property in turn for the rice they give 
you?”  At an unspecified time later, a group consisting of a U.S. CIC corps member and 
                                                
30 I have given the details and spelling of Sung Sum Chang’s home according to what this particular G-2 
weekly summary has provided (see footnote below).  However, according to today’s spelling and 
administrative unit breakdown, Chang’s home is not located in the currently existing 38th parallel: 
Sangsunae-ri, Nam-myeon, Inje-gun, Gangwon-do, Republic of Korea. The 1945 38th parallel had been 
further south than the current one.   
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south Korean soldiers/translators visited Chang to ask him to verify and provide details of 
this previous conversation with the Russian and North Korean soldiers.31   
This brief yet detailed report of the CIC focused not on the usual episodes of 
sporadic shooting or shouting matches between various military units stationed at the 38th 
parallel, but rather on specific episodes of conversation between a Korean peasant farmer 
and different military troops.  The tri-lingual sign above Chang’s home, the conversation 
about rice rations and property, and the later questioning about the previous conversation 
– all three acts of language were the focus of the CIC report.  Military troops were 
periodically engaged in contests over the proper demarcation of an abstract boundary – 
the 38th parallel – using the threat of gunfire and violence.  In the case of Chang and his 
home, military troops and intelligence officers waged their battle over Chang himself 
with language – and also the threat of possible violence.  Just as the 38th parallel was 
difficult to discern, the political leanings of Koreans like Chang were a source of great 
anxiety for the U.S. occupation military forces: What had the Russians and North Korean 
soldiers said to Chang? How had Chang replied to them? Chang’s own trilingual sign was 
a clear attempt on Chang’s part to pre-empt any ambiguity – however, the CIC apparently 
still found it unnerving that Russian and North Korean soldiers had engaged Chang in 
conversation so casually.  
 The extent to which the U.S. CIC would go to ascertain what questions the 
Russian and North Korean soldiers had asked a Korean peasant farmer reveals, in turn, 
the degree to which the individual Korean subject was a source of anxiety, confusion, and 
                                                
31 Mi kunjŏnggi chŏngbo charyojip: CIC (Pangchʻŏptae) pogosŏ, 1945.9-1949.1 (Kangwŏn-do 
Chʻunchʻŏn-si : Hallim Taehakkyo Asia Munhwa Yŏnʼguso, 1995), Volume 1, report dated April 19, 1946 
included in 971st CounterIntelligence Corps Detachment Annual Progress Report for 1947, 331.  [hereafter 
CIC 1945.9-1949.1] 
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frustration for the U.S. occupation forces – one that reflected the peculiar nature of U.S. 
occupation on the Korean peninsula.  In 1945, U.S. military officials arrived on the 
Korean peninsula to effect “liberation” through military occupation.  What kind of 
subject was the Korean individual?  Was Chang a “liberated” subject, and how did one 
treat a “liberated” subject? Whom did he consider to be his primary authority? Did he 
recognize U.S. military authority?  Chang’s trilingual sign – “Beyond this house is South 
Korea” – demonstrated a recognition of the politics in the 38th parallel, but the concern on 
the part of the CIC authorities about whether or not a mere conversation with Russian and 
North Korean soldiers could influence Chang – or other Koreans – demonstrated an 
uncertainty about whether or not Koreans fundamentally respected the authority of the 
U.S. military government.   
 This chapter plots out a different analytical terrain on which to explore the 
question of how an “occupation of liberation” ended in a “war of intervention.”  In 1945, 
the U.S. state had deemed the Korean people as liberated, but not independent, and in 
1950, the U.S. entered a war dubbed a “police action” against a nation-state it did not 
officially recognize.  The Korean peninsula became the experimental testing ground for a 
new conception of “occupation” and also “war” in the face of a movement that later 
proved to be much bigger than U.S. hegemonic projects themselves – decolonization.   
Land, rice, and the question of distribution – this triad of concerns lay at the heart 
of the post-liberation political landscape on the Korean peninsula.  Peasant farmers like 
Sung Sum Chang were a part of what scholar Bruce Cumings has called “the most 
numerous of the Korean classes and the class that gave the liberation period its dual 
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characteristics of extensive participation and widespread resistance.”32 Under Japanese 
colonial rule, land and labor had become commodified. Japanese colonialism had both 
forcibly moved Korean peasants into industrial labor and vastly increased the percentage 
of land tenancy among the peasants. After August 15, 1945, a mass movement in 
Manchuria and Japan began as Koreans returned to villages in Korea. In conjunction with 
this movement of people, Korean peasants themselves began organizing ways to 
redistribute land and to dismantle colonial structures.33  “Liberation” – the definition, the 
achievement, the process – hinged upon these very questions of subsistence, sustenance, 
and self-governance.  It was this very human drama of decolonization and social 
revolution into which the U.S. military government officials entered – and their arrival 
was markedly late also.  August 15, 1945 had marked the beginning of liberation from 
Japanese colonialism – September 9, 1945 was the day U.S. Army officials arrived at the 
port of Pusan to commence the military occupation of the southern half of Korea.34 
This chapter traces a history of the U.S. military occupation by examining how 
Koreans and Americans were engaged in a struggle over claims to sovereignty in the 
wake of 1945.  The chapter begins with the U.S. military’s initial proclamations to the 
Korean populace, announcing the start of the occupation as essentially a “state of 
emergency.”  I contend that the “state of emergency” fashioned by the U.S. military 
government created not a total, but rather a specific suspension – one that strategically 
aimed to undermine the possible claims by Korean political groups upon sovereign 
                                                
32 Bruce Cumings, The Origins of the Korean War, v. 1: Studies of the East Asian Institute, Columbia 
University (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, c1981-c1990), xxii. 
33 Bruce Cumings discusses this mass movement’s impact on the demographics and thus the political 
potentialities of the southern half of the peninsula in Origins of the Korean War, volume I.   
34 For work on U.S. policies towards Korea before and after liberation, see Chŏng Yong-uk, Haebang 
chŏnhu Miguk ŭi Taehan chŏngchaek: kwado chŏngbu kusang kwa chungganpa chŏngchaek ŭl chungsim 
ŭro (Sŏul : Sŏul Taehakkyo Chʻulpʻanbu, 2003). 
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legitimacy to the basic questions over land, rice, and distribution.  An analysis of the 
myriad legal codes, ordinances, and orders issued by the United States Army Military 
Government [USAMGIK] reveals an occupation force that was profound anxious about 
its own dearth of legitimacy on the ground – and thus, the USAMGIK was 
extraordinarily concerned with the individual Korean person. Unable to control 
effectively the actions and activities of the Korean people, the U.S. military government 
began to assert its control over defining the parameters of the political public sphere.  
Establishing an “occupation of liberation” necessitated the invention of a language that 
restricted “undesirable” behavior on the part of the decolonized Korean subject – and 
soon, it was language practice itself that became the most strategically constrained and 
criminalized by the U.S. occupation. 
From the “occupation of liberation” through the later “war of intervention,” a 
single question was a common thread through this period – what constituted legitimate 
politics on the Korean peninsula, and who would determine its legitimacy?  It is around 
this central question that we must begin our analysis of how the occupation and 
subsequent war attempted to provide answers.  In order to glean the history of the 
struggles around this question of politics, I analyze the contested nature of the political 
public sphere in post-1945 Korea through different acts of language enacted by the U.S. 
military government, Korean political groups, and the mediating power of the U.S. 
military intelligence units, namely the Counterintelligence Corps [CIC].  The military 
intelligence branch of the U.S. Army – otherwise known as “G-2” – played a critical role 
in the interpretation and application of the “state of emergency” on the ground. Mere 
criminalization via codes and speeches left U.S. power in the realm of the theoretical and 
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rhetorical. An occupation of liberation required apparatuses that could establish the lines 
of legitimacy and transgression on the ground.  This was the function of the 
Counterintelligence Corps; this chapter examines not just the intelligence gathering 
function of the CIC , but also its more essential and strategic project of “knowing” the 
Korean individual subject.   
Language itself became the realm of concern to the CIC, and as it established 
lines of communication, alliances, and patronage locally, the authority and power of the 
CIC grew, as did the authority and police power of the USAMGIK.  The aura of 
confidence in asserting a complete knowledge of the internal will and desires of the 
Korean people was painted by the CIC, one that, I argue, was entirely contingent and 
dependent upon a close, working relationship with an extreme rightist youth group – the 
North West Young Men’s Alliance [NWYMA]. The “professionalization” of the CIC in 
Korea consisted of rather paradoxical labor.  The work of the CIC provided the 
USAMGIK a certitude in its claims about the political landscape, but this certitude came 
by framing the political dynamics and activities on the ground as a “war of espionage.”  
The transgression on the part of Koreans did not lie in acts of violence but rather in their 
acts of intent.  All Koreans were rendered essentially “suspicious” under this rubric, and 
the U.S. military government reserved the right to hold all political claims in abeyance.  
Sovereignty, according to the model of “occupation of liberation” created by the U.S. 
military government, was something for the U.S. military government to mete out to the 
Korean population.  
When the Counterintelligence Corps began their work again on the Korean 
peninsula in 1950 under the auspices of a war of intervention, they quickly re-
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encountered what the U.S. military occupation had rendered.  In the month of February in 
1951, towards the close of the first year of the Korean War, the Masan Sub-Detachment 
of the 704th CIC Detachment learned of “approximately thirty Korean Nationals posing 
as members of a G2 Office in Masan.”35  It was perhaps startling to learn that these 
Koreans had been effectively running a “G2 office” ever since the month of October in 
1950.  When questioned by the CIC on whether or not they knew about the G2 office, the 
Masan Police replied that “they believed that the organization was authorized by the 
United Nations forces.” The presence of U.S. and UN forces on the peninsula had 
provided the possibility to imagine a particular multiply layered sovereignty – the “war” 
had triggered the multiple “states of emergency” as had been practices during the U.S. 
occupation, and as other scholars would also argue, throughout the 1948 through 1950 
years also under the Syngman Rhee regime.   
This Masan G2 case was a double-edged sword for the CIC regarding the legacies 
of U.S. military intelligence work on the Korean peninsula.  The case demonstrated that 
the U.S. military had indeed created a sovereign, exceptional plane of activity and 
authority on the ground in Korea; however, at the same time, it also demonstrated that the 
Korean people did not necessarily consider it sacred or inviolable.  The 
Counterintelligence Corps later in their retrospective history of the CIC called the Korean 
War simply an extension of a war they had already been waging during the U.S. 
occupation period – the “war of espionage.”  The contradictions undergirding the U.S. 
occupation period were both unresolved and constantly surfacing.  
                                                
35 Migun CIC chŏngbo pogosŏ : RG 319 Office of the Chief of Military history. (Sŏul : Chungang Ilbo 
Hyŏndaesa Yŏnʼguso, 1996), Volume 2; “Korean War: CI Activities,” Investigative Records Repository 
(IRR), Box #99/Case #ZF010482. Agent Report: Masan G2 Office, dated 14 March 1951. [hereafter CIC 
RG319] 
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In histories of the Korean War, the history of struggles over the meanings of 
decolonization on the peninsula has been subsumed by the Cold War frame manifested 
by the 38th parallel.  Much of the literature on the Korean War either takes the 38th 
parallel for granted, or charts the character of the war primarily as movement over the 
physical terrain, with the 38th parallel highlighted in the center of the Korean peninsula.  
By charting out the landscape of “states of emergency,” which focused the question of 
legitimacy on the individual Korean subject, I challenge the historical primacy scholars 
have granted to the 38th parallel in narratives of the Korean War.  In the latter half of the 
chapter, I examine the CIC’s return to the Korean peninsula with the outbreak of the 
Korean War, and argue that an understanding of the relationship rendered between 
language, interrogation, and the political sphere by the U.S. military government during 
the post-1945 occupation is crucial to understanding the dynamics of the prisoner of war 
camps of the Korean War.  In other words, the question of the political had a long, 
continuous history through the occupation years and even in the activities behind the 
barbed-wire fences of the U.S.-controlled POW camps of the war. 
 
 “I Am Government”: Sovereignty, Authority, and Liberation 
 
Three hundred thousand leaflets poured out from the sky over the southern part of 
the Korean peninsula from September 1 to 5, 1945.  U.S. Commanding General John 
Hodge, appointed by MacArthur to command the military occupation of Korea, had 
ordered the airforce to distribute these leaflets in advance warning of the occupation to 
the Korean people.  The leaflet, addressed “To the People of Korea,” began as follows:  
The armed forces of the United States will soon arrive in Korea for the 
purpose of receiving the surrender of the Japanese forces, enforcing the 
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terms of surrender, and insuring the orderly administration and 
rehabilitation of the country.  These missions will be carried out with a 
firm hand, but with a hand that will be guided by a nation whose long 
heritage of democracy has fostered a kindly feeling for peoples less 
fortunate.  How well and how rapidly these tasks are carried out will 
depend on the Koreans themselves.”36 
 
A subsequent Proclamation Number Two was issued on September 7, 1945 – clearly, 
there was a concern about how the Koreans might receive the U.S. occupiers. This time it 
was MacArthur who addressed the “People of Korea.” Invoking his position “as 
Commander-in-Chief, United States Army Forces, Pacific,” he proclaimed the following: 
Any Person Who: 
Violates the provision of the Instrument of Surrender, or any 
proclamation, order, or directive given under the authority of the 
Commander-in-Chief, United States Army Forces, Pacific, or does any act 
to the prejudice of good order or the life, safety, or security of the persons 
or property of the United States or its Allies, or does any act calculated to 
disturb public peace and order, or prevent the administration of justice, or 
willfully does any act hostile to the Allied forces, shall, upon conviction 
by a military Occupation Court, suffer death or such other punishment as 
the Court may determine.37 
 
This pair of Proclamations would become a part of the slender file of documents given to 
the U.S. military personnel arriving on the Korean peninsula on September 9, 1945 to 
guide them through inventing a “military occupation” in Korea. “[E]ach officer did 
receive a copy of the Cairo Declaration, of MacArthur’s three proclamations to the 
Korean people, of the secret operational military government plan that had been hastily 
improvised by a joint-staff committee of the XXIV Corps and the Seventh Fleets, and of 
those dozen or more ordinances, general orders, and notices thus far printed by Military 
                                                
36 Mi Kunjŏngch’ŏng kwanbo: Official gazette, United States Army Military Government in Korea (Sŏul: 
Wonju Munhwasa), Proclamation No. 1. [hereafter Official gazette] 
37 Official gazette, Proclamation No. 2. 
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Government.”38  These Proclamations heralded – and positioned – the U.S. occupation of 
Korea as a form of rule between benevolence and death. In the most fundamental sense, 
these Proclamations introduced the U.S. military forces to the Korean people – it was a 
twinned self-introduction of the nature of rule that would be enacted on the peninsula. 
 Both Proclamations also belied a concern about the behavior and reactions of the 
Korean people to the U.S. military forces, as benevolence and death were meted out as 
the parameters for reward and discipline within the U.S. occupation.  And on September 
10, 1945, the Korean populace quickly made it known to the U.S. occupation officials 
that they also had ideas about what the U.S. military occupation should look like as they 
filled the streets of the capital city, Seoul, to protest the first decision announced by the 
U.S. military occupation authorities: the “United States Army orders leaving temporarily 
in office Japanese overlords who have ruled the little empire for thirty-five years.”  
Demonstrations were extensive, and Associated Press journalists noted that the Koreans 
had “plastered walls with posters of protest” – the Koreans were speaking back to the 
U.S. military forces through these writings that took up public space in the capital.  “Only 
yesterday thousands of Koreans massed at the palace grounds of the Governor General, 
Noboyuki Abe,” commented the journalists, “and roared their approval as the hated 
ensign of Japan was hauled down.”39 However, Abe and administrative officials were to 
be maintained in their positions, and as the Chicago Daily Tribune described, “The hopes 
of the Koreans that independence was immediately at hand were dashed[.]”40 Or, as the 
                                                
38 E. Grant Meade, American Military Government in Korea (New York: King’s Crown Press, 1951), 67. 
39 Associated Press Article, “Koreans March in Protest Against Keeping Japanese; Officials in Washington 
Amazed at Army Action – State Department Disclaims Any Part in Move – MacArthur Bars Disorder,” 
The New York Times, September 11, 1945. 
40 “Hodge Quiets Koreans’ Fear Japs will Stay: “I Am Government,” He Tells Them,” Chicago Daily 
Tribune, September 11, 1945. 
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U.S. military intelligence G-2 office reports observed, “The general feeling of the Korean 
people seemed to be that they had at last been liberated, and they were now free to 
proceed with the organization of the Korean government under direction of the 
occupation forces.  When it was announced that the Japanese government would remain 
in office there was a violent denunciation of the policy by Koreans professing to be 
leaders in the various political movements.”41  
 Confronted by this public mass protest on the streets of Seoul, Lieutenant General 
John R. Hodge, the commander of the XXIV U.S. Army Corps, declared in a press 
conference, “In effect, I am the Korean government during the transition period. […] Abe 
will take orders. I am making use of the Japanese governmental machinery because it is 
the most efficient way of operating now.”(my italics)  By declaring himself the 
sovereign, where one person of the American military occupation forces could embody 
the authority of the Korean government (at least south of the 38th parallel), Hodge, the 
U.S. Army commander, effectively suspended both Korean claims to independence and 
also Japanese ties to autonomous decision-making.  Hodge’s assertion that he was the 
“Korean government” was an attempt to wrest away possible authority from the masses 
in the streets, but it also belied an unsettled anxiety on the part of the U.S. military 
authorities – such an utterance put forth the legitimate authority of the U.S. Army as 
assumed, as a priori, but as the posters, parades, and clamoring press attested, authority 
was anything but assumed in this moment.42 The question of what liberation would look 
                                                
41 G-2 Periodic Report /United States Army Forces in Korea. Headquarters. G-2. 1945-1948 (Kangwŏn-do 
Chʻunchʻŏn-si : Hallim Taehakkyo Asia Munhwa Yŏnʼguso); report dated September 12, 1945. 
42 I draw here upon Derrida’s notion of the “mystical foundation” of authority.  Please see Jacques Derrida, 
“Force of Law: The ‘Mystical Foundation of Authority’” in Deconstruction and the Possibility of Justice, 
eds. Drucilla Cornell, Michel Rosenfeld, David Carlson (New York: Routledge, 1992). The particular 
analysis of Montaigne is applicable to the situation under analysis in this study: 
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like under U.S. military occupation was at stake, and the answer to that question was still 
uncertain. 
Many more proclamations, declarations, and ordinances would be issued, and 
many more directives to the press would be given in the coming months.  Charting the 
story of these “acts of language” on the part of the U.S. military authority, I argue, also 
allows to chart the construction – albeit unwieldy at times – of the “state of emergency” 
that was called “military occupation” in Korea.  The elements of the “state of emergency” 
were a crucial aspect in understanding the particulars of the U.S. military occupation of 
Korea. At the end of World War II, the United States had set up “military governments” 
all throughout the globe – Germany, Italy, Austria, France, Japan, Saipan, Tinian, Guam, 
the Philippines, and Korea.  Korea, in particular, presented a rather different quandary 
than the other settings for U.S. military government: military occupation occurs on the 
basis that one is occupying enemy territory; however, with Korea, the U.S. would be 
occupying a former colony of an Axis power – Japan.  How did one “occupy” a former 
colony of a wartime “enemy” who had surrendered unconditionally?  For the group of 
“all professional soldiers and none with any training or experience in civil affairs” who 
arrived on the Korean peninsula to begin the occupation, the Cairo Declaration “provided 
the only statement of high policy available at the time, the single sentence: ‘The aforesaid 
three great powers, mindful of the enslavement of the people of Korea, are determined 
                                                
“And so laws keep up their good standing, not because they are just, but because they are laws: that is the 
mystical foundation of their authority, they have no other….Anyone who obeys them because they are just 
is not obeying them the way he ought to.” 
Here Montaigne is clearly distinguishing laws, that is to say droit, from justice. The justice of law, justice 
of law is not justice.  Laws are not just as laws.  One obeys them not because they are just but because they 
have authority. (12) 
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that in due course Korea shall become free and independent.”43  Or in other words, as 
according to the History of the United States Armed Forces in Korea [HUSAFIK], 
“Koreans were to be treated as liberated people, but liberation was to be given 
gradually.”44  The period of military occupation was to be one of granting, one of 
becoming, and one of suspension. The space of the “state of emergency” was 
concomitant with the project of “decolonization” as envisioned by the Western imperial 
and colonial powers – and the United States.  The history of the U.S. occupation of Korea 
– and its particular insistence on the “state of emergency” - must be placed within a much 
longer history of mandates, trusteeships, and decolonization.  This main characteristic is 
what makes the element of the “state of emergency” so crucial to our analysis.  
On November 2, 1945 when Ordinance No. 21 was published by the U.S. 
military, it became clear that the “suspension” heralded by the “state of emergency” 
espoused by U.S. military officials was not a suspension or break from Japanese colonial 
rule per se: 
Until further ordered, and except as previously repealed or abolished, all 
laws which were in force, regulations, orders, notices or other documents 
issued by any former government of Korea having the force of law on 9 
August 1945 will continue in full force and effect until repealed by 
express order of the Military Government of Korea.45 
 
The text of the ordinance was essentially specifying what was being “suspended” during 
the state of emergency – and essentially, it was not Japanese colonial law or the force of 
law that was suspended or eradicated. What was suspended was any competing claim to 
                                                
43 Philip H. Taylor, “Military Government Experience in Korea; Part I; Administraton and Operation of 
Military Government in Korea,” in American Experiences in Military Government in World War II, ed. by 
Carl Friedrich (New York: Rinehart, 1948), 357. 
44 History of the United States Armed Forces in Korea (United States, Far East Command, Published in 
1948). Part III: Chapter 1, “Creating Military Government,” 11.  [hereafter HUSAFIK] 
45 Official gazette, Ordinance 21. 
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the “force of law.” Legitimacy was something to be granted by the American forces. 
Sovereignty and self-determination were promised, and on the basis of that promise  
Ordinance No. 21 was clearly an attempt to render the authority of the U.S. military 
government as assumed – as the sovereign. In this early phase of the occupation, the U.S. 
military government was not interested in creating a normative legal framework for state-
building, but rather much more concerned about holding competing claims to the “force 
of law” in abeyance, as that became the object supposedly in the hands of the USAMGIK 
that would then be granted as Korea gains independence.  
The USAMGIK also held in abeyance, along with Korean claims to sovereign 
power, a legally legible status of subjecthood for Koreans. To quote from the introduction 
to the Selected Legal Opinions compilation from the U.S. occupation, “Since Korea had 
been a part of the Japanese empire until the surrender of the Japanese and the latter’s 
sovereignty over Korea had been terminated by the Potsdam Declaration of July 1945, in 
fact, Koreans ceased to be Japanese nationals.  Korea being still a state in the making, it 
became necessary to devise a test and definition of Korean nationality[.]”46  As the 
HUSAFIK stated in retrospect, “Technically, according to international law, until a peace 
treaty was signed, all Koreans were subjects of the Japanese Empire.  It was suggested by 
Foreign Affairs that the JCS Directive be changed so that Koreans at least need not be 
considered enemy aliens, but there was no such thing as Korean citizenship, and there 
could not be until Korea was recognized as a free and independent sovereign power.”47 
                                                
46 Migunjŏnggi Chŏngbo Charyojip: Pŏmmuguk Sabŏppŭi Pŏphaesŏk Pogosŏ, Selected legal opinions of 
the Department of Justice, United States Army Military Government in Korea : opinions rendered in the 
role of legal adviser to the military government of Korea, and covering a period from March 1946, to 
August 1948 (Seoul, Korea : Department of Justice, Headquarters, United States Army Military 
Government in Korea, 1948; reprint, Kangwon-do Ch`unch`on-si : Hallim Taehakkyo Asia Munhwa 
Yonguso, 1997), 5. [hereafter Selected Legal Opinions] 
47 HUSAFIK, Foreign Affairs Section – History 1, 43.    
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Or in other words, “The Koreans were to be treated as liberated people, yet the liberation 
was to be accomplished gradually.”48  The subjecthood of the Korean people and their 
claims to self-governance were the target of the state of emergency during the U.S. 
occupation – Japanese colonialism itself, its manufactured force of law, its administrative 
and police network systems, its massively overgrown and ponderous bureaucracy, all of 
these would continue under the “guidance” of the U.S. forces as decolonization became 
more a process of deferral than state-building.  
Inventing the “occupation” of Korea did not merely involve creating a certain 
framework for the occupation activities; in fact, the most crucial aspect of “occupation” 
for the U.S. military authorities was claiming the authority of “I am the Korean 
government” – the “force of law” as expressed by a sovereign authority.  To chart the 
story of the U.S. occupation is to chart the construction of a “state of emergency” as the 
years between 1945 and 1948 see a series of declarations of emergency.  In Opinion 
Number 239 dated 19 April 1946, the legal advisor bureau to the USAMGIK recognized 
that Proclamation No. 2 issued at the beginning of the occupation heralded a “state of 
emergency” on the Korean peninsula; however, the very same legal advisors went on to 
note that if the power of “state of emergency” was stretched or applied too widely or 
broadly in  “Mother Hubbard” style, then the force of law upon which the “state of 
emergency” was based will no longer retain its force.  In other words, as the legal advisor 
bureau astutely observed, the “state of emergency” frame for U.S. occupation did not 
necessarily immediately give license for absolute power over matters on the peninsula – 
the “state of emergency” would have to be created, shifted, and reinvented as a project of 
                                                
48 HUSAFIK, Part III, Chapter 1, “Creating Military Government,” 11. 
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very particular politics vis-à-vis activities on the ground that would lead, in due course, to 
Korean independence and sovereignty.49  
 U.S. military authority over the occupation on the southern half of the Korean 
peninsula was one created not only through the display of force with a military presence, 
but also through a great deal of paper – ordinances, proclamations, and published 
speeches.  However, as the 300,000 papers from the September 1945 airbombing fell to 
the ground and as the ordinances issued by the U.S. military were posted to walls 
throughout Seoul and distributed to offices throughout the countryside, two problems 
became apparent immediately: first, it was not clear whether or not Koreans were reading 
these publications, and if they were, how they interpreting them. The U.S. military 
government was having a crisis in readership, so to speak - if authority speaks, it only has 
authority because someone is listening.  A G-2 Weekly Summary dated 9 October 1945 
stated, “Civilians interviewed state that the proclamations issued by the US occupation 
forces reach only a few of the people.  Some of these orders have been misunderstood 
because civilians are not able to either read or interpret the proclamations.”50  And 
although MacArthur had declared English to be the official language of the U.S. 
occupation – the question of reception was not resolved.  The second problem was that 
those who were indeed reading and following the different statements and proclamations 
issued by the U.S. military authorities were issuing their own statements on paper – 
“Posters and pamphlets continue to appear in INCH’ON and SEOUL criticizing and 
denouncing the U.S. Army occupational policy in KOREA. […] These writings are 
identified with different radical political parties associated with the Communistic 
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group.”51  The assertion of sovereign authority through the act of language, an utterance 
of a priori power, was being challenged by acts of language by the Koreans themselves.  
Much to the chagrin of the U.S. military forces, Koreans had formed their own 
ideas about how the occupation should be carried out.  An earlier intelligence report in 
JANIS 75, “which had been the chief source of basic intelligence upon which the XXIV 
Corps staff had to depend in drawing up the ‘Baker’ plans,” noted the following about the 
Korean people’s possible reactions to U.S. occupation: 
[The Korean people] would prefer initial inefficiencies of administrative 
inexperience to the danger of extended control…[they] would favor an 
international regime rather than one of a single nation….Korean 
cooperation [is] likely to be proportioned to Korean belief in the strictly 
temporary and short terms nature of such control…Appointment of a non-
Korean official to a post for which a Korean is available, however, may 
have an unfavorable effect on public opinion.52  
  
In his work reflecting upon the U.S. military government’s work, activities, and policies 
in the first year of occupation, Edward Grant Meade, himself a participant in the U.S. 
military government, noted that there was indeed a “de facto government” on the Korean 
peninsula even before the arrival of the American army personnel in early September 
1945.53  This government was called the People’s Republic of Korea (Chosen In Min 
King Hwa Kuk). The development of this organization began with the immediate pre-
liberation period, when the governing Japanese officials, predicting a possible surrender 
to the more physically near military forces of the Soviet Union, looked for Koreans to 
contain order when the Japanese surrendered.  Needing someone who held legitimacy in 
the eyes of the Korean peasant masses especially, the Japanese officials chose Lyuh Woo 
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Hyun,54 a central leftist with a deep history of involvement with the independence 
organizing and movement in Shanghai and founder of the Korean Restoration 
Brotherhood, who accepted the offer.55 Under Lyuh, the Committee of Preparation for 
Korean Independence coalesced into existence, each province holding its own committee. 
In preparation for the arrival of the U.S. troops on September 9, 1945, the Committee of 
Preparation for Korean Independence convened in the capital city of Seoul, with the 
representatives who were elected in the prior provincial assemblies.  On September 6, 
1945, the “delegates formed a national government with jurisdiction over all of Korea.”56  
The People’s Republic articulated and developed its platform based on five elements: 1) 
unification of different political groups, 2) a land distribution program in which current 
tenants could afford to buy their farms, 3) the purging of collaborators and Japanese from 
official positions, 4) extension of suffrage across the population, 5) minimization of 
government monopoly.  It was a platform on which to begin the restructuring of postwar 
liberated Korea.  
Koreans had formed People’s Committees all throughout southern Korea. After 
August 15, 1945, members of the People’s Committees, who would later become part of 
what would be called the People’s Republic, had stepped in to help manage and organize 
the rice collection and food stock in the midst of Japanese officials fleeing the peninsula.  
“After the Koreans drove the Japanese police out [the KPR leaders] took over the rice 
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collection machinery and were operating it successfully when the Americans arrived.”57 
The question of land, rice, and distribution were not simply abstract mechanisms for 
state-building for the majority of Koreans – it was immediate and material. In 1945, the 
average caloric content of the Korean diet had dropped to between 1000 and 1800 
calories a day from the prewar average of “approximately 2077 a day,” which was “little 
more than a slow starvation diet,” according to the HUSAFIK.58 When we look at the 
picture of land tenancy in 1945 provided by historian Bruce Cumings, we can see the 
problems underlying the difficulty in obtaining fundamental means of subsistence: 
“[A]bout 80 out of every 100 Korean farmers were tenants or semi-tenants.” And this 
situation had resulted from the rapid increases in tenancy under Japanese colonial rule.59  
A decolonized Korea would need to address these fundamental issues, and the People’s 
Committees had begun to do so.   
Much anxiety surrounded these Korean peasant “masses” on the part of the U.S. 
intelligence sections. “The population of Korea is almost wholly in the lower social 
scale,” observed U.S. military intelligence personnel in a weekly summary dated 23 
October 1945.  “It consists mainly of peasants and laborers whose lot has been bad from 
any standard.  In any form of popular government this is the class of people who will 
swing an election.  This is the class which every political party will woo and in which the 
radicals will find the most fertile ground.”60 In a “Memorandum to Public Safety Officer” 
dated November 7, 1945, an assistant public safety officer l made the following 
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observation regarding the People’s Committee in his particular area of leftist Koksong 
and rightist Yongkwang: 
My further opinion is that the People’s Committee in the more rural 
districts is well organized and has a large and influential 
membership....they do not appear to be gangsters, hoodlums or [a] “bad 
element” organization, but on the contrary a representative group of 
Korean people.61  
 
The fact that this assistant public safety officer had to insist that the People’s Committee 
in his region were not “gangsters” or “hoodlums” clearly indicates how within the first 
two months of the U.S. military’s arrival on the peninsula, the higher level officials 
retained a suspicion of these mass, peasant-based political organizations.  Meade himself 
addresses this characterization of the People’s Committees directly in his book: 
Charges of radical tendencies leveled against many of the leaders can be 
easily substantiated, but they merit further explanation.  The original heads 
of the movement were, for the most part, respected men of the community, 
who had little or no association with either the Japanese administration or 
the organized Korean underground movements. […] The members of the 
underground, on the other hand, were acutely aware of the people’s 
desires and attitudes and allowed their knowledge of the public mind to 
mold their politics.  If the People’s Republic exhibited radical tendencies, 
it only reflected with reasonable accuracy the views of the Korean 
majority.”62   
 
Meade quite pointedly remarked on the fact that many of the People’s Committees 
leaders were men who did not have experiences prior to liberation that could be easily 
labeled as either “rightist” or “leftist.”  If on a certain level the People’s Republic did 
indeed “[reflect] with reasonable accuracy the views of the Korean majority,” why within 
a matter of less than two months had the U.S. military occupation forces begun to dismiss 
the “People’s Republic” as – to take the words of the afore-quoted assistant public safety 
officer – “gangsters, hoodlums or [a] ‘bad element’ organization”? 
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 Scholars have argued that the Cold War anti-communist stance and usual 
disregard for grassroots, popular politics contributed greatly to the harsh repression of the 
People’s Republic and the general political left in south Korea during U.S. occupation.63  
While building off this important scholarship, I argue for a different approach to this 
development through an analysis of a different piece of writing – a handbill titled “A 
Message to U.S.A. Citizens” dated October 5, 1945, a month after the arrival of the U.S. 
military.  The Central Committee of the People’s Republic of Korea were the authors of 
the handbill that was circulated in Seoul, and eventually the G2 officials obtained a copy 
– however, judging from the handbill’s title, all members of the U.S. military government 
were the intended readers of the handbill.  It is important to note that the People’s 
Republic of Korea actually did welcome the U.S. military government. The handbill did 
indeed position the U.S. military as a supporter and aide in the liberation of Korea, and 
explicitly pointed to Lt. Gen. Hodge by name and referred to Proclamation No. 1:  
At last our eagerly waited helper of the oppressed and guardian of liberty 
arrived.  In his first message, General Hodge declared that one of three 
missions of the armed forces of the United States in Corea is to 
“rehabilitate Korea.”  We took his message in gratitude and with respect 
because we believed in his commandership – the general of the nation of 
Washington, Lincoln, and Roosevelt. 64 
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The Central Committee also took special care to position a particular equivalence 
between “Korea” and “America” by emphasizing a shared enmity against Japan: “You 
know Japanese, their ambitions, their cruelty and their treachery.  However, if there is 
any people who have a deepest grudge against the Japanese, it is the Koreans who have 
lived with them for thirty six years. […] Your loss was our loss; your triumph, our 
triumph.”65   
But the authors took this question of colonialism to another level by narrating an 
unbroken line of political will and subjectivity from the colonial period through the 
present – a narrative argument, essentially, against the idea that decolonization would 
require the United States and Western powers to teach “politics” to the decolonized 
Korean: “If any Corean remained mentally normal during the war, he was a fool.  
Coreans made themselves split personalities.  They showed obedience in the presence of 
Japanese and they did just the opposite thing in reality. Without any munitions, 
revolutionists fought bravely in fields and in factories.”  The liberation period – the 
moment of August 15, 1945 – was to herald a time when Koreans would no longer have 
to be “split,” when they could be whole political subjects.  Political desire and historical 
agency was already the realm in which Koreans acted and made decisions. 
 But the objective of the handbill becomes clear – this “Message to U.S.A. 
Citizens” is intended as a corrective to the “mistakes” or concerning tendencies of the 
U.S. military occupation as viewed by the Central Committee.  “A few days ago,” stated 
the handbill,” the Military Government of U.S. Army in Corea issued a decree that says, 
‘No gathering, no procession or parade should be held without permission of the 
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government authority.’ […] Suppose the decree is true, our aspiration and agitation will 
be in vain.  Do you think it is possible to build a new nation in democratic way without 
freedom of speech, without freedom of mass meeting without freedom of all political 
activities?”  Published and circulated less than a month after Hodge’s declaration of “I 
am the Korean government,” this handbill reveals the surprising escalation of events of 
the U.S. military occupation during the month of September 1945.  October 5, 1945 – the 
date of the handbill’s publication – also was the date of Ordinance No. 9 issued by the 
U.S. military, which contained the first “National Emergency” declaration over the 
southern Korean peninsula.66 
 The U.S military government came to characterize the People’s Republic as an 
illegitimate and subversive organization because the People’s Republic insisted that there 
was not a “state of emergency” on the Korean peninsula.  There was not to be any 
deferral of political agency, according to the Central Committee’s handbill: 
Suppose the Military Government of U.S. Forces in Corea oppose the will 
of the Coreans and ignore their desires, this would bring the tragedy of the 
century.  American public opinion certainly will not allow it!  Let the 
Coreans govern themselves.  Protect us, but do not try to rule over us.  We 
know what is the best government for us; we are intelligence enough to 
manage our own affairs.  The people’s Republic of Korea needs your 
unlimited sympathy and help in her development.  Your sympathy and 
your help will make an imperishable record in the glorious history of New 
Korea.”67 
 
It is a remarkable final paragraph of the handbill – the Central Committee argues that the 
U.S. military government is in danger of “[ignoring]” the political desires of Koreans, 
and in turn also explicates what it believes should be the desires of the American people 
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(“American public opinion certainly will not allow it!”).  Rather than the United States 
providing the stage of history upon which the decolonization and liberation of Korea 
would occur, the Central Committee is presenting the stage of history-making that they 
have already claimed and built – “the glorious history of New Korea.”  Within the text of 
this handbill, the U.S. military occupation has been allowed to maintain its “benevolent” 
character – but only up to an extent.   
 General Hodge, in his report to General MacArthur, commented on the attitudes 
of the Korean populace towards the U.S. military government.  “The Koreans are the 
most politically minded people I have ever seen,” Hodge wrote.  “Every move, every 
word, every act is interpreted and evaluated politically.”68   The close scrutiny and high 
level of attention paid by Koreans to the activities of the U.S. military government 
seemed to have somewhat surprised Hodge.  However, Hodge drew a line between an 
interest in politics, and then what he judged to be a mature capacity for politics: “The 
Koreans want their independence more than any one thing and want it now.  This stems 
from the Allied promise of freedom and independence which is well known by every 
Korean without the qualifying phrase ‘in due course.’  I am told there are no Korean 
words expressing ‘in due course.’”69 Hodge essentially reduced the demands for 
immediate independence by Koreans as an impossibility of translation – that the Korean 
language itself was incapable for holding the more complex meaning of a deferred 
temporal process of indeterminate duration.  In due course – the operative phrase of the 
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Cairo Declaration that placed Korea within the “waiting room of history” along with 
other mandates, colonies, and trusteeships – had become, according to Hodge’s logic, a 
concept indicative of mature and enlightened political thinking. 
 Such a denial of the Koreans’ capacity for and ability to understand and 
participate in the political sphere continued at various high levels of the U.S. military 
government.  On October 10, 1945, U.S. Major General Archibald Arnold, the military 
governor of occupied southern Korea, responded to the activities of the People’s 
Republic – perhaps with the handbill specifically in mind - with his own statement, one 
that would resonate with Hodge’s previous declaration.  In front of the Korean press in 
Seoul, Arnold prefaced his remarks by saying a few words pointedly addressed to the 
press: “What I say and hand to-day must be given a prominent place in the front page of 
every newspaper.  This is a request with the force of an order.”  He then, without directly 
denouncing the People’s Republic of Korea, stated the following, “There is only one 
government in Korea south of 38 degree north latitude.  It is the government created in 
accordance with the proclamations of General MacArthur, the government of Lt. Gen. 
Hodge, and the Civil Administration Orders of the Military government.”70 The U.S. 
military government’s authority relied on the “mystical foundations” of the proclamations 
issued by MacArthur and the successive ordinances issued by Hodge’s military 
government.  It was, according to Arnold, these very acts of language performed by the 
U.S. military government that conferred it the exclusive authority of sovereignty.  Arnold 
continued by selectively undermining the authority of the Korean political organizations 
already in place on the peninsula: “Self-appointed “officials” and “police groups,” big (or 
little) conferences “representing all the people, the (self-styled) government of the 
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Republic of Korea, are entirely without any authority, power or reality.  If the men who 
are arrogating to themselves such high-sounding titles are merely play-acting on a puppet 
stage with entertainment of questionable amusement value they must immediately pull 
down the curtain on the puppet show.”71 In these early days of the U.S. occupation, U.S. 
forces were consumed with establishing control over public rituals, speech acts, and the 
symbolic realm. The fact that Maj. Gen. Arnold had to go to such lengths as to call 
Korean political organizations “a puppet show” not only reveals the more obvious 
condescension towards the possibility of Koreans being able to comprehend the essence 
of “politics,” but also demonstrates the degree of anxiety along with the frustration that 
Koreans were not – as instructed in Proclamation No. 1 – simply passive recipients of a 
liberation fashioned out of a military occupation.  The Koreans – via handbills, posters, 
conferences, parades – were creating their own political space, and published their own 
English-language pamphlets addressed the U.S. military officials, instructing them how 
to participate in the project of decolonization. 
 
“The movement had started”: The Criminalization of the Grassroots Political 
Movement 
 
 Land, rice, and the question of distribution had been the central concerns of the 
conversation between Chang and the Russian and North Korean soldiers at the threshold 
of his home on the 38th parallel in April 1946.  The widespread challenge to the calculus 
between “benevolence” and “death” expressed in the two Proclamations issued at the 
beginning of the U.S. occupation was triggered by a rice crisis – and the CIC’s concerns 
over Chang’s conversation belied the U.S. military government’s own anxiety over the 
Korean populace.  On October 5, 1945 – the same date of publication as the handbill 
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issued by the Central Committee of the People’s Republic – the U.S. military government 
published two different ordinances regarding land tenancy and the rice market.  The first 
ordinance – Ordinance 9 - declared a “national emergency […] by reason of oppressive 
rents and interest rates payable under existing contracts by tenants of farm lands.”72 This 
ordinance’s professed objective to declare a maximum ceiling on land rent costs was 
popular among the Korean tenant population, but ordinance – and the “national 
emergency” – failed in practice due to the fact that it was landlords on-the-ground who 
were supporting U.S. military government, and the U.S. military had no effective means 
of regulating and enforcing the ordinance itself.  The second ordinance – called General 
Notice No. 1 - declared, “[A]ll laws and regulations having the force of law described 
below are hereby abolished to the end that Korea may have a free market in rice,” and 
ended with disastrous consequences.73   
  U.S. military intelligence noticed a change in the activities they usually reported 
from week to week.   “Many people are out of work and are encountering some difficulty 
in obtaining food,” stated a report dated 9 October 1945. “An increasing number of 
instances were reported of Koreans forcing Japanese employers and factory owners to 
pay bonuses and advance pay even though the plants are closed.”74 By the end of the 
month, U.S. military intelligence reported “12 disturbances in widely scattered localities 
though S Korea[.]”  Korean laborers were beginning to demand that Japanese employers 
hand over ownership and control of businesses.  “Force was used to obtain compliance 
with many of these demands,” the report went on – “No organization of labor in general 
or of employees were caused by employees of individual plants and who are capitalizing 
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on the defeat of Japan and the opportunity to put pressure on Japanese civilians who are 
being forced evacuate Korea.”75  Labor organizations were seemingly absent from these 
incidents – and U.S. military intelligence seemed to concede that these demands were 
indeed more spontaneous than meditated.   
The effort to expel Japanese factory owners rapidly developed into the demanded 
expulsion of all Japanese administrative officials and also policemen all over the southern 
half of the peninsula.  For the period between October 23rd and 30th, 1945, “22 
disturbances by political parties in widely scattered localities throughout S Korea were 
reported[.]”76  These disturbances were “directed against Japanese soldiers and civilians 
who are still in public positions, such as policmen[sic], school teachers, local officials, 
etc.,” and all were associated in some form with the Korean People’s Republic.  In 
Hadong, the Korean People’s Republic moved to take over the local government, and 
“refused to recognize the Military Government.”  As a seeming pattern emerges, the U.S. 
military intelligence G2 summary concludes, “It is believed that disturbances will 
continue in communities where Japanese or former Japanese collaborators are in office or 
are used as advisors by US Military Government.”77 Utilizing the network of People’s 
Committees already in place on the ground, the Korean populace had clearly decided to 
act upon the structural change they wanted to see happen, which was the immediate 
replacement of markers of Japanese colonial sovereignty with local Korean authority.  
The Korean populace was not waiting for the U.S. military to “grant” them their 
independence.  
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 Confronted with a population who had apparently deemed the U.S. military 
government as inadequate and insufficient for their demands for change, on October 30, 
1945, the U.S. occupation forces published Ordinance Number 19 – and Section One was 
titled, “Declaration of National Emergency.”  Significantly, the text of the ordinance 
begins with a re-introduction of the American Forces to the Korean people, a move 
reminiscent of Proclamation Number 1: “After four long years of war, from which they 
emerged victorious, American Forces landed upon your shores the friends and protectors 
of the Korean people.” The theme of the “benevolent sovereign” had re-entered the 
frame.  But the lengthy ordinance also very pointedly commented on “certain groups” 
which the authors of the ordinance portrayed as mercenary – the opposite of the 
“benevolent” U.S. military government: “In addition, certain groups, with the sole idea of 
acquiring the wealth of the Korean people for themselves, have prevented labor from 
returning to employment, children from returning to school, and farmers from selling the 
produce of their lands. Such conditions,” the ordinance continued, “have created within 
Korea an emergency[.]”  Following such a statement that essentially denied any agency 
or will on the part of the strikers and resisting farmers, the next sentence brought the 
benevolence front and center of its self-portrayal of the Military Government: 
As all of the people know the American Nation is a powerful nation.  Its 
people, however are gentle with the true gentleness that come only 
through an appreciation of their own good fortune and in their desire to 
protect others against adversity.78 
 
And although the ordinance did not stipulate what the national emergency entailed, the 
ordinance declared that “[r]igid emergency controls are therefore hereby established, in 
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order to prevent such conditions from existing which will harm the people.”79  The U.S. 
military government declared yet another “state of emergency” in an attempt to create a 
strategic severance between any collective political organizing and widespread popular 
political recognition.  This ordinance, in a sense, was a strategy to render the U.S. 
military government as relevant to the Korean populace. 
 But Section II of the ordinance brought the other element of the “state of 
emergency” - death - more squarely to the fore.  An act that challenged the Military 
Government’s authority was construed as an act that threatens the “People’s Welfare” – 
and the three stipulated “unlawful acts” revealed the difficulty the Military Government 
had encountered in establishing legitimacy on the ground.  The three “unlawful acts” 
encompassed an almost infinite range of actions – from language, physical action, to 
political intent.  For example, the first unlawful act was “Knowingly making any false 
statement orally or in writing to any member of or person acting under the authority of 
USAFIK or the Military Government”; the second unlawful act consisted of any 
“[attempt] to obstruct, or contravening any orders or announced program of the Military 
Government; and thirdly, “directing or participating in acts of discipline, threats, coercion 
or any other form of intimidation of victimization (including boycotting) against any 
person cooperating in any form directly or indirectly with USAFIK or the Military 
Government of Korea.”80  In essence, the U.S. military government was ordering the 
Korean populace to at least act and behave as if they had accepted the legitimate 
authority of their presence, while also broadening its state power of oversight. 
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 Six months later, on May 4, 1946, the U.S. Military Government published a 
nine-page ordinance– and Ordinance Number 72’s title was “Offenses Against the 
Military Government.”  Apparently, the three “unlawful acts” stipulated in Ordinance 
Number 9 of October 30, 1945 had not been sufficient to quell the rising movement of 
Koreans demanding for change on their own terms.  Ordinance Number 72 outlined 
eighty-two specific behaviors that were considered as “Offenses Against the Military 
Government.”  Stating that the specificity with which these offenses were enumerated did 
not “[limit] the provisions of Proclamation Number 2, GHQ, USAFPAC, 7 September 
1945,” Ordinance Number 72 became the purveyor of the “state of emergency” framed 
by the threat of death.81 
The “force of law,” in effect, that was the province of the “state of emergency” 
had been broken down into behaviors that the U.S. military government wanted to 
control.  And the extensive enumeration of forbidden “behaviors” rather than being a 
show of force and authority, instead revealed the different fractures and fissures in the 
U.S. military government’s own self-presentation and narrative of power. Twenty seven 
out of the eighty-two stipulations dealt with language, paper, and the performance of 
authority – such as slander, rumors, fraudulent documents, false statements, forged 
identity cards or any other type of permit pass, “concealing” papers from authorities, 
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the United States or its Allies, or does any act calculated to disturb public peace and order, or 
prevent the administration of justice, or willfully does any act hostile to the Allied forces, shall, 
upon conviction by a military Occupation Court, suffer death or such other punishment as the 
Court may determine. 
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falsifying contracts, and even impersonation of military government personnel.82  The 
“offenses” demonstrated both the extent to which U.S. military authority could be 
mimicked and the extent to which U.S. military authority was fragile and still not 
established.  This ordinance specifically attacked the elements of language in the 
political, public sphere – and the handbills of the Central Committee of the People’s 
Republic no longer would be permissible.   Number 22 stated, 
Acts or conduct in support of, or participating in the formation of, any 
organization or movement dissolved or declared illegal by, or contrary to 
the interests of, the occupying forces, including publication or circulation 
of matter printed or written in aid of any thereof or the possession thereof 
with intent to publish or circulate same, or the provocative display of 
flags, uniforms or insignia of any such organization or movement.83 
 
Number 30 addressed “[r]emoving, obliterating, defacing or altering written, printed or  
typed matter posted by or under authority of Military Government”; Number 31 forbade 
the publishing and distribution of material that is “detrimental or disrespectful to the 
occupying forces or to the United Nations […] or any person acting under their 
authority”; the dissemination of rumors that “undermine the morale of the occupying 
forces” or any purposeful “inciting to or participating in rioting or public disorder.”84   
The more the authorities specified which actions were forbidden, the vaguer the 
terms seemed – and what became clear was that the USAMGIK was not simply interested 
in stipulating which actions and activities would not be tolerated during U.S. occupation, 
but it was also intending to assert its power of defining the “state of emergency.”  The 
last four articles of the Ordinance illustrate this effect, where the final four elements 
widen the scope and power indefinitely in terms of what the USAMGIK can condemn: 
                                                
82 The twenty-eight stipulations are as follows: Numbers 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, 20, 21, 22,30, 31, 32, 33, 
34, 47, 48, 49, 50, 51, 52, 53, 54, 57, 58,59, 60.  
83 Official Gazette, Ordinance 72. 
84 Ibid. 
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79. Acting in contravention of terms imposed by the Allies upon their 
enemies on their defeat or surrender, or of any orders supplementing such 
terms. 
80. Violating or disobeying any proclamation, law, ordinance, notice, 
directive or order of the Military Government or of any person acting 
under the authority thereof or pursuant thereto, where a penalty is not 
expressly imposed. 
81. Engaging in acts to the prejudice of good order or to the interests of 
the occupying forces or any member thereof. 
82. Violating in any way any of the laws of war or acting in aid of the 
enemy or endangering the security, safety or operations of the occupying 
forces, any member thereof, or any person acting under their authority in 
the performance of his duties.85 
 
And the Ordinance went on to state that no one would be allowed to claim a defense that 
“the offense charged was committed under instructions or orders of any civil or military 
superior of any former government of Korea or of any person purporting to act as an 
official or member of any dissolved or illegal organization or movement, or that the 
offense was committed under duress, by reason of threats or through fear.”  To not be 
able to claim that one had acted under duress or fear was to collapse accountability for 
action – language was not trusted, and only a singular “self” and will was recognized.  
And that will had to be in line with the U.S. military government.86 
August 15, 1946 was the one-year anniversary of Korean liberation from 
Japanese colonial rule.  The leftist Korean political organizations, in Hodge’s own 
words, “boycotted” the Joint American-Korean surrender anniversary ceremonies, 
                                                
85 Ibid. 
86 My own summary breakdown of the 82 stipulations follows: 
1-4 about physical harm to occupying forces; 5-10 about bribing and looting; 11-21 – any acts of 
communication or ownership of any communication means; 22-27 – any act assisting those imprisoned by 
the USAMGIK; 28-29 – movement and transportation; 30-34 – altering printed material, or participating in 
riots; 35-36 – possession of arms; 37-41 – damaging property of USAMGIK – railroads to documents; 42-
46- stealing; 47-48- willfully destroying records or archives; 49-60 – falsifying or forging – either identity, 
documents, or property ownership; 61-65- interference in market; 66-67 - interference in voting 
68-72 – public health; 73-failing or refusing to collect taxes; 74. circulating without permit; 75. criminal 
persecution; 76-77- obstructing USAMGIK persecution; 78. abduction of USAMGIK officials; 79 – 82 – 
violation of laws of war. 
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instead “[holding] a mass celebration of their own in another part of town where 
they passed 16 political resolutions including at the top of the list opposition to 
prolongation, expansion or strengthening of MG [Military Government].”  Hodge 
vented his frustration with the Korean left in this memorandum, writing, “The 
Leftist elements felt that they have been cheated out of a social revolution, with 
MG merely perpetuating a traditional social order that had been maintained by the 
Japanese.”87 The twinned ordinances that the U.S. military government had issued 
back in October 5, 1945 regarding the issues of land tenancy and the rice market 
had not resolved the demands of the Korean people – the ambition of the land 
tenancy ordinance had been thwarted by the landlords who worked closely with 
U.S. military government officials, and the rice market ordinance had opened up a 
disaster in incredible market inflation. The “traditional social order” that Korean 
leftists were criticizing the U.S. military government of upholding was the basic 
social control by landlords, factory owners, and the administrative and police 
officials 
“Disturbances” kept on occurring, and with incredibly inflated prices and the 
hoarding of rice, the “occupation of liberation” was looking more and more like 
occupation rather than the “liberation” the Korean people had hoped for.  And September 
22, 1946, “eight thousand employees of the railroad system in Pusan (1200-1340) 
declared the complete strike in that area making as demands: 1. Opposition to the daily 
wage system. 2. Raise wages. 3. Distribute food. 4. Start the government rationing system 
                                                
87 Letter from CG USAFIK, Seoul, Korea from Hodge for Langdon thru GHQ SCAP, dated 25 Aug 46; 
Folder: Papers of Harry S. Truman, SMOF: Selected Records on Korean War, Pertinent Papers on Korea 
Situation; Box 11; SMOF: National Security Files; Papers of Harry S. Truman; Harry S. Truman Library.  
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again. 5. No discharge.”88  The railroad workers at Taegu and Inchon soon joined the 
Pusan workers in a strike.  Workers at Seoul Electric Company were supposedly about to 
join in the strike, and the Printers Union along with factories in “several districts went on 
strike either presenting their demands or merely stating that they were striking in 
sympathy with the railroad workers.”89  The widespread protests gave way to challenges 
to the police force by the Korean populace – as the CIC report commented, “It must be 
conceded that police methods are brutal in cases, and the Korean people, seeing the 
police in action during the strike breaking, fell easy prey to agitators. On 1 October 1946 
a crowd of about 4,000 strikers from factories and railroad yards stormed a police box 
near the Taegu railroad station, claiming that they were starving and that the police were 
trying to kill them.”90 One policeman died from a beating, a striker was proclaimed dead, 
and five other strikers were “allegedly killed.”  The next morning, 2200 people carried 
the body of the dead striker through the streets of Taegu to the Central Police station, 
where they overtook the station until three U.S. Army tanks arrived.  The CIC report for 
that event simply indicates “13 confirmed deaths among the rioter files” – cause of death 
was not noted. The CIC reported other events in the wake of the demonstrations – a 
“minor demonstration by housewives demanding more rice” in Chonju, and in Kyonggi-
Do province, “the student bodies of several schools staged walk-out strikes.” “The 
movement had started,” stated the CIC. 91  Over the next few weeks, Korean peasants 
began to target “policemen, magistrates, landlords and their agents.”92  And as scholar 
Bruce Cumings has noted, “When a local office was seized, records of rice and grain 
                                                
88 CIC 1945.9-1949.1, Volume 2, CIC Monthly Information Report, 1947.1.17.  
89 Ibid. 
90 Ibid. 
91 Ibid. 
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collections were the first objects destroyed.”93  These uprisings “were the predictable and 
logical culmination of more than a year of unheeded Korean demands for meaningful 
reforms, labor unions, peasant unions, and self-governing organs of power.”94 
 
Interpreting the “Peculiar situation of Korea”: The CIC’s Manufacturing of 
“Korea” 
 
 “Nothing in the three years of the Occupation so shook Americans at all levels as 
the autumn uprisings of 1946,” scholar Bruce Cumings commented.  And indeed at the 
Joint Korean-American Conference called by General John Hodge and Major General 
A.E. Brown to allow “Koreans present to the US authorities for discussion and 
consideration the major problems confronting the Korean people,” a major agenda 
element was “The Causes and Background of the October Riots and the Anti-Police 
Feeling.”  The CIC was asked help prepare a report for G-2 Colonel John N. Robinson, 
who would then present it at the conference.  In essence, the CIC had been given the 
assignment and responsibility for gleaning a narrative significance – a discernible pattern 
– and thus an explanation for the autumn uprisings.  The title of the report perhaps 
succinctly conveyed the CIC’s conclusions about the uprisings: “Case Against the 
Communist Party, Disrupting the Peace of South Korea.”  “Based upon investigation of 
the riot and disturbances incidents as they occurred, it was evident that the riots were not 
spontaneous reaction of the people, but were planned political moves led and agitated by 
political leaders and henchmen. [….] [I]t was necessary to show that the Communist 
Party, itself, through a long series of mis-education, propaganda, and false incidents, had 
                                                
93 Cumings, Origins, Vol. 1, 368. 
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fomented and guided the physical violence against police and civil elements of South 
Korea.”95   
 The CIC’s collapsing of the more complicated dynamics of what had been 
essentially a peasant uprising in September and October 1946 to the simple puppeteering 
of the Communist Party is certainly a story that resonates with many projects of the U.S. 
military and intelligence organizations through the globe in the early Cold War period.  
My analysis though contends that such a conclusion that the Korean peasant movement 
was essentially a Communist plot opens up the opportunity to examine how the CIC 
manufactured the “Communist enemy” by the end of 1946.  Members of the Korean 
Communist Party had indeed been organizers and leaders of certain parts of the uprising, 
but local people’s committees and labor and peasant unions provided the majority of the 
leadership.  The “Communist enemy,” as painted by the CIC, was a puppet of the 
Soviets, smaller Communist cells who received instruction from either Pyongyang or 
Moscow.96  Bruce Cumings, in his analysis of the Autumn Harvest uprisings, notes that 
the uprisings themselves did not occur simultaneously, but rather in waves as “one 
rebellion touched off another in contiguous areas.”  “The evidence suggests,” Cumings 
writes, “that South Chŏlla peasants rose up not because of Communist agitation, but 
because of deep grievances arising from land conditions and relations, grain collection 
inequities, and the local interlocking of landlord, government official, and policeman.”97  
The project of making the “Communist enemy” was a denial of both indigenous claims 
                                                
95 CIC 1945.9-1949.1, Volume 2, CIC Monthly Information Report, dated 1947.1.18.  
96 “The Korean governor of North Kyŏngsang could write with equanimity that there were in his province 
some 3,000 native leftist leaders, “strong men, ingenious, courageous, and ready to die.”  Americans could 
not stomach suppressing such people unless they could perceive a tie to the Soviets.” From Cumings, 
Origins, Vol. 1, 375. 
97 Cumings, Origins, Vol. 1, 367. 
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and grievances and the possibility of a local form and application of communism.  And it 
was not simply a project of finding and making the “communist enemy” – it was also a 
project of knowledge claims.  The CIC, in this 1946 report, had asserted its abilities to 
discern, understand, and narrate the political landscape of U.S. occupied Korea. In other 
words, the CIC “knew” the Korean better than the Korean herself.   
 In essence, the professionalization of the CIC reflected the larger 
professionalization of the U.S. occupation of Korea.  And this very “professionalization” 
lies in the interpretative claims of the CIC about the “peculiar situation of Korea.”  Or 
more explicitly, as Dow states in the SOP about the objectives of the “Political Section” 
of the CIC: “Proclamations of the Supreme Command for the Allied Powers and 
Ordinances of USAMGIK will be used as a guide in connection with the investigation of 
persons involved in subversive activities other than U.S. military and civilian 
personnel.”98  It is this very space through which the CIC found a possible space for 
legitimatization and professionalization.   
 Developing this “knowledge” was highly mediated.  The CIC gathered and read 
both people and paper – interrogation and the constant translation of handbills, posters, 
and leaflets were at the center of the CIC operation.  However, one needs to go one step 
further in examining the CIC, and ask the question of how the CIC found people and 
paper to interrogate.  The North West Young Men’s Association, an organization 
                                                
98 The full mission of the “Political Section” is as follows: 1) Initiate investigations on all known political, 
social and other organizations to determine their objectives and activities and control and coordinate such 
investigations and process reports thereto. 2) Initiate investigations on all underground and secret 
organizations in insure that their activities are not inimical to Military Government and control and 
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and prepare reports of political trends. From CIC 1945.9-1949.1, Volume 1, US Army Intelligence Center, 
History of the Counter Intelligence Corps Volume XXX, “CIC During the Occupation of Korea (1959.3), 
158-159. 
  75 
comprised of young men who had crossed over the 38th parallel to the south, became the 
critical element to the daily operations of the CIC.  These young men, among whom 
many came from the landed class in North Korea, created one of the extremist rightist 
youth groups in Korea. 
 On September 9, 1945, when agents of the 224th CIC Detachment arrived at the 
port of Inchon on the USS Chilton, they were coming from the campaigns in Leyte and 
Okinawa.  But despite this previous experience of U.S. military and imperial projects in 
the Philippines and Japan, these agents of the “CIC had come to Korea without much 
preparation and with little idea of what to expect,” according to the official military 
history of the CIC in U.S.-occupied Korea – “No precedents for CIC from previous 
occupations were available as guides for action […] As CIC acquired special missions 
and unusual conditions developed, the organization of the 971st was changed to meet the 
new conditions.”99 The CIC agent who had visited Chang and his trilingual sign in April 
1946 was one of only a few handfuls of CIC agents scattered across the southern Korean 
peninsula.  The “total authorized strength” of the CIC was 126 agents, but in September 
1946, the number of agents actually only amounted to 89. The CIC – to take one very 
important organization of the G-2 – was indeed a day-by-day operation run by people on 
the ground, not necessarily the streamlined military intelligence teams we have come to 
imagine regarding the Cold War. There were concerns about the constant turnover of the 
agents themselves, resulting in a situation where the agents themselves “do not remain in 
Korea long enough to become thoroughly oriented in the situation or in the importance of 
security measures.”  And MacArthur had forbidden “fraternization” between the U.S. 
                                                
99 CIC 1945.9-1949.1, Volume 1, CIC, vol. 1, US Army Intelligence Center, History of the Counter 
Intelligence Corps Volume XXX, “CIC During the Occupation of Korea (1959.3), 15. 
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military personnel and Korean civilians - “In a country where fraternization is ‘taboo’ the 
lonely and homesick young soldier will talk at length with any Korean who can speak 
English and who wants to talk with him.”100  Cautionary warnings like “Don’t Brag about 
your Last Case”101 to explicit capitalized directives like “GET OUT AND GET IT!!!” 
regarding the leftist organizations that had gone underground – a gamut of concerns over 
the professionalization and effectiveness of the CIC appeared in the CIC monthly reports. 
Two elements that would facilitate the operations and activities of only 89 agents 
in 21 field offices to cover the entire southern half of the Korean peninsula: interpreters 
and paper. Native Korean interpreters were “motivated by strictly mercenary impulses 
and could not be trusted to any great extent,” while second generation Korean and 
Japanese Americans numbered at most at twelve.  Paper also was in short supply – 
“Paper, an essential for any intelligence agency was particularly scarce.  The USAFIK 
supply people did not seem to understand why a CIC District Office needed more paper 
than the orderly room of an infantry company.”102  
But the Korean population was wary of the CIC, reluctant to talk freely with 
them: 
Many Koreans believe the CIC is the American counterpart of the 
Japanese Kempei Tai, and, as a result of this misunderstanding, CIC 
agents find it advantageous to represent themselves as G-2 personnel, 
Office of Public Information personnel, members of the Political Advisory 
Group (PAG), or as novices who have developed a curiosity of and an 
interest in Korean politics.103 
 
                                                
100 CIC 1945.9-1949.1, Volume 1, CIC, vol. 1, US Army Intelligence Center, History of the Counter 
Intelligence Corps Volume XXX, “CIC During the Occupation of Korea (1959.3), 90. 
101 CIC 1945.9-1949.1, Volume 1, 971st CounterIntelligence Corps Detachment Annual Progress Report for 
1948, 470. 
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The Counter Intelligence Corps found itself with a more immediate difficulty in carrying 
out operations – establishing its own legitimacy. And even though we may usually 
imagine CIC agents as working discreetly undercover, the annals of the CIC attest 
otherwise – “since CIC was outfitting its men in a uniform worn by no other 
organization, agents were open to compromise on all occasions.”104  And, “[t]he 
distinctive uniform of CIC agents in Korea was only one factor contributing to the 
unsought notice given to CIC operations in Korea.”105 As mentioned earlier, the CIC was 
actually a very public operation, and not the clandestine operation one would assume of a 
Counter Intelligence Corps.  In the first place, the CIC’s objectives and mission resonated 
with the Korean population – but not in the way that CIC had hoped. In short supply were 
“reliable” interpreters – the native Korean interpreters were “motivated by strictly 
mercenary impulses and could not be trusted to any great extent,” while second-
generation Korean and Japanese Americans numbered at most at twelve.106   
 As a result, the CIC had to rely on Korean agents for their “information” “because 
of the language barrier, and the customs of the Korean people, and the physical difference 
between the Oriental and the Caucasian.”  Korean “nationals employed as interpreters, 
detectives, and undercover agents” often carried around “passes for identification 
purposes to entitle them entrance into the CIC office and to assure them immunity in 
cases where, on a special assigned task, they may be apprehended by the police for 
suspicious activities.” Approximately 180 Korean nationals worked as regular agents for 
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the CIC, a number that did not include special operations.   Of those 180, 150 worked as 
informants within leftist organizations, and 30 other informants worked within political 
parties.107 But a combination of 89 CIC American agents with a minimum of 180 Korean 
informants would not necessarily provide the type of coverage that the official military 
history had boasted about. The CIC also had developed a network that depended on paid 
agents of various sorts, youth organizations, and the interrogation of refugees who were 
picked up by this section when they entered South Korea.108 Over 1946 and 1947, the 
element that became central to the CIC operations were the “Use of Youth 
organizations.”  The CIC weekly report for June 19, 1947 noted that rightists 
organizations had set up their own “networks of agents and their own intelligence section 
for the purpose of working against Communism,” and the “most valuable of these 
organizations was one made up of individuals who, themselves, had fled from the 
Communist Police State, North Korea” – the North West Young Men’s Association 
[NWYMA].109   
The NWYMA, according to the CIC, had “complete coverage of each district” in 
the city of Seoul, and had men stationed in each section: “they know almost all of the 
people in their areas; they know when new persons move in or others move out, and they 
know the reasons for this moving.  They become acquainted with the activities of almost 
every individual in their area and are able to report on anything suspicious.”110  The 
surveillance system set up by the NWYMA became crucial to the CIC’s own claims to 
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knowing what was happening on the ground.  Seemingly little attention or concern was 
paid by the CIC to how the NWYMA was exactly defining who was an anti-Communist 
or Communist, or rightist or leftist.  What does come across in the CIC reports is the 
CIC’s enthusiasm for the potential exploitation and usage of the NWYMA’s surveillance 
system.  The reports suggests giving the youth groups “small sums” to create surveillance 
over “suspicious persons,” and that the youths could also be used to watch “Koreans in 
high MG positions” as well as the “interpreters and translators” who worked with the 
military government.  The NWYMA – as well as the other rightist youth groups utilized 
by the CIC – enabled the maintenance and development of the “exceptional” reach and 
landscape of the Counterintelligence Corps and its activities, as the CIC carved out its 
own niche within the Military Government apparatus in terms of claims over 
“knowledge.”  
 The increasing intimacy between the NWYMA and the CIC developed as the CIC 
itself was attempting to professionalize itself through the creation of standards and 
objectives. Indeed, [i]t was not until 29 March 1947 that a permanent SOP [Standard 
Operating Procedures] could be drawn up.”111  A 1st Lt. Harry H. Dow, who had been one 
of the members of the arrival CIC corps in 1945 and stayed with the CIC in Korea until 
1947, was responsible for what the military history described as “adapting CIC 
organization and operations to the peculiar situation in Korea.” Before turning to the 
“peculiar situation in Korea,” a brief look at Dow’s 1947 SOP for the Counterintelligence 
                                                
111 CIC 1945.9-1949.1, Volume 1, CIC, vol. 1, US Army Intelligence Center, History of the Counter 
Intelligence Corps Volume XXX, “CIC During the Occupation of Korea (1959.3), 10. The following 
information is pulled from the same document history: 
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Corps provides a sense of how the CIC had come to understand its particular “mission” in 
Korea: 
The basic mission of Counter Intelligence Corps is to assist in the 
maintenance of military security.  The mission has now been enlarged to 
require special investigative activity in both the Positive Intelligence and 
Counter Intelligence fields involving political groups and social 
organizations and the collection of information relating to adjacent areas 
to insure the successful completion of the over-all mission  of the U.S. 
Forces in Kroea to set up a democratic form of government as outlined in 
Headquarters XXIV Corps letter TFOIE dated 15 January 1947.112  
 
The SOP signaled a significant development in the objectives of the CIC – the 
organization that had began the first two months of the occupation engaged in activities 
similar to the other forces of the USAFIK – “assembling all Japanese nationals 
preparatory to their repatriation; and maintaining law and order”113 – had explicitly 
acknowledge that the parameters of maintaining “military security” grew to include both 
positive and counter intelligence.  Indeed, if we take note that Dow has explicitly singled 
out a particular activity of the CIC regarding the “peculiar situation of Korea,” we can see 
how the “political groups and social organizations” have become the main object of the 
CIC’s activity – and, I would argue, sense of purpose.     
 This space of legitimatization and professionalization was the realm of 
“espionage.”  The NWYMA would become central to the operations of the “Espionage, 
Sabotage, and Miscellaneous Section.”  And “espionage” – along with all its attendant 
miscellany – began to become an object that the CIC attached a myriad of fundamental 
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meanings.  “Espionage” became the all-encompassing term for the supposed realities of 
the activities and individuals involved on the ground in Korea – and it would have a 
profound afterlife in the Korean War, as mobilized and identified by the CIC: 
In many respects, the armed conflict that broke out in Korea in June 1950 
was simply a new phase of a way that had been going on silently, 
insidiously, for five years.  In its earlier phases, this war made few 
headlines and drew little attention.  But CIC agents in the Korean 
occupation had known the quiet struggle.  It was a war of espionage.114  
 
The insistence on parsing the Korean population for “espionage” agents was, I argue, 
parallel and resonant with the December 1946 report on the Communist party 
machinations as being the overdetermined impetus for all strikes and uprisings during the 
period from late September through October 1946.  Similar to the ordinance stipulations 
on the eighty-two behaviors that feel under U.S. military government sovereignty 
authority to punish, discipline, and judge, “espionage” became the category of behavior 
under the auspices of the CIC that effectively depoliticized and distracted the stakes 
involved in the conflicts on the ground.  In other words, the lines of conflict became 
either pro-America or anti-American, collapsing the issues of land, rice, and distribution 
as demonstrated by the investigation around Chang’s sign in April 1946.  Those who 
were viewed as anti-USAMGIK became “espionage” agents – people who were deemed 
beyond the protective norms, and also essentially rendered “foreign” in a sense to the 
project of state-building in Korea.  As Ordinance 21, dated November 2, 1945, declared 
that all previous laws – except for those noted by the USAMGIK – retained their force of 
law – thus moving the conflict over control over the on-the-ground situation not as one 
who defines and applies the law, but rather about who laid claim to the “force of law” – 
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the issue of “espionage” also rendered the People’s Committees and other organizations 
as suspended.  No other organization could claim authority – and only the United States 
could grant authority.115   
 A tension developed though, between the CIC and the NWYMA – though it is not 
over the escalating violence that the NWYMA increasingly was involved in all over the 
southern peninsula, but rather the question of police actions – and who has claims over 
police actions on the ground.  The NWYMA, in sum, refused to only be an instrument of 
procuring, gathering, and purveying “information.”   
 By 1946 the CIC had also garnered certain powers of jurisdiction; basically, it 
“had all the prerogatives of a police agency, including search and arrest.”116 As the 
official history noted, “The police prerogatives and functions given CIC endowed the 
organization with power never intended for a confidential investigative organization.  
Some of the members of the organization have described the 971st as a rough and ready 
outfit that probably interpreted this unusual power too liberally, and have stated that, 
especially early in the occupation, operations were too ‘high, wide, and handsome.’117  
By the end of 1947, however, in its report titled “Statistical analysis of Terrorism, 1947,” 
the CIC had a problem on their hands.  The tally of the different acts of terrorism reported 
was as follows: 
 Rightists instigated – 223 
 Leftist -74 
 Neutral – 5 
 Unknown – 203 
                                                
115 Official gazette, Ordinance 21. 
116 CIC 1945.9-1949.1, Volume 1, CIC, vol. 1, US Army Intelligence Center, History of the Counter 
Intelligence Corps Volume XXX, “CIC During the Occupation of Korea (1959.3), 24. 
117 CIC 1945.9-1949.1, Volume 1, CIC, vol. 1, US Army Intelligence Center, History of the Counter 
Intelligence Corps Volume XXX, “CIC During the Occupation of Korea (1959.3). 
Descriptions culled from interviews with Captain Kenneth E. MacDougall, 5 October 1954, Fort Holabird, 
and Lieutenant Colonel Elbert H. Keller, 20 October 1954.  The last quote is from MacDougall. 
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 Total: 505 
 Killed – 90 
 Injured – 1100118 
 
This “rise in terrorism,” under the analysis of the CIC falls into multiple categories – 
firstly, the “terrorism conducted by the Right Wing is directed to the absolute suppression 
of the Leftists” and also to the “consolidating efforts” of certain rightist groups.  On the 
other hand, the leftist activities were primarily marked by “malicious propaganda and 
force” deployed to “sabotage the rice collecting program and other Military Government 
sponsored activities.”119  How, where, and on whom would the CIC focus its police 
action capabilities?  Or what would be the overall strategy in front of these statistics? 
 The NWYMA emerged as one of the rightist youth groups most involved in the 
violence.  “Numerous reports of the Terroristic activities of the North West Associatoin 
have reached this office during the past weeks,” stated the CIC report dated April 23, 
1947.120  “Numerous reports on terrorism were received from almost every office. In 
Taegu, Taejon and Ongjin the North West Youth Association seemed particularly on the 
rampage,” a report from May 22, 1947 stated.121  And by August 28, 1947, the CIC report 
revealed an escalation in the situation: “Kangnun sent in a copy of the MG weekly report 
in their area giving an account of the activities and organization of the NorthWest Youth 
Association. Their acts of terrorism are innumerable as they are staging a fight for control 
and complete extinction of the leftists.  The rightists are believed to be capable of much 
more trouble in this area than the leftists, and in some instances they may even resist 
                                                
118 CIC 1945.9-1949.1, Volume 1, 971st CounterIntelligence Corps Detachment Annual Progress Report for 
1947, 348. 
119 CIC 1945.9-1949.1, Volume 1, 971st CounterIntelligence Corps Detachment Annual Progress Report for 
1947, 347. 
120 CIC 1945.9-1949.1, Volume 2, Weekly Information Bulletin dated 1947.4.23, 174. 
121 CIC 1945.9-1949.1, Volume 2, Weekly Information Bulletin dated 1947.5.22 , 221. 
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American personnel, if called upon to maintain law and order.”122  What becomes 
apparent through these surprisingly detailed accounts of the NWYMA by the CIC is that 
the violence itself did not pose a problem to the CIC, but rather the moments when the 
NWYMA usurped police actions of the CIC, and refused to only be a conduit of 
information.   
The leader of the NWYMA in the area encompassing Taegu, Taejon, and Ongjin 
was brought into the CIC offices, where CIC agents “lectured [him] on his responsibility 
for the activities of this organization.”  The leader, in turn, “pleaded that his group were 
mostly boys and really not bad boys at that.”123  Lecturing, reprimanding, and warning 
were the extent of the CIC’s commentary on the NWYMA’s activities and violence – and 
only occurred when the violence was an extension of the organization’s assumption of 
certain sovereign, surveillance powers for example, the CIC had been preparing a raid to 
“apprehend three visitors from North Korea only to find that the North West Association 
had beat CIC to the punch and had abducted these men.”124  The CIC prepared a meeting 
with the leader to make them “understand that they have no powers along this line.”  And 
in September 11, 1947, the CIC reports revealed that the NWYMA in Seoul was 
continuing the exercise of police powers – members of the NWYMA had attempted to 
kidnap an employee of the CCIG-K headquarters, claiming that he was a leftist and 
wanted to investigate him further at their headquarters.  “Orders for this kidnapping were 
given by the head of the Inspection Section of their group.  The leaders of this group were 
                                                
122 CIC 1945.9-1949.1, Volume 2, Weekly Information Bulletin dated 1947.8.28, 364.  
123 CIC 1945.9-1949.1, Volume 2, Weekly Information Bulletin dated 1947.5.22, 221. 
124 CIC 1945.9-1949.1, Volume 2, Weekly Information Bulletin dated 1947.4.23, 174. 
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brought to CIC headquarters, lectured on their responsibilities, and warned to stop their 
terrorist activities and the assumption of police powers.”125 
 The transgression lay, then, not in the acts of violence, but rather in a realm 
elsewhere – it was not about excessive violence.  Instead, it was about excessive claims 
to authority – it was the kidnapping, the threats, the wielding of death in its most potent, 
abstract form that was the transgression.  Villagers – and even policemen – began to take 
matters into their own hands.  Coming under constant harsh criticism from leftists for 
essentially facilitating rightist young group’s terrorism, the police, according to CIC 
reports in May 1947, began a different policy towards the youth groups.  Arrests began to 
be made, and in one town the “NWYA were ordered out of town by the Police and in 
another many members of the NWYA were placed aboard a train and shipped from the 
province; place the burden on some one else – you know.”126  In late August, there were 
reports coming in from Pohong that leftists had sent a petition to “General Hodge asking 
for the abolishment of the Northwest Young Men’s Association and other terrorist youth 
groups[.]”127  However, abolishment never came – only in [date] was a specific rightist 
youth group dissolved, and it was not the NWYMA.  In Taejon, after “approximately 29 
members of the Northwest Youth Assn, some of whom were armed, had attacked a small 
village in their area the villagers gathered together and drove the youths away.”  The 
youths took shelter in a Police Box in the village, and the villagers surrounded the police 
station.  As the NWYMA members began throwing stones, the villagers threw some 
stones also – and soon the “Police fired into the crowd – killing three villagers.”128 
                                                
125 CIC 1945.9-1949.1, Volume 2, Weekly Information Bulletin dated 1947.9.11, 397. 
126 CIC 1945.9-1949.1, Volume 2, Weekly Information Bulletin dated 1947.5.22, 221. 
127 CIC 1945.9-1949.1, Volume 2, Weekly Information Bulletin dated 1947.8.28, 367. 
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The NWYMA, observed the CIC, had “increased faster and become of more 
significance than any other rightist youth group,” by early 1947.129 The NWYMA, 
observed the CIC, had “increased faster and become of more significance than any other 
rightist youth group” by early 1947.130  And in a report dated September 11, 1947, the 
CIC noted another trend concerning the NWYA: “Terrorism by the right wing, for the 
most part, continue merrily on its way.  An apparent all out attempt to eradicate the 
leftists is under way.”  Observing that the police in these situations “were either afraid to 
act against this society or were in complete accord with their actions,” the CIC wrote that 
the NWYA’s activities were often condoned or supported by the police.  “It will serve 
only to make the left to underground[sic] entirely,” stated the CIC.131  And, indeed, the 
CIC’s statement proved to be prophetic. 
 
The “War of Espionage”: Suspicion and the Political in the U.S.-controlled POW 
Camps 
 
The declarations and statements made by both the United Nations and the United 
States framed June 25, 1950 as a turning point – a specific break with the past, a past that 
had been supposedly stable and “peaceful.” The announcement of war effectively 
“normalized” the pre-war situation and the existence of the 38th parallel.  A border and a 
state that was the result of unpopular elections had become “what had been there before” 
– the assumed normative plane of politics on the Korean peninsula. The U.S. occupation 
had not only successfully pushed the left underground, but the tide of the conversation 
had now become flattened to a conflict between two “states” – and the stakes involved in 
                                                
129 CIC 1945.9-1949.1, Volume 2, Weekly Information Bulletin dated 1947.5.1, 184. 
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the war became a question of which state was legitimate, which state expressed the will 
of the Korean people.   
On June 25, 1950, the Security Council of the United Nations, with the U.S.S.R. 
delegate conspicuously absent, adopted a resolution, which noted the “armed attack on 
the Republic of Korea by forces from North Korea [and determined] that this action 
constitutes a breach of the peace.”132  On June 26, 1950, President Truman released a 
statement to the press, where he described the “lawless action taken by the forces from 
North Korea,” and underlined how “[t]hose responsible for this act of aggression must 
realize how seriously the Government of the United States views such threats to the peace 
of the world.”133  The next day, Truman announced his authorization for the mobilization 
of U.S. forces to support Republic of Korea troops. 
On June 29th, at a press conference, the following question was posed to 
President Truman: “Mr. President, would it be correct against your explanation, to call 
this a police action under the United Nations?” 
“Yes. That is exactly what it amounts to,” the President replied.  “We are not at 
war,” President Truman emphasized at the very same press conference.  And according to 
the notes of George N. Elsey, Truman’s press secretary, “The President later called the 
North Koreans ‘a bunch of bandits.’”134 
The harsh reprimand of the DPRK military by President Truman and the United 
Nations was to evoke a feeling among the public of a horror over a violation of a 
fundamental trope of international “law,” and that, thus, the DPRK had placed itself 
                                                
132 UN Security Council, Resolution 82 (June 25, 1950) (S/1501). 
133 “Statement by the President on the Violation of the 38th Parallel,” dated 26 June 1950. Part of the Public 
Papers of the Presidents: Harry S. Truman, 1945-1953 of the Harry S. Truman Presidential Library, 
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134 George N. Elsey, Oral history. Harry S. Truman Presidential Library, NARA. Independence, Missouri.  
  88 
outside of the bounds of “law.”  But the most significant aspect of this condemnation was 
that it also effectively created the impression that there was a normalized “international 
law,” when, in fact, such normalization or consensus was exactly at stake in the conflict 
itself.  To take the 38th parallel at face value would be to miss the point entirely, which is 
that the basic formulations of “war,” “sovereignty,” and “occupation” were contested, 
conflicting, and even clumsy at turns on the longer project of decolonization on the 
Korean peninsula.   
Two critical experiences of pre-war history effectively fall away from the frame 
of the Korean War narrative – the U.S. military occupation of “state of emergency” and 
the leftist political organizations. As the Truman administration was busy inventing the 
“Korean War” for the benefit of the global stage, the war over decolonization on the 
Korean peninsula had absolute continuity with the occupation itself.  The “war of 
espionage” was indeed continuous from the U.S. occupation period through the Korean 
War – and instead of the war operating over a boundary like the 38th parallel, this war 
was operating over individual Korean subjects.  The U.S. military intelligence agents and 
the leftist political organizations and networks encountered each other in a very familiar 
terrain – a “state of emergency” that was now called a “police action.”  
On the ground on the Korean peninsula, the Counter Intelligence Corps had 
returned, and the approach of the CIC to the “war of espionage” and the navigations on 
the part of the Koreans revealed surprising continuity with the 1945 to 1947 period.  In 
November 1950, on the Korean peninsula, the 704th Counter Intelligence Corps continued 
their activities in the southern region of the peninsula.  “The former and present are of 
responsibility […],” states the historical report, “is the territory within the arc of the 
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perimeter formed by the following towns, Pohang-Dong, Kyongju, Taeju and Masan, 
with the headquarters organization located at Pusan.”  This area was the same region the 
CIC had covered during the U.S. occupation of Korea – and its objectives seemed to 
present an uninterrupted continuation between the occupation period and the war: “The 
primary mission is the protection of the Port of Pusan and the entire area by all 
counterintelligence measures available and the detection of former and present South 
Korean Labor Party members within this area of responsibility.”135 The SKLP and the 
guerilla fighters were the same characters in the conflict over sovereignty and 
decolonization in the pre-1950 occupation era.   
The “thirty Korean Nationals” that had established a false U.S. military 
intelligence local headquarters in the city of Masan – complete with the sign “Branch 
Office, Namhang Commercial Company, Telephone Masan 19” – were clearly familiar 
with the performance needed to establish a semblance of U.S. sovereign authority on the 
Korean peninsula. Paper, uniforms, English-language writing, and a perfectly calibrated 
performance were all that was needed – with “false G2 passes, permits to wear military 
uniforms, and travel authority permits,” the members would at times also disguise 
themselves as members of the CIC.136   
The personal histories of the Koreans involved in the case demonstrate a longer 
history of engaging in the struggle over the political public sphere.  One of the members, 
Kim Chi Kyu, illustrates the continuity from the late colonial period through 1951.  
Arrested on 17 July 1944 for “disturbing the peace,” he was later released.  In April 1946, 
after liberation, he joined the Masan Branch of the Democratic Youth League and began 
                                                
135 Historical Report for Period 1 November to 30 Number 1950; Folder: Historical Rpt 704 CIC Nov 1950; 
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working with organizing students at the Masan Commercial school, whom he led in a 
strike on October 7, 1946.  Supposedly around June 30, 1950, he “called a meeting of all 
students who were from Kyongsang Namdo Area and who were then attending Tongkuk 
University in Seoul.”  He “[p]osted street posters welcoming the North Korean People’s 
Army (NKPA) and denouncing the American Far Eastern policy.”  He joined the NKPA 
and later returned to Masan to help establish the G2 Office. 
The strategy of these Korean Nationals to establish a G2 Office not only as a front 
to their activities, but to actually facilitate their activities is a testament to the type of 
sovereignty and “state of exception” the U.S. military government had established on the 
peninsula.   It was apparent that the Korean people simply assumed that the U.S. or UN 
forces would operate on a parallel plane of activity similar to how they had during the 
occupation, but as evidenced by this investigation case, this plane of activity did not 
inspire the complete fear or respect that the United States had assumed it was due.  The 
“war of espionage” was thus at heart a conflict of the unresolved contradictions of the 
post-colonial era – or, to put it differently, a conflict that aimed to keep those 
contradictions unresolved.  Although a “state of emergency” is an abstract concept, it had 
immediate material consequences upon the Korean people. The deferral that was the state 
of exception had created novel forms of warfare. 
It was onto this stage that the “prisoner of war” entered.  The “prisoner of war” 
was certainly a figure of warfare, a temporary category that would cease to exist 
supposedly once the war stopped. Prisoners of war were brought within this rubric, not as 
a new category per se, but rather as contiguous with the SKLP and the guerilla fighters: 
“Sub-Team #2, during the month of November 1950, continued to interrogate Prisoners 
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of War, primarily to gain information of subversive activities, knowledge of atrocities or 
war crimes, locations, strength and armament of units of the North Korean Army and 
Guerilla Units.  Worthwhile information has been secured by this team during the course 
of its activity with its present project.”  Another Sub-Team of the CIC, Number 4, was 
reported to have “maintained constant liaison with the Korean Law Enforcement 
Agencies, with the emphasis on the detection of subversive elements, such as South 
Korean Labor Party members and guerillas.  Good liaison has been made by this team 
with the police.”137  The POW camps of the Korean War must be understood and 
inflected through the prism of the political landscape as shaped by the policies, 
experiences, and violence of the U.S. occupation period.  
The frame of the “war of espionage” was especially applicable to the U.S.-
controlled POW camps, and the parameters of “benevolence” and “death” still operated 
within the barbed-wire confines of the camp.  But a close examination of the U.S.-
controlled POW camps reveals a crucial change from the U.S. occupation “war of 
espionage” – in the POW camps of the Korean War, all Koreans were considered to be 
“suspicious.”  In other words, the U.S. military – despite, or perhaps even because of, the 
previous years of occupation – was even more unsure and uncertain of which Korean was 
leftist, rightist, communist, anti-communist, or any other category along a “political” 
axis.  And with the mass movements of soldiers, civilians, refugees, and also prisoners of 
war, the Counterintelligence Corps faced a particular challenge in locating and 
identifying the “war of espionage” on the ground.  For Agent Reports, the CIC had 
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developed a key for marking the political affiliation of all Korean subjects who appeared 
in the report narrative, including the interrogated Korean subject: 
RM-CP – Reported Member of Communist Party 
KM – Known Member of Communist Party 
PM-CP – Probably Member of Communist Party 
A-C – Anti-Communist 
U – Communist Affiliation Unknown/Political Affiliation Unknown138 
 
For the period of early 1951, the agent reports titled “Location and/or Apprehension of 
Espionage Agents” all contain a striking similarity – the key “U,” or “Political Affiliation 
Unknown” was used as labels for almost every Korean subject interrogated by the CIC or 
other affiliated military intelligence teams.139  Even with cases that seemed to present a 
straightforward case of affiliation with the northern Korean People’s Army, the CIC 
suspended immediate political categorization.  For example, the case of Pak Ik Soo was 
one illustration of the denotation: “On 6 June 51 Pak, Ik Soo (1) (U) was apprehended by 
elements of 5th Marines 1st Marine Division. At the time of capture Pak was wearing a 
NKPA uniform.”140  Pak had been captured by Chinese Communist Forces in February 
1951, and later became a prisoner of war under the custody of the Korean People’s Army.  
Pak then volunteered to serve with the NKPA.  However, possibly due to Pak’s 
divulgence of information – details about other members in his KPA battalion and 
description of military plans – the CIC labeled Pak with a “U.”  Other details similar to 
Pak’s report abound: Chong Do Yong, age 23 and from “Kyong Sung Nam Do,” was 
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“wearing an NKPA uniform under a ROKA uniform” at the time of apprehension by the 
Marine CIC agents on June 6, 1951.141  
Or in the case of Chung Nak Sam, age 29 from “Kangwon-do,” had joined the 
South Korean Labor Party in early 1948, went to North Korea for further training with 
the North Korean Labor Party, organized a guerilla fighter band in September 1950, and 
then supposedly helped with military intelligence work on United Nations activities.  The 
“Agents[sic] Note” for the report states, “During the course of interrogation Chung 
uttered various statements which were contradictory to earlier statements made by him.  
Chung talked openly about his own actions but was very reluctant to implicate other 
agents working with him.”142   Regarding the two other Koreans Chung does identify as 
having taken the “indoctrination” course in North Korea, the CIC special agent, George 
Yamamoto of the 181st CIC Detachment, also labels them as “U”: “Che Bong Sul 
(Korean) (U), age 32 […] Yu Uk Sam (Korean) (U), age 30.143 
The pattern of assigning “Political Affiliation Unknown” to the different Koreans 
suspected of having ties with North Korea or leftist organizations demonstrates two 
important elements of the “war of espionage” – first, the 38th parallel was not considered 
a determining factor in whether or not one was a radical “communist” Korean, and 
secondly, the vast application of the “U” category was not necessarily a political reprieve, 
but rather an indication of the extent of the overall suspicion the CIC and U.S. military 
intelligence harbored regarding Korean subjects.  Just as difficult to pin down was “anti-
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communism” – if it was difficult to ascertain exactly who was a “communist,” then how 
would one be able to determine who was an “anti-communist”? Although there was a 
great deal of ambiguity in the political categorization of the interrogation Korean subjects 
in the reports on potential espionage agents, ambiguity was neither sustainable nor 
possible politically in terms of survival during the Korean War.  At this point in the war 
in the year 1951, all Koreans along the political spectrum were potentially suspicious.   
As demonstrated earlier in this chapter, the economy of violence that undergirded 
the “state of emergency” worked in tandem with an economy of information that 
facilitated the U.S. military government’s claims to “knowing” the Korean, and thus 
legitimating its assertions to articulate the political desires of Koreans, on behalf of the 
Koreans.  During the U.S. occupation, the North West Young Men’s Association had 
become critical to the operations of the CIC – during the Korean War, a newly formed 
organization within the U.S.-controlled POW camps came to play a similar role vis-à-vis 
the U.S. military: the Anti-Communist Youth League.   
The ACYL became the dominant youth group organization in the U.S.-controlled 
POW camps, appearing in the POW camps during 1952.  In a report based on interviews 
with twenty-four Korean POWs leaders involved with the ACYL, the report’s author – 
the Psychological Warfare Section – mentions that earlier types of youth groups such as 
the “Students National Defense League” or “Corps” or the “Korean Youth Association” 
had been formed with the “aid of CIE personnel, to provide the framework whereby 
security might be maintained ‘so that the common POW had nothing to worry about.’”144 
These youth groups later were subsumed into the overall organization of the ACYL, the 
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formation of which had been encouraged by the Republic of Korea Army.  As I 
demonstrate in later chapters, much of the activity of the ACYL – in terms of 
surveillance, education, violence, and interrogation – much be seen as sovereignty-
claiming practices.  Or in other words, the ACYL functioned as a proxy in many ways for 
the anti-communist Korean state.  A later chapter tackles the issue of political recognition 
within the struggles of the leftist communist Korean prisoners of war – however, political 
recognition was also fraught on different levels for the rightist, anti-communist Korean 
prisoners of war also.   
Although the Civilian Information and Education and the Psychological Warfare 
Section of the U.S. military both worked very closely with the ACYL, the U.S. military 
both condoned the majority of the physical beatings and interrogations the anti-
communist youth groups administered on fellow prisoners of war.  Violence was, once 
again, not the issue. However, the report on the twenty-four POW ACYL leaders did 
express a discontent with one particular finding:  
The anti-communist leaders seem so eager to establish their own role in 
the creation of the anti-communist phalanx that they tend to minimize, or 
even deny, the contributions of CIE toward their success in the internal 
political struggle.  What these leaders regret is that CIE (and the Camp 
Command generally) did not take an active physical part in destroying the 
communist groups, that is this sense its position was, to the leaders, “too 
neutral.”145  
 
The difficulty here was that the ACYL leaders, although anti-communist, did not 
willingly express a gratitude for the “benevolence” of the U.S. military activities.  Even 
the rightist leaders, although in a different vein from the leftist leaders of earlier sections 
of this chapter, asserted a claim to a political subjectivity that was not fundamentally 
shaped by the policies and agendas of the United States. 
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 But the CIE and the Psychological Warfare Section should not have so easily 
dismissed the violent practices of the ACYL.  As demonstrated earlier with the 
“espionage” agent reports from the CIC, all Koreans were rendered suspicious, and the 
usual markers of identity, personal history, or self-narrative were no longer sufficient or 
deemed reliable.  Language was no longer reliable.  And what could be rendered visible 
within the political public sphere during the Korean War was in terms of the other 
parameter of the “state of emergency” – death.  The terrain of the political had been 
collapsed onto the individual Korean subject – and in turn, one could only render oneself 
visible by expressing one’s own relationship to U.S. sovereign power. 
In other words, from the “occupation of liberation” through the “war of 
intervention,” the U.S. military state had demanded a type of Korean subject – one that 
answered directly to the sovereign, exceptional authority embodied by the United States.  
And just as the United States posited itself as a “universal” liberal power, the subject it 
demanded was, in turn, also a “universalized” decolonized subject – but here, 
“universalized” had come to mean a divestment of all particular material histories in 
order to sublimate a direct relationship between the individual postcolonial subject and 
the United States.  A blood petition created by the members of the ACYL in the U.S.-
controlled POW camp located at Yongchon perhaps best exemplifies this collapsing in 
the political public sphere between the U.S. “state of emergency” and the political 
struggles on the ground. There were three sets of petitions – addressed specifically to 
President Eisenhower, General Clark, and Lt. Gen. Harrison, and each one was dated 
May 10, 1953, the petitions meticulously written in Korean and translated into English by 
the POWs themselves. For the text of the petitions, the POWs had used a sharp, dark 
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pencil, meticulously forming the Korean and English characters.  For signatures, the 
POWs had used their own pierced fingers, and the signatures that covered the entire 
width and breadth of these sheets of paper were signed in blood.   
The petition was a request for the release of the members of the ACYL from the 
POW camps – and thus from the category of “prisoners of war” – so they might fight 
against communist Koreans on the battlefield.  Beginning the petition with an excoriation 
of Stalin as the “son of a worthless shoe repairer,” the petition writers lament the 
misrecognition of themselves as “prisoners of war,” writing,   
Our sad fortunes is that today still double fence weight heavy on us and 
fall asleep with detention and get disappointment at surrounding when we 
wake up, moreover, why and how comes we are punished as a 
guiltlessness and vexatious PW?146 
 
At Panmunjom, there had been discussion on the part of the U.S. Army to release the 
anti-communist Korean prisoners of war in south Korea proper.   
We make a petition by our own warm blood.  Dearest Your Excellency! 
Even though these bloods are not worthwhile to see and a little quantity 
but it is an expression of our real determination Sir.  
It is our crying that give us an opportunity of releasing just like what Your 
Excellency said.  It is our real sincerity.”147   
 
“[R]eal determination” and “real sincerity” was to be communicated via the medium of 
blood, where the blood would more transparently and directly convey the true intentions 
and sentiments than any language or text itself.  In the end, it was the blood that mattered 
the most. 
The members of the ACYL insisted on their political will by framing their 
commitment in terms of their willingness to die for their state: 
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Estimate the tremble recollection of long time from five years we, the all 
members of Anti-Communist Young Men who are would opposed against 
the Reds, have been fighting continuously and how many times was it go 
over the point of death?148 
 
The expression of their political desires was couched in a vocabulary of bodily sentiment, 
where pain, tears, and their hearts were evidence of their loyalty: 
But our hearts which waiting with impatience for UN Forces and ROK 
Army in pain and how many times do we dropped tears looking upon the 
UN airplanes!149 
 
The medium of blood itself was to reinforce the collapsing of the intention, desire, and 
body into a “sincere subject,” where the blood itself expressed the “real determination.”  
Translation, in a sense, was circumvented by the medium of blood – there was no 
denying or misrecognizing the intent of the prisoners of war: 
We make a petition by our own warm blood.  Dearest Your Excellency!  
Even though these bloods are not worthwhile to see and a little quantity 
but it is an expression of our real determination Sir. 
 
It is our crying that give us an opportunity of releasing just like what Your 
Excellency said.  It is our real sincereity.150 
 
Each of the proclaimed demands of the prisoners of war was also positioned between two 
types of “deaths” – that of the anti-communist Korean prisoner of war and that of the 
communist Korean.  The earlier mentioned report on the POW leaders made a pointed 
comment on the “extreme feelings of the POWs toward communism and their desire for a 
a martyr’s role,” and attributed “[t]heir assumption of the hero’s role” to a need to 
“[compensate] for their ‘degrading’ POW status.”  But before “shame” solidifies as the 
operative incentive behind these seeming exhortations of “till death” pronouncements, it 
                                                
148 Ibid. 
149 Ibid. 
150 Ibid. 
  99 
is important to pause and consider this as an “act of writing.”  Who was the intended 
readership of this blood document?   
Similar perhaps to the Korean peasant farmer Chang with his trilingual sign over 
his home in 1946, these prisoners of war in 1953 were preempting any ambiguity in how 
they could be read by the U.S. military and state – the POWs were already performing the 
“collapsing” work of the demands of the United States in order to present a political 
demand.   I also believe that again similar to Chang’s sign, the writing was an act that 
signaled a definite position vis-à-vis the neighbors, or in the case of the prisoners of war, 
their fellow prisoners and other Korean personnel in the camp.  For 478 different, 
individual Korean prisoners of war sign their names with blood on large, separate sheets 
of paper, each act of signing must have been witnessed by the collective group.  With 
language sorely insufficient, the blood itself perhaps transformed the text into something 
more of a performance – a performance of one’s subjecthood, perfectly attuned to the 
demands upon it: 
1. We opposed to the death against prevail upon us to be repatriated which 
is under negotiation at cease-fire talks at Pan-Moon Jeom, becuase as we 
had been in N.K. under Red puppet regime for five years we well know 
their deception. 
 
2. We opposed to the death against Armistice without unification of our 
fatherland which be about to repeal the blood shedding during the Korean 
War for three (3) years.  Let’s attack up to the North Korea. 
 
3. Even if end us to a neutral nation or a neutral zone on ROK land for the 
purpose of bringing the temporary Armistic, we think it is one of 
deception policy of cruel Red for the forced repatriation, therefore to kill 
ourselves we dare in that case at ROK land. 
 
4. Give us an opportunity of releasing so that we may be able to going to 
front lines to fight against Red and make revenge on Red and washed a 
triumphal knife with the water of the Doo-Han River.151   
                                                
151 Ibid. 
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But what kind of performance was this petition, which was carefully rendered into 3 
separate copies with 487 signatures written in blood?  To refer back to an act of writing 
mentioned earlier in this chapter: “If any Corean remained mentally normal during the 
war, he was a fool.  Coreans made themselves split personalities.  They showed 
obedience in the presence of Japanese and they did just the opposite thing in reality. 
Without any munitions, revolutionists fought bravely in fields and in factories.”  This 
reflection on the demands on Korean subjectivity by the Japanese colonial rule within the 
pages of a leftist text from the U.S. occupation has, I argue, a resonance with the text and 
medium of the blood petition signed by the ACYL in 1953 during the Korean War.  The 
Koreans were still having to render themselves strategically as “split personalities,” 
performing a recognition of the benevolence of the United States in order to gain a 
certain breadth of limited political recognition in return, as death still hung in the balance, 
a continuous threat and reminder of the high stakes in this performance.  
 
Conclusion 
What kind of politics were possible within the public realms of the U.S. 
occupation?  How did the U.S. occupation profoundly impact the contours of the political 
during the Korean War?  The G-2 – and the CIC in particular – was at the heart of the 
epistemological project of the U.S. occupation – in order for the U.S. occupation to 
derive legitimate authority, the occupation forces must have been able to claim to know 
the “true intent” – the political desires - of the Korean people.  The U.S. occupation 
forces must purport to know the Koreans better than they do themselves – and it is in this 
very claim that the military intelligence enters the historical stage.   
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The foremost relationship that the U.S. military government was concerned with 
was the relationship between the individual Korean and the U.S. military government – 
did the average Korean recognize the authority and legitimacy of the USAMGIK?  What 
happened was that the U.S. occupation – and its subsequent structural and discursive 
legacies through the war – essentially collapsed the parameters for political discourse in 
Korea by distilling the question of power and the political into one that is the relation 
between the sovereign and the “bare life” individual.  Not the state and the citizen, nor 
the nation and the subject – but the sovereign and the “bare life” individual.  The 
profound material question of the nation-state itself – and the more immediate concerns 
surrounding the issues of land, rice, and distribution – would be swept under the rug, with 
all eyes focused on the meanings of Chang’s sign, rather than on his interests in terms of 
land distribution. 
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Chapter Two 
 
The Babel of Interrogation: 
A History of Japanese Americans from “Enemy Alien” to “POW Interrogator,” 
1942-1953152 
 
 
 In the files of the 500th Military Intelligence Service [MIS] in the National 
Archives located in College Park, Maryland sits a mimeographed copy of an article 
written by Associated Press journalist John Fujii.  The article itself never made it to press, 
as the MIS had deemed that it contained compromising material for the U.S. military 
efforts during the Korean War.  Fujii had written an article on an interrogation scene on 
the battlefield of the war.   
 John Fujii begins his never-published article, which was dated October 23, 1952, 
with this introduction to the interrogation scene: “There is a babel of tongues on this 
much fought over ridge – a babel of Chinese dialects, Korean, Japanese and one soft 
Louisiana drawl.”  The Louisiana drawl belonged to Lieutenant Henry J. Picard, “who 
[headed] a frontline interrogation team the Allies have whipped into shape to question 
prisoners.”  The team functioned as follows, according to Fujii’s description: 
Four languages are employed on each operation by the interrogation team. 
                                                
152 Using “Japanese Americans” for this time period is indeed anachronistic, as the term “Orientals” was 
the commonly-used one during this period.  “Asian American” would later be created by student 
movements in the 1960s as term for expressing the political solidarity of students from different Asian 
backgrounds.  Although “Japanese American” is awkward to use in a sense, the use of “Oriental” within 
this chapter would replicate much of the conflation between the Asian citizen of the United States and the 
Asian subject of U.S. hegemonic projects in East Asia.  As a result, I have decided to begin with the 
differentiated landscape of race and racializations by using “Japanese American,” rather than to begin with 
the flat, one-dimensional plane of “Orientalism,” since it is the argument of this chapter that one type of 
racialization project is used to delineate another. 
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Prisoners are interrogated in their native dialects by Hsiao Shu-len, a 
Chinese civilian, and Yun Bong Chun, a former Korean policeman. 
Their findings are written in English. 
Lieutenant Picard, who learned fluent Korean in a U.S. Army Language 
school, and his assistant First Lt. Thomas Shiratsuki, a Nisei from Salinas, 
Calif., who speaks fluent Japanese and English, translate the English into 
Korean for officers. 
It sounds like a cumbersome way of doing things but the team functions 
smoothly with Pvt. Kenjiro Fred Wakugawa, another Nisei, of Honolulu, 
acting as a sort of jack of all trades.153 
 
In fact, there were even more people involved in this “babel” of interrogation: when the 
Chinese prisoners of war began speaking quickly, “South Korean Lieutenant Pak Chan 
Be, who was born in China and educated in Japan, explained the proceedings in Japanese 
to Lieutenant Shiratsuki and in Korean or English to Lieutenant Picard.  They pieced 
together the information they were after.”  
 The officials in the MIS stated that they did not want the article to be published 
since it mentioned the names of the interrogators.154  But perhaps Fujii’s interrogation 
scene was also a potential threat to the integrity of the U.S. military in that it exposed the 
tremendous labor and contingent variables involved in producing a single document of 
“military information” or intelligence.  Six people and three languages were involved in 
this post-battle interrogation scene.  Fujii interpreted the scene as an example of the 
congenial, collaborative work between military allies.  But I argue that it is more of an 
example of how the activity of “interrogation” itself was entirely bound up in the 
histories of two empires – Japan and the United States – and the wars over the Pacific in 
the twentieth century. Shiratsuki and Wakugawa were from Salinas, California and 
                                                
153 AP Dispatch 148 by John Fujii; Folder: ITGP – 500; Journals – 500th Military Intelligence Group; Box 
6177; Army AG Commercial Reports; RG 407; National Archives and Records Administration; College 
Park, Maryland. 
154 Folder: ITGP – 500; Journals – 500th Military Intelligence Group; Box 6177; Army AG Commercial 
Reports; RG 407; National Archives and Records Administration; College Park, Maryland. 
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Honolulu, Hawaii respectively, both Nisei second-generation Japanese Americans who 
were members of a larger cohort of an estimated 4,000 Japanese Americans who worked 
as interrogators, translators of captured documents, or interpreters for diplomatic military 
meetings during the Korean War.155  In a war that has been often heralded as the marker 
of different beginnings – the early Cold War, the first military mobilization on the NSC 
68, the first official “hot war” of the U.S.-Soviet developing standoff – the histories of 
Shiratsuki and Wakugawa repositions the Korean War within the currents of much longer 
histories.   
This chapter follows a cohort within this generation of Japanese Americans as 
they move from being the “enemy aliens” of World War II to being drafted as “POW 
interrogators” for the Korean War.  Tracing their experiences provides a history of the 
interrogation room, by placing the interrogation room within longer histories of how 
“military necessity” was constructed within the U.S.-East Asia transpacific relationship 
within shifting constructions of race, empire, and nation.  The terms “internment,” 
“hostage exchange,” and “repatriation” join the “interrogation room” in this grounded 
history of military necessity.  In order to historicize the interrogation room, the 
interrogator and the templates of interrogation themselves must also be historicized. 
                                                
155 With President Truman’s executive order for the desegregation of the U.S. Army in 1948, the 
categorization and identification of military personnel by “race” was no longer used, although according to 
some of my interviewees, the U.S. Army circumvented the order by using photographs attached to 
personnel files. With such archival challenges, I have culled this number of “4,000” from the estimates 
given by members of the Japanese American War Veterans of the Korean War.  The war veterans have 
invested a great deal of time tracking down Japanese Americans who had served in World War II and the 
Korean War, examining both archival material of the U.S. military and also relying upon community 
memory.  The number of “4,000” could be considered rather conservative by some standards – in his book 
on Japanese American linguists who had served with the Military Intelligence Service during World War II, 
James McNaughton notes that “[b]y the spring of 1946 the school [Military Intelligence Service Language 
School] had graduated nearly 6,000 military linguists in the Japanese language.” (from James McNaughton, 
Nisei Linguists: Japanese Americans in the Military Intelligence Service during World War II (Washington, 
D.C.: Department of the Army, 2007), preface.) Not all of the 6,000 graduates would have been Japanese 
American; however, a sizable percentage was called back into service for the Korean War, as well as new 
draftees and volunteers. 
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 The U.S. military’s reliance on Japanese American translators and interrogators 
was expressly recognized in a hearing held by the U.S. Subcommittee on Korean War 
Atrocities, a subsidiary of the larger Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations headed 
by Senator Joseph McCarthy.  On December 4, 1953, Colonel James M. Hanley, the 
former head of the War Crimes Division, expounded on the process of interrogation 
utilized to guarantee the veracity of the reports and cases filed by his Judge Advocate 
General (JAG) teams: 
You might be interested in how we interrogated these prisoners.  We used 
Koreans, of course, to carry on the preliminary interrogations of the 
prisoners, and in the case of the Chinese used the Chinese or at least 
Chinese-speaking Koreas.  Some of the work, interrogation, was done by 
American Nisei, speaking Japanese, with the Koreans who understood and 
spoke Japanese, many of whom did.156 
 
Hanley emphasized that in order to verify the accuracy of the information given; the 
protocol required that the POWs “swear to them before an American officer in all cases, 
or subsequently getting the document translated into English.  Those documents were 
sworn to in the native tongue of the prisoner so he had an opportunity to read it and know 
exactly what he signed.”  For Hanley, the procedural bureaucratic nature of the process 
was clearly fundamental to the presentation of the interrogation room as a site that would, 
in turn, produce “objective truth” or “information.”  Distortion – as in all possible human 
variable elements – was supposedly eliminated through the checks and balances of 
bureaucracy. 
 Bureaucracy plays a central role in this chapter’s story of subject-making, as I 
first examine the extensive practice of list-making by the U.S. Department of State in the 
surveillance over the Japanese American population in the United States.  The Japanese 
                                                
156 Subcommittee on Korean War Atrocities, Korean War Atrocities, 83rd Congress, First Session, 
December 4, 1953 1953, 152. 
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American had become the object of bureaucratic rule and surveillance during World War 
II, but in the Korean War, the Japanese American interrogator became the small military 
bureaucrat in the role of the POW interrogator, responsible for assessing the “reliability” 
of the Korean prisoner of war.  By moving from President Roosevelt’s Executive Order 
in 1942 through the Korean War until 1953, I demonstrate how the figure of the Japanese 
American moved from being a subject created by U.S. anti-Asian exclusionary 
immigration laws, to the subject of “enemy alien” emergency measures, to the 
redemptive post-WWII figure of U.S. racial liberalism, and then became the bureaucrat 
who would determine the “reliability” of the postcolonial Korean subject.   
 But this very same story is also a history that reveals that the interrogation room 
may have looked nothing like what Colonel Hanley asserted in front of the House Sub-
committee in 1953.  Even the U.S. military interrogation room had its own history, one 
embedded in a longer temporality of multiple imperial projects across the Pacific.  In 
1950, second-generation Japanese American Sam Miyamoto found himself on the 
Korean peninsula, after having been drafted by the U.S. military to work as a POW 
interrogator.  According to Miyamoto, the Korean communist prisoners of war would, 
almost without fail, spit upon the interrogation room floor before entering.  However, 
when they arrived at his interrogation room, they would instead want to ask him 
questions – and Miyamoto did allow the Korean POWs to ask him personal questions.  In 
essence, one could say that the interrogator allowed the interrogatee to interrogate him. 
There was one particular question the Korean POWs all seemed to want to ask 
Miyamoto. The Korean prisoners of war wanted to learn about the internment camps that 
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the U.S. government had created for the Japanese American population during World 
War II after Pearl Harbor.  The exchange, in Miyamoto’s words, unfolded as follows: 
Well, they know that I was in a concentration camp in America during 
World War II, and they said, ‘You know, if I was in a concentration camp, 
I won’t be in the army here.  I won’t be fighting under the U.S. Army.’ 
[And] I told him the truth.  I said, ‘I’m here because I was ordered to come 
here.  I didn’t come here by choice.  I was ordered to join the army and I 
was ordered to study the Korean language, and I was ordered to come here 
and talk to you about this.157 
 
“I told him the truth,” the seventy-year-old Sam Miyamoto said in reflecting upon his 
experiences as an interrogator during an oral history interview he gave in February 2008.  
It was an extraordinary gesture – a former interrogator in reflections upon interrogations 
he had conducted over a half-century before was insisting that he had told the “truth” to 
the prisoners of war in his interrogation room.   
Miyamoto’s “truth” was one of a man who had been made a subject of multiple 
projects of empire, namely Japanese and American imperial ambitions.   But Miyamoto’s 
insistence that he had told the “truth” also belies his insistence that he had made a choice.  
Miyamoto’s experience as an interrogator must be understood within his own history of 
constant negotiations with U.S. state bureaucracies. Miyamoto’s own life story frames the 
Korean War within a series of different “state of emergency” policies fashioned and 
mobilized by the United States.  Born in California, Sam Miyamoto was fourteen years 
old when Roosevelt’s “Day of Infamy” occurred and his family subsequently sent to the 
internment camp in Poston, Arizona.  Within less than a year, Miyamoto and his family 
found themselves aboard the S.S. Gripsholm as parties to a hostage exchange, where 
Japanese nationals and Japanese Americans were exchanged for white American 
businessmen, journalists, and missionaries.  Upon arrival at the port at Yokohama in 
                                                
157 Sam Shigeru Miyamoto, interview by author, March 1, 2007, Monterey Park, California. 
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Japan, Miyamoto’s own strangely rendered “statelessness” would take yet another twist – 
because his parents had not registered his birth in Japan, he was therefore not recognized 
as a citizen in Japan.  Unable to attend Japanese schools and struggling to survive in a 
war-devastated Japan, Miyamoto left his family to try to make his own way, and 
eventually came to Tokyo. A witness to the U.S. military firebombing of Tokyo and later 
to the post-atomic landscape of Hiroshima, Miyamoto was an American citizen legally, 
but was essentially a stateless person, an enemy alien to two different empires.  In 1949, 
after attending Christian missionary-run schools in Japan, Miyamoto enrolled at UCLA, 
but wanted to pursue studies in law, which at that time were only offered at UC Berkeley.  
While he was waiting for his transfer, the U.S. military drafted him for the Korean War, 
and within a few months, Miyamoto found himself on the Korean peninsula, instructed to 
interrogate Korean prisoners of war. 
When we examine the Korean War from inside the military interrogation room, 
the Korean War gains significance as yet another development in a series of “states of 
emergency” as mobilized by the United States.  The presence of defiance and reluctance 
in Miyamoto’s interrogation room revealed not only how the subject-making was a two-
fold project, involving both the interrogator and the interrogatee, but also how both 
people were negotiating shifts of “personhood” – moving from colonial subject to 
national citizen, or, in case of Miyamoto, from enemy alien to citizen-soldier.  In essence, 
the story is about subject-making by the U.S. empire. 
More crucially, this story is about how the interrogation room, symbolic of the 
liberal bureaucratic military of the U.S., has its own history in a trajectory longer than the 
standard temporal frame of 1950 to 1953 for the Korean War – this story will instead 
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span the years from the 1920s through the early Cold War. Formal decolonization had 
arrived, and the United States, along with the United Nations, had proclaimed itself the 
“beacon of light” for the postwar world. After 1945, the former colony of Korea was to 
become a nation-state via trusteeship under the United States, Japan would be a former 
empire domesticated into a nation-state by the United States, and the United States would 
emerge as a hegemonic power firmly ensconced in its disavowal of its own imperial 
ambitions.  The individuation of “nation-states,” and the normalization of the fiction of 
the nation-state system demanded also a reinscribing of who was the proper individual 
subject of a nation-state.  The interrogation room’s particular production of “information” 
was simultaneously revealing of the shifting discourses around sovereignty, liberal 
individualism, and racial formations in the wake of formal decolonization; and the 
interrogation room exposed how all three ideas were fundamentally implicated and 
informed by each other in the newly-fangled post-1945 U.S. empire.   
This chapter, I aim to denaturalize notions of “military necessity,” “information,” 
and “interrogation,” by gathering and reading a myriad of materials to suggest multiple 
histories and subjective interpretations of what happened in an interrogation room during 
the Korean War.  By presenting the histories, negotiations, and power dynamics in the 
interrogation room, I hope to present a methodology for reading the U.S. military 
bureaucratic archive, both against and along the grain. From the military records of 
different interrogation units during the Korean War to the records concerning the U.S.-
Japan hostage exchange conducted by the U.S. State Department, bureaucratic records 
play a crucial role in the telling of the story.  Because this chapter is also a reflection on 
the workings and assumptions of “bureaucracy,” and ultimately locates “military 
  110 
necessity” as an ideal of liberal bureaucratic U.S. imperial workings, the oral history 
interviews with Japanese American former interrogators form the key material as the 
former interrogators themselves narrate the process, the decisions, and their actions.  In 
turn, their attention to process and production informs the overall methodology of this 
chapter.158  The oral history interviews create a productive tension with bureaucratic 
records, illuminating not only how the bureaucratic record collapses gestures and labor 
involved in the interrogation process, but also a different set of stakes involved in the act 
of interrogation.  If, as this chapter argues, interrogation was ultimately a moment of 
subject-making in terms of both the interrogator and the interrogated, how did the 
interrogator negotiate this project?  And, indeed, why did Sam Miyamoto, a half century 
after his experiences interrogating on the Korean peninsula, insist that he had told the 
“truth” to a Korean POW? 
 
A Hostage Exchange to Herald the “War” 
On December 8, 1941, President Franklin Delano Roosevelt stood in front of the 
U.S. Congress and delivered a speech that would herald the entrance of the United States 
into World War II.  “Yesterday, December 7, 1941 – a date which will live in infamy – 
the United States of America was suddenly and deliberately attacked by naval and air 
forces of the Empire of Japan.” He ended the speech with a request: “I ask that the 
                                                
158 The interviews conducted for the Japanese American Living Legacy Oral History Project are housed at 
the Center for Oral and Public History, California State University, Fullerton.  Susan Uyemura has been the 
driving force behind the JA Living Legacy initiative. I thank her and the rest of the people with JA Living 
Legacy for their generosity in helping me contact different veterans, while also teaching me an enormous 
amount on the local histories of Japanese American communities in southern California.   
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Congress declare that since the unprovoked and dastardly attack by Japan on Sunday, 
December 7th, a state of war has existed by the United States and Japanese Empire.”159   
“War” was most immediately heralded by two actions taken by the U.S. 
government in December 1941: the arrest of over 2,000 Japanese Americans in the 
United States and the sending of a letter to Japan regarding a potential exchange of U.S. 
civilians in the Japanese empire for Japanese nationals and Japanese American citizens in 
the United States. Agents from the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) came directly to 
the homes of Japanese American families, and the arrests of 2,000 Japanese American 
men affected the families of young adolescents like Toro Isobe and Sam Miyamoto.  On 
December 7, 1941, Toro Isobe was fourteen years old.  Born in San Francisco, Toro had 
moved with his parents to Los Angeles in 1939 to seek work during the Great 
Depression.  His father found employment managing a small hotel called the Victorian 
Hotel, and they leased a small residential unit in the hotel itself. “On the night of 
December 7th, the FBI came and took my father away, so mother was left by herself with 
four kids.”160 Sam Miyamoto remembered the visit of the FBI to his family home also: “I 
still recall two FBI agents who came to our home on February 19, 1942 with sirens 
piercing the small farming community in Imperial Valley.  It was frightening.  My father 
was stunned.”  Miyamoto’s father showed the FBI his passport to prove that he was a 
legal immigrant.  In response, the FBI stated that they “were not questioning his loyalty, 
rather they were rounding up the community leaders.”  The FBI took Miyamoto’s father 
away, and froze the family’s bank account.  “Financial ruin and fear of an uncertain 
future for the family finally took its toll on my father.  When Dad joined the family in 
                                                
159 U.S. Department of State, Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States: Japan, 1931-
1941, vol. 2 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1943), 793-794. 
160 Tohoru Isobe, interview by author, February 27, 2007, Los Angeles, California. 
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July of 43, all his hair had turned white, and suddenly he looked old beaten and 
withdrawn.  He showed pain when I told him we lost everything; the farm, equipment, 
car, home, truck, and all our personal belongings.”161 
By June 27, 1942, the infamous Public Proclamation No. 8 was posted on the 
walls and telephone poles of different communities all throughout the military zones:   
The present situation within these military areas requires as a matter of 
military necessity that persons of Japanese ancestry who have been 
evacuated from certain regions within Military Areas Nos. 1 and 2 shall be 
removed to Relocation Centers for their relocation, maintenance and 
supervision and that such Relocation Centers be designated as War 
Relocation Project Areas and that appropriate restrictions with respect to 
the rights of all such persons of Japanese ancestry, both alien and non-
alien, so evacuated to such Relocation Centers and of all other persons to 
enter, remain in, or leave such areas be promulgated […]162 
 
For the next three years, over 120,000 Japanese Americans would be forcibly removed by 
the U.S. government into internment camps located in sites as various as Heart Mountain, 
Wyoming to Poston, Arizona.  “Although two thirds of the internees were American 
citizens, they were incarcerated without any charge, trial, or evidence against them.”163  
Most of this study’s cohort was shuttled through the Santa Anita racetrack camp 
eventually, and then was sent to camps scattered all over the United States: Manzanar in 
California - Jerome, Arkansas – Gila River near Phoenix, Arizona - Rohwer, Arkansas – 
Poston, Arizona - Heart Mountain, Wyoming. Arnold Yoshizawa, twelve-years-old at the 
time, was living in the Boyle Heights neighborhood of Los Angeles – he was sent to 
Manzanar. Robert Shiroishi, an eleven-year-old growing up on Long Beach, was shuttled 
                                                
161 Miyamoto, interview.  
162 From the Japanese American War Veterans online digital archive: www.javadc.org. Accessed May, 25, 
2010. 
163 Michael Robinson, By Order of the President: FDR and the Internment of Japanese Americans 
(Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2001), 4. 
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with his family through Santa Anita and finally to Jerome, Arkansas.164   
 Another displacement would soon take place within the Japanese American 
communities, and Sam Miyamoto along with the members of his immediate family 
would find themselves on yet another list.  The names of all the members in the 
Miyamoto family appear within the pages of a different U.S. government list dated 
September 2, 1943. Sam Shigeru Miyamoto at age 15, along with his parents and three 
other siblings, found himself on a sailing list with a simple title: “Japanese Embarked for 
Second Voyage of Gripsholm.”165  They became part of a “hostage exchange” between 
the United States and Japan. 
627. Miyamoto, Shinichi M 53   United States 
628.       ˝        , Masu (Mrs. Shinichi) 43   ˝ 
629.  ˝ , Arata M 17     ˝ 
630.  ˝ , Shigeru  M 15    ˝ 
631. ˝ , Atsushi  M 13    ˝ 
632.  ˝ , Ayako Lily  F 11    ˝ 
  
For the Miyamoto family, another document in addition to the Executive Orders, 
Proclamations, and the Constitution would be brought to bear – or held in abeyance – 
onto their experience: the 1929 Geneva Conventions on Prisoners of War.  A different 
calculus in determining the proper subjecthood for people like the Miyamoto family came 
to the fore – and this time it was a certain formulation of sovereignty.  In other words, 
there was yet another project of “military law” and “military necessity” being worked 
through the Japanese American population. 
                                                
164 Arnold Yoshizawa, interview conducted by Susan Uyemura for the Japanese American Living Legacy 
Oral History Project, December 2, 2006, Carson , California.  Robert Shiroishi, interview conducted by 
Susan Uyemura for the JA Living Legacy Oral History Project, November 22, 2006, Cypress, California. 
165 From a narrative and archival document compilation given to me by Atsushi “Archie” Miyamoto, the 
younger brother of Sam Miyamoto.  Compiled and written in October 2006, Miyamoto titled the report, 
“The Gripsholm Exchanges: A short concise report on the exchange of hostages during World War II 
between the United States and Japan as it relates to Japanese Americans.”  Atsushi “Archie” Miyamoto, 
interview conducted by author, February 26, 2007, Harbor City, California. 
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On December 8, 1941, the same day as President Roosevelt’s “Day in Infamy” 
speech, the U.S. government transmitted through the Swiss Minister in Tokyo its initial 
proposal for the treatment and eventual exchange of Japanese government officials in 
return for American government officials.  In 1942, according to U.S. naval intelligence 
calculations, there were approximately 3,000 U.S. citizens in the Far East, of whom 1,000 
to 1,500 were missionaries. The Japanese military in its large sweep down from 
Manchuria to the south of the Asian continent – to Singapore and the Philippines -  had 
taken prisoner these 3,000 American citizens. 166 Businessmen, journalists, and 
missionaries composed most of this “hostage” population – they were the “non-officials.”  
And they were the locus of the U.S. government’s concern.  
On December 10 1941, Japanese officials in Tokyo received the U.S. proposal to 
exchange non-official American citizens who were within the reach of the Japanese 
empire, especially Manchuria, along with government officials.  But one question 
remained: under which legal precedent or rubric would the exchange take place?  On 
December 17 1941, Max Huber, President of the International Red Cross, “answered a 
Japanese inquiry on this very point: ‘We think that [the] fact Japan is not party [to the] 
1929 conventions relative to war prisoners does not prevent carrying out above-
mentioned scheme provided reciprocity agreed upon by parties of war or provided these 
parties declare themselves prepared apply de facto provisions contained in 1929 war 
prisoners convention.”167 As both the Japanese and U.S. governments agreed to follow 
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the provisions of the 1929 Geneva Conventions, the phrase “reciprocity” soon became a 
basis for much of the negotiations to follow.168 
Soon members of the U.S. Department of State were becoming upset over the 
treatment of “Americans” by the Japanese. BL (most possibly Brekendridge Long, the 
assistant Secretary of State) wrote in a memo, “It has come repeatedly to my notice, and 
for sometime I have had the intention of recording the thought that according to the terms 
of our exchange agreement with Japan the whole affair was to be on a reciprocal basis.” 
169  
The Japanese military had sequestered American citizens into certain sections of cities, or 
camp-like areas. However, the anxiety provided a moment of reflection on the 
“reciprocal” aspect of the exchange, members of the Department of State acknowledged 
that American actions with Japanese Americans had undermined a possible case for 
protest against Japan’s sequestering of American citizens in camps: 
February 16, 1943 
SD[special division] does not feel that this Government is in a position at 
this time to protest the mass internment of American nationals on the basis 
of the four reasons outlined by the Swiss in Bern’s 1028, February 13. 
One: Many Japanese were moved to relocation centers before camps were 
completed. 
Two: The aged and infirm and sick, as well as pregnant women and small 
children, were moved by trains and buses to relocation centers. 
Three: Many Japanese were removed from their homes on only a few 
hours notice. 
Four: Many of the relocation centers to which Japanese were removed are 
in remote inaccessible areas. 
No reasons have been given by the Japanese for the mass internment of 
American nationals in and near Shanghai.  It can be assumed that if we 
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were to protest that action the Japanese would be justified in replying that 
this Government has already taken similar action in regard to Japanese 
nationals, which is true.170   
 
The significance of the various interpretations, frustrations, and preoccupations with 
“reciprocity” on the part of the Special Division of the Department of State lies in the 
longer history of the United States and Japan negotiating their imperial ambitions with 
each other.  This concern over “reciprocity,” I contend, demonstrates another set of stakes 
involved in the “hostage exchange” with Japan.  
The conflict over political recognition – or to put it more directly, the position of 
Japan within white, Euro-centric systems of imperial hegemony, namely British and 
American – was one that had its own history.  Scholar Bruce Cumings has charted what 
he termed the “archaeology of Japan in the twentieth-century world-system,” where he 
analyzes how Japanese officials and diplomats had to negotiate with both Britain and the 
U.S. in their claims for hegemony in Asia, ambitions that were supported and encouraged 
by the two Western states as long as Japan remained “Number Two,” to further borrow 
from Cumings’ terminology.171  Japan, in the opinions of prominent Anglo Americans, 
was uniquely positioned to extend the “civilizing mission” and “enlighten” the other 
areas of Asia, such as China and Korea.  The Taft-Katsura agreement of 1905 made the 
stipulation that Japan would be able to claim Korea as a colony, only if Japan would not 
impede American efforts in the Philippines.  As Japan increased in ambition, expansion, 
and control over the Asian region, the fiction of equal nation-state actors or nation-bound 
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entities came to the fore in the treaties in which Japan participated.  Attempting to use 
leverage to claim itself as a recognized power with the Euro-American sphere of 
influence, Japan put forth a series of proposals, most importantly the racial equality 
clause for the Treaty of Versailles.  But the proposal set forth by an Asian empire shone 
too much light on the inherent contradictions of Euro-American imperialism and colonial 
systems.  The racial equality clause was not adopted – and Japan also found itself 
negotiating the Gentleman’s Agreement with the United States in the face of the Asian 
exclusion act, which followed from the earlier anti-Chinese immigration era.172   
In addition to the realm of migration and labor, war and sovereignty became also 
the arena in which questions of recognition and subjecthood were negotiated between 
Japan and the United States.  The most notable – and also most important for my analysis 
in this chapter – was the Stimson Doctrine in 1931. On September 18, 1931, Japanese 
imperial forces moved to occupy cities and towns in southern Manchuria.  Over the next 
two months, members of the U.S. State Department debated over the proper stance to 
take vis-à-vis Japan.  The most immediate concern – besides U.S. access to markets and 
materials in China – was the breach of the Kellogg-Briand Pact. A resolution to the issue 
came in the form of a note written and sent by Stimson – later to be known as the 
Stimson Doctrine – stating that the United States would not, in fact, recognize the 
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territories acquired by the Japanese in Manchuria. The fiction of the nation-state system 
was asserted in this moment of non-recognition, and the Stimson Doctrine drove home 
the point that Japan was not to be an empire on par with the Western nations. 
Within the much longer history of treaty-making and exchanges between the U.S. 
and Japan, this particular “hostage” exchange would present an age-old dilemma in a new 
light: how does the U.S. engage in a hostage exchange with an enemy it does not want to 
recognize as its equal?  The language of “reciprocity” would become critical to the 
dialogue over the exchange, laying bare the fiction of the equality of sovereign nation-
states. According to scholar Bruce Elleman on the stance of Japanese officials over the 
hostage exchange: “In the midst of World War II, the Japanese negotiators were 
determined not to allow any inequalities between enemies.  To make matters worse, at the 
beginning of the war there were many more American officials and ordinary citizens 
being detained by Japan than there were Japanese officials and citizens being held in 
custody by the United States.  This made a truly ‘reciprocal’ exchange very difficult.”173 
The calculus of the politics of recognition – each nation-state being an equal actor on the 
world stage – was also the calculus determining the logistics of the hostage exchange: 
one Japanese subject for every American citizen. 
But who was a “Japanese” subject, and who was an “American” citizen?  And 
what happens when one does not have enough “Japanese subjects” to exchange? The 
international language of treaties and warfare had officially become the framework that 
bound the exchange – and the language of “prisoners of war” had been adopted for 
application to the exchange of official and non-official civilians. In this moment, the 
Japanese American was being interpolated not simply by one state, but rather the politics 
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of recognition; the Japanese American was not firmly a citizen of a state, but rather a 
subject of two empires, on whom the conflict of political recognition would play out. 
The Japanese government had already given a list to the U.S. of different 
Japanese nationals residing in the United States whom they would deemed as acceptable 
“reciprocal” exchanges with the American citizens in its custody.  The list-making was 
fraught with difficulties. In a telegram dated May 18 to Bern, the Special Division stated: 
“United States Government thus confirms that it expects to repatriate upon the 
contemplated voyages of the Gripsholm (numbering possibly three) all Japanese internees 
or detainees or other Japanese nationals expressing desire for repatriation whether that 
desire is first expressed by the individual or by the Spanish Embassy in charge of 
Japanese interests.”174 Here, it is crucial to note that the United States government was 
now beginning to turn to find Japanese nationals and Japanese Americans detainees who 
were not on the list sent by the Japanese government.  
The Japanese American internees did not respond as the U.S. Department of State 
had anticipated.  According to a Department of State Special Division document titled, 
“Individuals Named by the Japanese Government for Repatriation Who Have Refused to 
Go to Japan,” three thousand one hundred and one of those individuals had refused 
repatriation.  Another fifty-six had refused to respond to the question regarding 
repatriation all together.  In response to these large numbers of repatriation rejections – 
and those who had refused to take the survey at all – George Brandt of the Special 
Division wrote that the Japanese individuals might reconsider repatriation once they 
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realize that “their emperor” had requested their repatriation, since they were, as he noted, 
an “obedient race.”175 
But “obedience” and “loyalty” would not map out according to the expectations 
of those in the Department of State.  According to Bruce Elleman, the infamous loyalty 
questionnaire was one method the U.S. Department of State employed to find more 
willing “repatriates” among the Japanese Americans.  But in the end “only 4 Japanese 
from the relocation centers were included on the first exchange in 1942, while 314 others 
were included in the 1943 exchange.”176  The loyalty questionnaire had supposedly 
produced “a total of 20,161 Japanese citizens and American citizens of Japanese ancestry 
[who] offered to participate in the official U.S.-Japanese exchange program by returning 
to Japan.” Of this group, over 15,000 elected to remain in the United States at the war’s 
end – and the Japanese government, in its insistence upon “reciprocity,” rejected the 
exchange of primarily working-class Japanese nationals for the American officials in its 
care.  On the other hand, 3,101 of the Japanese and Japanese American citizens requested 
by the Japanese government refused “repatriation.”  “Loyalty” and “obedience” were 
clearly not the ideologies framing this choice of “repatriation.”  And yet, the constant 
reassessment, the constant list-making of the loyal versus disloyal continued. 
 The project of racial liberalism had taken on many different forms. 177 From the 
internment camps to the SS Gripsholm, it is clear that the United States had no problem 
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with rendering people “stateless.” For Miyamoto, citizenship would take on another 
dimension of “statelessness.” List-making, categorization, making more lists, and re-
categorization was also at the heart of the Japanese American internment project.  
“Military necessity” in this instance did not mean simply the nullification of citizenship – 
and the claims therein – but “military necessity” also meant the exercise of sovereign 
power.  Holding people’s subjecthood in abeyance was not the problem confronting the 
Department of State’s Special Division – rather the constant ability to  - the sovereign 
practice of – hold a person in abeyance was the point, in fact.  It was a “politics of 
recognition” being played out upon a highly differentiated population of Japanese 
nationals and Japanese Americans.   
 
The Choice of an “Enemy Alien” between Two Empires 
In September of 1942, armed guards arrived at the Poston camp to escort the 
people who were to be exchanged on the SS Gripsholm. “It was not an adventure which I 
either desired or volunteered for,” said Miyamoto. Upon arriving in New York, a few 
protested and refused to board the ship, but according to Miyamoto, “those who refused 
were told that they would be tied and loaded on the ship with the baggage to be shipped 
to India.” 
We sailed south hugging the South Pole view the magnificent large 
icebergs.  Avoiding the war, we finally approached India.  We were 
hypnotized by the beauty and mystic calmness of the Indian Ocean – 
sometimes when I see a beautify[sic] sunset, I am haunted by the memory 
of one Japanese American who jumped overboard into the Indian Ocean – 
what was he thinking?  Was he a romanticist or was he grieving? 
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The choice to “repatriate” was one that was fraught with the unknown. For Sam 
Miyamoto, a young fifteen-year-old Japanese American who did not speak Japanese, 
going to Japan was unimaginable.  And although we cannot answer Miyamoto’s question 
of what the Japanese American man who had thrown himself overboard into the Indian 
Ocean was thinking, we can delve further into inquiring what this “choice” of pseudo-
repatriation entailed for the non-official Issei and Nisei Japanese Americans.   
 Among the multitude of lists of Japanese Americans in the Special Division 
archives is a series of excerpts from and summaries of letters sent between Japanese 
American family members, especially those families residing in Hawaii whose fathers 
had been taken to U.S. mainland camps for closer surveillance.  A close reading of the 
excerpted letters demonstrates that the choice of whether or not to go to Japan as the 
Special Division was encouraging was debated in terms of family reunions and 
imaginings of what the postwar world would like.178  Questions of loyalty, nationalism, 
and the Japanese empire were absent, at least from the excerpts.  Instead, the question on 
the table for these families was: What kind of life would be possible for the Japanese 
American after the war, and where? 
 Fort Sill, Oklahoma held many of these Japanese American men from Hawaii’s 
communities, and the letters addressed to the men interned at Fort Sill illuminates how 
these families were attempting to use “repatriation” as a possible way to reunite the 
family.  Hirayoki Okaji from Hawaii wrote to Toyomi Okaji in Fort Sill, Oklahoma: 
“clothing ready to be packed for trip to Japan, mother could go too.  Sanehiro and I could 
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remain here, we can always have any amount of cash sent to you.”  A T. Shoda from 
Maui wrote to Mr. Seichi Shoda: “If you go we might as well follow, if possible,” an 
implication that the family would join Shoda in Japan, if necessary. The Special Division 
noted that in the letter from Mrs. Yasu Hino of Hilo, Hawaii to the Reverend S. Hino, 
“Writer says that her friends are assured that they are to be sent to Japan, and requests her 
husband to take steps to secure her evacuation to Japan.” Yoshinao Kokuzo also of Hilo, 
Hawaii may have been one of Mrs. Hino’s friends – the Special Division noted that in her 
letter to Reverend Zenkai Kokuzo at Fort Sill, the “[w]riter looks forward with complete 
assurance to her return to Japan and eventual reunion with husband.”179 
 Anticipating and imagining the postwar era was a crucial part of the decision-
making process. Toraichi Uyeda in Camp Livingston wrote a very revealing letter to Mrs. 
Masaye Uyeda in Honolulu: according to the summary done by the Special Division, 
“Husband tells wife why he wishes to be repatriated.  Has aged mother and son in Japan 
and can return more quickly from Japan to the Islands than from U.S. to the Islands, after 
the war.” Others noted the current treatment of Japanese Americans within the United 
States. T. Sekiguchi in the WCCA Center in Pinedale, California wrote to a Mr. B.A. 
Ploe in Canada: “Dissatisfied with treatment received in Assembly Center  American-
born does not like to be treated as alien.” Sekiguchi’s letter was condemned, but other 
letters echoed similar sentiments, expressing wariness about the postwar future for 
Japanese Americans in Hawaii or the United States.  Mr. Hoshida in Lordsburg, New 
Mexico wrote to Mrs. Tamae Hoshida in Hawaii: “We’ll have bery[sic] little 
opportunities left in Hawaii after the war and believe will be better to start over in Japan.” 
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 Miyamoto did not know exactly why his father had decided to bring the family to 
Japan, but it is clear that the question of “repatriation” was a crucial moment in the 
“transnational” imaginary of the Japanese American community.  And “transnational” for 
these Japanese Americans was not about “transcending” the national, as Eiichiro Azuma 
has asserted in his scholarship – “transnational” was an important element of the 
Japanese American communities’ strategies for negotiating their place within the 
competing “politics of recognition” outlined earlier in the chapter.180  Only for the 
Japanese Americans, the “politics of recognition” had already been playing out in terms 
of a particular claims to personhood – labor.   
In his noted work, The Issei, historian Yuji Ichioka stated, “Japanese American 
history is labor history,” and this frame of labor is crucial to our analysis in this section as 
we follow the histories of the young Japanese Americans through the postwar era.181 
Their own family histories spanned an era that is significant in the policy changes 
rendered - from the Chinese Exclusion Act of 1882, the 1907 Gentlemen’s Agreement, 
through the 1913 Alien Land Act, the 1924 Immigration Act, and the 1931 Stimson 
Doctrine.  In this section, I argue that we must view the displacement of Japanese 
Americans via internment camps and the “hostage exchange” within a longer history of 
negotiated migration and labor.   
The story of labor begins with sugar cane, steel, lumber, and fish along the 
Pacific.  The sugar cane plantations established by white American settler colonists in the 
U.S. colony of Hawaii, the expanding railroad system in the American West, and the 
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fishing and lumber industries in the northwestern states were often the initial labor 
markets available to Japanese at the turn of the century.  The parents of Thomas and 
Harry Tanaka, two brothers who were born in 1927, had come to Hawaii from their home 
in Fukuoka, Japan to work in the sugar cane fields.182  The railroad companies had relied 
heavily on Chinese laborers, but with the Chinese Exclusion Act of 1882, some Japanese 
migrant laborers began filling the ranks, as did Howard Okada’s grandfather: “You know 
the Santa Fe railroad that goes down to LA?  He worked on that.  Like a lot of Chinese 
laborers did.”183  Roy Shiraga’s father and Jim Yanagihara’s father both went north.  
Shiraga’s father arrived in San Francisco in 1905 at the age of sixteen, but after the Great 
Earthquake in 1906, went north to work as a lumberjack in the mills of Oregon and 
Washington, later working on the northern railroads.  Yanagihara’s father first worked in 
the fishing industry in Seattle, and later settled in Imperial Valley, in southern California, 
similar to Okada’s grandfather.184 
In 1907, in an attempt to extricate and exceptionalize Japan in the face of the 1882 
Chinese Exclusion Act, the “Gentlemen’s Agreement” was reached between the U.S. and 
Japan, allowing for the travel of Japanese students and diplomats to the United States 
with the understanding that Japan would prevent further emigration to the United States.  
1908 would herald a shift in the strategies of the Issei who were already residing in the 
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United States – and they changed from being a primarily labor-contracting source of 
labor to inhabiting what scholar Eiichiro Azuma has called a “settler colonist” identity.185  
The Issei became permanent settlers as a way to counter the anti-Japanese and anti-Asian 
movement in the States, and agriculture in turn became the primary strategy. 
 The decision to move to southern California became a common one among the 
first-generation Japanese Americans.  Cultivating “niche crops that white farmers tended 
to neglect – such as asparagus, berries, celery, onions, potatoes, and cantaloupes,” 
Japanese Americans were able to create a living.186 Okada’s father specifically cultivated 
strawberries and vegetables outside of Fresno; Roy Matsuzaki’s parents worked on a 
strawberry farm, and in the winter, they grew cucumbers; Katsuya “Kats” Nakatani’s 
father had a stall in the 9th Street, City Market in Los Angeles, where he would sell 
produce, primarily cabbage, grown by the other farmers who lived around them.187   
 But this period was quickly followed by a series of legal actions that furthered 
disenfranchised the Japanese American communities.  California’s first Alien Land Act 
was enacted in 1913, and it declared that “aliens ineligible for citizenship” were limited 
to land leases of up to three years, and all ownership by “aliens” were banned.188 The 
period between the 1913 California Alien Land Act and the 1924 Immigration Act was 
one characterized by multiple legal challenges by the Japanese American community, all 
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concurrent with the rapid adoption of similar Alien Land Acts in Arizona (1921), Oregon, 
Idaho, and Montana (1923).  The legal challenges garnered the most attention with the 
historic Ozawa v. U.S., but in 1922 the Supreme Court decided to uphold the continuation 
of denying naturalizable citizenship to Japanese Americans.  Historian Azuma 
characterizes the 1920s as a moment for significant change in the strategies of the Issei in 
the United States: “While most Issei chose to stay, many immigrants rejected lives under 
the command of another race.  In order to break away from such social conditioning, they 
left the United States for their homeland, or for third countries, where they believed they 
could remain “the people of a first-class nation.”189  During the years 1923 and 1924, the 
U.S. census reported the highest rates of Japanese farmers leaving the United States.  
Although George Taniguchi’s father was on the very last boat from Japan to the United 
States in 1924, he would later take his family to Brazil.  Taniguchi’s father had been a 
student, and therefore allowed under the Gentlemen’s Agreement to emigrate to the 
United States, but the 1924 Immigration Act prevented any further immigration from 
Asia.  Faced with the legal racism in the United States, Taniguchi’s father decided to find 
work with a Japanese construction company as an engineer in Brazil – another site for 
Japanese settler colonists within the hemisphere.190  From Brazil, they would later sail for 
Japan on the eve of the World War. Other families moved to settled in places such as 
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Mexico or Manchuria, the latter being the latest acquisition of the Japanese empire in 
1931.191   
Families had begun discussing possibly moving away from the United States – 
Katsuya Nakatani recalled that his parents thought about moving to Japan, since they 
could not buy land in the United States.192  The Alien Land Act influenced the parents of 
George Tsuda, a Japanese American who had grown up around Salinas, California and 
whose grandfather had come to the United States sometime before 1910 to work on the 
railroad and eventually moved back to Japan.  In 1937, due to the war between Japan and 
China, Tsuda remembered the growing anti-Japanese sentiment.193 Tsuda’s father also 
had other thoughts on their family’s future in the United States.   According to Nakatani, 
his father wanted “to be paid for the work we do around the farm.  He felt that [this] 
family value needed to be instilled.   I also believed that the lease was up on the farm, and 
the owner wanted a bigger share.  These consideration[s] help my folks decide to go back 
to Japan, at least temporarily.”  At age thirteen, Tsuda and his family boarded the Taiyo 
Maru, a Japanese passenger ship, at San Franscisco on February 3, 1938. 
 The diaspora present in the Americas and Japan also shaped the population aboard 
the later SS Gripsholm – Peru, Panama/Costa Rica, Mexico, Cuba, Ecuador, El Salvador, 
Honduras, Nicaragua, and Bolivia were among the places of residence for those aboard 
the exchange ship.  After the SS Gripsholm departed from New York on September 2, 
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1943, it made a few more stops – at Rio de Janeiro, Brazil and Montevideo, Uruguay to 
pick up more passengers – and at Port Elizabeth, South Africa to replenish supplies. The 
destination for the SS Gripsholm was actually Goa, the one location in south Asia that 
was under Portuguese colonial rule, and thus deemed neutral territory.  Mormugao, Goa 
was to be the site of the exchange.  The exchange took place on October 20, 1943.  The 
passengers from both the Teia Maru, the ship from Yokohama, and the SS Gripsholm, the 
ship from New York City, had disembarked onto the shore.  “During the exchange, 
passengers of both ships […] walked past each other in a line and boarded the other 
ship.”194  One “Japanese” subject for each “American” subject. 
 
Labor History Meets the U.S. Military 
When Sam Miyamoto and his family disembarked at the port of Yokohama in 
Japan, Miyamoto’s family began their travels to his father’s hometown village.  But the 
food shortage was severe, and Sam Miyamoto decided to leave his family to ease the 
burden of feeding yet another mouth.  He set off for Tokyo, telling his parents that he 
would return once he had made a life for himself. In Tokyo, Miyamoto would witness the 
U.S. firebombing of the almost completely wooden-structure Tokyo, and there he would 
also discover that because he was not a Japanese citizen, he could not attend any schools 
or use any of the public hospitals.195  A Catholic missionary school became his refuge, 
where in exchange for English lessons, he received shelter, food, and an education.  But 
when he heard that the United States had dropped the atomic bomb on Hiroshima, Sam 
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Miaymoto and his older brother decided to leave Tokyo to witness Hiroshima 
themselves: 
In August of ’45, America dropped the atomic bomb.  It is very difficult to 
find holiness in this ugly war; especially when you witness the aftermath 
of the atomic bomb. […] I wanted to see Hiroshima.  I arrived at the 
outskirts by train and walked into the city.  There was total destruction of 
the city by the atomic blast as far as I could see. […] Sometimes I still 
have nightmares of this hideous “living hell.”  Of those who survived the 
initial blast, their bodies were disfigured and burnt beyond any form of 
medical help.  They survived only to suffer and die a few days later.  I 
learned the hard way that the screams and fears of a suffering victim are 
the same in any language.  It is ironic that 45 years after my visit to 
Hiroshima, I became ill with a brain tumor the size of a lemon.  Was it the 
radiation from the atomic bomb or just a coincidence?196 
 
Sam Miyamoto was sixteen years old when he “wanted to see Hiroshima.”  Traveling by 
train with his older brother from Tokyo to Hiroshima, Sam moved through a landscape 
devastated by the fire-bombing and warfare.  One may wonder why two Nisei Americans 
felt compelled to witness the aftermath of Hiroshima directly. But if we linger in 
Hiroshima and look around, we would realize that Miyamoto’s presence is neither 
unexpected or a necessarily a contradiction. The interstices of empire that Azuma had 
talked about were present in Hiroshima and other prefectures of Japan also.
 Hiroshima, on the day of the bombing, held its own populations that complicated 
both Truman’s lens of Hiroshima as the “enemy population” and Japan’s own lens of 
proper subjects of empire.  In Hiroshima and Nagasaki, among the victims of the “total 
destruction” were “as many as twenty-thousand conscripted Korean workers,” laborers 
from the Japanese colony of Korea, annexed in 1910. “One or two dozen Caucasian 
American prisoners of war” were also in Hiroshima.  But there is a final population 
statistic still to be taken into account – “probably three thousand U.S. citizens of Japanese 
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background were residing” in Hiroshima, according to scholar John Dower, at the time of 
the atomic bombing. And at least one of them, a young woman named Judy (Aya) 
Enseki, had arrived in Japan via the SS Gripsholm, the very vessel that had take 
Miyamoto and his family to Goa.197  
 Enseki was born in Delano, California, the fifth of eight children in a farming 
family.  After Roosevelt’s “Day of Infamy,” Enseki found herself at the Manzanar 
Relocation Center, where she gave birth to a child.  Her husband, also a Nisei, renounced 
his American citizenship, and decided to “repatriate” to a Japan that neither of them had 
known very well.  Once they arrived in Hiroshima, her husband was soon drafted by the 
Japanese Imperial Army, and the Soviets took him prisoner in Manchuria. 
Judy Enseki described her experience in wartime Japan as being like a “fish out of 
water.”   Like many other Nisei Japanese Americans in U.S.-occupied Japan, she later 
turned to the postwar U.S. occupation forces as a possible way to both make a living and 
to return to the United States. “There were many opportunities available as interpreters 
for older Nisei who still remembered English. Enseki left Hiroshima on a special 
occupation train for Tokyo,” writes scholar Rinjiro Sodei.198  And indeed, GHQ was 
aware of the utility of these Nisei individuals and families for the U.S. occupation.  On 
May 8, 1946, GHQ “ordered the Japanese government to compile and submit to 
American authorities lists of all Japanese Americans residing in Japan during the war, 
those who had obtained Japanese citizenship, and those who had served in the Japanese 
military or government institutions.”  The GHQ would determine not only who would be 
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eligible to work for the U.S. occupation, but also who would be eligible to cross the 
Pacific one more time – to the United States.199  
 The year 1948, according to a history of southern California Japanese published 
that year, the highest number of Nisei came from U.S.-occupied Japan to southern 
California.200 But in 1948, the United States treatment of Japanese Americans had taken a 
marked turn. And the memory of Japanese internment had been cast differently by 
another story of Japanese American involvement in World War II, where through 
military heroism and sacrifice, Japanese Americans had demonstrated both loyalty and 
assimilation into the American nation.   
 On June 5, 1948, The Los Angeles Times and Washington Post published articles 
detailing a funeral for two Nisei soldiers in Arlington National Cemetery, their respective 
headlines announcing, “Arlington Honor Paid to Two Heroic Nisei” and “Tribute Paid to 
Nisei Heroes.”  The articles focused on the loyalty of these two Japanese-American 
soldiers.  The Los Angeles Times reported,    
The Army buried two Japanese-American soldiers in Arlington 
National Cemetery today with a general’s graveside declaration that ‘they 
proved their loyalty and devotion beyond all question.’ 
 The two privates were Fumitake Nagato of near-by Arlington, Va., 
and Saburo Tanamachi of San Benito, Tex. [...] 
 Gen. Jacob L. Devers, chief of Army Field Forces and one of 
several high-ranking officers who paid final honors to the two Nisei, said: 
 ‘There is one supreme final test of loyalty to one’s native land.  
This test is readiness and willingness to fight for, and, if need be, to die for 
one’s country.  These Americans and their fellows passed that test with 
colors flying.”201 
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With the Nisei soldiers, their military deaths do not signal a continuation of the 
“unfinished task” of battling for an American ideology of liberal individualism; rather, 
their deaths prove their adherence to such American ideals.  The battlefield is the “one 
supreme final test” for the Japanese-American soldiers, a place where “they proved 
themselves to be ‘Americans first class’,” according to General Devers.  Within the 
media portrayal and official military speeches, the “test” was not about the Nisei soldiers 
defeating German troops in the Vosges Mountains – instead, the ultimate “test” was 
whether or not they could sacrifice themselves “for one’s country.”  The accomplishment 
of the soldiers was an isolated, internal one, where they proved their desire to be 
assimilated into the abstract ideal of “Americanness.”  The experience of internment, 
however, was not recognized. 
The politics of visibility had a particular relevance to the shifting racial 
formations around Japanese Americans.  The constructedness of racial ideologies would 
be blasted into high relief as the U.S. government employed a host of shifting 
characterizations of the “Oriental” to buttress the projects of Japanese American 
internment camps, postwar occupation of Japan, Korea, and the Philippines, and the 
manufacturing of a racially harmonious U.S. society for the “world.” The Japanese 
American would become the model figure for successful assimilation and internalization 
of American values – a discourse of liberal individualism was mobilized in order to focus 
attention on the dynamism of American democracy, rather than the dynamism of racial 
orders.202 
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 On July 20, 1948, The New York Times reported, “President Truman started the 
draft today with a proclamation requiring 9,500,000 youths to register during seventeen 
designated days of August and September.”  With Proclamation 2799, President Truman 
had effectively begun the increased militarization of the U.S. global presence, later 
articulated in NSC 68.  The Cold War had become the rallying cry for rapid militarization 
within the United States, as President Truman delineated a global drama between tow 
binary forces of anti-communism versus communism. 
 But for the Japanese American young men who had spent their adolescence in the 
internment camps of World War II, the draft meant something altogether different. 
Education and family ended up being the most important factors affecting how they 
rationalized participating in the U.S. military.  For example, Arnold Yoshizawa had 
settled in Chicago after getting out of Manzanar.  Still unsure about college, Yoshizawa 
was working two jobs – one as a shipping clerk and the other with a Christmas tree light 
company.  Another Nisei named Tom Honda, who had been in Manzanar with him, had 
helped him get these jobs.  Yoshizawa recalled that his sister had dared him to join the 
army: 
The next morning I go down there and they told me if I sign up for three 
years they’ll send me to any part of the world the Army has people.  I 
could go to Germany, I could go to France, Puerto Rico at that time, 
Persian Gulf, Japan – Oooooh.  What if I go to Japan and find grandpa? I 
said, ‘Oh. Japan.’203 
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For Jim Yanagihara, enlisting in the U.S. Army was a strategic move: “I got the draft 
notice, but didn’t want to do two years and five years of reserve time.”204  Yanagihara 
simply enlisted.  Even Roy Shiraga, who had enlisted in the U.S. Army a year before 
Truman’s 1948 proclamation, had not signed up for the U.S. Army with the growing 
Cold War in mind. In 1947, Roy Shiraga graduated from high school in Washington 
state. “My parents wanted me to go to college, but I didn’t have any money,” Shiraga 
recalled.  He had planned to work on the Great Northern Railroad similar to his father 
who was dismissed from his railroad job after Pearl Harbor.  But Shiraga soon had a 
conversation with a Nisei WWII veteran, Spady Koyama, who was also a friend of the 
family.  Koyama encouraged Shiraga to join the army “because he said you could pick 
any school you want and they’ll send you there.”  On August 4th, Shiraga enlisted. 
“As I recall I signed up for photography school.  I wanted to be a photographer,” 
Shiraga said.  But during the tenth week of basic training, Shiraga and another Nisei 
enlistee were sent to Presidio, Monterey for a test.  “This lieutenant comes in and he 
made a little speech, said that you’re going to take this test.  He handed out a page that 
was all in English and he says write in Japanese.”  The other Nisei in the room  
wrote down his name, rank, and serial number.  Then he put it aside.  He 
picked up a magazine as I recall.  I said hey, aren’t you going to take that 
exam?  He says, hell no, I don’t want to go over there.  I said, oh, I don’t 
either.  I want to go to photography school.  So I did the same thing.205   
 
The lieutenant came back twice, but each time, the papers in front of Shiraga and the 
other Nisei were blank.  Afterwards, they were both sent to basic training, and at the end 
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of the thirteenth week of training, both Shiraga and the other young man received their 
assignments.  They were both going to Presidio, Monterey for language training.206 
 Arnold Yoshizawa was also sent to Presidio, Monterey for language training.  If 
at all possible, the U.S. Army attempted to funnel Japanese American enlistees and 
draftees into the language programs; the U.S. occupations of Japan and Korea demanded 
a large corps of translators, interpreters, and interrogators.  Most of the Japanese 
American men did indeed find themselves at the language school in Presidio, Monterey – 
and those who passed the intensive language training then usually found themselves 
shipped to Camp Zama in Japan, where they received further training and began their 
work with the Allied Translator and Interpreter Service (ATIS).  Yoshizawa, in his own 
words, “flunked” out of the Presidio language school, and moved to the engineering 
corps in the army.207  Roy Shiraga, on the other, explained that he was sent to the Presidio 
language school, and eventually was assigned to go to Hokkaido, Japan, where his older 
sister, Ayako, lived.   
She was an interpreter.  She was thirteen when she went back to Japan but 
she maintained her English with her brother George.  […] Every weekend 
I used to go into town and talk to her.  She used to be an interpreter for the 
officers of the 7th Division, 31st Infantry Regiment because they found out 
she could talk both English and Japanese.208   
 
The year 1950, before the outbreak of the Korean War, found the Japanese American 
communities on both sides of the Pacific profoundly altered by the experience of World 
War II.  Language, the U.S. military, and citizenship became the triangulated matrix in 
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which young Japanese American men found the means to make claims on their futures 
within the U.S. and Japan.  Their labor, though, would be utilized in ways they may have 
been familiar with already: truth itself had a racial hierarchy.209   
 
The Choice of an “Oriental” in an Interrogation Room 
On June 26, 1950, when President Harry Truman announced that the United 
States would not tolerate the “act of aggression” of the Democratic People’s Republic of 
Korea, the nature of war had changed considerably since FDR’s “Day of Infamy” speech 
in 1942. In 1948, the year Miyamoto had left Japan for University of California, Los 
Angeles (UCLA), the United States had made a crucial decision regarding its occupation 
of the Korean peninsula south of the 38th parallel.  As the previous chapter laid out, the 
United States, unable to find a large population of Koreans who were willing to accept a 
U.S-dictated government, moved to hold elections in the southern part of the peninsula.  
With the northern half of the peninsula also having held elections, two governments soon 
were claiming sovereignty over the peninsula. The United States and the United Nations 
only recognized the southern Republic of Korea as a legitimate sovereign body. 
Stimson’s doctrine of nonrecognition had come into play again.  Previously, 
the United States had been insistent upon perceiving Japan as a nation, not an 
empire (although one can note that being a “nation” is not mutually exclusive of 
being an “empire”). But now, a former colony of Japan was on the map, one 
divided by trusteeship and a 38th parallel.  How did one enter war with an entity one 
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did not recognize?  Previously, the question revolved around repatriation and 
putative “citizenship.” Now, the question would revolve around repatriation and the 
figure of the “prisoner of war.”  And the Japanese American interrogator would be 
the key figure in facilitating and mediating this particular alchemy of sovereign 
power in this era of formal decolonization. 
In effect, as the Korean War escalated on the peninsula, and the U.S. Army 
scrambled to find translators and interrogators, a new geography had been mapped for the 
drafted and enlisted Japanese Americans.  From the language school at Presidio, 
Monterey to Camp Zama in Japan to G2 headquarters in Pusan, Korea, yet another 
mapping of U.S. empire had become the frame for the movements of this cohort of 
Japanese Americans.  And in 1950, Miyamoto found himself back yet again in East Asia 
– first in Japan, and then later in Korea.  Another war that involved the United States and 
East Asia had determined his life trajectory.  But there was a critical difference between 
the time he had arrived in Yokohama in 1944 and when he arrived in Pusan in 1950. The 
Japanese Americans in this particular cohort who became a part of the U.S. military 
in1950 were almost all drafted – and almost all had undergone internment.  Howard 
Okada, who had been born in Fresno, California and later sent with his family to the 
camp in Jerome, Arkansas, was drafted in November 1950.210  Jim Yanagihara, born in 
San Diego, California and sent to the camp in Poston, Arizona, remembered receiving his 
draft notice on his nineteenth birthday – November 30, 1950.211 The US. brought Katsuya 
Nakatani to Maryland in November 1950 – and one of the first things he was obligated to 
do was an FBI test that consisted of a thorough self-history narrative.  “They wanted to 
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know what I’ve been doing my whole life,” recalled Nakatani. “And then my father’s too 
– they want to know his history.  And my grandfather.”  During his class time, one of his 
superiors brought him out of the classroom, and asked him pointedly about the 
information he had provided.  The exchange that followed challenged Nakatani’s 
superior’s understanding of what had happened during World War II, as Nakatani 
explicitly brought up the “concentration camps” in which the United States had placed 
him: 
An officer said, “Where were you from 1942 to 1945?” And I said, “I was in 
prison.” And he said, “What were you charged for?”And I said, “I don’t 
know.” He said, “Soldier, you don’t say I don’t know to the officer.  What 
were you charged for?” Again I said, “I don’t know. I don’t know. I’ve never 
been charged for anything.” […] Then they asked me, “Where was this?” 
“Arkansas.” […] “Arkansas?” I said, “Yeah, Arkansas. “Arkansas State 
Penitentiary?” I said, no. […] I finally told them that it was an American 
concentration camp. And he got mad. He said, “Soldier, we have no such 
thing in this country.” […]And I said, “Well, you call it whatever you want 
to. Well, that’s what it is.”212  
 
Nakatani was summarily tossed into the stockade for insubordination, but his 
“insubordination” made it clear that this generation of Japanese Americans were bringing 
their experiences and memories of a previous war in the trans-Pacific into the Korean 
War. How would this generation negotiate their experiences with internment and the 
hostage exchange within the interrogation room, the battlefield, and the administration 
offices of a war the U.S. was waging on the landscape of a former Japanese colony? 
This section aims to historicize the modes of assessment involved in the 
interrogation room during the Korean War within the longer history of U.S. state 
practices of categorization – one being namely determining the “loyal” and the “disloyal” 
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Japanese Americans.  In tandem with such an analytical context, I will also focus on the 
question of what type of labor Japanese Americans were doing in these interrogation 
rooms.  Instead of taking the interrogation process as a transparent, self-evident fact, I 
will be examining the multiple negotiations involved in the process of interrogation.  At 
heart of this section will be the question: What was the purpose of interrogation during 
the Korean War?  During the war, interrogation was utilized in a myriad of settings, but 
there were certain new types of interrogation created also, namely the repatriation 
screening interrogation room.   
 In the end, interrogation became an exercise in imperial knowledge – the assertion 
that the U.S. could and did know how to read the more “naïve” postcolonial Korean.  A 
racialized labor hierarchy was mobilized in order to assert and “ensure” that “truth” 
would be end-product of any interrogation report.  Interrogation was an incredibly 
flexible practice.  It was a tool of persuasion and hegemony – and in the end, it was much 
more about how the United States perceived itself, than about the information held by the 
Korean postcolonials. 
 
How to Interrogate an “Oriental” 
Japanese American interrogators and translators worked in all aspects of U.S. 
military work, ranging from the diplomatic to the bureaucratic, from the battlefield to the 
field offices.  Primarily though, Japanese American interrogators worked with the Allied 
Translation and Interpretation Service (ATIS), Military Intelligence Service (MIS), and 
Interrogation of Prisoner of War Teams (IPW). The language of “military necessity” – 
earlier encountered in the form of internment and a hostage exchange – returned to the 
  141 
lives of these Japanese American young men in the form of “information” – the purpose 
of interrogation was to procure “information.”  However, despite the seemingly 
straightforward depiction of the bureaucratic processes of garnering and verifying 
information provided by Colonel Hanley in front of the House Sub-committee, procuring 
and verifying “information” from a Korean prisoner of war was not a simple 
straightforward bureaucratic procedure.  According to a widely-circulated U.S. military 
pamphlet on interrogating “Orientals,” a certain cultural finesse was necessary.  
Interrogation was performance, although the question of “for whom?” remains to be 
answered.  
Interrogation training for the Korean War drew extensively upon previous 
experiences – not from the U.S. occupation of Korea, but rather from the Asia-Pacific 
Wars.  One particular lecture given by Lieutenant Commander Samuel C Bartlett, Jr., a 
U.S. Naval Reserve Interpreter who had been present at the Japanese surrender at Iwo 
Jima, gained considerable traction and circulation within the Military Intelligence 
Sections.  The lecture had most probably been given by Bartlett to the interrogators 
working in U.S.-occupied Japan, but due to the multiple copies of the lectures – the 
original lecture draft with Bartlett’s notes in the margins, as well as the distillation of 
Bartlett’s lecture into a comic-book format for easier consumption – present in the files of 
the ATIS and MIS archives for the period of the Korean War, one can surmise that this 
lecture also had relevance in the interrogation training of those deployed to Korea.213   
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 At heart of Bartlett’s lecture, titled “Some Aspects of Interrogation of Oriental 
POWs,” was a template for the process of procuring “information” from an “Oriental” 
prisoner of war. Mr. Jack Alberti, an interrogator who had worked with German POWs, 
specifically in terms of submarine warfare, was scheduled to talk with the class later in 
April.  Deferring to Alberti’s expertise, Barlett prefaced his lecture by saying that his 
comments would simply supplement those of Alberti.   
 The first part of Bartlett’s lecture is a lesson in how the interrogator must 
conceive of the interrogation process, and the process hinges upon the successful 
objectification of the POW as a receptacle of information.  He then delineated what he 
considered to be a few key differences between Alberti’s experiences and “ours,” 
meaning that Alberti had interrogated Europeans, not “Orientals.”  The “purpose of POW 
explanation,” which Bartlett noted “hardly needs to be said,” was “To obtain information 
which the POW has and which we need.”  “While the process is not always quite so 
simple,” began Bartlett’s notes, “it may be likened to a drink out of a coconut – cut the 
top off with a machetti[sic] and pour it out.  There are six steps even in this simple 
process: 1. Get coconut 2. Make sure there is milk in it, 3. Cut it open, 4. Remove milk,. 
5. Taste milk for potability, 6. Give it to the thirsty party.”   
U.S. military history in the Pacific during World War II impacted the construction 
of the interrogation room at the most fundamental level – in the conceptualization of the 
process and “target” himself.  In the collapsing of the coconut (a symbol of the tropical 
landscape, void of people and rendered ready for conquest) and the “Oriental” mind (the 
Japanese POW), Bartlett had, in fact, offered to the interrogators working in U.S.-
occupied Japan and later the Korean War an analogy of racial violence. Through the 
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language of “paradise” and “conquest,” Bartlett offered a characterization of 
interrogation as a standardized relationship between two subjectivities.  What I will argue 
though is that the interrogation training and manuals for the soon-to-be-interrogators did 
not so much theorize the mind of the interrogated as much as it presented a certain 
subjectivity for the interrogator to inhabit.  In the end, the interrogation training was not 
so concerned with the “Oriental” as it was with controlling and shaping the agency and 
subjectivity of the U.S. military interrogator.  Interrogation training was about subject-
making – making the interrogator. 
What makes an interrogator, according to Bartlett?  In “Screening or Testing” or 
“Shaking the coconut to see if it’s dry,” Barlett suggests a preliminary examination of 
“ALL” prisoners to determine which POWs may have information and which ones would 
be most willing to “yield up his information.”  In determining the latter, Bartlett states 
that the interrogator must evaluate the “Nature of the POW,” meaning his “personality – 
Security, tractability – intelligence – language.” 
There is an assessment of power that occurs in the interrogation room – and the 
successful interrogator would create the correct dynamics, not through what is actually 
spoken, but rather through the unspoken.  Bartlett’s lecture – although highly simplified 
through a collapsing of different geo-racial ideologies and imaginaries – is primarily 
about how to read and hide intent.  The interrogator must be able to successfully “read” 
the POW, be able to assess the “reliability” of the POW, be able to ascertain the “intent” 
of the POW.  The issue of judgment is at the core of the interrogation practice.   
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In the next step, called “Conditioning the Prisoner” or “Cutting open the coconut,” 
Bartlett mentions eight different methods to start the prisoner of war talking.214  
1. Self-starters, or naturally talkative prisoners frequently occur. 
2. Matter-of-fact approach 
3. Rough approach 
4. Kindness approach 
5. Combination or alternate approach 
6. Appeals to pride of prisoner of war 
7. The willingness of most human beings to correct mistakes can sometimes be used 
to advantage 
8. Saving the POW’s face 
 
 For “self-starters,” Bartlett cautions the interrogators-in-training about “plants,” POW 
who are purposefully giving incorrect information in order to mislead the U.S. military.   
The other “approaches” are primarily templates or scripts for the interrogator to 
follow to direct the POW’s attention away from the interrogator’s intent or objective.  For 
example, in the “matter-of-fact approach,” Bartlett suggests beginning the session with a 
seemingly purely bureaucratic matter, such as the filling out of forms or simply obtaining 
very basic information from the prisoner of war.  The bureaucratic approach – or the 
“matter-of-fact” approach – seems to set the stage for an emotionally-detached encounter, 
one where the interrogator is not a subjective person, but rather simply carrying out 
orders.  In the “kindness approach,” medical care, food, water, cigarettes are all part of a 
possible exchange – but Barlett cautions that “the prisoner of war should be made to 
realize (by indirect suggestion) that any favors he receives come from the hands of the 
interrogator. (any pup wags his tail for the hands that feed him.)”  Upending the 
expectations the POW has of the interrogation is key to a few of the approaches 
recommended by Bartlett – a strategic disorientation of what the interrogator’s 
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expectations might be.  In the “combination or alternate approach,” Bartlett recommends 
for the interrogator to switch between two or more different methods of interrogation, or 
to literally alternate the interrogation with another interrogator.  The last two aspects – 
“Appeals to pride of prisoner of war” and “The willingness of most human beings to 
correct mistakes” – are methods that intend to give authority to the POW in a particular 
strategic moment, the illusion of choice in a sense. 
 Further theorizing on the “coconut” itself – or the Oriental POW – can be found 
in other supplemental documents on interrogation within the archive on training and 
education.  In a document titled “Techniques of Interrogating Orientals,” the author states 
that the techniques discussed in the document “will be mainly concerned with the 
Japanese, since much of our experience during World War II has been concerned with 
this particular group of ‘Orientals.’”215 Indeed, “an interrogator must first understand the 
background of the particular people with whom he is dealing, and, most important, the 
racial psychology of the people in order for him to understand the behavior pattern of his 
subject which will, therefore, result in a successful interrogation.” 
 “Many Orientals,” stated the document, “believe themselves to be inferior to 
Americans and are easily kept in their proper places as prisoners.”  During World War II, 
there were three different configurations of interrogation teams: 
a. An American who spoke Japanese interrogated PW’s. 
b. A Nisei (American-born Japanese) soldier interrogated PW’s. 
c. A Nisei interpreted for an officer interrogator. 
 
In reflecting upon the relative effectiveness of these different configurations, the author 
concludes that “(a) was considered to be the best.  […] When the Nisei interrogated the 
                                                
215 “Techniques of Interrogating Orientals”; Folder: Trainee Interrogation – General 0131; Box 18; Office 
of Naval Intelligence – POW Desk, Operational Section, 1949-54; Records of the Chief of Naval 
Operations; RG 38; National Archives and Records Administration; College Park, Maryland. 
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Japanese PW, a psychological advantage had been lost to a degree, in that the average 
Oriental feels inferior to an American (Caucasian) and when a Nisei confronted the PW, 
this advantage was lost, and they were on an equal footing.”216  What is striking about the 
document is the racial ideology that frames the subjectivity of the Japanese “Oriental” – 
the author insists upon how the Japanese Oriental essentially has no sense of agency due 
to a low intelligence level:  “[T]he average intelligence of Orientals is lower than that of 
Causasians, and the illiteracy rate precludes any possibility of a high standard of 
intelligence being achieved for some time to come.  The knowledge of the average 
Oriental will therefore amount to little more than what he has seen or has been told.”   
 The “average Oriental” according to this document would give only naïve, 
straightforward answers, and yet a racialized hierarchy of labor would be instituted to 
insure the accuracy of the “truth” provided.  In the interrogation scene provided by John 
Fujii’s AP article that had been censored and therefore never published, six different 
people were involved in the interrogation of Chinese prisoners of war after a battle on the 
Korean peninsula, resulting in an interrogation report written simply in English.  And 
language – the supposed medium for communication – was itself mediated by the 
negotiations and imaginations of all six people present. Fujii’s interrogation scene was 
potentially a threat to the integrity of the U.S. military in that it exposed the tremendous 
labor and variables of contingency involved in producing a single document of “military 
information,” or intelligence.  But perhaps single most important variable to the integrity 
of the information was Lieutenant Henry J. Picard from Louisiana, trained in Korean by 
the U.S. Army.  The racialized labor hierarchy of producing “truth” in the U.S. military 
intelligence bureaucratic structure became clearly evident in this scene.  Picard, the final 
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overseer of the interrogation, heads this team, consisting of “middlemen,” such as the 
“jack of all trades” Wakugawa.  The Nisei, although perhaps now “loyal” and considered 
more “reliable” than the Korean, still operated within the checks and balances of a white 
superior.  And indeed during World War II and Korean War, officers of interrogation 
teams and divisions, who primarily “checked” and “evaluated” interrogation reports were 
white, while those conducting interrogations and writing the reports were Korean 
civilians or Japanese American interrogators. 
 Let us now return to Sam Miyamoto, after he completed his language training 
both at Presidio and Camp Zama.  Schooled in basic Korean, Miyamoto had now also 
become fluent in Japanese, thanks to the experience under the hostage exchange.  With 
three languages – and a fraught relationship with each one of them – Sam Miyamoto 
began his work on the Korean peninsula as an interrogator of Korean prisoners of war. 
   
The Babel of Interrogation 
“You had to know history to survive,” remarked Miyamoto in his interview as he 
reflected upon his experiences living between the U.S., Japan, and Korea.  History, to 
Miyamoto, was an awareness of the relationships between different states.  And because 
of his insistence on this type of historical consciousness, language was the first and 
foremost concern of Sam Miyamoto in his interrogation room.  Interrogators would 
usually commit a crucial mistake, according to Miyamoto, by launching into Japanese 
immediately with the Korean POW. “Most of the well-educated [Korean] people they 
know Japanese because a lot of them went to universities in Japan,” said Miyamoto in his 
interview. “They speak Japanese but if you just went out and asked them from the direct 
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start, ‘Do you speak Japanese?,’ they would say no.” Speaking from the perspective of 
the Korean prisoner of war who would have been sitting across from him, Miyamoto 
continued, “For five years now, we’ve been speaking the Korean language, we were no 
longer part of Japan, so why would you expect me to speak Japanese, and we’re not 
going do it.”  1945 had been the year of liberation for Koreans from Japanese 
colonialism, and in 1950, Miyamoto was navigating between the years of liberation and 
the years of colonialism in the choice of language to use in the interrogation room.217 
 Miyamoto was able to converse in Korean due to Korean language courses at the 
U.S. Army language school, but he was still not completely comfortable conducting an 
interrogation in Korean.  He recounted his usual method for beginning an introduction; 
with the POW in front of him, Miyamoto would call out over his shoulder to a fellow 
Japanese American serviceman in Japanese purposefully:   
I call out in Japanese, “There’s coffee and donuts, so can you bring us 
some coffee and donuts? And put a lot of sugar and cream in. Coffee for 
him, and make mine black.”  And we were just talking Japanese so that the 
prisoner would know that I speak Japanese. 
 
Then, he strategically would begin speaking in Korean: 
And I would ask [the prisoner], “Would you like another donut?” And I 
call out again [to my friend], “Hey, bring a couple more doughnuts.  
Maybe he can take one back to his friends.” Then I would go up and then 
offer a cigarette. I say something like, “중국어를 모르겠습니까? 
[Spraken] Deutsch? Francais?” And then I would think to myself in 
Japanese [out loud]: “But I know that all the educated Korean people they 
speak two or three different languages so I wonder what other languages 
he speaks.”  And then I would say something like, “일본어를 모르겠습
니까? […]Do you speak a little Japanese?” And he would say, “Oh yeah, I 
speak Japanese.”  And then from there you pick it up and that doesn’t hurt 
their sensitivity. 
 
                                                
217 Miyamoto, interview. 
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Reflecting on the other Japanese American servicemen who had also served as 
interrogators during the Korean War, Miyamoto claimed a certain exceptionalism in 
terms of his experience.  His own experience – and those of his brother, Archie – resulted 
in experiencing discrimination not only from the U.S. government, but also from the 
Japanese government.  “And so we understand what other people had to go through, so 
we understand their sensitivity,” said Miyamoto.  Miyamoto attributed the moments 
when other Japanese Americans encountered resistant Korean POWs during interrogation 
to the Japanese Americans’ own ignorance of the histories – or “sensitivities” – of the 
Korean POW.   
 Miyamoto’s interrogation room was essentially created by a strategic performance 
on Miyamoto’s part – a performance of his own language skills, a performance that was 
also contingent upon the presence of another Japanese American.  He had created a 
situation where the prisoner of war could feel that he “knew” more than the interrogator.  
It is a situation that differed, perhaps, in one crucial way from the “cutting open the 
coconut” interrogation room illustrated by Bartlett.  Miyamoto was offering the 
interrogated prisoner of war a seeming choice of language in which the interrogation 
would be conducted. 
 Miyamoto recognized that his interrogation methods and process were different 
than those used at the frontlines of battle during wartime.  Those on the frontline were 
“asking different questions.”  His preoccupations were different from the IPW 
[Interrogation Prisoner of War] teams who followed combat units, similar to the team 
described in Fujii’s AP article: “Because people like me, I don’t care how many soldiers 
were up in the hill over there with him.  I mean, if you’re on the frontline and you’re 
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shooting in the frontline, you want to know how many people are up there because your 
life is at stake.”  He then described the interrogation done by the ATIS interrogation 
teams, who primarily interrogated POWs in order to gain information and maps of areas 
in China and North Korea: “If a war breaks out with China, because MacArthur wanted 
to sort of encourage to go into China, we got to know where all the targets are.  So there 
are different questions there.” 
 This section examines the different interrogation rooms – the IPW, ATIS, MIS, 
and the repatriation interrogation room – of the Korean War through the experiences and 
bureaucratic records left by this cohort of Japanese American interrogators.  Although, as 
Miyamoto’s statement has demonstrated, we often think that the type of information 
needed shapes, or is, the purpose of the interrogation, this section will take a different 
conceptual approach.  In an attempt to destabilize our assumptions about interrogation 
and its embedded aims, I will demonstrate how persuasion was actually at the heart of the 
interrogation pushed to the fore by the U.S. government.  In other words, the Japanese 
American interrogator often had the task of “persuading” the “Oriental” POW of 
accepting and inhabiting a specific positionality vis-à-vis the United States.  The most 
high-profile interrogation room during the Korean War was the repatriation interrogation 
room, and this section will locate this interrogation room within a genealogy not simply 
of “military necessity” but rather of subject-making.   
 Miyamoto, even before setting foot in his own interrogation room, would find out 
the military rank of the prisoner of war before the interview.  For example, if the POW 
was a second lieutenant, he would put the markings of a first lieutenant rank on himself.  
In his words: “if you’re a second lieutenant and some private or corporal questioned you, 
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I mean that’s an insult for me.  I had a picture here of Tojo and he was asked ‘When did 
you finally realize that Japan lost the war?” and he said, “When I was in Sugama Prison 
when the Japanese American soldier came up and simply told me to come.’  There were 
multiple genealogies for the interrogation rooms set up by the Japanese American 
interrogators, ones that Bartlett’s lecture and Bowles’ interrogation memorandum did not 
encompass. 
Mamoru “Steve” Yokoyama was one of the Japanese American interrogators who 
were assigned to Hideki Tojo in Sugama Prison. In 1943, Mamoru “Steve” Yokoyama, 
born and raised on Maui, was eighteen years old.  And instead of finishing high school, 
Yokoyama decided to enlist in the U.S. Army, since at that time, the U.S. government 
had decided to recruit Japanese Americans for the military.  Although he was initially 
brought into the Army as a possible replacement for the 442nd, Yokoyama recalled his 
motivations for enlistment differently: “And the reason why I wanted it was, it would 
fulfill all my dreams.  I got my shoes; I never had shoes.  I never had pants.  I mean I 
would wear my brothers’ pants or something, my brother’s shoes.  We never had 
anything good and then all of sudden we had army chow!”  Yokoyama recalled that it 
was during basic training when officials began testing the Japanese Americans for their 
proficiency in the Japanese language.  The U.S. Army sent Yokoyama to Camp Savage in 
Minnesota for language training – and soon, Yokoyama was being flown out to 
Australia.218   
                                                
218 Mamoru “Steve” Yokoyama, interview conducted by Colleen Wakai for the Japanese American Living 
Legacy Oral History Project, October 14, 2006, California. Yokoyama was present at the Japanese 
surrender in the Philippines, and as a Hawaiian-born Japanese interrogator, he witnessed the end of 
Japanese empire.   
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At the war’s end, Yokoyama was sent to be an interrogator at Sugamo Prison in 
Japan.  The man to whom he was assigned was Hideki Tojo, a general in the Japanese 
Imperial Army and Prime Minister of Japan for much of World War II. “Nice guy, I 
mean he acts nice when we interrogate him and stuff,” recalled Yokoyama.   
We had to see him about five times because we needed him to be the bad 
guy that caused all the problems for the officers below him.  And he 
would smile and say this or that, but he would never take the blame for 
any…what we needed from him was to say […] ‘Hey look, I take 
responsibility and by doing so, you guys lay off all the higher generals.  
They weren’t the guys that decided all those rules and those kinds of 
things that they had to do.’ […] As for the information that I needed to get 
from him, it wasn’t necessarily military strategies or anything, it was a 
question of ‘Can you take the blame so that all these lower class guys 
don’t get hanged?’  He said, ‘No.’”219   
 
Yokoyama’s interrogation was not one of military information, but rather one of 
persuasion.  His interrogations began in a manner reminiscent of Miyamoto’s: “[Let’s] 
have a chat, won’t you sit down?  You give him a cigarette and give him an extra pack 
and you smoke and he smokes.  That the beginning of the end for him. Because there’s 
nothing he can do other than to say, ‘Hey, thank you for being polite to me, I’m an 
officer.’”  Yokoyama’s experience as an interrogator of Tojo is significant for my 
analysis of Korean War interrogation because it points to a different end point of 
interrogation than merely “information.”  Rather, Yokoyama was attempting to persuade 
Tojo to inhabit a particular subjectivity, one where American legal “disciplining” of the 
Japanese military imperial ambitions also reflected a larger project of disciplining the 
empire of Japan into a nation-state construct determined by the United States.  If Tojo 
had taken responsibility and blame for the war crimes, the United States would have been 
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able to state more effectively that it had meted out “justice.”  Persuasion, not information, 
was the basis of the “military necessity” in this form of interrogation. 
 “Reliability” as a category to be assessed by the interrogator also had its own 
history in the U.S. occupation of Japan.  Many Japanese American interrogators within 
the U.S. Army worked primarily on screening Japanese repatriates from during the Asia-
Pacific Wars – and most of the repatriates were former prisoners of war from Russia.  
George Taniguchi was one of these interrogators - “Reliability is a factor when we 
analyze the information we get,” he remarked, and for him “reliability” was defined 
along Cold War ideological lines.  Describing some of the Japanese repatriates as 
“brainwashed,” Taniguchi noted, “We were talking with them just for ‘information,’ not 
there to convert them out of communist thinking.  [But] we would make a notation on the 
report that the guy was left-leaning,” said Taniguchi.220  The notation of a POW’s 
possible leftist sympathies was a marker of the “reliability of the information.” And 
indeed, Taniguchi’s standard of “reliability” inflected with Cold War ideology had a 
legacy in the Korean War also, as the question of whether or not an “Oriental” was 
capable of rendering the truth would converge with a concern over “communism” and 
individual “agency.”221    
George Tsuda also had been an interrogator working with ATIS in interrogating 
the repatriated Japanese POWs – both Tsuda and Taniguchi were deployed to Korea to 
work with the frontline IPW teams.  As Tsuda recalled, “Right after the Inchon landing, 
they needed some translators.  So they threw me in, and when I got to Pusan, there was a 
                                                
220 Taniguchi, interview. 
221 For more on the history of Japanese repatriates, see Lori Watt, When empire comes home: repatriation 
and reintegration in postwar Japan, Harvard East Asian monographs (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard 
University Asia Center  : Distributed by Harvard University Press, 2009). 
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sergeant waiting for me.  And they put me on a bus that ran on the rail.  They took me to 
the outskirts of Tongnae.”  From there he was moved close to the Chosin Reservoir.  
There were many, many Korean prisoners of war.  As Taniguchi also remembered from 
his experience in a POW compound located in Ascom City near Inchon right after the 
Inchon landing, “The marines were bringing in thousands of prisoners of war.  Of course, 
this was right after the Inchon landing, so they were surrendering by the thousands.”222  
At this point, interrogators such as Tsuda and Taniguchi were primarily responsible for 
registering the prisoners of war, taking down names and assigning serial numbers.   
 But these prisoners of war were also considered a source of “information.”  And 
according to Tsuda, when he was working at the 10th Corps Headquarters near Tongnae, 
he worked with a Korean interpreter while talking with the prisoners of war.  Often, the 
POWs came to them in groups of twenty or thirty.  The immediate task at hand was to 
divide those who might have “information” from those who might not have 
“information.”223   
When there’s a whole bunch of them, then you have to immediately 
separate them.  And the way they do it is look at them – he looks smart; if 
he looks dumb; or if he looks clean-shaven; or after you talk with them, 
maybe he seems smart. There could be as many as three hundred.   
 
But, as Tsuda recalled, the challenge “was the guy who knows, and you’re pretty sure 
that he knows, but he won’t speak up.”   
You try to let them relax.  Give them a cigarette or candy.  [chuckles] It’s 
a sort of bribing.  It doesn’t matter if it takes thirty minutes or an hour.  
You talk about the family, where his hometown is.  Things like that.  And 
gradually, you see if you can go into key parts.  But you can’t take too 
long […] because there are too many of them. 
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223 Tsuda tells the following with a laugh, in recognition of how random this process was. 
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Regarding what he meant by “key parts,” Tsuda explained that the higher command 
would give them the questions, the agenda.  The “hakujin” officer would tell Tsuda and 
his colleagues which questions to ask.  Interestingly, one question that Tsuda remembers 
being of high priority was asking the prisoners of war “what they thought about colored 
troops.”  “I think that what they wanted to hear was that they weren’t too good of a 
fighter.  But a lot of them said that, ‘They’re black, and it’s the first time I see them, so 
I’m afraid.’ And then the lieutenant said [to me], ‘You sure they said this?’  In other 
words, he doesn’t like the answer.”   
 Tsuda’s recollection of this particular “key part” is revealing because it 
illuminates two important aspects of interrogation: the racialized hierarchy, and the role 
of interrogation as “feedback” on the performance of the United States military.  The 
military “information,” although encompassing questions such as numbers, types of 
weapons, and identification of higher command members, also included a crucial aspect – 
the prisoners of war were to provide feedback on the effectiveness of different military 
tactics employed by the U.S. military.  What kind of “image” and “performance” was the 
United States hoping to portray and enact in front of the Korean and Chinese soldiers? 
 But the performance and image of the United States in the U.S. military 
interrogation room could be at times precarious, and Taniguchi expressed particular 
frustrations regarding the dearth of qualified translators with whom to work.  When the 
U.S. military began taking in Chinese prisoners of war, no one was prepared in 
Taniguchi’s unit to interrogate the POWs.  Quickly, they looked for available Mandarin 
speakers in the local, surrounding villages.  According to Taniguchi, they were only able 
to locate two men: one was a “skinny, old guy” named “Mr. Wong.”  He was sixty-five-
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years-old, and spoke Chinese, Korean, and some Japanese.  “The other guy was sixty-
years-old,” said Taniguchi.  “He could only speak Korean and Chinese.”  Using yet 
another interrogator who could speak Korean and Japanese, Taniguchi showed different 
pictures of Russian weapons to the two elders, and explained how they were going to be 
asking prisoners of war if they had used or seen any such weapons.224  And as a group of 
four, much like the team of six in Fujii’s article, they began interrogating Chinese 
prisoners of war.   
 But, as Sam Miyamoto has noted, the interrogated prisoner of war was not a 
simple, naïve recipient of the questioning – or to use Bartlett’s terms, the “Oriental mind” 
was not simply a “coconut” that needed assessment and opening.  The prisoner of war 
himself or herself often attempted to control the interrogation process itself – a story 
perhaps best exemplified in the following interrogation report on the most famous Korean 
prisoner of war, Senior Colonel Lee Hak Ku of the Korean People’s Army. 
 
The Most Famous “Reliable Oriental” 
  
The Allied Translator and Interpreter Section (ATIS) was responsible for 
publishing an extensive series of “Interrogation Reports: North Korean Forces” 
throughout the Korean War.  These reports, according to ATIS, “represent consolidations 
of individual interrogations obtained from the on-the-spot interviews with North Korean 
prisoners-of-war and deserters and Republic of Korea refugees.”  The “eighth volume in 
the series,” which contained “individual ATIS Interrogation Report Nos. 1300 through 
1399 inclusive,” a very significant interrogation report was included.  ATIS Interrogation 
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Report No. 1293 dated 29 September 1950 was the interrogation of DPRK Senior 
Colonel Lee Hak Ku, conducted by a “Sgt Hayashida” from ATIS. 
 In an earlier ATIS interrogation report, one where the interrogator was “not 
named,” dated 24 September 1950 (based on a field report conducted by the MISDI 164 
at 0930 on 21 September 1950), the “circumstances of surrender” regarding Lee Hak Ku 
are given.  Given that the date of Ku’s capture was September 21, 1950, following 
excerpt was most probably from his “intake” POW interrogation. 
PW surrendered to US troops on his own volition. […] 
PW left his unit in the mountains (south of TABUDONG) and approached 
the American lines at night.  He approached two American soldiers 
sleeping on a roadside, and roused them by gently shaking them; and they 
brought him in as a PW. 
PW was disgusted with the Communist doctrine and system and 
consequently surrendered.225 
  
In the follow-up ATIS interrogation report dated 29 September 1950 (based on a field 
report conducted by ADVATIS dated 25 September 1950, 0900), Sergeant Hayashida 
made the following “assessment”: 
PW was intelligent and very cooperative.  No attempts were made at 
evasion and answers were given without hesitation.  Although PW at one 
time was in position of great responsibility in the NKPA, he did not show 
any signs of being a Communist.  PW is of a higher than average caliber, 
and, from all indications, highly ambitious.  He may have surrendered 
because he believed that the NKPA is fighting a losing battle without 
possibilities of active foreign support.  Reliability – good. [my emphasis] 
 
Lee Hak Ku was a Senior Colonel in the Korean People’s Army, and Chief of Staff of the 
13th Division.  He gave the following personal timeline: Born in “HOI-Dong” on January 
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  158 
18, 1921, he then graduated primary school in 1936, and then farmed “at place of birth.”  
He then taught Japanese at his home in HOI-Dong during 1937, after which he attended 
HONAM Primary School, and later passed the National Teachers Examination.  He 
became a Japanese teacher at Yanghwa Primary School, and supposedly on the day of 
interrogation Lee still carried a valid teacher’s certification of his appointment at 
Yanghwa.  After liberation from Japanese colonialism in 1945, Lee Hak Ku was 
“[e]mployed by the North Korean People’s Government Ministry of Interior as Chief of 
Public Security (Police) Section, MYONGCH’ON).”  He then would become a member 
of three critical organizations: the Peace Preservation Corps at NANAM, the NK 
Democratic Youth League, and the North Korean Labor Party. 
 In light of Lee’s personal timeline, the comment that Lee “did not show any signs 
of being a Communist” raises the simple question of exactly what a “Communist” would 
show or demonstrate.  In fact, if we continue to follow the paper trail of Lee’s 
interrogation reports, we come upon a report sent by Frank E. Lowe, a Major General in 
the U.S. Army, to President Harry Truman.  The introductory letter, dated 3 May 1951, 
begins, 
Dear Mr. President, 
Colonel Lee Hak Ku, as of 6 October 1950 and since that time as far as I 
know, the highest ranking NOK officer captured as well as those 
voluntarily surrendering. 
Attached hereto is a copy of his interrogation which is both interesting and 
significant.  I believe that overall it is as significant today as it was on 6 
October 1950. 
Yours faithfully, 
Frank E. Lowe 
 
Lowe had attached a narrative of the interrogation an interrogator named Edward L. 
Bowles had conducted with Lee on “Friday, 22nd of September, in the detention area at 
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Pusan.”  It was a day after Lee’s initial intake interrogation report, and two days before 
the later tactical interrogation report.  “The man answered my questions forthrightly and 
willingly so far as I could observe,” wrote Bowles. “I had the impression that he was an 
able person.”  As for the actual process of interrogation, Bowles briefly mentions that 
there was a translator of some sort – “The interpreter seemed unusually able in his 
translations” – and attributed the fluency of the translation to Lee’s character.  “[He] gave 
one the feeling that he is precise not only in his manner of speech but his thinking.”   
 Interestingly, Bowles began his conversation, at least according to the provided 
narrative, with a question about the North Koreans.  “Several times during the 
interrogation I questioned the prisoner as to what it was that caused the North Koreans to 
fight with such fever.  His answers pointed consistently to the conclusion that the 
soldiers, at least, believed that they were fighting for the unification of Korea without 
Russia.”  The issue of the Russians clearly loomed large for Bowles – the discussion soon 
turned again to the Russians:  
I […] asked why is was that the North Koreans were not given more 
aircraft by the Russians.  He stated quickly that it was because the North 
Koreans had no pilots for the aircraft.  I then asked why if the Russians 
sent guns, tanks, munitions, and radar and communications equipment, 
they did not send pilots.  He explained that this was different.  He made 
this statement as if it had aroused an intense feeling in him.  I tried to 
develop the subject further, and he went on to explain that equipment was 
a ‘thing,’ whereas the pilot was a ‘man, and that the Russians were 
concerned with United Nations action (he actually referred to the United 
Nations as such).  He went on to say that the Russians were worried about 
world opinion. 
 
It is a moment in the narrative where Lee Hak Ku supposedly becomes impassioned – 
and it is a moment that seems to indicate that Lee is not the passive “Oriental” imagined 
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either by Bowles or Bartlett.  He was insisting on explicating the Russians’ actions even 
within a U.S. military interrogation room. 
In his letter to President Truman accompanying a copy of Bowles’ narrative, 
Lowe asserted that the interrogation “is both interesting and significant,” and goes so far 
to say, “I believe that overall is it as significant today as it was on 6 October 1950.”  
Similar to Hanley’s characterization of the interrogation room, Bowles’ interrogation 
room – and the success of the interrogation – was dependent on the seeming transparency 
of two major aspects: language, and the intent of Lee Hak Ku.  Language, according to 
Lowe’s report, was not an issue – and the translator, who had most probably been either a 
Korean civilian translator or a Japanese American interrogator/translator, was rendered 
immediately invisible.  Indeed, even the complex bureaucracy and multiple interrogations 
surrounding Lee Hak Ku’s surrender were hidden – the intake interrogation done by MIS, 
the reports filed by ATIS, the tactical interrogation done by ADVATIS.  But the omission 
of these multiple types of interrogation was perhaps significant in itself – each type of 
interrogation was conducted with the objective of extracting a specific type of 
information.  But what type of “information” was being produced supposedly in Lowe’s 
interrogation? 
 I would argue that the reason Bowles sent the interrogation memorandum to 
President Truman was to demonstrate how U.S. interrogators were able to discern and 
gain insight into the “North Korean mind.”  The ability to note and judge Lee Hak Ku’s 
character was on full display in the 3-page typed narrative written by Bowles.  There is 
also an element of spectacle present in the narrative as we watch vicariously through 
Bowles the particular physical gestures and verbal emphases Lee supposedly does during 
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the interrogation.  Bowles’ parenthetical notation that Lee had actually noted the United 
Nations by name juxtaposed with observations of Lee’s emotional reactions conveys the 
positionality of the interrogator all too well – detached, the interrogator notes with some 
surprise that Lee is aware of the United Nations, and also pays attention to his physical 
gestures, often characterizing them as somewhat naïve.  Lee Hak Ku, a Senior Colonel in 
the DPRK’s military, was supposedly a rather intelligent, but ultimately unsophisticated 
and naïve Oriental.  He was an anti-communist Korean.   
 Bowles’ interrogation was a portrait of an anti-communist Korean, to convey to 
President Truman what manner of “man” – and what kind of human intelligence 
substance – the United States was involved with in both war and occupation. And 
perhaps there was even a measure of reassurance in the sending of Bowles’ interrogation 
narrative to Truman by Lowe – it was reassurance that the United States could indeed 
render transparent the will and desires of the Korean, and, more importantly, that the 
Korean would render himself willingly as a transparent subject in front of the United 
States. 
 But I would also argue that Lee Hak Ku was very consciously insisting upon the 
agency and autonomy of the North Korean army and state – throughout the interrogation, 
Ku again and again reiterated his belief that the North Korean soldiers were fighting on 
behalf of unification, not because of Russia.  After his time in the detention center in 
Pusan, the U.S. Army made Lee Hak Ku a “prisoner of war.”  Later chapters will delve 
more deeply into Lee’s experiences as a POW during the Korean War, but he later 
becomes the lightening rod for much of the U.S. Army’s frustration with Korean 
communist prisoners of war, as they refuse to participate in U.S. military interrogation.  
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He will be characterized as an “Oriental Communist fanatic,” a man with no regard for 
human life – and Lowe’s letter to Truman was most probably quietly disregarded.  The 
desires of an empire are much too vulnerable in the interrogation room – and the desire to 
claim knowledge over Lee Hak Ku is all too bare in Bowles’ interrogation narrative.  But 
even in the archival, bureaucratic record of the U.S. military, Lee Hak Ku’s insistence 
opens up the possibility for recognizing the agency of Korean communist POWs in 
Miyamoto’s interrogation room – the significance of the spitting on the floor and the 
awareness of racial projects being undertaken by the United States.  The “Oriental” who 
was being read by the U.S. military was also aware of the different projects taking place.   
 
Conclusion 
 “I told him the truth,” said Sam Miyamoto during his reflections upon his work as 
an interrogator of POWs during the Korean War.  Miyamoto had told the Korean POW 
that he had been drafted, that he was only acting under orders, that he had not chosen to 
be an interrogator.  In essence, Miyamoto was attempting to carve out space for his own 
autonomy in the interrogation room, a space where the subject-making project also 
included him.  The “truth,” although perhaps not of structural consequence in the 
interrogation room, held significance because of Miyamoto’s insistence that his own 
history and experience were not collapsed in the U.S. military interrogation room.   
 The interrogation room was to produce an interrogator and the interrogated POW 
– two differently inflected subjects of U.S. empire. But as the case with POW Lee Hak 
Ku and interrogator Sam Miyamoto, consent was not always assumed or given.  Instead, 
through this close history of the interrogation room and the Japanese American 
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interrogators, a different story about war, states of emergency, and military necessity 
emerged, where the United States rendered “statelessness” strategically in their program 
of “repatriation.”  As the re-ordering of power between the rising empire of the United 
States and the now falling empire of Japan occurred, this cohort of Japanese American 
young men had become one of the sites for this re-assignment of racialization, 
subjecthood, and labor.  And as the re-ordering of global power continued through the 
Korean War, another proposal of “repatriation” would be placed upon the negotiation 
tables at Panmunjom – voluntary POW repatriation.  Persuasion in the interrogation room 
would be transformed and heightened in the newly created “repatriation screening 
interrogation room.”  The creation of the “prisoner of war” and this “repatriation 
interrogation room” is the subject of the next chapter. 
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Part II: The POW, War, and the Global Order 
 
Chapter Three 
 
Making a Prisoner for War: 
Practices of War and Decolonization in the POW Controversy of the Korean War 
 
 
It was October 1, 1950, and twenty-year old Oh Se-hui was making his way back 
to his home in north Kyongsang Province, after multiple stints with the Korean People’s 
Army [KPA].  After General MacArthur’s successful landing at Inchon a month before 
on September 1st, the KPA had been in steady retreat, and Oh had seized upon a chance 
to return home.  Oh stepped out of the wooded hills onto a road that wound around a 
cabbage field and began to walk north. 
 A voice barked out from behind him – “Hands in the air!”  Oh raised his hands 
slowly in the air. He had already deemed it inevitable that he would eventually run into a 
soldier of the Republic of Korea Army [ROKA], the United Nations Command [UNC], 
or even the KPA again - and in preparation for such encounters he had stashed away four 
different pieces of paper in strategic places on his body. The first, a hand-written “patriot 
certificate” attesting to his true dedication to the KPA, had been folded carefully and 
placed into the lining of his beret-like hat, one worn often by guerilla fighters.  The 
second, a leaflet dropped by UN reconnaissance planes, guaranteed his safe surrender, 
and he had placed it, like “precious cargo,” in the inside pocket of his coat. The third, 
tucked away in the right back pocket of his pants, was his student papers stating that he 
was enrolled at Seoul University, the prominent, national university of South Korea.  In 
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the left back pocket of his pants the fourth piece of paper – a slim notebook - contained 
the registered names of his students when he had been a middle school teacher in the 
countryside. He had rehearsed over and over in his mind what he would do when he met 
a member from the KPA, or a U.S. soldier, a guerilla fighter, or an ROKA soldier.  The 
certificate would hold him in good stead with the KPA and the communist guerilla 
fighters; the UN surrender leaflet appeared to have the most wide-ranging application 
since the military forces of sixteen different nations, including the Republic of Korea, 
were operating on the Korean peninsula under the auspices of the UNC, led by the U.S. 
military; the student and teacher papers attested to his civilian status and ROK 
citizenship, possible necessary evidence for someone of the ROKA. 
Car brakes screeched to a halt.  An ROKA soldier stepped out of the jeep, 
pointing his rifle at Oh.  “What are you?” barked the soldier.  Taking out the “precious 
cargo” of the UN leaflet from his jacket, Oh gave the leaflet to the ROKA soldier, who 
promptly scoffed at him, declaring, “This doesn’t mean anything here,” and ripped up the 
paper. Oh then gave him his student paper, and the soldier yelled out, while ripping up 
the paper, “What the hell is a college student doing here?” Not knowing if he would live 
or die, he then offered the teacher papers to the soldier.  “What’s a teacher doing here?” 
the soldier stated, and tossed aside the papers.  Impatient, the soldier pointed his rifle at 
Oh’s chest and commanded, “Take off your hat!” Nervously, Oh removed his hat, 
praying that the Communist certificate would not fall out.  It did not. The ROKA soldier 
examined Oh’s hair, which had grown quite long and unruly during the past few weeks, 
unlike the short, cropped hair of the guerilla fighters.  Thus satisfied that Oh was not an 
enemy, the soldier finally called out to the others in the jeep: “Someone come take care 
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of this!”  “This” was Oh Se-hui – he had now become a prisoner of war.226 
 Oh Se-hui had attempted to barter for another moment of life with four pieces of 
paper, as he tried to render himself legible within at least one of the multiple types of 
“war” occurring on the peninsula.  The Korean peninsula was the site of a civil war 
between North and South Korea, the first “hot war” of Cold War containment, and anti-
imperial revolution.  The United States, the United Nations, and the people of Korea were 
well-acquainted with each other, as the official liberation of Korea from Japanese 
colonialism, the official beginning to the United Nations as an entity, and the official start 
to U.S. military occupation on the divided peninsula all began in 1945. The legacies, 
violence, and struggles over who would claim and decide the project of decolonizing 
Korea was also the crux of the Korean War, as the United States, the United Nations, the 
Soviet Union, and different groups in Korea fought over the power to define the war.  
The Korean War was a war over decolonization. 
 A particular piece of paper became crucial to this war over the Korean War – the 
1949 Geneva Conventions on the Treatment of Prisoners of War.  At the armistice 
meetings at Panmunjom, the debate over prisoner of war treatment became the issue on 
the table that delayed the signing of the ceasefire for eighteen months.  The postcolonial 
states of the Republic of Korea and the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, 
international entities such as the United Nations and the International Committee of the 
Red Cross, a rising hegemonic power like the United States, and even the Korean 
prisoners of war themselves became embroiled in a debate about the proper application of 
the 1949 Geneva Conventions in the Korean War to the POWs on the ground. The crisis 
over the prisoner of war during the Korean War brought the “laws of war” – or 
                                                
226 Oh, Se-hui. Suyoungso 65 [Compound 65] (Taegu: Maninsa, 2000), 61-62. 
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international humanitarian law, as it is now commonly called – into its own crisis, as 
multiple genealogies of empire, conceptions of nation-states, and legacies of anti-colonial 
movements converged on this one figure of the mid-twentieth century institutionalizing 
of war – the prisoner of war.  This chapter tells the story of how the United States 
military and the Korean prisoners of war – both communist and anti-communist – began 
to engage in a struggle over defining the “prisoner of war,” a struggle that was 
effectively, I argue, a struggle over making a subject for decolonization.227   
The successful landing at Inchon on the western coast just south of the parallel, in 
tandem with the Eighth Army moving swiftly north from the Pusan Perimeter in the 
southeast part of the peninsula, had resulted in the unexpected capture of many prisoners 
of war. The numbers of Korean prisoners of war coming under U.S. military custody 
increased exponentially week to week, month to month.  At the end of August 1950, 
before the Inchon landing operation, a total of 1,745 Korean POWs were under U.S. 
custody.  By the end of September, the number had jumped to 10,819; the end of October 
saw the total of 62,678, November saw 98,143, and December’s total tallied up to 
137,118.228  In total, the number of POWs under U.S. military custody for the duration of 
the Korean War reached 170,000, and Oh Se-hui became part of that statistical 
population.  
                                                
227 Although there is still a lack of scholarship on the application of international humanitarian law during 
the Korean War specifically, there is a great deal of scholarship examining and analyzing the development 
of international humanitarian law especially after 1945. For a more general overview, please see Geoffrey 
Best, War and Law Since 1945 (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1997) and his other monograph, Humanity in 
Warfare (New York: Columbia University Press, 1980).  Another good overview narrative on the 
development of law and conflict is Yoram Dinstein, The Conduct of Hostilities under the Law of 
International Armed Conflict (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004).  For scholarship that 
historicizes notions of warfare within colonial projects and nation-states, please see footnote 7 of this 
chapter. 
228 Calculation of prisoners interned each month & captured rates (1952), Folder: Unclassified, 511-02, 
Korea; Box 19; Unclassified Records, 1969-75; POW/Civilian Internee Information Center; Records of the 
Provost Marshall General, 1941-; Record Group 389; National Archives at College Park, College Park, MD. 
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 The U.S. military had been wholly unprepared for such a sudden increase in the 
number of prisoners of war.  Until the Inchon landing ROKA and UNC soldiers had 
gathered and processed the POWs in prisons that had been used through Japanese 
colonialism and U.S. occupation, such as the prisons in Mapo in central Seoul and Suwon 
in the south of Seoul.  But under the different opinions within the Truman administration 
about the nature of the war at hand, the relationship between the battle front and the 38th 
parallel changed, making the prisoners of war an even larger logistical issue for the U.S. 
military.   
 On September 27, 1950, the Joint Chiefs of Staff authorized General MacArthur 
to cross the 38th parallel, transforming the focus of the war from containment to rollback.  
By November 6th, MacArthur was sending reports to Truman about the large numbers of 
Chinese Communist forces crossing over the Yalu River into Korea.  The aim of the war 
was to shift yet again. “As I look back,” Dean Acheson wrote in his memoir, Present at 
the Creation, “the critical period stands out as the three weeks from October 26 to 
November 17,” a period after which General MacArthur would state on November 28: 
“We face an entirely new war.”229   
As the Truman administration scrambled to articulate what exactly this “entirely 
new war” consisted of, the U.S. military was also scrambling to move the POWs south 
along with the U.S. troops that retreated to south of the 38th parallel.  Soon, the POWs 
were amassed behind barbed-wire fences in camps in the southeast port city of Pusan, 
and then later moved to the island of Koje, located approximately 68 miles offshore from 
Pusan.  At Koje, Oh Se-hui encountered another very important piece of paper – an 
                                                
229 Dean Acheson, Present at the Creation: My Years in the State Department (New York: W.W. Norton 
and Company, 1969), 468-469. 
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abbreviated version of 1949 Geneva Conventions on the Treatment of Prisoners of War, 
which the U.S. military posted in each and every POW compound according to the 
Conventions’ stipulations.  Frederick Bieri, the delegate from the International 
Committee of the Red Cross assigned to report on the conditions of the POW camp on 
Koje Island, commented, “The POWs are very interested in the Convention, which is 
quite new to them.”230  However, it turned out that it was the Korean POW that was 
“quite new” to the Conventions, and not the other way around – the Korean POWs, 
whether anti-communist or communist, held and mobilized an awareness of the profound 
stakes involved in the application of the 1949 Geneva Conventions. 
In 1950, when the official outbreak of the Korean War occurred, the International 
Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) quickly mobilized to establish communication with 
all parties involved in the war. But the entities that had entered the conflict on the Korean 
peninsula were not the idealized sovereign nation-state entities that the Geneva 
Conventions had traditionally envisioned in war: the recently-formed United Nations had 
entered the conflict as a belligerent, the Korean peninsula was still divided, the northern 
Democratic People’s Republic of Korea was not recognized as a sovereign entity by 
either the UN or the United States, and the United States was a former military occupier 
on the Korean peninsula.  And none of the parties involved had directly ratified the 1949 
Conventions.   
But within the first few weeks of the conflict, the ICRC had received the pledges 
from the United Nations, United States, the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, and 
                                                
230 Report on UN POW Camp No. 1 Koje-do and Pusan.  Bieri: May 29 to June 9, 1951.  Dr. Bessero May 
29, 31, 1951. Transmission des rapports de visites de camps aux Nations Unies, aux Etats-Unis et à la 
Corée-du-Nord, 16/01/1951-12/05/1952, B AG 210 056-021, Archive of the International Committee of the 
Red Cross. 
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also the Republic of Korea that they would uphold the “principle” of the 1949 Geneva 
Conventions.  But what was the “principle” of the 1949 Geneva Conventions? 
With the specter of the atomic bomb after 1945 and the horrors of mass violence 
in the aftermath of World War II, the ICRC and the decolonizing world was facing a shift 
in the language and conduct of warfare, a change that had been in place well before 1945 
– a shift noted by German jurist Carl Schmitt in his work The Nomos of the Earth, which 
was published in 1950, the same year of the outbreak of the Korean War.  The universal 
moralism espoused by the ICRC and as observed by Carl Schmitt in Nomos “would bring 
into existence – in fact allow only the existence of – wars on behalf of humanity, wars in 
which enemies would enjoy no protection, wars that would necessarily be total.” The 
United States, in Schmitt’s judgment, would be the harbinger of this new type of war and 
empire, articulated and enacted along lines of “intervention,” “which was not confined to 
new states and governments in the traditional sense of the praxis of European law.” 231   
Schmitt’s interventionist “war on behalf of humanity” and MacArthur’s “entirely new 
war” would converge upon the figure of the prisoner of war in the Korean War.   
The armistice meetings between the U.S./UN delegates and the representatives 
from the DPRK and China began at Kaesong on July 10, 1951 and later moved to 
Panmunjom on October 25th of that year.  By the end of the year, all sides had agreed 
upon the location of the ceasefire line near the 38th parallel.  A single item of debate - 
Agenda Item 4 which concerned the matter of prisoners of war – was still on the table. 
                                                
231 Carl Schmitt, The Nomos of the Earth in the International Law of the Jus Publicum Europaeum (New 
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However, on January 2, 1952, U.S. delegates presented a new demand – voluntary 
repatriation. The Chinese and North Korean delegates pointed out that the Geneva 
Conventions required mandatory repatriation.  The policy of voluntary repatriation 
moved the political and ideological struggle well beyond the moral and humanitarian 
principles of the Geneva Conventions.  
But the POW did not remain a simple discursive figure of war.  Dean Acheson 
would devote a few pages of his memoir to the “POW problem.”  “By mid-April a 
disconcerting report came in from General Ridgeway. […] Again in March twelve 
prisoners were killed.  General Ridgeway now reported that 37,000 prisoners in seven of 
the seventeen compounds could not be screened without the use of force.”232 A U.S. 
Army intelligence report declared that “the United Sates has never confronted a POW 
like the Oriental communist POW.”  The POW was laying claim to determining the 
application of the 1949 Geneva Conventions, and as this chapter will demonstrate, the 
three wars of civil war, Cold War “hot war,” and anti-imperial revolution were present in 
the camp itself.  The war over the Korean War was on both sides of the barbed-wire 
fence. 
This chapter begins on the ground of the Korean peninsula with the Korean 
prisoners of war as they navigate through processes of surrender, capture, and their later 
arrival at the POW camp on the island of Koje, a camp that ICRC delegate Bieri called 
“the largest camp ever run in accordance with the Geneva Conventions.”  As the war 
itself changed drastically from June to September 1950 and the in November again, the 
viability of the figure of the prisoner of war became more and more central to the 
strategies of war fashioned at the White House and Pentagon. This first section focuses 
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on the different patterns and uses of violence deployed by the different groups in the 
camp during the first year, which, I argue, reveal how the socio-political landscape of this 
massive POW camp on the southeastern island of Koje was the site of competing projects 
of hegemony.  Two different nation-state projects were claiming the individual Korean 
subject, while the United States claimed the role of guardian and guide for the Koreans 
regarding how to conduct oneself in war.  But the violence – the beatings, the grenades, 
the shootings, and the suicides – would all evidence how much effort such projects 
demanded.  The practices of violence or protest would be highly revealing also – beating 
by the anti-communist Koreans, shooting by the ROKA military guards, concussion 
grenades thrown by U.S. soldiers, hunger strikes by communist Koreans.  In the midst of 
these struggles, it was the “prisoner of war” and the question of the application of the 
1949 Geneva Convention that would become the site for contention.  The second section 
focuses on the Psychological Strategy Board’s proposal on the issue of POW voluntary 
repatriation, and I frame the PSB’s particular approach to the category of “prisoner of 
war” within the history of 1949 Geneva Conventions to ground the Cold War PsyWar 
discourse within a larger conversation about claims to determining legitimate “warfare” 
and “humanity.”  
 
Building a POW Camp 
In January 1951, the U.S. Army decided to construct a camp to hold over 150,000 
prisoners of war on Kojedo, a mountainous island off the southeastern shore of the 
Korean peninsula.  When International Committee of the Red Cross delegate, Frederick 
Bieri, visited the camp in June of that year, he noted in his report, “Koje-Do[…] is very 
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hilly. […] Lovely landscapes. Healthy surroundings.”  The island was also home to a 
sizable population of Koreans, the majority of whom cultivated rice or fished as a 
livelihood.  These peasants had also been, especially in the post-liberation period, highly 
supportive of land reform, and the U.S. military had marked Kojedo as a “leftist” territory 
that was sympathetic to communists during the pre-Korean War occupation. When the 
U.S. Army engineers decided upon two valleys in the northeastern part of the island as 
the location for the camp, the Korean peasants protested the wholesale confiscation of 
their land, and U.S. Army memos noted that the peasants often angrily wielded their 
farming tools dangerously in their protests. However, within record time, the U.S. Army 
took over “1,260 Korean houses and buildings, as well as some 1,680 acres of land” for 
the camp’s construction, and as Bieri would later report, “It is interesting to note that the 
Compounds are built on former paddy fields.”233  
One population was displaced supposedly in the interests of another displaced 
population.  But the prisoners of war would soon be needed almost immediately to 
provide labor for the camp’s construction; in fact, by February 1st, “[p]ressure for the 
transfer was so great that the first POW’s were detailed to setting fenceposts and 
stringing barbed wire for their own confinement.”234  The issue of labor would continue 
through the close of the camp in 1953 – the U.S. Army did not have sufficient personnel 
                                                
233 “Normal procedure was to acquire the land for an indefinite period and without compensation to the 
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to run the camp, and relied almost completely on POW labor.  In May 1951, Bieri, the 
ICRC camp inspector, observed, “Hundreds of thousands of stones have been, and are 
still being carried by POW by hand from the seashore and from the hills, into the building 
areas. […] The Enclosures and the POW hospital are tented (squad tents). The tents 
(arranged in company lines) are well ditched and have low walls made of mud and earth 
mixture.  Each POW Battalion has its own kitchen, dispensary, feeding lines, utility 
shops, (tinsmiths, shoemakers, carpenters, barbers).”235  The prisoners of war themselves 
built the camp - and the camp would become, in the words of ICRC delegate Frederick 
Bieri, “the largest POW camp ever run in accordance with the Geneva Conventions.” 236   
The U.S. Army began bringing over prisoners of war from the temporary camp at 
Pusan to Koje in February 1951.  Oh Se-hui had been one of those POWs brought by 
cargo ship from Pusan to Koje.  The journey from Pusan to Koje Island took 
approximately three hours, and according to Oh’s memoir, there were approximately 500 
other POWs on the boat with him. The U.S. and UN forces had close to 140,000 
prisoners of war in the Pusan camp at that time.  The large undertaking of transferring 
these POWs to the island had begun.  
Eventually, Oh Se-hui and other POWs were taken to the northern part of the 
island, where the U.S. Army, engineers, and POW laborers had begun to build the more 
permanent POW camp within two valleys near Dokbongsan mountain.  In the 
westernmost valley, the U.S. Army had built compounds to house the prisoners of war 
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that had originally come from south of the 38th parallel. 237 Oh Se-hui entered Compound 
65 located in this westernmost valley; the compound itself was a vast swath of land 
ringed by barbed-wire fences and occupied by a multitude of tarp tents.  Each compound 
held 2500 prisoners of war – however, to make some sort of organization out of the POw 
population in each compound, the compound was divided into three “regiments,” each of 
which were divided further into 3 “battalions,” each of which were divided even further 
into 2 “corps.”  Each corps was housed in a tent, approximately 50 prisoners of war. And 
as according to the 1949 Geneva Conventions, the POWs were arranged with respect to 
military unit formation, and each compound would elect its own spokesman.  Leadership 
and discipline in the compounds were certainly a key issue.  Each compound elected their 
own compound spokesman, who would act as a representative for the POWs in the 
compound in front of the camp authorities.  The spokesman would carry a significant 
amount of weight, but the most important figure in the compound was the Compound 
Monitor (CM).  The Compound Monitor wielded a great deal of control over the 
everyday activities in the compound – they coordinated activities, cooperated with the 
camp authorities in making lists of the POWs, and in general maintained “law and order” 
in the camps.238   
 Central to each compound was a posted piece of paper – an abbreviated copy of 
the 1949 Geneva Conventions on the Treatment of Prisoners of War.  In the same first 
report to the ICRC on the conditions at the UNC POW camp on Koje Island, delegate 
Bieri noted one particular request of the POWs, voiced during two meetings he had held 
                                                
237 In this valley, the compounds were numbered in the 60s.  On the opposite side of the mountain towards 
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238 Oh, Se-hui. Suyoungso 65 [Compound 65] (Taegu: Maninsa, 2000). Information taken from Chapter 5, 
“Kojedo POW Camp.” 
  
176 
on June 5, 1951, one with all of the spokesmen from Enclosure No. 6 and another 
meeting with the spokesmen from Enclosures No. 7 and 8 on June 5, 1951. “Issue of 
more copies per compound of the Geneva Convention (POW) Extract in Korea,” Bieri 
noted in his report.  “The one copy displayed in each Compound is not sufficient.”  And 
the delegate added a remark following the request: “The POWs are very interested in the 
Convention, which is quite new to them.”239   
 The camp on Koje Island – massive in scale and in population – would become 
the first large-scale application of the 1949 Geneva Conventions, and the United States 
military would be first and foremost responsible for the application, being that the United 
States had become the head of the UN forces, under which the ROK Army was included.  
Although Oh Se-hui’s first impression upon entering the Koje Camp was one of isolation, 
the camp of 170,000 prisoners, U.S. soldiers, KATUSA and ROKA members, and 
Korean civilian workers was not isolated at all.  In fact, the multiple wars of the Korean 
War would be distilled almost in its essence as multiple groups attempted to reinscribe 
state military’s claims to power repeatedly upon the POW, military, and bureaucratic 
populations within and without the camp.   
The 1949 Geneva Conventions on the Treatment of Prisoners of War were a 
constant presence in the camp, and as it was supposed to mediate the encounter between 
Se-hui Oh and the ROKA soldier at the opening of this chapter, the Conventions were to 
also mediate the different encounters within the camp also – whether between prisoners 
of war themselves, prisoners and sentries, or prisoners and the administrative powers.  At 
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the Koje Camp, the following provision, Article 121, would hold a particular 
significance: 
Article 121: Prisoners Killed or Injured in Special Circumstances 
Every death or serious injury of a prisoner of war caused or suspected to 
have been caused by a sentry, another prisoner of war, or any other person, 
as well as any death the cause of which is unknown, shall be immediately 
followed by an official enquiry by the Detaining Power.240 
 
An examination of the over 300 incident case files on the instances of death or injury in 
the Kojedo camp reveals an entire political economy of violence, ranging from suicide, 
escape attempts, hunger strikes, and interrogation procedures created by the POWs 
themselves.241  These files, complete with transcripts of interrogation and testimony 
statements, provide material from which to glean the shifting socio-political landscape in 
the camp.  In each case, the body of the prisoner of war was at the center of the meaning-
making. 
 
Becoming a Prisoner of War 
 
As the camp began to be put together with barbed-wire, stones, and tarp, the 
prisoners of war themselves created an administrative quandary for the U.S. military.  
When Yi Chong-gyu arrived at Koje Island, he was assigned to Compound 91 – the camp 
was expanding constantly during the year, and new compounds running through the 80s 
and the 90s were in construction.  The camp he encountered upon arrival was in constant 
flux and re-organization.  Each compound held tens of thousands of POWs or CIs, and 
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because of the demand for military personnel at the front, there was a dearth of U.S. 
military personnel assigned to Koje-do.242  In fact, a report dated January 3, 1952 stated 
that “189 US personnel were charged with the supervision of 37,000 prisoners.”243  As a 
result, ROKA soldiers and KATUSA personnel were usually the ones who performed 
perimeter guard duty, while U.S. military personnel would occasionally perform a 
headcount and other administrative duties.  The lines of authority within the Kojedo 
POW camp were neither evident nor stable. 
Early administrative memos from the POW camp on Kojedo indicated both 
frustration and anxiety over the categorization of the POW.  Even the most basic 
administrative task – the identifying and marking the POWs – was becoming difficult. A 
memo detailing instructions on the proper processing of prisoners of war dated from 
February 20 1951, the instructions lay the following rather straightforward process for 
creating the identification tags for the prisoners of war: 
As soon as possible after capture and, in any case, as soon as prisoners of 
war come into military police channels, prisoner of war tags, UN AGO 
Form #3, will be prepared.  In addition to the data shown on the form, the 
prisoners’ name will be written on the form, if possible in both Korean (or 
Chinese) and English characters, to provide a means of identification since 
enemy prisoners of war have not, in general, been provided with 
identification by their own forces.  Thereafter, each prisoner of war will be 
required to keep this tag on his person, at all times, until he is issued a 
permanent identification tag carrying his interment number.244 
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However, in a memo addressed to the Office of the Provost Marshal General regarding 
the handling of prisoners of war dated over a year later than the previous memo, the tone 
and concern regarding POW administration had changed quite considerably. 
Prisoners of war or Civilian Internees are furnished with identification tags 
of metal, however, this serves no purpose for the metal is used by the 
prisoners for other purposes.  […] Another […] difficulty [is] resolving 
the Chinese or Korean characters into anglicized names.  The oriental 
prisoners of war interchange their names, forget their internment serial 
number, or deliberately change them, etc., therefore, any attempt at 
identification by other than fingerprinting has been abandoned as 
impractical.245 
 
The camp administration’s frustration with how the POWs were subverting the 
administration’s bureaucratic surveillance – and also authority – is clear in the above 
quoted memorandum.   
The prisoners of war themselves were a motley population – some had come from 
as far away as Uzbekistan, others from Manchuria, and still others from both north and 
south of the 38th parallel. Yi Chong-gyu, for example, arrived at United Nations 
Command Camp Number 1 in late 1951, and became a part of this POW population. 
Many prisoners of war had family in the south, and Yi recalled that during his time in the 
camp at Pusan, a prisoner of war would receive food daily from his elderly father, who 
visited the camp everyday.  The pre-war occupations of the prisoners were as far-ranging 
as their hometowns.  Although a good percentage of the POWs reported their previous 
occupation as “laborer,” other positions such as teacher, railroad conductor, merchant, 
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journalist, student, doctor, and nurse were offered as background information.246  Women 
soldiers and nurses, who had joined the KPA, as well as female guerilla fighters, were 
also in their own compounds.  In his reports, inspector Bieri discussed the infants and 
children living with their mothers in the camps.  Yi Chong-gyun had even mentioned that 
in his compound at Kojedo, three generations of one family were present – the 
grandfather, father, and son.   
In March 1951, approximately 50,000 prisoners of war were claiming that they 
had been residents of Korea south of the 38th parallel before the outbreak of the war, and 
had been forcibly drafted into the KPA.  As later stated during the meetings at 
Panmunjom, the U.S. Army had captured persons of a wide-ranging circumstances – 
guerrillas and Communist sympathizers. Some had been “taken into custody as a security 
measure,” and still others had become prisoners of war “through the confusion of war.”247  
Soon, the category of “civilian internees” [CI] was made available to the camp 
population, and the U.S. military and the ROKA initiated a screening process to sift 
through the claimants.  The civilian internees and prisoners of war from “South Korea” 
were assigned to compounds marked with numbers in the 60s, and those from “North 
Korea” were accordingly assigned to the compounds marked with digits in the 70s. 
But even after being designated as “civilian internees,” much conflict continued. 
Oh Se-hui, who became one of these “civilian internees,” described five different 
categories of people who were in his compound: 
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1. Civilians who were unable to flee during the KPA southern 
advancement, and then were subsequently drafted by or joined the KPA or 
the Chinhandae. 
2. Civilians who had been forcibly drafted by the KPA, fought against the 
ROKA, and then subsequently became POWs. 
3. ROKA soldiers who were captured by the KPA, became POWs under 
the KPA, and then were captured again by the U.S. military when they 
crossed the 38th parallel. 
4. ROKA soldiers who had either defected or became stragglers, and were 
regarded as KPA soldiers because of language miscommunication. 
 5. Civilians who had either purposefully or mistakenly joined the lines of 
POWs being marched by the U.S. forces. Or civilians who had been 
suspected of being spies, and thus arrested.248 
 
Civilians from both north and south of the 38th parallel, along with a large population of 
ROKA soldiers, comprised this category – an unexpected population to find behind the 
barbed-wire fence of a POW camp.  The U.S. military practice of summarily rounding up 
civilians or all captured soldiers had shaped a significant portion of the POW population 
– and the character of the still ensuing civil war did also. Among the members of the 
Korean People’s Army from the DPRK who had also become POWs, whether through 
capture or surrender, were people – both men and women – who had been born on either 
side of the 38th parallel.  Certain members of the KPA had been trained military in China 
during the anti-colonial movement and insurgency training, while members of the ROKA 
had been trained under the U.S. military during the occupation years, and some members 
had been a part of the Japanese imperial army even before then.    
Colonel Francis Dodd, one of the camp commanders of the Koje camp, stated 
bluntly at one point that the POWs could have easily overrun the guards and escaped en 
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masse at any point, if they had wanted to do so.249  But the POWs did not, and the camp – 
despite the anxieties held by U.S. military officials of how the POWs refused 
identification and the U.S. soldiers seemed unable to tell one “oriental” apart from 
another – did not descend into chaos. M. Frederick Bieri, one of the ICRC delegates who 
visited the Koje camp regularly, even noted, “The discipline is good, enforced by the 
POW themselves.”250 And in a later report he noted, “[T]he general feeling amongst the 
POW, that their days of travel from one camp to another are over, encourages them to do 
their utmost in furtherance of their constructional, educational, and recreational needs.”251 
The investigation reports into cases of violence certainly mark a steady pattern of 
different types of violence during the very time period that Bieri is observing, and a 
further probing into the interrogation transcripts, along with material from memoirs and 
oral histories, reveals a startling specificity to each use of violence, whether it was a 
group beating in an anti-communist-dominated compound, a fatal judgment in a People’s 
Court held in a communist-dominated compound, or a shooting or concussion grenade 
injury caused by South Korean or U.S. military personnel.   
 Bieri observed in the same breath in his report dated November 23-24, 1951 that, 
“In Compound No. 10 both Chinese and Korean POW work together on building 
projects, kitchen, etc. without the usual friction,” and later that a POW in the “maximum 
security” compound was under protective custody because “for reasons of his own, he 
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had stolen another patient’s X-ray photo, in Koje-do, in order to be transferred to Pusan.”  
The fear – and also strategy – of the Korean POW who attempts to claim tuberculosis as 
a way to escape the camp perhaps unsettles the seeming placid diplomatic turn 
demonstrated in the collaborative work between the Korean and Chinese POWs.  Death 
was still not in abeyance for the Korean POWs.  Almost all of the instances of violence 
reported in the investigation cases occurred around situations with Korean POWs, not the 
Chinese POWs.   
 The socio-political landscape of the targeted violence, surveillance and fear in the 
POW camp was not one manufactured simply behind the barbed-wire fences. The 
category of “civilian internee” encompassed the capture and surrender experiences of 
prisoners of war Oh Se-hui, Yi Mu-ho, and Yi Chung-gyo, and the unstable character of 
the “civilian internee” and also the “prisoner of war” reveals the more complicated stories 
of how these POWs became POWs through a series of various interpolations by different 
kinds of military and states.  The question “What are you?” for Oh Se-hui was the 
beginning of his becoming a prisoner of war – but from the moment of capture, through 
the multiple POW processing centers, through every truck transfer, the arrival at Koje, 
and then every compound transfer within the camp, Oh Se-hui had to answer that 
question time and time again.  And each time he was asked the question “What are you?,” 
the threat of violence and possible death was present, whether in the form of an ROKA 
soldier or an anti-communist youth group.252   
 The category of “prisoner of war” or “civilian internee” was a bureaucratic 
category of warfare that did not reflect the on-the-ground experiences of the prisoners of 
war. One former POW, Ko Yeong-gun, titled his memoir, Facing Death, and structured 
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his narrative of his wartime experience around sixteen moments of near-death 
experiences, beginning with his entrance into a temporary camp, and ending with a 
confrontation in the Koje camp.253  Each moment of confronting death results from an 
encounter with new people, whether it be DPRK soldiers or ROKA soldiers, or even 
other POWs.  The question of “What are you?” was not asking the prisoner of war to 
narrate him or herself, but rather signaling the beginning of a process where the soldier or 
policeman would execute in order to determine exactly “what” a potential prisoner of war 
was.  When the ROKA soldier ripped up the UN leaflet in front of Oh Se-hui, the soldier 
was rejecting any claims the UN or U.S. would have on the conflict itself, an assertion of 
his own representation of state power on the ground.  The U.S. or UN-led conflict of 
intervention was not to have any bearing upon the encounter between the ROKA soldier 
and Oh Se-hui – only the civil war, a conflict that had its origins in the Japanese colonial 
period and its escalation during U.S. military occupation, could be the legitimate template 
in which Oh Se-hui could become visible. 
 The prisoner of war Yi Chong-gyu’s experience of becoming a prisoner of war 
illustrates this working of the state. At the outbreak of the war, sixteen-year-old Yi 
Chong-gyu was hiding with his older brother from the Korean People’s Army, not 
wanting to be drafted.  His family held a firm reputation as Christians in the community 
and owned a sizable piece of land, larger than most other farming families.  Finally, on 
August 10, 1950, they decided they could no longer continue hiding. Yi was drafted, 
received ten days of training, and then was sent south. 
I walked all the way down from the north as a soldier in the Korean 
People’s Army.  On the night of General MacArthur’s Inchon landing I 
was on a mountain close to where the Imjin and Han Rivers meet […], 
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Two large naval ships were shelling bombs all through the night, lighting 
up the northern skies.  The bombs seemed like chunks of fire.254 
 
The landing at Inchon would prove to be a military turning point.  Faced with hundreds 
of U.S. marine units and a naval flotilla, Yi and others in his KPA unit began a fast 
retreat northward.  Among his fellow soldiers were a few men from Yi’s hometown, and 
eventually he made a pact with one of them to desert the Korean People’s Army and find 
their way back to their hometown; both were certain that only death awaited them if they 
continued to march north in those conditions.  They left one night, and began making 
their way back to Sŏhaedong. They trekked over mountainous terrain, only pausing to dig 
out radishes left over in the earth for their food.   
 As they neared their hometown, soldiers from the Republic of Korea Army 
captured them.   Holding his hands up, Yi Chong-gyu repeated over and over that he was 
a Christian and not a Communist.  The ROKA soldiers, somewhat skeptical, took him 
aside for interrogation and asked him to recite the Lord’s Prayer.  He did. The ROKA 
soldiers took him aside, and Yi became a POW. 
 The prisoners of war that the ROKA soldiers took in were essentially prisoners of 
war who were not prisoners of war – that is to say, if one seemed to be a fervent enlistee 
in the Korean People’s Army of the DPRK, then certain death would have been waiting.  
In the cases of Yi Chung-gyu, Oh Se-hui, and also Ko Yeong-gyun, the ROKA soldiers 
granted them the privileged status of “prisoner of war” because they seemed to be in a 
third category aside from the two states engaged in civil war.  Their humanity – or at least 
recognition of being worthy for another moment of life – stemmed from their appearance 
as a “civilian,” in the case of Oh Se-hui, or appearance as a “refugee,” in the case of 
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Christian Yi Chung-gyu.  The utterance of the Lord’s Prayer or the presence of long hair 
became a shorthand in a time of continued mass violence of reading a person’s 
relationship to the state, and to the violence itself – a moment which reveals what 
Fernando Coronil and Julie Skurski has described as where “[i]ndividual biography and 
collective history seem momentarily united, as history and the body become each other’s 
terrains.”255  And indeed, the Korean War had engendered such a moment where “the 
territoriality of nations and the corporeality of people become privileged mediums for 
reorganizing the body politic and for forcibly controlling the movement of persons and 
ideas within the nation’s material and cultural space.”  
 But this template of conflict was not the one defining how U.S. soldiers captured 
Korean “prisoners of war.”  Eighteen-year-old Yi Mu-ho, who had crossed over the 38th 
parallel from the north before the war’s outbreak in hopes of receiving refugee status in 
the south, had enlisted as an ROKA soldier, most probably in hopes of escaping the 
constant interrogation he had suffered at the hands of multiple policemen as a “refugee.”  
After the Chinese pushed the U.S. and UNC forces back to the 38th parallel, Yi and two 
other fellow ROKA soldiers asked the people of a local village to hide them.  The 
villagers agreed to do so, but only on the condition that Yi and the others dress in civilian 
clothing and put down their rifles.  They agreed – but later when the U.S. military troops 
come to the village, the U.S. soldiers rounded up the entire village and processed them as 
“prisoners of war.”  Yi Mu-ho, the eighteen-year-old boy who had sought asylum in the 
south as an anti-communist Christian from the north, had now become a “prisoner of 
war.” 
 With the U.S. troops, the question of death for the potential prisoner of war was 
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highly dependent on the tide of the battlefields.  Robert William Burr, who joined the 
U.S. Army on January 26, 1951 at twenty years of age, noted the following: 
I was present when a half a dozen prisoners upon capture [sic]. A platoon sergeant 
asked for volunteers to take them to the bottom of the hill, when he got no 
volunteers, he said he would take care of them himself. He shot  
them.256 
 
Burr had been a part of two battles – Bloody Ridge and Heartbreak Ridge – that had 
resulted in devastating casualties for all sides.  “One thing that will remain in my memory 
forever is the uphill struggle climbing hill 1179 (meters) which equates to over 3800 feet. 
[…] I think that was why the men were reluctant to take prisoners.  They were so dogged 
tired that they were ready to drop in their tracks, without the added duty of taking 
prisoners to the bottom of the hill [….].”   
 The prisoners of war the U.S. soldiers did take in belied the soldiers’ expectations, 
as the longer history of U.S. military occupation and relations with Korea entered their 
frame of war.  Sergeant Joseph Vincent Lisiewski, a nineteen-year-old from New Jersey, 
had captured a total of six Korean prisoners of war, but he noted that “Some went to 
school in the U.S.A., smoked U.S.A. cigarettes, spoke American.”257  A staff sergeant 
named Robert H. Moyer, who had enlisted in 1947 and had served in South Korea before 
the outbreak of the war, offered the following assessment: “Before the war, Koreans 
considered us as another occupier of their country.  And after the elections in 1948, we 
were only permitted off post in groups of 3 or more, for safety reasons.  They disliked 
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us.”258  The “enemy” Korean smoked American cigarettes, and the “friend” Korean 
resented the American military presence.  The U.S. soldiers, a number of them also from 
farming families in the Midwest or South, expressed “compassion and pity” for the 
ROKA or KATUSA soldiers, calling them “poor farm boys who had no idea what was 
going on.”259  But it would be the “look of hate” that confounded the U.S. soldiers – 
Anthony B. DeAngelis described an encounter with “a young and attractive North 
Korean woman lieutenant, a nurse”: 
Never in my life did a I witness such a look of hate as was evident on the 
face of this woman, an emotion I found difficult to comprehend since she 
now was positioned to enjoy what I believe was the best opportunity in the 
world for happiness.  But it also told me how effective Communism was 
as a mind poison; that this person could believe Americans, the liberty 
beacon of the world, were evil.”260 
 
“[D]ifficult to comprehend” in myriad forms became a constant presence in the language 
of the U.S. military camp administration at the Koje camp.  The frustration underlying 
the camp administration’s memorandum on the difficulty of keeping surveillance due to 
the POWs’ deliberate sabotage (“The oriental prisoners of war interchange their names, 
forget their internment serial number, or deliberately change them, etc., therefore, any 
attempt at identification by other than fingerprinting has been abandoned as 
impractical.”261) echoes DeAngelis’ incomprehension in front of the “look of hate” from 
the North Korean lieutenant nurse.   
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 The next section delves into the investigation case files, exploring the specific 
meanings of different types of violence practiced by different groups in the “largest POW 
camp ever run in accordance to the Geneva Conventions.”  The prisoner of war became 
the site of multiple projects of subject-making, as the military and police forces of the 
ROKA (both as POWs and military guards within and outside the barbed-wire fences), 
the military personnel of the KPA and civilian internees advocating the DPRK, and the 
U.S. military forces who administered the camp and oversaw both POW work details and 
ROKA/KATUSA police patrolling.  As the first year in the Koje camp passes, the POWs 
themselves and all involved in the camp’s everyday logistics became embroiled in a 
struggle over what a prisoner of war should be – and the claims to political visibility 
embedded in such a category of the “laws of war.” 
 
The War over the Prisoner of War 
 On March 13, 1952, over sixty ROKA soldiers who were serving as guards on 
Koje were summoned and instructed by an ROKA captain to escort a “parade” of three 
hundred POWs at around 9:30 in the morning.  One of the ROKA guards in his later 
testimony stated, “I was surprised because the PWs were carrying the South Korean and 
UN flag. […] I was at the head of the parade with a South Korean Flag detail of six men 
and myself.”  The parade began “200 yards from compound 92,” and was slated to pass 
specifically by the compound, a communist Korean POW area.  As they passed the 
compound, words were thrown, and soon the situation had escalated.  UN military 
personnel soon arrive to join the ROKA personnel, and someone shot rounds into the 
compound. At the end of the parade, twelve POWs were dead and twenty-eight were 
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injured.262   
 The “parade” incident on March 13, 1952 was exceptional only in its explicitness. 
The claiming of legitimacy and sovereignty, signaled by the pairing of the ROK and UN 
flags, was demonstrated by a collective group of POWs, supported by military figures, in 
a space outside of the barbed-wire of their compound. In the months preceding the 
parade, much of the assertion of the ROK nation-state was occurring within the 
compound, often in the tent of the compound monitor, in the form of interrogation and 
beating.  From April 18, 1951 until March 13, 1952, the U.S. military opened twenty-six 
separate case files for the investigation into POW deaths resulting from beatings inside 
the primarily anti-communist-dominated compounds. Although often the case files 
investigate the causes of only one POW death, a number of cases involve as many as 
fifteen deaths, or nineteen injured POWs.  And more significantly, the supposed dates of 
the incidents also cluster somewhat around certain times – mid-September 1951, the first 
half of October 1951, late December 1951. Beating and interrogation took place after the 
transfer of a POW into a new compound, which accounted for the clustering of incidents 
around specific dates. On September 17, 1951 around four in the afternoon, seven 
Prisoner of War guards in Compound 83 severely beat newcomer Choi Hyun Hyo, who 
later stated, “The guards had asked me if I was Christian and when I replied ‘no,’ they 
beat about one hundred times with pick handles.”  Lee Yun Jun, a witness to the beating, 
said that Choi “was beaten because he was a communist and he had killed other anti-
communist prisoners at compound Number 78; he had been transferred from that 
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compound to 83.”263   
The Korean POWs attempted to create their own surveillance of the POWs in the 
Koje-do camp, which also meant understanding the certain administrative moves the U.S. 
military made in moving POWs around to different compounds.  For example, a later 
beating in October 15, 1951 was also focused on a POW who had transferred from 
Compound 90 – the maximum security compound – and the POWs were suspicious of his 
previous activities in the camp.264 The U.S. military often transferred POWs from one 
compound to the next if the POW’s life was in danger due to political conflicts.  In a 
sense, although Choi’s utterance that he was not a Christian marked him as a possible 
Communist, it was his transfer from another compound that had already marked him as a 
suspicious figure.  The beatings accompanied an extensive interrogation, where the 
compound leader or monitor demanded a full history and narrative of the transferred 
POW’s life before the transfer and before entry in the camp.  Wary of possible 
communists “disguised” as anti-communists and vigilant for former members of the 
KPA, the anti-communist Korean POWs used these beatings as regular disciplinary 
practice within the compounds.  Compound 83 was also the site where the South Korean 
Youth Group had taken control – in September 1951, this vigilante anti-communist group 
was most probably establishing its control in the compound, and used Choi to mark their 
disciplinary power.   
 In Compound 91, where Yi Chong-gyu was assigned, there were both anti-
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communists and communists among the prisoners, all of whom came from north of the 
38th parallel. Yi worked as an assistant to the doctor in the compound medical facility, 
and he recalled that the doctor, whose hometown was in the northernmost region of 
Korea near China, had been the leader of a communist uprising in the compound.  The 
uprising failed to take control of the compound, and subsequently the anti-communist 
faction in the compound took disciplinary action against the communists. 
 Although Yi could not remember the exact date of the uprising, one particular 
case file seems to fit Yi’s narrative: Case file No. 71, which investigated the death of a 
prisoner of war caused by the beating from other POWs in the compound monitor tent on 
January 14, 1952.  Yi recalled what he knew about the interrogation process:  
The interrogation of the uprising’s leaders involved stripping them down 
to their underwear and dunking their heads into large basins of cold water. 
Then they would be forced to kneel on wet gamani [rice straw bags] while 
being beaten.  And if they still did not tell the truth, their heads would be 
held under water again.265   
 
The scene described by Yi was a common one – albeit translated differently for each 
situation – in the Korean POW compounds on Kojedo.  The “truth” in these cases was a 
full narrative of one’s history before entering the camp – although many of these “truth” 
sessions would take place instead in the compound monitor’s tent, where a POW who 
had been recently transferred would be interrogated on his history and intentions within 
the compound.  Yi’s recollection holds significance in the spectacle nature of the 
interrogation and punishment – a public disciplining of a group of communists required a 
spectacle, while the more enclosed interrogation of a POW transfer established 
surveillance and the assertion that the compound leaders were now the ones who had 
basic sovereign rights to the POW’s body and life.   
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But violence – and the POW beatings occurring in the anti-communist 
compounds – albeit frustrating, did not trouble the U.S. military camp authorities.  There 
are over 300 such investigation case files on incidents ranging from suicide, beatings, and 
homicide. Of the 102 incident cases during the first year of the Koje camp operation, the 
average time between the date of the incident and the file date of the investigation is 
between 4 to 9 months. Among these 102 incident cases, 28 of them specifically dealt 
with cases of injuries and/or death within the POW compounds.  The narrative of the on-
the-ground experience in the camps offered by these incident case files unsettles a basic 
ideological narrative that was mobilized by both the anti-communist ROK government 
and the U.S. government in their stance towards communist Koreans in both the 
battlefield and the negotiating table: the Korean Communist prisoner of war was a 
fanatic, an ideologue who employed violent means in order to achieve a totalitarian or 
fascist compliance from others.  However, only four of the twenty-eight cases involved 
communist “perpetrators.”  
 But why did the anti-communist POW compounds need this particular form of 
violence as a practice and a disciplinary threat?  In a camp of 160,000 POWs, 
reinscribing lines of difference and sovereignty would take priority among the POWs. In 
a sense, the experiences of Oh Se-hui, Yi Chung-mo, and Yi Mi-ho at the time of capture 
would repeat itself over and over again within the POW camp.  The anxiety over 
rendering each individual’s history and subjectivity transparent was foremost a priority in 
the compounds.  And the effort and violence involved in the constant re-interrogation of 
prisoners of war belies the extreme effort and labor involved to insist upon a binary 
nation-state politics over this population.   
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In the March 13, 1952 incident of the POW “parade,” the communist Korean 
prisoners of war began shouting insults at the passing POWs and ROKA soldiers. And 
for the year preceding the incident, the communist Korean POWs hurled verbal insults 
constantly through the barbed-wire fence at the ROKA soldiers and military police. The 
fact that these incidents consistently ended with at least one POW shot by an ROKA 
soldier merits a closer analysis of the dynamics and meanings of insults, how the form of 
insults evolved over time, the power these insults displayed and the violence and reprisals 
these insults provoked in these moments. 
At approximately 6:15 P.M. on April 10, 1952 at Compound 95, PFC (private 
first class) Lim Chai Kwan, a member of the 33rd Korean Military Police Battalion, shot 
and wounded a prisoner of war while on guard duty.  The narrative of the full incident 
itself begins about a half an hour earlier.  A prisoner of war had shut himself inside the 
compound latrine, which was located at the corner of the compound area near the 
fence.  Sergeant Robert J. Mackenzie, part of the 551st MP Escort Guard Company, was 
making his rounds when he saw three ROK guards standing in a group at the corner of 
Compound 95. “[…] I stopped to see why they were not walking their posts.  They were 
perimeter guards.  There was a PW in the latrine, a stone latrine with a tin roof right 
outside the fence of Compound 95, and from what I gathered he was giving the ROKs a 
bad time. […] He had a megaphone inside.” Another soldier [Louis D. Raines, Pfc, 551st 
MOP EG Company] said that he had heard that the PW had “been shouting to the ROK 
through one of these tin deals that makes your voice louder, calling him all kinds of 
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names about the ROK Army and the UN Army, swearing at him.”266 
           Eun Jin Sik, a POW questioned by the board, stated that the POW had in fact been, 
“in the toilet, on the way back.  He was talking to this guard about Geneva conference, 
and this guard didn’t want to hear, and they shot him.”  “What did he say about the 
Geneva Conference?” asked the board.  “The 95 compound, POW’s all very bad, so they 
didn’t distribute the rations equally like the other compounds, so we demanded that we 
want equal distribution of the rations.”267 The POW in the latrine holding a megaphone 
was accusing the ROKA soldiers of withholding the full ration distribution that was 
allotted to his compound simply because his compound was a firmly communist one.   
           According to Lim’s testimony, “The prisoners talked to us, all Korean ROK 
soldiers, and bad words, and then meantime, throw the stones to us.  If I let them do that 
way, I will be punished by the law of Department of Defense of Republic of Korea, so 
finally I shoot.”268 A much earlier case needs to be looked at briefly in order to appreciate 
the full import of Lim’s statement.  In an earlier case where another ROKA guard shot a 
POW for insulting him, Captain Lee Byong Wha, who had been in command of the 
ROKA guards at the POW camps, gave the following testimony at 1500 hours on 
February 13, 1952: 
In the past I received the following order: If a PW attempts to escape to 
yell “Chung-Jee” [sic] (chŏngji) three (3) times before fireing[sic] the 
weapon.  But if the PW continues to escape the weapon may be fired. 
I misinterpreted the orders to read as follows:  In case a PW attempts to 
escape from the compound, commit a disturbance in the compound, 
attempts a riot, insults or threatens the guards or resists or disobeys the 
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guards the guard may fire his weapon for the purpose of killing. […]269 
 
According to Lee’s statement, the act of escape, rioting, and insulting carry the same 
equivalence in terms of punishable crimes. But what did an insult transgress, that 
rendered it possibly the equivalent of an act like rioting, or an escape attempt? Lim’s 
claim that he would have faced punishment if he allowed the POW to continue to insult 
him suggests that, for the South Korean state, insults are equivalent to a riot, an act of 
rebellion, endangering national security.   
 But a much earlier case of a challenge from the prisoners of war that invoked the 
1949 Geneva Conventions occurred on July 29, 1951.  The prisoners of war in 
Compound 76 – primarily POWs from north of the 38th parallel on the Korean peninsula - 
had begun to gather at the barbed-wire fence surrounding their compound.  It was a 
strange sight – a few of them were dressed in their newly-issued bright red uniforms, but 
the rest of the prisoners were naked.   
 These Korean POWs were staging a protest against their new uniforms.  Until that 
point, prisoners of war wore old military fatigues or handoffs from the U.S. military. In 
an effort to make escape more difficult, the U.S. military decided to hand out red 
uniforms. There was anxiety among the POW camp administrators regarding the civilian 
population surrounding the camp – a POW could escape to the surrounding villages and 
easily appear like a local civilian.    
 The POWs began to gather at the fence an hour after finishing their supper.  Soon, 
a few of the prisoners took off their uniforms, wrapped them around a rock or two, and 
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threw the package over the fence into the next compound, Number 77.  “We cannot wear 
this kind of clothing,” cried out the POWs.   
 Members of the ROKA 33rd battalion had surrounded the compound. Words were 
exchanged, and the POWs insisted upon refusing to wear the uniforms.  A scuffle ensued.  
Some POWs threw stones and some of the ROKA soldiers opened fire.  Three POWs 
were killed, and four injured.  The U.S. military investigation board concluded in its case 
file that the shooting was indeed “justified.”270 
 The Korean prisoners of war in Compound 76 protested on behalf of the Korean 
POWs in the camp.  They contended that under Japanese colonialism, prisoners who 
were sentenced to death were assigned the red-colored uniforms in prison. The prisoners’ 
refusal to wear the red uniforms was not simply a sign of their obdurate refusal to 
recognize the authority of the U.S. military – it was also an act that insisted upon the U.S. 
military’s recognition of their own histories, experiences, and understandings of conflict 
and war.  The Korean prisoners of war were refusing to be marked as criminals. 
 The decision of the hundreds of prisoners of war to stand naked in protest, 
without their red uniforms, and the subsequent shootings also laid bare the vulnerability 
of these prisoners. The 1949 Geneva Conventions on the Treatment of Prisoners of War 
were a constant presence in the camp, and as it was supposed to mediate the encounter 
between Se-hui Oh and the ROKA soldier at the opening of this chapter, the Conventions 
were to also mediate the different encounters within the camp also – whether between 
prisoners of war themselves, prisoners and sentries, or prisoners and the administrative 
powers. 
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The “red uniform” incident in its entirety, from the protest at the barbed-wire 
fence to the finished drafts of the investigation board’s conclusion, simultaneously 
exposed the Geneva Conventions’ assumption underlying its script of proper POW 
treatment, while also challenging the ability of the U.S. military to carry out its role as the 
detaining power according to Western standards.   
 The Geneva Conventions of 1949 on the Treatment of Prisoners of War began 
from the assumption that prisoners of war were essentially vulnerable persons, and was 
invested in creating a normative understanding that taking a person prisoner rather than 
his or her life was a marker of advanced civilization.  In fact, according to the 
conventions, the measure of any society’s civilization was revealed on the body of the 
prisoner of war – how the detaining power clothed, fed, and sheltered the body; how the 
detaining power marked, administered, and transported the POW body; and how the 
detaining power guarded, surveyed, and knew the POW body.271  But these standards 
were most intimately revealed in the very moments they were transgressed, mocked, or 
resisted – as in the case of the red uniform uprising. 
On June 18, 1951, the North Korean officers in Compound 72 staged a hunger 
strike.  However, in order to make the members of the investigation board appreciate the 
full import of these North Korean POW officers’ refusal to eat, Major Carroll Cooper, the 
one of the top camp officials on Kojedo, vented his frustration with this particular group 
of POWs by narrating a string of refusals on the POWs’ part in the past. According to the 
Geneva Convention, as officers, they did not have to labor because enlisted men would 
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undertake the work for them.  However, the North Korean officers had refused and 
protested against enlisted men working for them, and insisted that they would do the 
labor themselves.  However, according to Cooper, the POW officers were strategically 
refusing to maintain their compound areas.  “Prisoners were refusing to observe even the 
basic requirements of sanitation, be defecation and urinating on the ground, even though 
adequate receptacles were provided, and throwing trash and garbage on the ground.” 
On June 18, 1951 at 1000 hours, Captain Robert R. Armstrong, who had been 
assigned as the supervisor for Compound 72 on June 8, 1951, gathered all of the senior 
officers for a meeting where he stated that their living quarters would be inspected on a 
daily basis.   
On June 18, I made an inspection of the entire compound.  The Chinese 
area was well within the desired standard.  The North Korean officers area 
was in a deplorable condition.  The senior officers were called into the 
compound CP at which time they were told of the condition and that there 
would be another inspection at 1800 hours, the same day.  They were also 
told that no one would be served the supper meal until after the 
inspection.272 
 
According to Armstrong, when he returned at 1800 hours, one of the three sub-
compounds had blatantly refused to put their compound into order.  Armstrong issued the 
order that the POWs in sub-compound 3 would not receive food until they complied with 
his orders.  “At about 2030 hours, Master Sergeant Kahl, compound commander, 
reported to me that all the North Korean officers had refused to touch their food and 
would remain on a hunger strike until sub-compound 3 had been fed.”   
 On the morning of the 19th, the POWs still refused to touch their food.  The U.S. 
and ROKA soldiers were greeted with military songs accompanied by the beating on 
cans.  As Sergeant Armendo Poretta moved into the compound, he was greeted with 
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stones – and a POW had reportedly attempted to assault him with a “heavy chain.”  Soon, 
more stones were thrown – Poretta got out of the compound and manned a machine gun.  
There was gunfire, and eleven prisoners of war were injured, seven of them dead on 
arrival at the camp hospital. 
 The case file also contains the transcript of an exchange with Lee Hak Ku, a 
Senior Colonel of the KPA, which reveals a rather differently inflected narrative of the 
instigating moment of the June 18th incident:   
On 18 June 1951, the prisoners were supposed to have cigarettes 
distribution.  Some of the prisoners of 2d Battalion hung some laundry on 
the barbed wire which is prohibited.  When American M/Sgt saw it he 
took the laundry away with him.  This was the prisoner’s fault so we did 
not ask to get the laundry back, but since it was cigarette distribution day 
they requested their cigarettes.273   
 
Senior Colonel Lee, a figure who would later play a prominent role in the Dodd 
kidnapping, noted that the supposedly flagrant acts of defiance were perhaps more minor 
acts of transgression.  For example, the supposedly unkempt sub-compound only had a 
water can indoors, instead of outdoors, which then resulted in the punishment of 
withholding food.  Keeping his testimony rather even-handed, Lee appeared to strive to 
illustrate the severe disjuncture between the resulting punishment under the gunfire and 
the simple misdemeanors that the POWs committed. 
 Yet, the investigation board would again conclude, similarly to the red uniform 
uprising case, that the violence had been “justified” because it prevented a possible riot 
and escape attempt.  Carroll concluded his testimony with three “facts”: 
1) Since arriving in this Enclosure these Prisoners have resisted in every way 
possible the efforts of the protecting personnel to provide adequate facilities 
for them. 
2) Their desire to work was only a method by which they felt they could make 
                                                
273 Ibid. 
  
201 
demands upon and receive concessions from the protecting power.  These 
demands were always to their advantage, and never to advantage of all 
concerned. 
3) Their false promises indicate that they were stalling for time, in order to bring 
discredit, and criticism upon the United States Government.274 
 
Carroll’s frustration with the prisoners of war in Compound 72 stemmed from the fact 
that they did not accept the care or treatment of the U.S. military.  In essence, the POWs 
refused not only to play their role as the prisoner of war, but also to allow the U.S. 
military to play its role as the detaining power, according to the script of the 1949 Geneva 
Conventions.  The POWs’ refusals were multiple: the refusal to keep the compound 
clean, the refusal to allow enlisted men to labor for them, the refusal to work efficiently 
and quickly, and the refusal to eat.  Again, the body of the prisoner of war was at the 
center of the discussion – and the prisoners of war were strategically not allowing the 
U.S. military to take care of their bodies in terms of shelter, exercise, and nourishment.  
And the punishment for not accepting their roles as POWs was a possible death. 
 In a sense, the prisoners of war could only render their protest – and thus political 
position – visible via the use of their bodies.  The U.S. military constantly harped upon 
the fact that it was the Korean Communist POW, not the Chinese Communist POW, who 
would create the most trouble for the administration.  In fact, among the over 300 
incident case files investigating acts of violence to and among POWs in the camp, over 
96% of the cases involve Korean prisoners of war, both anti-communist and communist, 
not the Chinese prisoners of war.  In demonstrating resistance by making their bodies 
vulnerable to possible violence, the Korean POWs marked their bodies as political, 
demonstrating that they had something at stake that the Chinese POWs did not. That 
something was the meaning of the war itself.  The Korean POWs were refusing the 
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United States’ claims to a universal moralism by disallowing the fulfillment of a 
detaining power’s duties – and in turn, they were critiquing the United States’ professed 
moral reasons for its involvement in the war itself. 
 
The Psychological Strategy Board’s Prisoner of War 
On April 4, 1951 – only a few months after the opening of the POW camp on 
Koje Island - President Harry Truman issued an executive directive for the creation of the 
Psychological Strategy Board [PSB]  “for the formulation and promulgation, as guidance 
to the departments and agencies responsible for psychological operations, of over-all 
national psychological objectives, policies and programs, and for the coordination and 
evaluation of the national psychological effort.”275  The PSB members would be the 
Undersecretary of State, the Deputy Secretary of Defense, the Director of Central 
Intelligence, and any other head or representative of a department or agency as deemed 
necessary by the board.  In addition, a representative from the Joint Chiefs of Staff would 
sit as a military adviser. As part of the PSB’s duties, the members would report to the 
National Security Council regarding its evaluations of “national psychological 
operations.” The fashioning of the issue of POW repatriation into one that fulfilled 
psychological warfare needs began in August 1951.  On October 9, 1951, the 
Psychological Strategy Board issued a “Status of POW Policy Review.” The POW of the 
Korean War had now become a figure for the Cold War. 
The creation of the Psychological Strategy Board – and its focus on the POW as a 
figure important to the larger war on discourse – indicates the particular historical 
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conjuncture within which the Truman administration was attempting to position itself on 
the world stage.  The war-weary and war-wary public in the face of staggering number of 
military U.S. casualties, the horror of the atomic bomb, and the threat of World War III – 
all of these specters of war and death were implicated in the actions of the Truman 
administration.  Wartime death – both past and present – was proving to be a complicated 
issue for the administration.  Within a similar vein to the ICRC’s concerns with the 
legacies of World War II, the Truman administration also did not want the public to 
consider the Korean War as a potential “World War III.”  Instead, the Korean War had to 
become the global “state of emergency” – thus legitimating U.S. intervention – that 
effectively deferred “World War III,” a nuclear showdown with Russia.  However, a 
“state of emergency” that was quickly resulting in staggering numbers of casualties – 
both military and civilian – was becoming harder and harder to sustain.  Thus, the 
“prisoner of war” debate became the new site on which to manufacture consent, where 
the stakes in the conflict were rendered “apolitical” and “moral.”  As Truman would 
announce in May 1951, the prisoner of war repatriation issue was one about a divide 
between “freedom” and “slavery.”  The emphasis on a moral universalism as the framing 
for the war had an uncanny resonance with the “war over humanity” that Carl Schmitt 
had predicted would become the hegemonic discursive form of war in the post-1945 
world.   
“Psychological warfare” itself had been a more recently created label for a set of 
practices that the U.S. military had been using for different ends throughout the past few 
decades. Psychological warfare during World War II was one conceived primarily around 
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the idea of “information” in order to influence individual opinion.276 The Psychological 
Strategy Board was the first fully institutionalized oversight structure for psychological 
warfare, and it continued the earlier objectives of “explaining” American liberalism to the 
broader global public.  But by the time Truman had issued the executive directive for the 
creation of the Psychological Strategy Board, a marked shift in the evaluation of the 
importance of psychological warfare had taken place.  With formal decolonization 
quickly gaining momentum, the United States had to reposition and rearticulate its own 
global, universal claims vis-à-vis imperialism.  In his retrospective narrative review of the 
PSB’s activities of 1951, Raymond Allen, former Director of the PSB, wrote about the 
challenges facing the PSB: “[C]ould we present our policies and acts in such a light that 
they would strike a responsive chord in the hearts and soul of men and make them feel 
that their cause was our cause?  In seeking an answer to questions like these, some high 
officials became convinced that we needed the same kind of unified leadership as in a 
military struggle.  Accordingly, they proposed the appointment of a sort of ‘chief of staff 
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for the cold war’ responsible directly to the President and command-in-chief.”277  The 
mandate for the PSB essentially was to “identify exactly what we were trying to 
accomplish” – the PSB was to articulate the Cold War itself. NSC 20/4 and 68 had 
provided the policy rhetoric for the contours of the Cold War, and the PSB was to engage 
and practice it.  And Allen’s characterization of the United States was indeed an 
exemplary articulation of U.S. exceptionalism in the Cold War era: “In this time of crisis 
and stress, the American nation has risen to a new role.  We may speak of this role 
without vanity or self-consciousness because we did not seek it but rather tried to avoid 
it.” In a concern about winning the “war of wills,” Allen reminded Truman that “we must 
make it clear to those who are our friends, and to those who would be our friends, that we 
not only abhor militaristic imperialism, but also that we disclaim cultural and intellectual 
imperialism as well.  The only rule we seek is the Golden Rule.” 
The prisoner of war was undoubtedly a figure of policy-making during the Korean 
War – and perhaps more importantly, a figure of Cold War psychological warfare. On 
November 16, the Senior Staff of the NSC issued an interim report on the “United States 
Courses of Action with Respect to Korea,” recommending “a political course of action” if 
U.N. forces were forced to “retire” from Korea.278 Although Chinese forces, along with 
KPA, did not succeed in pushing the UN forces out of Korea, a “political course” 
eventually took the form of armistice meetings first at Kaesong, and then at Panmunjom 
located near the 38th parallel.  
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In that sense, Bruce Cumings is right to mark the spring of 1951 as the end of the 
Korean war [his italics], as the subsequent war continued protracted armistice meetings, 
extensive bombing of the north, and battles that simply served to reestablish the 38th 
parallel.279  With rollback no longer the aim, the war indeed moved to a more explicitly 
political and ideological terrain, where the figure of the prisoner of war became central to 
that political and ideological warfare.  In the “entirely new war” of the post-MacArthur 
period, the war for containment had prevailed, and the determining dynamics of the war 
seemed to be contained to the tables and tents at Kaesong and later Panmunjom – the 
villages at the 38th parallel where the armistice talks took place.  The figure of the 
prisoner of war became emblematic of this type of war, where the terrain was ideology 
and politics, not territory.  Although militarily the war was now one of containment, 
rollback was still operating – this time over people and their “psyches.”  
By January 1952, prisoner of war repatriation became the most controversial and 
public issue at the Panmunjom truce talks. The fashioning of the issue of POW 
repatriation into one that fulfilled psychological warfare needs began in August 1951.  On 
October 9, 1951, the Psychological Strategy Board issued a “Status of POW Policy 
Review.”  Stating that the PSB, “after an exhaustive study of the various legal and 
psychological aspects of the problem,” was now “endeavoring to secure working-level 
inter-Departmental and Agency (State, Defense, CIA) agreement” on the issue of POW 
repatriation.  The Joints Chiefs of Staff supported some form of voluntary repatriation, 
where POWs could elect whether or not they wanted to repatriate to China or North 
Korea; the Secretary of State narrowed the possible POW population in terms of non-
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repatriation, and stated that only ROK personnel forcibly drafted into the Korean 
People’s Army of the DPRK should not be sent north of the 38th parallel; and the 
Secretary of Defense, fearing that any alteration of the repatriation principle would result 
in jeopardizing the welfare of U.S. POWs, advised against voluntary repatriation.280 
 The PSB saw the following advantages to the policy of voluntary POW 
repatriation: “1) It would reinforce the principle of United Nations asylum from tyranny. 
2) The effectiveness of future United States psychological warfare programs would be 
enhanced by the adoption of this policy.”281  More specifically, it was hoped that the 
policy would encourage future defections from Communist armies, especially from the 
Chinese Communist Forces.  Moreover, it placed the Korean War squarely within the 
parameters of the “war of wills” that Allen had characterized.  The POW of the Korean 
War would become a figure of the Cold War – an individual abstracted from history who 
would freely make a choice between “communism and anti-communism,” and based on 
his or her fundamental humanity would choose the free-market democracy espoused by 
the United States. 
But POW voluntary repatriation policy was tricky to articulate because Article 
118 of the 1949 Geneva Conventions specifically stipulated that all prisoners of war had 
to be repatriated as soon as possible at the end of a conflict.  In fact, the PSB’s proposal 
of voluntary repatriation was a literal reversal of the U.S. delegate’s position on 
repatriation at Geneva only less than two years earlier.  Article 118 had, in fact, not only 
been the center of extended debate during the 1949 Geneva Conventions, it had also been 
the subject upon which both the Soviet Union delegate, General Skylyrov, and the U.S. 
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delegate, General Parker, agreed.  
A brief overview of the debates over POW repatriation during the 1949 Geneva 
Conventions is necessary for our understanding of the import and stakes involved with 
the PSB’s proposal for voluntary repatriation in 1951. “War” itself was the foremost 
concern for the International Committee of the Red Cross – albeit a different war, World 
War II. The ICRC had worked ever since 1942 to bring together another convention to 
address the limitations of the 1929 Geneva Conventions in front of a changing and 
shifting landscape of “total warfare” – the delegates needed to reexamine the regulatory 
measures of the 1929 Geneva Conventions regarding states’ behaviors and actions during 
wartime. The different categories of wartime personhood – civilians, the wounded and 
the sick, the prisoner of war – also ran up against another shifting landscape – one of 
sovereignty and civilization. On Thursday, April 21 1949, when Mr. Max Petitpierre, the 
Head of the Swiss Federal Political Department, made the opening welcome speech for 
the gathering of delegates from sixty-four nations for the Geneva Conventions, he laid 
out what type of work was in front of them: “The Convention of 1864, first conceived by 
Henry Dunant, a citizen of Geneva, has come to form part, as it were, of the spiritual 
heritage of mankind.  It is one of the steps mankind has climbed in its endeavors to raise 
the standard of civilization.”282 
The conventions had come together primarily in the interest of one particular 
category – the wounded and the sick.  But soon another figure of war would incite a great 
deal of debate and energy – at a level far surpassing the other categories of “civilians” or 
the “wounded and the sick.” But soon another figure of war would incite a great deal of 
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debate and energy – at a level far surpassing the other categories of “civilians” or the 
“wounded and the sick.”  As historian Geoffrey Best has written, “The 1949 POW 
Convention, so much enlarged beyond the 1929 bridgehead, was made up of 143 articles 
and five annexes.  […] None of the three other Conventions possessed as concentrated a 
character or invited such concentrated attention.  Its spotlight focused on just one actor, 
the POW, and one crowded stage, the POW camp.”283 The prisoner of war had taken such 
central importance at the conventions because of the very basic questions of state 
legitimacy the figure of the POW evoked and revealed. 
The UK delegate argued that some of the POWs still under the United Kingdom’s 
care did not want to repatriate to the USSR.  On June 23, 1949, the delegate from Austria 
proposed such an amendment that would allow the prisoners of war to choose whether or 
not to repatriate at the war’s end, but a large majority promptly rejected it. 
General Sklyarov (USSR) feared that a prisoner of war might not be able 
to express himself with complete freedom when he was in captivity.  
Furthermore, this new provision might give rise to the exercise of undue 
pressure on the part of the Detaining Power.  General Parker (USA) shared 
that opinion. 
 
At stake was the state’s sovereign claim on its citizen-individuals.  The focus on 
the individual – and its attendant implications for state sovereignty – at the 1949 Geneva 
Conventions became the later focus of the PSB in formulating voluntary repatriation. The 
Korean War, I contend, had forced the ICRC to articulate and negotiate its own position 
of legitimacy within a shifting world of war.  If the twentieth-century has been witness to 
the institutionalization of warfare, then the 1949 Geneva Conventions and the debates 
over the POW during the Korean War evidences a shift in conceptions of the “individual” 
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as a way to regulate state behavior. In 1958, an extensive commentary on the 1949 
Geneva Conventions – a nine-hundred-page undertaking, was published.: 
 
The individual is considered in his own right.  The State is not the only 
subject of law, and this step forward by the Geneva Conventions 
constitutes an important advance in the present-day international law.284   
 
Thus, the PSB’s proposal for voluntary repatriation was not, in the strictest sense, a 
reversal of the previous stance in 1949 – it was a different claim on the individual as a 
way to shape the most basic relationship over sovereignty – that between the state and the 
individual. 
The 1949 Conventions differed from the 1929 Conventions in two crucial aspects: 
the lack of a preamble and the notable increase in the number of articles.  As the 
introduction of the Commentary on the 1949 Conventions stated,  
The Regulations annexed to the Fourth Hague Convention of 1907 
contained seventeen Articles relative to prisoners of war, the 1929 
Convention constituted a code of almost one hundred articles and, based 
on the experience of the Second World War, the present 1949 Convention 
contains 143 articles.  The time for declarations of principle is past; the 
1929 Convention showed the advantages to be gained from detailed 
provisions.  The 1949 Convention went so far as to impose on the 
contracting States obligations which are so specific that in many cases 
they require the modification or the supplementing of national legislation.  
That is undoubtedly a great step forward in humanitarian law.285   
 
The lack of a preamble was based on an assumption of a universally accepted norm 
regarding the position of the “human” within a larger international system: “Obviously, 
rules as detailed as these were drawn up primarily with a view to lengthy conflicts, such 
as the last two world wars; but they also have the tremendous advantage of defining, in 
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practice and in relation to certain specific circumstances, the position of the human being 
as such in the present-day international system.”286  Without question, the 1949 Geneva 
Conventions aimed to control the behavior of different states in conflict – and as 
evidenced by the extensive debating over the figure of the POW during the conventions, 
the different states involved understood this aspect very well. 
The Psychological Strategy Board, in their attempt to fashion a prisoner of war for 
the Cold War, took it upon themselves to articulate the “principle.”  The Psychological 
Strategy Board would be the institutional entity within the U.S. government to configure 
the “prisoner of war” as a possible discursive site on which to integrate fully the Cold 
War hegemonic aims of the U.S. government and the humanitarian ideals of a longer 
Western genealogy. U.S. military psychological warfare tactics and the international 
humanitarian law espoused by the ICRC may appear unlikely bedmates, but during the 
Korean War, the struggle over the prisoner of war and the subsequent application of the 
1949 Geneva Conventions demonstrated how the terrain of warfare had shifted to a 
subject that both PsyWar and IHL had in common: the individual human subject.  
In a December 18, 1951 memo to fellow PSB staff member, Tracy Barnes, Palmer 
Putnam offered a few key suggestions regarding resolving the legal issues surrounding 
POW repatriation: 
2. Why not announce to the world that prisoners of war unwilling to return 
to the political control of the armies from which they were captured shall 
be regarded as political refugees who will be given sanctuary?  
3. Why could not the International Red Cross, or some similar nonpartisan 
group, accept the responsibility for interviewing each prisoner and 
establishing the truth of his personal wish? 
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4. Why does this not solve the problem of forced repatriation of prisoners 
of war, while at the same time conforming to the intent, at least, of the 
Geneva Convention?287 
 
Under this rubric, the post-1945 international nation-state order as managed by the 
United States, sanctioned by the United Nations, and looked after by the International 
Committee of the Red Cross would claim a moral legitimacy – and the POW would be its 
perfect subject, a person deserving of sanctuary within Western international 
humanitarian norms.  
The POW repatriation issues struck at the heart of a larger project the PSB began 
to articulate for the U.S. government on a global scale – how the “innate” desires and will 
of those under Communist rule would seek and “choose” American democracy instead.  
The Korean POW repatriation issue had larger consequences though when we take into 
consideration the 38th parallel, the arbitrary line drawn by the U.S. military colonels in 
August 1945. A divided Korea had been destined, according to the 1943 Cairo 
Conference, to become the first official experiment in “trusteeship” under the newly 
formed United Nations – the north occupied by the USSR, and the south occupied by the 
United States.  “Trusteeship,” of course, was a new rendering of Wilson’s “mandate,” a 
program of tutelage for former colonies under the auspices of an international community 
of nation-states.288  “Trusteeship” on the Korean peninsula soon gave way to a Cold War 
divided military occupation by the time the U.S. military arrived in 1945.  The U.S. 
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military and the United Nations had set up the 1948 elections which resulted in President 
Syngman Rhee, a man unpopular with the vast majority of Koreans.  However, it was not 
the legitimacy of Rhee’s regime per se that was occupying and concerning the U.S. 
policy officials during the Korean War – it was the issue of a proper subject of 
decolonization under U.S. guidance.  Indeed, in the face of the Soviet Union and the 
formally decolonizing world, the United States needed a subject it had successful 
“decolonized,” and that the Koreans had willingly participated and desired the particular 
system of governance put forth by the United States.   
The PSB’s voluntary repatriation proposal had as its main concern the continuing 
de-recognition of North Korea as a sovereign state, where the individual would renounce 
the state’s sovereign claims over him or herself.  In the state’s stead, the post-1945 
international nation-state order as managed by the U.S., sanctioned by the UN, and 
regulated by the ICRC would lay a claim on knowing the subjective desires of the 
individual POW.  Rendered stateless, the POW who chooses not to repatriate would be 
under the sovereign auspices of an international system.  By January 2, 1952, the U.S. 
delegates at Panmunjom had placed the demand for voluntary repatriation on the 
armistice negotiating table. 
 
Conclusion: Panmunjom, Koje, and Interrogation 
 
On February 12, 1952, a memo arrived at Koje camp that pressed for the 
preliminary screening of prisoners of war.  There had been a previous round of 
repatriation interrogation in late December 1951, but a few key compounds had 
successfully prevented interrogation teams from entering their compound.  Compound 62 
had been one of those compounds – it housed 5,600 civilian internees (CI).  Compound 
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62 civilian internees were self-professed Korean communists, and had rejected the notion 
of voluntary repatriation.289 
On February 18, U.S. and ROKA military interrogation teams accompanied by 
850 U.S. troops from the Third Battalion of the 27th Infantry arrived at Compound 62 at 
5:30 A.M.  By 9:00 A.M., 1 U.S. Army enlisted man was killed, 55 civilian internees 
killed, 4 U.S. Army enlisted men wounded, and 140 civilian internees were wounded – of 
whom 22 later died of the inflicted wounds. Alerted to the presence of U.S. military 
troops surrounding the compound, the CI’s met the troops with homemade cudgels, 
barbed-wire flails, and hundreds of stones.  The majority of POWs died from wounds 
inflicted from the concussion grenades. 
The stakes involved in the question of voluntary repatriation were high both at the 
tables of Panmunjom and behind the barbed-wire fence on Koje Island.  As the 
Psychological Strategy Board’s proposal and the three different wars on the ground in 
Korea converged upon the figure of the prisoner of war, the prisoner of war him/herself 
would make demands upon the international community, in turn.  At this point in the 
story, the Korean prisoner of war was afforded perhaps the most visibility on the global 
stage than at any other previous point in the Korean War – however, this was also the 
point where the “fanatic Oriental Communist” prisoner of war would begin to appear in 
the bureaucratic annals of the U.S. military and government.  In a study conducted during 
the war, titled “The Oriental Communist Prisoner of War: A Study from the Intelligence 
Viewpoint,” the writer states, “The United States Army has never had to deal with this 
type of prisoner before. […] He has taken unto himself many duties and missions to 
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perform to further the interest of his fatherland.  He has not stopped fighting just because 
he is a prisoner of war.  He continued his fight with all the zeal and patriotism he had on 
the fighting line.”290  In the struggle over defining the “prisoner of war,” the U.S. had 
taken a definitive turn – the “Oriental Communist prisoner of war” was to be a “fanatic,” 
one devoid of rational thinking, and certainly devoid of any claims to the political.   
But the Korean communist prisoner of war would utilize the very structures of 
bureaucracy and language outlined in this chapter, as they laid literal claim to their own 
sense of sovereignty in the shifting conflict over the meanings of decolonization.  The 
prisoners of war were about to have a personal conference with the head of the UNC 
Camp #1 on Koje Island.  And it would be on their terms. 
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Chapter Four 
 
A Mutiny of Sovereignty: 
The kidnapping of Brigadier General Francis Dodd  
by Korean Communist prisoners of war 
 
 
The king, we are told, exclaimed, ‘C’est une 
revolte,’ and Liancourt corrected him: ‘Non, 
Sire, c’est une revolution.’ 
- Hannah Arendt, On Revolution291 
 
Sometimes nowadays episodes take on such a 
fantastic character as to be almost unbelievable. 
-Editorial titled “Koje Fantastic,”  
The New York Times, May 11, 1952 
 
 
On May 7, 1952 – in a twist of events which journalist Murray Schumach of The 
New York Times would later describe as “the strangest episode of the Korean War”292 – a 
group of Korean Communist prisoners of war “kidnapped” U.S. camp commander 
Brigadier General Francis Dodd of the Kojedo POW camp, the largest U.S.-controlled 
camp during the Korean War. The POW spokesman for Compound 76, Joo Tek Kwon, 
had placed multiple, repeated requests to meet with Dodd, and that afternoon, Dodd 
finally agreed to meet with Joo.293  They met at the maingate of the compound, the 
barbed wire fence between them.  One of the prisoners of war from the compound served 
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as a translator.  The list of topics to be discussed was lengthy, ranging from mundane 
complaints about camp logistics to the larger issue of voluntary repatriation screening.  
The gate opened during the meeting to let a large truck carrying several tons worth of 
tents through.  One of the POWs, Song Mo Jin, a large man of considerable strength, 
walked slowly through the gate, waited till Dodd put away the piece of wood he was 
whittling, stretched his arms as he pretended to yawn, and then grabbed Dodd. The 
POWs literally carried Dodd into the compound, closing the barbed-wire fence behind 
him.  Soon, the POWs unfurled a large sign, approximately 25 feet long and 3 feet wide, 
over the main compound building. The following message in English had been painted on 
the banner: We have captured Dodd.  He will not be harmed if PW problems are 
resolved.  If you shoot, his life will be in danger.294 
  On Saturday morning, May 10th, tanks began arriving by ship onto the island.  A 
heavy rain was pouring down, and at least twenty Patton and Sherman tanks filed down 
the muddy roads towards Compound 76.  The U.S. Army had explicitly forbidden the 
presence of any media on the island, but one journalist – Sanford L. Zalburg – had 
managed to get onto the island by the graces of a Korean fisherman and his 20-foot boat, 
traveling four hours through the “rainswept seas” from the town of Chinhae on the 
peninsula to the island of Koje.   Approaching the island at 2:30 in the morning on 
Saturday, he described the island as such: 
From miles out you could see Koje’s prison camps.  The island is large, 
but the prison camps are concentrated in one section.   
We landed at a village.  […]  A mile or so on either side of the village 
strings of lights blazed over the prison enclosures and the guards quarters 
and camp.  Blue-gray colored light poured down into the enclosures from 
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searchlights on the mountainside.  [….] 
Koje Island compounds are heavily barbed wired, with two high wire 
fences surrounding each plot.  At night the lights blaze down.  In the 
corners of the compounds are three story high guard houses where 
machine guns are mounted.295 
 
Army jeeps manned by armed military personnel were patrolling the entire length of the 
coast surrounding the camp, and armed foot patrols could be seen also.  To Zalburg’s 
eyes, Koje Island had become a military fortress, or in the words of Icle Davis of the 
156th Military Police Detachment, Koje was an “Alcatraz” for the Korean War.296 
 Before being escorted off the island with a scolding by the U.S. Army, Zalburg 
was able to talk with a few of the U.S. infantry officers on the island.  One infantry 
officer who had been on duty at Compound 76 during Dodd’s captivity told Zalburg that 
“[…]he could see Dodd plainly.  The General’s clothes were freshly washed, he said.  
Dodd was about 100 yards away and surrounded by a great mass of Communists.  None 
of the Reds laid a hand on Dodd.”297  The juxtaposition between the seeming order and 
calm within Compound 76 and the demonstration of sheer force by the over twenty 
armed U.S. tanks moving steadily towards Compound 76 was the scene that greeted 
Zalburg on that Saturday morning. 
Rumors of the POWs’ capture of Dodd and finally a brief press release by the 
U.S. Army sent the U.S. press into a frenzy.  The front page of The Los Angeles Times on 
May 9, 1952 blared: 8th ARMY ORDERED TO FREE GENERAL HELD BY RED 
POWS.  By and large, the reaction was one of disbelief. “Sensational,” “bizarre,” 
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“incredible,” and “fantastic” – a vocabulary of the unbelievable, the ungraspable, was 
mobilized by the editorial desks and the journalists who had the task of reporting the 
event to the American public.298  Each newspaper and each statement issued by the U.S. 
Army echoed the similar sentiment – why had the POWs kidnapped the camp 
commander? Every newspaper stressed that the POWs had made a rather unusual request: 
“It was disclosed that the Communists had asked for 1,000 sheets of paper [presumably 
writing paper] and that this already had been sent to the island.  […]  The purpose was 
not clear but the requisite order was issued by General Colson.”299 By the next day on 
May 10, the Atlanta Daily World was calling the kidnapping “a bizarre episode.”300   
At the press conference General van Fleet held with the media, Lt. Col. James 
McNamara, van Fleet’s public relations officer, described the situation as such: “The 
Communists are talking with General Dodd.  Apparently they are trying to get as much as 
they can.  General Dodd is apparently holding out and talking to them.  It is a one-day 
Panmunjom.”301 Even the U.S. Army personnel on the island of Koje were not clear on 
what the demands of the POWs were.  According to Zalburg, “[o]ne officer said that the 
Communists ‘keep making demands, sort of like at Panmunjom.’” 302 The cluster of tents 
at the village of Panmunjom where the armistice negotiations were taking place had 
become a shorthand for a certain type of negotiating.  And indeed, the corollary between 
the activities within Compound 76 on Kojedo and the negotiations in the tents at 
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Panmunjom signaled a set of stakes in the conflict that challenged the bounds of the 
imaginations of the U.S. mainstream press.   
In this chapter, I argue that the term “prisoner of war,” in this historical moment, 
did not merely describe a category of wartime status.  During the Korean War, the figure 
of the prisoner of war became central to explaining the meaning of the conflict itself, 
whether it be anti-imperial resistance, anti-communist Cold War conflict, or a civil war.  
This chapter moves from the negotiating tents at Panmunjom to Compound 76 at United 
Nations Command Camp #1 on the island of Koje.  A close reading and microhistorical 
study of the Panmunjom negotiations over POWs and the Dodd incident itself reveal that 
the conversation and conflict effectively revolved around the structural legacies of the 
1945 division of Korea at the 38th parallel and the subsequent foreign occupations on the 
peninsula by the United States and the Soviet Union.  The stakes were about the 
meanings of effective postcolonial liberation and sovereignty as the legitimacy of the 
1948 elections held in the north and south respectively was forced onto the table of war 
by both the POWs at Koje and the negotiators at Panmunjom.   
However, diplomats and policy-makers fashioned the figure of the prisoner of war 
as central to the moral discourse underpinning the Cold War. On May 7, 1952 in the 
pressroom of the White House, perhaps no less than 12 hours after the kidnapping on 
Koje island, President Harry Truman made a statement regarding the ongoing armistice 
talks in Korea.  “[T]here shall not be a forced repatriation of prisoners of war – as the 
Communists have insisted,” he announced.  “To agree to forced repatriation would be 
unthinkable.  It would be repugnant to the fundamental moral and humanitarian 
principles which underlie our action in Korea. […] We will not buy an armistice by 
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turning over human beings for slaughter or slavery.”303 The prisoner of war was, 
essentially, a propaganda item on the negotiating table inside the tents at the village of 
Panmunjom. But the controversy surrounding the voluntary repatriation issue signaled a 
more fundamental problem than a simple claim to morality in the post-WWII global 
order.  
The ceasefire negotiations had begun on July 10, 1951, and by the end of the year, 
all parties had agreed upon the location of the ceasefire line near the 38th parallel.  A 
single item of debate - Agenda Item 4 which concerned the matter of prisoners of war – 
was still on the table. However, on January 2, 1952, U.S. delegates presented a new 
demand – voluntary repatriation. The Chinese and North Korean delegates pointed out 
that the 1949 Geneva Conventions on the Treatment of Prisoners of War required 
mandatory repatriation.  The issue of POW repatriation would become the most 
protracted subject of debate at Panmunjom, effectively prolonging the fighting in both the 
battlefields and the camps for another eighteen months until the armistice signing in 
1953.304  
The Dodd kidnapping revealed how the Korean War was a conflict that the 
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Geneva Conventions had not anticipated.  A post-colonial civil war in a nation divided at 
the 38th parallel by the occupying United States at the moment of liberation from 
Japanese colonialism, the Korean War had begun less than a year after the 1949 Geneva 
Conventions had drafted new “laws of war.” The United Nations and the United States 
did not recognize the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea [DPRK] as a sovereign 
state, and the United Nations had entered the conflict as a belligerent.  Such a situation 
tested a key assumption, that the “military” and the “political” could be divided, of the 
1949 Geneva Conventions, which still essentially regarded warfare as a conflict occurring 
between two nation-states. The prescriptions of the 1949 Geneva Conventions did not 
encompass the very real geopolitical shifts of the decolonizing world, and Korea would 
prove to be the first, direct challenge to the “international community.” As the United 
States and the United Nations sat down at Panmunjom with representatives from the 
Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, the situation brought into stark relief that high-
level negotiations were about to take place with an entity the U.S. and the UN did not 
recognize, calling into question the assumptions about the laws of war.  With the 
applicability of international laws of war called into question, the Korean prisoner of war 
represented the site on which resolution or conflict would proceed.305 The kidnapping of 
Dodd and the subsequent U.S. military response revealed a moment when the POWs 
themselves, the U.S. military, and the Panmunjom negotiators attempted to claim the 
definition of the POW. 
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In the days following Dodd’s release, the U.S. Army launched the longest 
investigation of a POW-related incident conducted during the Korean War, resulting in a 
case file that stretches to almost 500 pages of interrogation transcripts and statements.306 
During Dodd’s questioning, the U.S. military focused initially on attempting to delineate 
the use of force by the POWs in capturing Dodd; however, Dodd could not provide a 
satisfying answer about the violent nature of the prisoners of war themselves. “The only 
thing broken was my fountain pen,” he asserted.307 At 9:30 PM on May 10th, three days 
after the initial capture, the POWs of Compound 76 escorted Dodd to the maingate, 
received a written receipt for his release, and allowed Dodd to walk out of the compound.  
The POWs had released him on the condition that the U.S. and UN military recognize the 
organization – named “The Korean People’s Army and Chinese Volunteer Army 
Prisoners of War Representatives” – they had formed during their time with Dodd.  When 
one pauses to consider these details in view of the requests for the 1,000 sheets of writing 
paper, one can clearly see that this was indeed no ordinary kidnapping situation. 
In a memo dated May 13, 1952, the POW Command of the U.S. Army instructed 
the following to new camp commander Boatner: “Upon assuming command[…], your 
missions are to secure and maintain uncontested control of Prisoners of War and Civilian 
Internees under United Nations control wherever located.”308  The POWs of Compound 
76 continued to refuse the entry of U.S. and ROKA military personnel into the compound 
after Dodd’s release.  On June 10, 1952, Boatner ordered U.S. military troops and 
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paratroopers to storm Compound 76 using tanks, tear gas grenades and flamethrowers.  
That day, the death count was thirty-four prisoners of war and one U.S. soldier, and 
“uncontested control” became the official policy for POW camp administration.309  
The story of the Dodd kidnapping was the story of the invention of different 
strategies of war and diplomacy – but the site of invention was neither the battlefield nor 
the negotiating table with career diplomats and politicians.  Instead, the questions of 
sovereignty, decolonization, and self-determination were played out in the POW camp on 
Koje Island and the tents at Panmunjom.  The strategies were not about bombs per se or 
technological advances, but rather about the interrogation room, the negotiating table, and 
wartime bureaucracy.  The POWs’ demand for 1,000 sheets of writing paper and 
Truman’s demand for voluntary repatriation were part of the same story.   
 
Negotiations without Recognition 
The meetings at Panmunjom began on October 25, 1952, a single day after nine 2 
½ ton trucks moved material and tents to the site, where forty men labored to erect the 
conference tents, complete with lighting, flooring, and heating.310 In his memoir, titled 
How to Negotiate with Communists, Admiral Charles Turner Joy, the chief negotiator for 
the United Nations Command, uses a consistent phrase – “stage setting” – to describe 
much of the negotiating that took place in the tent. According to Joy, one of the U.S., 
UNC interpreters arrived at one of the earlier meetings with “a small standard bearing a 
handkerchief-sized replica of the United Nations flag” and placed it squarely in the center 
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of the negotiating table. Nam Il began to push the flag away from the center of table, and 
then Joy would then push it back to the “dead center.” After one of their breaks, the 
Communists then placed a North Korean flag on the table, and it was “identical in all 
respects to the United Nations emblem except that it rose some six inches higher.”[Joy’s 
italics]311 
The negotiations at Panmunjom revolved around the ritual gestures of sovereignty 
– and revealed the performative aspect of the meetings. The politics of recognition were 
deeply embedded in the negotiations themselves. The United States and the United 
Nations did not recognize the sovereignty of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, 
and yet the rituals of negotiation implied “conditions of equality” – the foundation of the 
sovereign nation-state order was based upon the notion of equality, and each nation-state 
was an individual actor within a larger community of states. As historian Prasenjit Duara 
has noted and anthropologists John Kelly and Martha Kaplan have furthered, “what is 
novel about modern nationalism is not political self-consciousness , but the world system 
of nation-states,” a system that became “real […] with the construction of the United 
Nations.”312 How would the U.S. and UN negotiate with North Korea without granting 
them recognition as a sovereign nation? In an effort to sidestep this morass, the United 
States decided to delegate the task of negotiating to the “military commanders in the 
field” rather than career diplomats or politicians.313  Thus, the tents were ostensibly a site 
that could effectively partition the “military” from the “political.” 
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However, there was one negotiating tent at Panmunjom which repeatedly could 
not finesse effectively the discursive construction of a separation between the “military” 
and the “political.”314 The meetings of the subcommittee on Item 4 on the negotiation 
agenda – prisoners of war repatriation – began on December 11, 1952.  The negotiators 
representing the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea and China respectively were 
Major General Lee Sang Cho and Colonel Tsai Cheng-wen, two men described by the 
official U.S. Army history of the Panmunjom talks as the “enemy[‘s] two ablest 
negotiators.” Seated across the negotiating table were Rear Admiral Ruthven E. Libby, 
whom the very same history described as “a fiery sea dog with salty tongue,” and Colonel 
George W. Hickman, Jr., who “provided added balance to the UNC team.”315  Each team 
had brought their own staff, interpreters, and stenographers.316 The time was 1300 hours, 
and Major General Lee said, “Let’s begin the talks.”317   
The first major debate revolved around the issue of “civilian internees.”318  Major 
General Lee repeatedly put forth the argument that to simply sift through the POW 
population to determine who had been where vis-à-vis the 38th parallel before the 
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outbreak of war was not a valid way to determine who belonged to which state.  “Can 
people who are not prisoners of war be made prisoners of war by this conference?,” he 
asked.  “That is not possible. […] I was myself a person of South Korean origin, but you 
know, and the other people of the world know, that I am not a person of your army but a 
loyal General of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea.”319 
In response, Libby insisted upon creating what he called “a clear distinction 
between politics and law, between a political question and a legal question.”  Invoking 
the “law of nations,” Libby asserted that the people in question regarding “civilian 
internee” status were for a “fact,” “citizens of the Republic of Korea, and thus “they have 
certain rights guaranteed to them by the laws of that country and they have certain 
responsibilities to their country.”  In this negotiating tent, one would expect that the 
discussion would have primarily revolved around the 1949 Geneva Conventions, but the 
quick turn in the conversations and arguments soon exposed the central stakes of the 
discussion.  To talk about the prisoner of war was to discuss the claims a state could 
make upon its subjects – and, more importantly, which states were considered legitimate 
within the post-1945 world order.320   
In essence, the talks surrounding Agenda Item 4 at Panmunjom revealed that five 
years after the division of Korea, it was still not clear what type of border the 38th parallel 
should be.  Born under the hands of “two tired colonels working late at night” at the 
Pentagon in Washington, D.C. on August 10, 1945, the 38th parallel did not follow any 
geographical or cultural division – rather, the latitudinal line of the 38th parallel served as 
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the division between two foreign occupations of Korea – the U.S. and the Soviets.321 For 
Koreans, the 38th parallel was entirely an artificial division.  Under Japanese colonial 
rule, the experience of being a subject of empire exceeded any territorial state bounds. 
Koreans were factory laborers in Manchuria or sugar cane workers in Hawaii, while self-
exiled Koreans built political “governments” in Shanghai and multiple anti-colonial 
military training outfits throughout the Manchurian-Korean border, the Korean peninsula, 
and in Hawaii.322 The prisoners of war in the camp on Kojedo reflected the migrations 
forced by both Japanese colonial policies but also Stalin’s deportation policies during the 
late 1930s due to perceptions that Koreans, still colonized by Japan, could serve as enemy 
spies.  Some prisoners of war had come as far away as Uzbekistan, others from 
Manchuria, and still others from both north and south of the 38th parallel, although all had 
been categorized as “North Korean” in their intake interrogation reports.323  
In the year 1950, five years after liberation, the question of the 38th parallel had 
not been resolved.  And the Korean War itself presented a true quandary to all involved. 
On one hand, if the war were a civil war, the 38th parallel would simply be a vestige of 
foreign occupation, it not having a longer historical meaning to the politics and 
communities in Korea.  If the war were a war of rollback, somewhat similarly the 38th 
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parallel would not signify territorial sovereignty.  On the other hand, if the war were an 
anti-Communist war of containment, the 38th parallel would have been solidified as 
sovereign border, albeit selectively, since the U.S. and UN did not want to grant political 
recognition of the DRPK’s sovereignty.  And yet on another level, if the war were a war 
of national liberation, the 38th parallel would primarily only have meaning as an imperial 
gesture. In the negotiating tents at Panmunjom, the question of the 38th parallel and the 
war would have to be resolved over the prisoners of war. 
Lee asserted the legitimate sovereign claims of the DPRK over the Korean 
peninsula by returning to the elections of 1948: 
If you talk about the so-called citizenship or nationality of these people we 
are talking about, as I have said, it is a complicated question.  You should 
remember the name of our Republic is the Democratic People’s Republic 
of Korea and when the Democratic People’s Republic was born, it was 
born as a result of an election which showed the will of the entire people 
of Korea, including the South Koreans.324  
 
The putative division between the “military” and the “political” fell apart in the 
negotiating tent because the debate addressed the very core of “sovereignty” in the post-
1945 era – what type of military action rendered a state legitimate in the decolonizing 
world?  Did the military government of the U.S. Army render a decolonized state 
legitimate?  Or did a history of anti-colonial military resistance impart legitimacy in 
terms of the relationship between the people and the state?  
It became clear that the subsequent naming of these respective states was another 
aspect of the sovereignty and recognition issue.  “[Y]ou made reference to ‘Syngman 
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Rhee’s government,’” said Libby to Lee on the meeting on December 27th.  “By this 
reference I assume you meant the government of the Republic of Korea, […] since there 
is only one recognized government in Korea. […] For the purpose of this conference it is 
sufficient that our side pays you the courtesy of referring to your government by the 
name you prefer – the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea.  We do this out of 
common courtesy and in deference to your wishes, and not because we recognize any 
such government in fact.”325   
And then on January 2, 1952, Rear Admiral Luthven put another issue on the 
table: voluntary repatriation of the prisoners of war. The issue of repatriation pushed the 
negotiations to another level of debate over the nature of nation-states in the post-1945 
world.  On January 26, 1952, Libby was the one who commenced the day’s talks. 
Addressing General Lee, he said, “In closing yesterday your side stated that it is proper to 
talk about north and south Koreans and about the areas north and south of the military 
demarcation line in order to avoid any political discussion.  […] These negotiations are 
being conducted within a certain political framework.  We cannot, and will not, as you 
suggest, close our eyes to these facts,” Libby asserted.   
The Republic of Korea is a sovereign state. It exists.  It exists as a result of 
the free will of hundreds of thousands of Koreans.  By their act of creating 
this state, the residents of the area south of the 38th Parallel made 
themselves nationals of that state.  […] This is not politics.  This law.  
This is fact.  However unpleasant this fact may be to you, it remains a 
fact.326   
 
In response, Lee addressed the question of an individual’s will vis-à-vis the state.  
He said, “It is impossible to arbitrarily classify the Korean people in accordance with 
their northern or southern national designation. […] Because in Korea there are two 
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forces which differ from each other in nature: on the one side, there is the Revolutionary 
People’s Army which represents the interests of the people; on the other side, there is a 
reactionary army.”  He continued,  
All those prisoners of war whom we captured from your army we do not 
classify into whites or blacks; nor do we instigate the negro to oppose the 
whites, and we have not canceled their military designation. […] We do 
not raise the question of whether those Americans should go to England or 
Africa after the war.  That is a question of electing one’s political 
standpoint.  We do not ask them to do so, and we don’t find it necessary 
either.”327 
 
At this juncture in the negotiations, the question of POW repatriation had pushed both 
Libby and Lee to betray a specific tension in the construction of the nation-state in the 
post-1945 world – the contradiction of the “military” and the “political” in the formation 
of a state.  The legitimacy of military participation, for both the DPRK and the United 
States, was founded upon the assumption of consent and choice on the part of the 
participants themselves, whether Korean revolutionaries or African American soldiers.  
And yet, Lee attempted to undermine this notion, by pointing out that the participation 
did not necessarily indicate a putative identity between the subjectivity of the person and 
the political agendas of the state.   
Libby took this opportunity to push the discursive logic further:  “The position 
taken by your side has two basic themes which are so diametrically opposed to each other 
that the inclusion of both in the same proposal cannot, in our view, be defended on any 
grounds of logic or reason.  These theses are: ‘freedom of choice’ and its opposite 
“forced repatriation.”328 And he went on to state, “So far as the individuals themselves 
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are concerned, the United Nations Command proposal is a bill of rights.”329 The debate 
over the prisoners of war repatriation exposed that the negotiations were more than a 
struggle over whose interpretation of “international law” would be valid – this was a 
conflict over who could lay claim to knowing the subjectivity, the desires of the 
“prisoners of war” amidst competing notions of citizenship, human rights, and 
sovereignty in the age of three worlds.   
 
The Prisoner’s Choice  
United Nations Command POW Number One on the mountainous island of Koje 
was sprawled within two long valleys, and essentially was, in the words of the 
International Committee of the Red Cross delegate Frederick Bieri, “probably the largest 
POW camp ever run in accordance with the stipulations of the Geneva Convention.”330 In 
this camp essentially created by POW labor using barbed-wire, mud, and thousands of 
stones from the sea, one particular piece of paper posted on every compound’s bulletin 
board garnered a great deal of attention from the prisoners of war themselves: extracts 
from the 1949 Geneva Conventions, in both English and Korean. 331  From May 29 to 
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By May 1952, the majority of the compounds had its own microcosm of tents – hundreds of tents housed 
the prisoners of war in groups of two hundred or so, while other tents were designated for medical 
attention, religious practice, the compound monitor, and even English language lessons which involved 
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June 9, 1951, ICRC delegate Frederick Bieri visited the camp on Koje island for the first 
time. On June 5, Bieri held meetings with the POW spokesmen at the camp.  He noted 
that “[n]o complaints concerning treatment were made”; however, he did note that the 
prisoners of war requested the “[i]ssue of more copies per compound of the Geneva 
Convention (POW) Extract in Korean.  The one copy displayed in each Compound is not 
sufficient.” In his remarks for that day’s meetings, Bieri wrote, “The POW are very 
interested in the convention, which is quite new to them.”   
However, the prisoners of war themselves did indeed have a sense of the larger 
international system in which they were embroiled. In the archives of the International 
Committee of the Red Cross is a letter from a Lee Hak Ku, a prisoner of war in the Koje 
camp who was writing to protest the introduction of voluntary repatriation interrogation 
screening, which had been attempted by the U.S. military in multiple compounds in late 
December 1951 around Christmas time.  He wrote in a letter dated 29 December 1951, 
addressed “To the Delegate of the International Committee of Red Cross.”  “Honorable 
Delegate,” he begins, “I wish you are healthy and happy, on behalf of all P.W.s, 
including officers and E.M.S., who are being kept in detention by American forces at 
Kojedo.” Lee had presented himself as a representative of the POWs, and then continued 
by reminding the ICRC of its own responsibility towards the POWs themselves:  At the 
same time I hope that our request to you […] would be fulfilled satisfactorily by you and 
your Committee’s endeavor, whose mission is to carry out its just and sacred duties along 
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with other humanistic problems entrusted by all the mankind of the world.”332  It is 
perhaps not all that surprising that Lee later invoked the Geneva Conventions in his 
protest of the repatriation interrogation screening.  His letter belied some knowledge of 
the Panmunjom proceedings – and an awareness of how politically linked the tents at 
both Panmunjom and Kojedo were to each other with the figure of the prisoner of war at 
the core of these discussions. Included with Lee’s letter was a message for General Nam 
Il, the North Korean negotiator at Panmunjom.  The U.S. Army had removed the 
message, but Lee had clearly thought of the ICRC as a meditating factor, all the while 
with an eye to intervene in the happenings at Panmunjom.  Lee would become a central 
figure in the Dodd incident on May 7, 1952. 
Within less than a month after the abovementioned exchange between Admiral 
Libby and General Lee at Panmunjom on January 26, 1952, a memo pushing for the 
preliminary screening of prisoners of war arrived at the Koje camp on February 12th.  
There had been a previous round of repatriation interrogation in late December 1951, but 
a few key compounds had successfully prevented the interrogation teams from passing 
through the gates to their compound.  Compound 62 had been one of those groups – it 
housed 5,600 civilian internees (CI), people who had been formerly classified as 
“prisoners of war” but whose status was changed to “civilian internee” when they argued 
that they had been civilians, not military personnel.  Compound 62 civilian internees 
were self-professed Korean communists, and had rejected the notion of voluntary 
repatriation. 
On February 18, U.S. and ROKA military interrogation teams accompanied by 
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850 U.S. troops from the Third Battalion of the 27th Infantry arrived at Compound 62 at 
5:30 A.M.  It was before daybreak, and the compound sat in darkness, save for three 
corner areas illuminated by the fence lights. The arrival at the compound before daybreak 
was a part of the strategy to take the 5,600 civilian internees living in large tents within 
the compound area by surprise.   The received orders stated that the military personnel 
must take control of the compound, line up the civilian internees for breakfast, and 
conduct them to the latrines afterwards.  Then according to the testimony of Lieutenant 
Colonel Norman Edwards, the orders explicitly instructed, “When breakfast is finished 
and everything is ready, conduct the polling team to each area and begin polling. […] 
Keep the CI’s squatting or lying down.”333   
 However, the plan did not unfold as anticipated.  By 9:00 A.M., 1 US Army 
enlisted man was killed, 55 civilian internees killed, 4 U.S. Army enlisted men wounded, 
and 140 civilian internees were wounded – of whom 22 later died of the inflicted wounds. 
Alerted to the presence of U.S. military troops surrounding the compound, the CI’s met 
the troops with homemade cudgels, barbed-wire flails, and hundreds of stones.  The 
majority of POWs died from wounds inflicted from the concussion grenades. The large 
number of casualties raised the question of why the U.S. military had been so insistent. 
Lt. Col. Edwards gave the professed goal of the mission as he understood it: “To 
give each CI [civilian internee] the right to freely express his desire for a rescreening, 
which meant that when he was rescreened, he could indicate whether or not he wanted to 
go to North Korea or South Korea.”334  The bounded space of the polling areas was to 
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facilitate the CI to “freely express his desire.”  But the mobilization of military troops 
necessary in order to construct the space signaled how the “freedom” of the polling area 
was made by the threat of mass violence by the troops’ presence. The patent juxtaposition 
of the bureaucratic space for the expression of liberal individual choice and the 
mobilization of military troops in order to construct it certainly threatened to be a 
contradiction of sorts, and it became the central focus of the subsequent investigation. 
According to Lieutenant Colonel Hartlet F. Dame, the U.S. troops have been 
instructed to “present overwhelming force in such a manner that prisoners would be 
discouraged from any overt act, and particularly discouraged from attack against troops 
being used.”335  The investigation board continued this line of logic in the conclusion 
section of the case file: “That the civilian internees deliberately attacked UN military 
personnel in the face of overwhelming firepower capabilities.”  “Overwhelming force” 
became the presentation of a rational state power in the narrative of the investigation 
case.  The POWs had not recognized this rational display of power, and thus forfeited 
their claims to protection of life.   
But a particular interaction destabilized this presentation of “overwhelming force” 
as the characteristic of a “rational state.”  Colonel Maurice Fitzgerald, the camp 
commander of the Kojedo Camp, appeared before the investigation board.  The following 
exchange transpired between the board and Fitzgerald regarding the use of force: 
Q: Am I correct in my conception of compound 62 as being in effect 
enemy held territory? 
A: No, we can go into Compound 62 any time to do anything we want. 
 
Q: Without force? 
A: It means, to do what we want.  Is open to adjustment at anytime.  We 
might do without force.  We have the capabilities of doing what we want. 
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Q: I didn’t mean that.  I am not questioning the capabilities at all.  My 
point is that would require force to enter the compound? 
A: Based on their prior conduct, their sections, their implied intentions and 
threats, it is reasonable to assume that we would have to use force.336 
 
Fitzgerald, the camp commander during this incident, hesitated and hedged on the 
question of the necessity of force. If force was used, then it was clear that the civilian 
internees themselves had not consented to nor recognized the authority of the United 
States as a protecting power.  The use of force threatened the actual professed goal of the 
“mission.”  
 Immediately after this incident at Compound 62, the U.S. military decided to 
discipline Colonel Maurice Fitzgerald by assigning him to the oversight of certain 
Communist compounds at the Koje camp.  Brigadier General Francis Dodd soon arrived 
at the island of Koje to assume the responsibilities of camp commander of UNC Camp 
#1.  But the issues concerning the uses of force and bureaucracy in creating the POW 
subject would remain.  What type of individual was the prisoner of war supposed to be?  
 
 
The Dodd Incident 
  
Compound 76 in the Kojedo POW camp was located in the maximum security 
area. On May 7th, 1952, Brigadier General Dodd went to the compound to negotiate the 
entry of U.S. interrogation teams to conduct preliminary repatriation screening. Holding a 
population of 6,418 prisoners of war, Compound 76 had already given a bit of grief to the 
administrative officials of the camp regarding voluntary repatriation screening, having 
persistently refused the entry of screening interrogation teams into the compound. Dodd 
was hoping to at least have the POWs agree to submit to fingerprint identification, since 
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the POWs had made it a practice to give false names, swap ID numbers, and multiple 
other acts to undermine the bureaucratic oversight. 337 
 At 2 PM on May 7th, Dodd was listening to the list of requests and complaints 
compiled by Joo Tek Woon through the barbed-wire fence.  A group of approximately 
six prisoners of war had gathered for the meeting.338  Although Joo could communicate 
sufficiently in English himself, one of the other POWs from the compound was serving 
as the official translator.  The topics of discussion ranged from arranging weekly 
compound spokesmen meetings to material requests such as socks, raincoats, and 
toothbrushes.  According to the statement of General Raven, who had stood beside Dodd, 
prior to the kidnapping, Joo had repeatedly invited Dodd inside the compound: “Please 
come inside the compound where we can resolve all the problems at a desk,” and “Please 
come inside and we will sit down and resolve our problems as gentlemen.” At around 
3:00 PM, a work detail passed through the gate, and the POWs seized Dodd and carried 
him into their compound.   Kim Chang Mo, who was the compound monitor for 
Compound 76, had instructed their chief compound clerk, O Seong Kwon, to paint a 
banner with the following English message: “We capture Dodd.  We guarantee his safety 
if there is shooting, such a brutal action then his life is danger[sic].” The banner unfurled 
from the compound’s main building after Dodd disappeared into the compound. 
Once inside the compound, Joo Tek Kwon made an extraordinary gesture towards 
Dodd.  In his interrogation transcript, Joo, the spokesman for Compound #76 who had 
ordered Dodd’s capture, recollected that after they had carried Dodd into the Compound, 
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“I then […] told the General […] that we were sorry that we had captured him against his 
will, and that we would guarantee his safety and not harm him.” Without the barbed-wire 
fence between them, the terms and meanings of the roles of camp commander and 
prisoner of war could have been dramatically altered. With the camp commander behind 
the barbed-wire fence, and Joo’s apology set a rather unexpected tone for Dodd’s 
duration in Compound 76.  Joo’s statement, I suggest, revealed that it was crucial to 
establish that Dodd was still a camp commander, and the POWs were still prisoners of 
war.   
What was at stake in this incident was the definition of the prisoner of war as a 
political subject. After Dodd’s capture, Joo immediately began negotiating with the 
authorities through the barbed-wire fence, stating that representatives from the other 
communist compounds must be brought to compound #76 in order to have a meeting 
with Dodd.  In hopes of negotiating this point, the U.S. Army brought the senior colonel 
of the DPRK Army, Lee Hak Ku, to the maingate – who, in the words of Colonel 
William H.Craig, was “the most influential officer PW.”  But upon arrival at the 
compound, Lee simply stated: “it would be impossible to hold a meeting with a barbed 
wire fence separating us, therefore it would be necessary to enter the compound.”339 
 O Seong Kwon, the 22-year-old POW clerk in Compound 76 who had also 
translated the appropriate words for the sign announcing Dodd’s capture, went with 
Captains Havilland and Carroll to each compound in the maximum security section.  He 
spoke with the spokesman and commander of each compound, telling them about the 
successful capture of Dodd, “and that a meeting would be held with the General in 
Compound #76, and that they should all come.”  Kwon and the two U.S. captains went to 
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Compound 96, 95, 607, 605, and then 66 and 62, bringing two representatives from each 
compound.340 
The group of Communist prisoners of war ultimately charged with “mutiny” by 
the U.S. Army numbered thirty-four POWs, three of whom were young women, and the 
rest were men.  But perhaps the most important detail of this infamous cohort of prisoners 
of war is that a total of ten POWs out of thirty-four Korean POWs had been born in South 
Korea.  They patently did not fit the later narrative of the U.S. press and military of 
“fanatic communist North Koreans.”  The ages of the prisoners of war ranged from 
nineteen to thirty-seven – all of them had been born during Japanese colonial rule.  These 
prisoners of war were a particular group among the rest of the POW population.  It was 
most probable that many of the prisoners who had participated in the kidnapping – all of 
whom were spokesmen and women for the other POW compounds – had a certain level 
of experience in the anti-colonial resistance movement.  
The personal history of Lee Hak Ku, a key POW figure in the Dodd incident and 
a senior colonel with the Korean People’s Army, followed these historical shifts, 
according to the reports of the multiple U.S. interrogations he had undergone.  Lee was 
born in Hamyong Pukto – the northernmost province of the Korean peninsula, right on 
the border with Manchuria.  After graduating school, he had supposedly farmed for one 
year, and then taught Japanese at a local primary school.  However, the chronology of his 
life shifted tremendously at the moment of liberation from Japan.  From August 1945 to 
August 1946, he was “[e]mployed by the North Korean People’s Government Ministry of 
Interior as Chief of Public Security (Police) Section in Myongch’on.”  In August 1946, he 
“enlisted in the Peace Preservation Corps at Nanam,” and he had also been a member of 
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the North Korean Democratic Youth League as well as the North Korean Labor Party.341  
Manchuria, also an area that had been under Japanese colonial rule, figured as an 
important dimension to the geopolitical imaginaries of these POWs. In the extensive 
investigation report on the Dodd incident, a prisoner of war named “Liu I” who had 
served as an interpreter for the two Chinese POW representatives appears in the 
interrogation records. In his interrogation report, the space reserved for noting whether 
the POW was “SK” (south Korean) or “NK” (north Korean) held an explanatory phrase: 
“Born in South Korea, citizen of China, Chinese Korean.”  The presence of two Chinese 
Communist representatives in a group of predominantly Korean POWs was a significant 
act of recognizing the history of the Korean anti-colonial resistance movement in China – 
and the larger vision of international anti-imperial struggle.342   
 Eventually, all the representatives from other Communist compounds arrived at 
#76. After multiple meetings with Dodd within the main compound tent, they moved to 
the Civilian Information and Education Building – the largest structure in each compound 
designed for teaching U.S. democracy and English to POWs, but now had been 
transformed into the site for a POW organizational activity unanticipated by the U.S. 
Army.  According to Dodd: “We were up on the stage of the platform; I would say there 
were about a dozen persons on the stage, and down in the chairs facing the stage, down 
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on the lower level, there were three or four rows of persons.”343 The POWs collectively 
formed the “Korean Peoples Army and Chinese Volunteers Prisoners of War 
Representatives Association.”  Sitting at a desk on the stage above the members, Dodd 
signed a note recognizing this representative organization.  This act of writing by Dodd is 
central to the project of the POWs – and it was clear that in order for the POWs to claim a 
redefinition of the POW as a political subject that they would need to transform – but also 
still require – the authority of the camp commander.  
Just as the space of the CI&E building had been transformed into a diplomatic 
meeting hall, other spaces that Dodd occupied were similarly altered.  After the meeting, 
the POWs escorted Dodd to a room that had been prepared for him: “rice mats on the 
floor and blankets on top of the rice mats, a wooden bunk, table, three chairs and rack on 
which to hang my clothes.”  As Senior Colonel Lee Hak Ku remarked in his 
interrogation: there were always two guards outside of the room, but they were there to 
“maintain the prestige” of Dodd.  His meals were delivered through the barbed-wire 
fence, the POWs noted in their interrogations – perhaps to help ease Dodd’s ulcerated 
stomach, they did not give him their POW rations.  But also, perhaps eating the POW 
rations would have also challenged Dodd’s hold onto his own authority as camp 
commander.  A performance of North Korean songs and plays had been planned that 
evening in the CI&E building – and Brigadier General Dodd was a guest at this 
performance.344   
The next morning, the POWs have arranged a certain morning routine – or ritual 
perhaps – for Brigadier General Dodd.  In the 500-page expanse of the investigation case 
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file, there is a particular interrogation of a POW who was not directly involved with the 
kidnapping or the creation of the POW representative body – An Jong Un, a POW who 
served as the compound doctor.  He gave the following testimony during his 
interrogation: 
Q: What knowledge do you have concerning the seizure of General 
DODD? 
A: […] An unidentified POW came to the dispensary and requested that I 
accompany him to a tent near the mess hall in 3rd Bn area to treat General 
Dodd.  Enroute to the tent I met Lee Hak Eu and he asked what I was 
doing.  When I explained that I was going to treat the General, LEE stated, 
that is fine, go ahead.  Upon arrival at the tent, General DODD was taking 
a bath in a metal tub made from an oil drum.  About three (3) PW 
monitors were washing the General’s body. […] When the General had 
finished bathing I examined his finger and knees and observed they were 
healing.  The Interpreter told me the General had a cough when he woke 
that morning, so I listened to his heart beat and examined his chest.  He 
appeared to be in good condition. […] In leaving, the General gave me a 
pack of cigarettes.345 
 
The spectacle of Dodd being bathed by three POWs and then the careful medical 
attention Dodd received toed a line between the assertion of a complete surveillance over 
his body and also the offer of special services to an elite guest.  Dodd was unmistakably a 
prisoner under the care of his captors, who were prisoners of war.  Yet, there was no 
carnivalesque reversal of a binary hierarchy of power between a POW camp commander 
and the POW. Instead, the POWs carefully marked Dodd’s body and the space of the 
compound itself to establish and assert Dodd’s authority – which they explicitly made 
contingent on their own authority as a collective of representatives for the POW camp.   
On May 8th, the POWs gave Dodd the most important document of the incident: 
a list of 11 functions and demands of the POW representative organization. Item #7 on 
the list was the most revealing: “In order to secure the business of this institute, we 
                                                
345 Case File #33. 
  
244 
request four tents, ten desks, twenty chairs, one hundred K.T. paper and two hundred 
dozens of pencils, three hundred bottles of ink and two hundred stencil paper and one 
mimeograph.”  The organization wanted to create their own archive, their own 
bureaucratic overseeing function, of the POW. When we ponder the meaning of such a 
demand and look at the very first item on their list of organizational functions, we can see 
how this move towards establishing the means of an archive on the POW is also a move 
towards claiming a legitimate sovereignty: “1) We organize the representatives of PW’s 
association by total PWs of Korean Peoples Army and Chinese People’s Candidates that 
are confined in Koje Island.” In his interrogation, Joo stated that after Lee Hak Ku was 
elected president of the PW representative association, he effectively “became the 
commander of all PW Compounds in the UN POW Camp #1.”346 
 The bureaucracy they would create would approach the POW as the subject of a 
state, not simply a wartime category. The single, most important demand the POW 
organization made was the cessation of U.S. military repatriation screening, claiming that 
the U.S. was forcing subjects of the DPRK to renounce the state’s sovereign claims over 
them.  Using their position as prisoners of war, these representatives in turn forced the 
international community to ask what type of political collective body the DPRK was – 
and to argue that it was a legitimate state. 
 In an effort to lessen, or triage, the damage from the capture of Dodd, the U.S. 
military sent in General Colson to become the camp commander of Koje.  Colson’s duty 
was to announce to the POWs upon his arrival that Dodd was no longer in command, and 
therefore all negotiations with him would be null and void.  Colson delivered the 
following message via loudspeaker and writing to the members of Compound 76 at five 
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minutes after midnight, the night of Dodd’s capture: 
At about 1500 hours of 7 May certain PW of Compound 76, maliciously 
attacked Brigadier General Francis T. Dodd, then CG of this Camp and Lt 
Colonel W.R. Raven, CO of Enclosure Number 7.  General Dodd against 
his violent opposition was forcibly carried into Compound 76 where he is 
now held a prisoner.  Such an action is contrary to all the principles of the 
Geneva Convention.  I am the new CG of this Camp and as such I am 
authorized by the rules of the Geneva Convention to order you to 
immediately release General Dodd and permit him to return safely.  I do 
hereby order that you release him unharmed.347  
 
Dodd was not released.  Instead, altogether twelve messages were sent through 
the barbed-wire fence to the new camp command.  A message sent to the U.S. command 
on May 10th, signed by Lee Hak Ku on behalf of the PW representative organization, 
provides a crucial frame through which to understand the functions of the organization 
they had created.  “This Representative Group announce once again that the unwilling 
detention of Brig. Gen. Dodd, US Army, your predecessor by this Representative Group 
is the legal leading measure for the protection of lives and personal rights of our POWs 
who have been intimidated by unjust management handled by your authorities having 
decreased the authority of Geneva convention[sic] and nullified the said Convention by 
the illegal management of POWs and the violence against the POWs.”348 The invocation 
of the Geneva Convention in this exchange message makes a very crucial discursive 
move: it unhinges the authority of the United States from the moral authority of 
international humanitarian law, by stating that the U.S. was not synonymous with the 
international order.  
Lee ended the message by writing, “I announce that American Brigadier General 
Dodd is, as he has reported, in utterly safe condition, being protected from all danger and 
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there is not even the smallest change in his sanitary or mental condition could be seen.  
He is discussing with us in most usual condition.  Your health and new result of 
practicing Geneva Convention is hoped for.  Representing the representatives group of 
KPA and Chinese volunteer Troop PW by the approval of the then CG of PW Camp.  
Signed Lee, Hak Koo.”349  The POWs were not necessarily either surprised or perturbed 
by the change in command.  They shifted their bureaucratic strategies in their 
negotiations – all statements regarding past events of violence, etc. that had occurred 
under Dodd’s command would be verified by Dodd’s signature, and those statements 
regarding the future entitlements and functions of the POW representative organization 
would be signed by Colson. 
 On May 10th, 1952, both Dodd and Colson had marked their signatures on the 
corresponding statements.  Upon Dodd’s release, the U.S. military, in turn, immediately 
demoted both of them.  It was the fact that they had signed their signatures on documents 
written up by POWs attesting to violence in the camps among multiple items that led to 
the quick demise of both of these men’s military careers.  Their signatures were the act of 
transgression. 
 
Interrogation without Recognition 
The administrative summary to the U.S. Army investigation file on the May 7 
1952 “kidnapping” of Brigadier General Francis Dodd contained a peculiar turn of 
phrase:  “When Dodd was released he was in good physical condition and there is no 
doubt that his captors treated him well, in fact, to the point of being patronizing.”350  The 
                                                
349 Case File #33. 
350 Summary for Case File #33.  
  
247 
usual straightforward chronological telling of the case file’s events paused, and an “in 
fact” created a rupture large enough for a comment, a slight aside – and suddenly, it was 
evident that there was something in this case file that could not be contained by the 
bureaucratic language of the U.S. Army. Case #33 of the Dodd kidnapping was the sole 
case where the United State Army brought charges of “mutiny” against prisoners of war, 
and the case file itself extended to almost 500 pages of interrogation transcripts and 
statements.  The labor involved in the investigation and preparation for prosecution was 
evident, but in the end, as the file was prepared for the archive, the administrative 
summary insisted on noting that the prisoners of war were “patronizing.” The amount of 
effort the U.S. Army exerts to address a “mutiny” committed by “patronizing” prisoners 
of war raises a simple question: what political / psychological boundaries had these 
Korean Communist prisoners of war transgressed in taking the American commander of 
the POW camp prisoner?  
The 29th Military Police Criminal Investigation Detachment of the United States 
Army began its investigation into the Dodd incident on May 29, 1952..  The investigation 
did not end until August 7 of that year, with the investigation officially declared “closed” 
on August 25, 1952.  Two separate cases, Cases #32 and #33, were filed by the United 
Nations against the prisoners of war who had been involved in the kidnapping.  Case #32 
involved the six prisoners of war who were present at the meeting at the barbed-wire 
fence with Brigadier General Dodd: Joo Tek Woon, Kim Chang Mo, O Seong Kwan, O 
Byong Keol, and Song Mo Jin.  Case #33 also included Joo and Kim, but expanded its 
list of accused to the POWs who were in the POW representative organization.  The 
official charges, according to the case file summary read as follows: 
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The defendants in Case #32 are charged with unlawfully striking Brig Gen 
Francis T. Dodd, a member of the United Nations Command, on 7 May 
1952 at UNC PW Camp #1, Koje-do, Korea.  The twenty five (25) 
defendants in Case #33 are charged with mutiny in their joint refusal to 
release Gen Dodd in accord with a lawful order given them by Brig Gen 
Charles W. Colson, Gen Dodd’s successor as Commanding General of 
UNC PW Camp #1. […] Included among the defendants in #33 are two 
(2) former members of the Chinese Volunteer Army.  All other defendants 
are Korean.351 
 
The phrases “unlawfully striking” and “joint refusal to release Gen Dodd in accord with a 
lawful order” clearly attempted to stress the characterization of these POWs’ actions as 
outside the bounds of the law.  But when Dodd’s own interrogation revealed that the 
result of the physical kidnapping had been minor scratches and a broken fountain pen, 
one can question why the authorities had insisted on using “unlawful striking” as the 
characterizing phrase of the incident. And the act of “mutiny” occurred not necessarily in 
the moment of bringing Dodd behind the barbed-wire fence of Compound 76, but rather 
at the moment of refusing to recognize the authority of Colson’s demand to release Dodd. 
To undermine the authority invested in the signatures of Dodd and Colson on the 
documents recognizing the PW representative organization, the U.S. military criminal 
investigation team had to de-invest the political content of the POWs’ demands 
themselves by criminalizing the POWs.  The investigation report was one particular 
process to criminalize the prisoners of war themselves in order to nullify the other actions 
of the two Brigadier Generals, Dodd and Colson.  
Rather significantly, the investigation case file itself revealed an important aspect 
of the investigation: there are twenty-eight transcripts of interrogations with prisoners of 
war who had been involved in some way with the incident, while all U.S. military 
personnel involved submitted narrative statements. The only other interrogation transcript 
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was the questioning of General Dodd after the incident, while he was stationed at Pusan. 
The interrogation transcripts themselves show the template of questions and the priorities 
held by the CID during the investigation, and more specifically, they reveal that the main 
concern of the CID agents was the representative organization the POWs had created.  
The 20th MP CID members had to demonstrate the premeditated nature of the 
kidnapping, while also eliding the broader political and organizational aspects of the 
POWs’ activities. The kidnapping had to be a criminal act, not a political one.  There was 
one particular question that the CID agents would ask only the POWs directly involved in 
the POW representative organization. The question was essentially two-fold: “Q: Have 
you read the rules for governing PW’s as prescribed by the Geneva Convention?,” which 
was followed by, “Q: Did you, as a member of the association, know that you were 
holding General Dodd against his will and in violation of the Geneva Convention?” [my 
italics] 
The answers given by the prisoners of war in response to the first question were 
almost unequivocally “yes” – or they would specify which parts of the Convention they 
were familiar with. The responses to the second question, without exception, all held to 
the claim that ultimately the POWs had not violated the Geneva Conventions and that the 
capture of Dodd had been simply a necessity because they could not otherwise have a 
meeting with him.  For example, four women Korean prisoners of war had been members 
of the KPA and CPVA PW Representative Association – all of whom were from 
Compound #80 in Enclosure 8, the all-women compound. Pak Soo Pok, a 20-year-old 
woman from south Korea and who had joined the North Korean Army as a nurse, stated 
in her interrogation on June 10, 1952: “I, as a member of the committee, disregarded the 
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Geneva Convention laws governing Prisoners of War because I felt that we were right in 
detaining General DODD.”  Kim Jong Sook, the 22-year-old spokesman for Compound 
#80, declared, “I as a member of the association felt that I was right in helping to detain 
General Dodd.”  And Kim Jong Ja, the 21-year-old commander of Compound #80 from 
south Korea, stated, “I thought we were right in holding General DODD and that we were 
not violating the Geneva Convention Laws.” These POWs offered the same rationale as 
the others accused in the case: the circumstances surrounding the Dodd incident were 
extraordinary, and the conditions in the camp previous to the incident had rendered the 
kidnapping necessary.  The Geneva Conventions, according to the POWs, did not hold in 
the circumstances due to particular violations of the conventions committed already by 
the U.S. military and the supporting ROKA soldiers within the camp.  Or as PW 
representative Sun Jin Kwan stated, “I felt that our demands were legal.”352  
On June 25, 1952, Lee Hak Ku was brought in for interrogation by the CID 
agents.  The usual question was put forth: “Q: Did you, as a member of the association 
know that you were holding General Dodd in violation of the Geneva Convention?”  
Lee’s response was brief: “A: I do not care to answer this question.”  Lee’s apparent 
refusal – and perhaps “patronizing” attitude – to recognize any obligation towards the 
U.S. authority in the interrogation room later prompted the investigation case file to 
brand him as a leader of the “fanatical” POWs. 
Lee Hak Ku had extensive experience with the U.S. military bureaucracy, having 
gone through multiple interrogations.  A senior colonel in the Korean People’s Army, 
Lee had been a highly valued POW under U.S. custody.  However, his intake 
interrogation report noted an unexpected surrender on Lee’s part soon after MacArthur’s 
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landing at Inchon in mid-September 1950: 
PW surrendered to US troops on his own volition. […] 
PW left his unit in the mountains (south of TABUDONG) and approached the 
American lines at night.  He approached two American soldiers sleeping on a 
roadside, and roused them by gently shaking them; and they brought him in as a 
PW. 
PW was disgusted with the Communist doctrine and system and consequently 
surrendered.353 
  
In the follow-up interrogation on September 25, 1950, the interrogator, a Sergeant 
Hayashi from ATIS, characterized Lee Hak Ku “as intelligent and very cooperative.” He 
made the following notes on Lee during the interrogation: 
No attempts were made at evasion and answers were given without 
hesitation.  Although PW at one time was in position of great 
responsibility in the NKPA, he did not show any signs of being a 
Communist.  PW is of a higher than average caliber, and, from all 
indications, highly ambitious. […] Reliability – good.354 
 
On September 22, 1950, which was a Friday, Major General Frank E. Lowe paid a visit 
to Lee Hak Ku, and Lowe would send a copy of the interrogation to President Truman in 
a mailing dated May 3, 1951.  The Memorandum’s narrative begins as such: “I 
interrogated Colonel Lee Hak Ku, Chief of Staff, Thirteenth Division on Friday, 22nd of 
September, in the detention area at Pusan.  The man answered my questions forthrightly 
and willingly so far as I could observe.  I had the impression that he was an able person.”   
 The interrogation reports up until the Dodd incident had portrayed Lee as a 
rational man, a person who, in fact, “did not show any signs of being a Communist.”  
Major General Low held steadfastly to this opinion of Lee’s character even after this 
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following response from Lee to Lowe’s question about what “caused the North Koreans 
to fight with such fever”:  “His answers pointed consistently to the conclusion that the 
soldiers, at least, believed that they were fighting for the unification of Korea without 
sending that, in fact, they were fighting through the influence of Communist Russia.”355 
Even within his previous interrogations, Lee had been insisting on the autonomy of the 
political subjectivity of North Korean soldiers.  But in the Dodd investigation files, and 
the subsequent U.S. media outlets, Lee would fill a necessary role in the script needed by 
the U.S. military to delegitimatize the claims made by the POW representative 
organization.  Lee Hak Ku would become the “fanatic Oriental Communist prisoner of 
war” par excellence, a leader who essentially brainwashed other POWs via Communist 
ideology.   
When we consider scholar Elaine Scarry’s assertion in The Body in Pain  that 
“[t]he relative ease or difficulty with which any given phenomenon can be verbally 
represented also influences the ease or difficulty with which that phenomenon comes to 
be politically represented,”356 and take another look at the investigation files on the Dodd 
incident, what initially may have simply seemed to be a “strange event” was, in fact, a 
political gesture - one that reveals the high stakes of articulation, visibility, and power in 
the prisoner of war camps of the Korean War.  And the arrival of Brigadier General 
Haydon Boatner would articulate these stakes with tanks, paratroopers, and 
flamethrowers. 
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The “New Regime” 
 
An internally circulated U.S. Army history titled, “The Handling of Prisoners of 
War during the Korean War,” dubbed the arrival of Boatner at Koje as “The New 
Regime,” a welcome change supposedly from the previous bungling of Dodd.357  In his 
own unpublished memoir typescript, Boatner made the following bold statement:  “Well, 
then, just what if anything was the weakest element in our prisoner of war methods in 
Korea?  In my opinion, the greatest weakness stems from our inability to cope with the 
Oriental.”358  Boatner prided himself on having been the commanding general of troops 
in Burma during the Asia-Pacific Wars.  Fluent in Mandarin, he recollected many 
moments where he surprised the POWs on Koje with his linguistic knowledge.  The June 
10, 1952 storming of Compound 76 with tanks, flame throwers, and even paratroopers 
would be hailed as a success by the U.S. military. 
 In the memoir, Boatner recalls the morning of June 10.  Boatner had constructed 
new, smaller compounds under U.S. Army directives to split the communist compounds 
into more “manageable,” smaller groups.  “I took Colonel Lee over to the site of the new 
compounds so he could see them for himself.  Then I gave him orders written in Korean, 
Chinese and English to assemble all prisoners in the open area in the center of his 
compund, No. 76, in groups of 100, to be marched under armed escort to the new 
compounds.  I told him if his men moved orderly no one would be hurt, but that if they 
resisted force would be used and any resulting casualties would be his responsibility and 
due to his own disobedience of my legal orders.” 
                                                
357 The Handling of POW during the Korean War, Folder: Unclassified, S11-02, Korea; Box 16; 
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 After dismissing Lee and sending him back into Compound 76, Boatner allotted 
thirty minutes to wait before entering the compound.  Then, according to Boatner, 
“fifteen minutes after the announced time for our entrance, our troops cut holes in the 
wrie[sic] and the tanks entered followed by flame throwers and then the paratroopers.” 
 Boatner then stood at a Command Post on an adjacent hill so he could observe the 
operation.  He noticed homemade “Molotov cocktails” being thrown at the oncoming 
tanks.  In the later investigation interrogations of the POWs, it became clear that the 
POWs had been preparing for some sort of conflict – the U.S. troops were surprised to 
find that the POWs had somehow made gas masks in the event that gas grenades would 
be launched.  The operation had lasted four hours.  “[W]hat a gruesome sight it was!” 
exclaimed Boatner in the memoir.  “A battlefield in every respect.  Entrenchments, 
wounded, dead, burning buildings and tests[tents] with a few human hands, legs or feet 
here and there.”359 
 The former policy of “overwhelming force” had found new expression under 
Boatner’s command.  But even after the June 10th, 1952 incident, the highest levels of 
U.S. military command were still not content with the situation of “uncontested control” 
in the POW camps under U.S. Army control.  Upon closer examination, the policy of 
“uncontested control” no longer means the demonstration of “overwhelming force,” but 
the complete eradication of resistance that was not only physical, but also symbolic.  
 The Dodd incident reveals a process of fashioning the Korean Communist POW 
into an ideological figure – or more specifically, a “fanatic” – a phrase used extensively 
by U.S. military personnel to describe the Communist POWs in both their statements for 
the case file and administrative memos passed from higher command to the camps. 
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“Uncontested control” would become the central official policy for the camps, and 
Boatner’s decision to storm Compound 76 on June 10th and the resulting deaths were 
clearly in line with the new objective of preempting the issue of consent on the part of 
POWs.  I believe that we can view the policy of “uncontested control” as the other side of 
the coin of “voluntary repatriation” – both depoliticized the Korean prisoner of war, and 
demonstrated the prerogative of the U.S. to define a normative POW subjectivity for the 
post-1945 order, and thus the power to define the relationship between the international 
order, the state, and the individual. 
On August 4, 1952, in a statement to all POWs that was posted in the compounds, 
Boatner gave this summary of the Dodd incident: “The last two months have been a 
critical period in this Prisoner of War Camp.  Many difficulties were caused by the 
kidnapping of General Dodd and other acts of mutiny and defiance by Prisoners of War.  
Those were criminal acts which were caused by stupid, selfish and politically motivated 
self-appointed leaders, who acts[sic] as compound representatives.”  In contrast, he 
offered the following template of normative POW subjectivity: “Each Prisoner of War 
must remember that he has surrendered and is a prisoner of war under the custody and 
command of the Camp Commander, acting for the Detaining Power.  Each prisoner must 
do his duty as a soldier, and do nothing illegal.  He must obey orders and comply with the 
policy of the Camp Commander.  Do these things promptly and in good spirits and you 
will be more contented.”360 A proper POW must be a content one – and more 
importantly, a subject of the camp itself, rather than an outside state.   
The longest clause of Boatner’s statement to the POWs that invoked the Geneva 
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Convention repeated this sentiment that POWs cannot claim a subjecthood outside of the 
camp’s confines:  
The Geneva Convention states: “In all places where there are Prisoners of 
War, except in those where there are officers, the prisoners shall freely 
elect by secret ballot, every six months, and also in case of vacancies, 
prisoner representatives entrusted with representing them before the 
military authorities, the Protesting Powers, the International Committee of 
the Red Cross and other organizations which may assist them. […] Every 
representative must be approved by the Detaining Power before he has the 
right to commence his duties. […]”  You will see, therefore, that your 
representatives can be removed by your Camp Commander.  I want him to 
serve you for the well-being of the POW’s in accordance with my orders 
and policies.  If he does not, I will remove him from his responsibility and 
call upon you to elect another representative.361 
 
Representation and the cessation of forced repatriation screening were the two most 
important demands the POW representative organization made.  As both the U.S. 
government and the Korean communist prisoners of war understood, at stake in the 
interrogation process was the question of what type of political subjectivity would be 
legitimate within the post-1945 international nation-state system. Clearly, if the United 
States military could demonstrate that an overwhelming number of Communist 
combatants and civilians desired non-repatriation, the U.S. interpretation of the Geneva 
Convention’s humanitarian intentions would take precedence at the negotiating 
table.  But more importantly, the POWs understood that the repatriation interrogation 
held up only one particular template for subjectivity – the internee would need to narrate 
him/herself as a “human,” a subject devoid of claims to collective subjectivities, such as 
citizenship, nationalism, or a Communist revolution. If we take Carl Schmitt’s statement: 
“War is the existential negation of the enemy,” we can see how the voluntary repatriation 
policy is, in fact, creating a different discursive violence – by focusing on the individual, 
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the U.S. essentially “negates” the claims to sovereignty made by North Korea.362   But the 
discursive violence is not directly committed by the United States, but rather by the POW 
individual him/herself.   
On August 16, 1952, Mark Clark, the Commander of the United Nation 
Command, sent a memo to the head of KCOMZ (Korean Communications Zone), which 
was the military branch in charge of the POW Command.  The top figure of the U.S. 
Army was concerned about the situation on Koje: 
A review of reference messages as well as previous reports from your 
headquarters show continued incidents, ranging from what appear to be 
minor incidents to mass demonstrations and open defiance of the camp 
authority, amny[sic] of which have resulted in deaths, serious[sic] injuries, 
and intolerable affronts to camp authority[…]  I assume you are familiar 
with my previous directives to seize and maintain uncontested control of 
all POW installations […]. 
2. If proper control is being exercised it is incomprehensible to me how 
prisoners could have in their possession Red Flags for demonstrations, or 
how they could seize a member from the security forces and force him to 
eat a POW ration.  The continued complete dependence on use of Tear 
Gas from compound perimeters for putting down demonstrations is also a 
manifestation of weak control.  This can never be substitute for immediate 
intervention within the compounds by an adequate group of guard 
personnel authorized to use such forceful means as necessary.   
3. I do not intend to tolerate the conditions which have resulted in the 
disorders in UNC POW Camps and which have proved embarrassing and 
harmful to our position in the Eyes of the Free World.  The adverse effect 
on the Armistice negotiations at Panmunjom is obvious. […]363 
 
The “Eyes of the Free World” were now on the infamous Koje camp.  But what  exactly 
did the Koje camp need to demonstrate for the “Eyes of the Free World”?   Clark’s memo 
revealed much more about the shifting tactics of the POWs than about how “uncontested 
control” was to be achieved.  The POWs continued to insist on waving signs of their 
                                                
362 Carl Schmitt, The Concept of the Political, trans. by George Schwab (Chicago: The University of 
Chicago Press, 1996), 33. 
363 Correspondence of POW Division Relating to Enemy POWs; Box 1-4; Headquarters, U.S. Army Forces, 
Far East; Record Group 554; National Archives and Record Administration – College Park, MD. 
 
  
258 
sovereign state, and the forcing of a U.S. soldier to eat a POW ration seemed to be a 
demonstration of tactics of humiliation.  In the face of Boatner’s shift in the use of 
“overwhelming force,” the POWs in turn seem to have understood the stakes involved in 
maintaining a situation of conflict with the U.S. military on the island. 
 
Conclusion 
 On May 13, 1952, New York Times journalist Murray Schumach gave a narrative 
on what had happened behind the barbed-wire fence at Compound 76 - Brigadier General 
Dodd had finally given a statement at a press conference in Korea: “General Dodd 
nervously read to correspondents an acount[sic] of his experiences in the compound with 
6,000 Communists.  In a deep voice that quavered a few times, the burly, gray-haired 
general started with the Communist ruse that brought him to the gates of the compound.” 
In this long article, Schumach quoted directly from Dodd in describing his treatment by 
the POWs – “During my entire stay in the compound,” Schumach quoted Dodd as saying, 
“I was treated with the utmost respect and courtesy, and my personal needs were looked 
out for.  The demands made by the P.O.W.’s are inconsequential, and the concessions 
granted by the camp authorities were of minor importance.”364 
Dodd was attempting to minimize the significance of the kidnapping – and, most 
importantly – the consequences of his signature on multiple documents the POWs had 
presented to him.  And the U.S. military, both in terms of military investigation and 
military force, had begun to work towards resolving the problem of “Koje Fantastic.”  
But the attention had already been garnered. In his “Confidential Report Concerning the 
Real Crisis in the Relationship between the Detaining Power and the Prisoner of War in 
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South Korea” dated May 27, 1952, ICRC delegate Georg Hoffmann stated, “The capture 
of an American general by the prisoners of war of Kojedo created a sensation throughout 
the world and suddenly brought mass attention to the precarious situation in Kojedo.” 365 
Hoffmann then provided the following analysis of the reasons behind the turmoil and 
conflict on the island of Koje:  
The Korean war, although an object of international politics, is also a civil 
war, and nonetheless a civil war where the conflicting adversarial 
ideologies do not strictly lie within specific region, such as, for example, 
the “war of Sonderbund” or the “war of succession” in America.  In the 
past, the larger centers of communism were in southern Korea, where 
much more of the population as a whole resided than in the northern half 
of the country.366 
 
The kidnapping of Dodd had sparked a discussion on the international stage about the 
meaning and character of the Korean War itself.   
 But back on the Korean peninsula, the Koreans newspapers were reporting the 
event to their Korean readership. On May 16, 1952, Dong-A Ilbo ran an editorial titled, 
“The Meaning of the Dodd Incident.”367  The editorial began with none of the disbelief, 
surprise, and outrage expressed in the U.S. media outlets.  “The implications of the event 
are various,” the editorial began. “And if one examines the possible objectives of the 
kidnapping of the camp commander by the prisoners of war, it is not difficult to discern 
the myriad significance and meanings of the event.”  Rather than using “bizarre” or 
“fantastic” to describe the event, the editors of Dong-A Ilbo used the word 
“performance.”  The kidnapping had been a performance, very similar to the 
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performances enacted by the North Korean negotiators at Panmunjom, according to the 
editors.  In positioning “democracy” and “communism” as antithetical to each other, the 
editors moved to a vocabulary of “performance,” of empty gestures, to delegitimate the 
political claims of the Korean communist prisoners of war, and to strengthen anti-
communism as the concrete stronghold for democracy.  As Truman stepped down and 
Eisenhower became the President of the United States, the Korean anti-communist POWs 
made their own appeals for political visibility to the U.S. government.   
In July 1953, after the signing of the ceasefire agreement at Panmunjom, the 
urgency surrounding the question of political recognition for POWs did not subside.  In 
fact, the issue took on an even greater immediacy as the final prisoner of war camp and 
the final interrogation room were built on the 38th parallel, in preparation for the 
voluntary repatriation process.  India, it had been decided by the United Nations and 
agreed upon by all delegates present at the Panmunjom armistice negotiations, was now 
in charge of the prisoners of war. 
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Chapter Five 
 
An “Experiment in Neutrality” for Decolonization: 
The POW, India, and the Global Geopolitics of the Unending Korean War 
 
On July 27, 1953 at Panmunjom, UN Command representative U.S. Lieutenant 
General William K. Harrison Jr. and Northern Command representative DPRK 
Lieutenant General Nam Il entered a hall built specifically for the purpose of the 
armistice signing ceremony.  With the “mutter of artillery fire” coming through the “thin 
wooden walls,” Harrison and Nam took their seats at separate tables and wordlessly 
signed nine copies of the armistice, which would take official effect within twelve hours 
later.  In front of “Allied observers” and press from sixteen different United Nations 
countries as well as observers and thirty-five press members from different communist 
countries, General Harrison finished signing at 10:10 AM, with General Nam finishing 
one minute afterwards.  “The North Korean general glanced at his watch, rose and strode 
quickly from the hall, without a glance at the United Nations table,” narrated a New York 
Times article. Harrison exited more “leisurely,” pausing to smile and pose for 
photographs, and “saluted the honor guard and greeted some United Nations 
representatives before he climbed into a helicopter to fly back to Munsan at 10:27 
A.M.”368 
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The ceasefire had been signed, but it seemed that everyone was quick to caution 
against considering the armistice as the “end” of the conflict. As President Eisenhower 
stated in an address broadcasted nationally:  
[W]e have won an armistice on a single battleground, not peace in the 
world. We may not relax out guard nor cease our quest.  Throughout the 
coming months, during the period of prisoner screening and exchange, and 
during the possibly longer period of the political conference which looks 
toward the unification of Korea, we and our United Nations allies must be 
vigilant against the possibility of untoward developments.369 
 
The Korean War had not come to an official close – only a ceasefire pause. “Seventy-two 
hours after the signature of the armistice,” the military troops of all sides withdrew “one 
and a quarter miles from the fighting line, and a neutral zone [was] established between 
the armies.”370  The Demilitarized Zone, representing the ceasefire, had become the 
setting for the next phase of the war – the exchange of prisoners of war. 
 In early October 1953, Indian General Kodandera Subayya Thimayya arrived at 
the 38th parallel, escorted in a U.S. helicopter.  “In the helicopter,” he explained, “I had a 
superb view of the Korean landscape, and I was struck by the beauty of the country – 
until I got a glimpse of the DZ. The land here looked like a bleak, barren and blasted 
piece of hell.”371  On this very “piece of hell” what Thimayya called an “experiment in 
neutrality” took shape in the final prisoner of war complex of the Korean War, and the 
final iteration of the interrogation room, here called the “explanation room.”  India led the 
experiment with a resolution to the impasse at the armistice table over POW repatriation.  
Each POW would individually enter the “explanation room,” and after listening to an 
“explanation” provided by a representative from the POW’s pre-war nation-state on why 
                                                
369 “Texts of Eisenhower and Dulles Broadcasts on Truce,” The New York Times, 27 July 1953, p. 4. 
370 “Ceremony is Brief,” NYT. 
371 Kodendera Subayya Thimayya, Experiment in neutrality (New Delhi: Vision Books, 1981), 47. 
  263 
the POW should return home, the prisoner of war would choose to repatriate, to not 
repatriate, or to go to a yet undetermined “neutral country.”  The landscape of the 38th 
parallel had changed again as specified buildings and compounds were erected by both 
sides. 
This carefully scripted encounter often broke down in actual practice.  As 
Thimayya himself noted in his memoir, “Some amazing incidents occurred during the 
explanations[.]”  He recalled one young Korean man who had originally been from South 
Korea, but was now a prisoner of war in North Korea and refused to repatriate back to the 
south: 
In one instance, a prisoner entered the room to discover that the explainer 
was a late friend who had been in the same regiment.  They greeted and 
hugged each other as old comrades would.  The prisoner then asked if he 
could site alongside the explainer, and the Chairman of the subordinate 
body had no objection.  The two men started to reminisce and to tell 
stories about the old days, and the prisoner made enquiries about his 
mother.372   
 
At this point, the explainer pulled out a photograph of the POW’s mother, saying that he 
had just seen her before coming to the 38th parallel.  “She wants you to come quickly,” 
the explainer said.  Upon seeing the photograph, the prisoner “burst into tears and said, 
“Please give her my love.  I will come back quickly.  I will come back when Korea is 
free, and that is not very far off.”373 
 In today’s history books, the 38th parallel – or the Demilitarized Zone – appears 
more permanent than temporary, the line cutting across the Korean peninsula often being 
the most recognizable feature of Korea to the American mainstream public.  But in 1953, 
even with the signing of the ceasefire agreement, no one – not Eisenhower, not 
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Thimayya, nor the Korean prisoner of war – considered the 38th parallel to be a 
permanent line of division.  The immediate post-ceasefire phase of the war, namely the 
exchange of prisoners of war at the 38th parallel, affords us an opportunity to refract the 
meaning of the Korean War not through the usual, overdetermined prism of Cold War 
politics where anti-communism and communism become the only stakes visible, but 
rather through the prism of neutrality, a different history that has been present on the 
Korean peninsula. For India and Korea, the POW controversy was not the first time that 
India had played a role in the questions of applications of international law over political 
recognition in Korea through the United Nations.  In 1948, India had been one of the 
members of the United Nations Temporary Commission on Korea, overseeing the 
elections in the Republic of Korea, and then remained on the United Nations Commission 
on Korea afterwards.  
This chapter charts the history that informed the construction of neutrality in 
terms of political philosophy, military/diplomatic practice, and visions of the decolonized 
globe.  In this particular rendering of the POW controversy that connected the 38th 
parallel of the Korean peninsula beyond the United Nations or the United States, 
extending the ramifications to India, Mexico, Brazil, and Argentina. This chapter 
examines and takes its analytical premise from the multiple imaginaries of the 
decolonized futures present at the 38th parallel in 1953, which came out in full force in 
the struggles over defining, practicing, and even embodying “neutrality” at a site that was 
also the site of the frontline of the global Cold War, the 38th parallel. In order to glean 
this history of “neutrality,” I turn to a set of unexamined memoirs and United Nations 
documents pertaining to the POW issue, while other documents, like the proposals 
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offered by different UN state representatives, have been analyzed by historians of 
international policy vis-à-vis the Korean War.   
 I analyze three distinct phases and levels of the “experiment in neutrality” that 
was POW repatriation.  The first section examines how India’s own strategic approach to 
drafting and presenting the proposal on the POW repatriation issue reveals India’s own 
interpretations and application of international law during this era. For India, the 
interpretation and application of “neutrality” to the case study of Korea contained 
elements that would later be important to the articulation of non-alignment at the 
Bandung Conference in 1955 – Indian diplomats, officials, and military personnel were to 
lay claim to the universal concepts espoused by the United Nations. But a key 
significance of the POW controversy for the scholarship on neutrality and non-alignment 
in the Third World is how it reveals the parsing and thinking through of neutrality 
through a project of recognition, not through states, but rather through the subjects of 
these states.  Indeed, the question – what kind of subject is the prisoner of war? – was 
central to the debates in the United Nations.   
 The second section of the chapter focuses on the application of the proposal’s 
terms to the 38th parallel in 1953 – the ambitious undertaking of creating the Neutral 
Nations Repatriation Commission, supervising the construction of the POW compounds, 
and overseeing the “explanation” activities on the 38th parallel.  Here, the central question 
became: how does one create a physical space of “neutrality” that facilitates the 
individual POW to make a “free choice”? Each explanation booth held a tableau of 
different actors.  The prisoner of war sat on a bench accompanied by 2 or 5 Indian 
guards, facing the “explainers,” who sat behind a table.  In the far corner behind another 
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table sat the 5-member Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission inspection team – 
composed of delegates from Switzerland, Sweden, Czechoslovakia, and Poland, with the 
head delegate from India. In the other corner, sitting on a bench were members of 
“observers” from the United Nations Command.  Neutrality, in the explanation room, lay 
in the carefully calibrated encounters of speaking, listening, and observing – it was a 
scripted encounter, supposedly strong enough to mitigate any “excesses” enacted within 
the room.  By extending the analysis to the preparation POWs and U.S. PsyWar 
educational programs encouraged before their arrival at Panmunjom, this section 
demonstrates how rather than “choice” being the operative mode or concern in these 
“explanation rooms,” the concept of “performance” was more central to the basic 
relationship between the state and the individual that being reconfigured and tested in 
these rooms. 
 The third section of the chapter follows a specific cohort of Korean prisoners of 
war.  At the end of the allotted “explanation” period, there were exactly eighty-eight 
prisoners in war in total who had chosen to go to a “neutral country,” although the 
country itself had not yet been determined.  Seventy-six of the eighty-eight POWs were 
Korean, two of them were from South Korea and the rest were from North Korea. For the 
prisoners of war who chose a “neutral country,” they would move from being one of the 
most oddly “hypervisible” subjects on the stage of struggles over political recognition to 
become one of the most oddly “invisible” subjects after the Korean War conflict receded 
into the past with the 1954 Geneva Conference on Korea and Indochina, where a 
different 38th parallel – the 13th parallel – was instituted.  As they waited in India, the 
eighty-eight prisoners of war soon discovered that they had become essentially stateless 
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persons, and it become incumbent upon the prisoners of war themselves to gauge the 
geopolitical globe, propose possible countries for the category of “neutral country,” and 
then petition the appropriate authorities.  Survival once again hinged upon a certain 
recognition by a state power.  This section explores and reflects upon how these prisoners 
of war created strategies to render themselves as “visible” subjects – and what 
“neutrality” had possibly meant to them. On the most basic, individual levels, these 
Korean prisoners of war were asking themselves what kind of life they wanted – and each 
time, the response to this question was fraught with the constant deferral of 
decolonization on the Korean peninsula.  What did it mean to seek a life elsewhere for 
these Korean prisoners of war? 
 This chapter marks the very first attempt within both U.S. and Korean 
historiographies to write a history of the POW explanations process, the Neutral Nations 
Repatriation Commission, and the seventy-six Korean prisoners of war who chose to go 
to a “neutral country.”  Histories of the Korean War have often either ended the narrative 
with the ceasefire agreement signing ceremony, or historians have considered the 
activities of the Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission and the seventy-six Korean 
prisoners of war as outside the realm of nationally-bounded histories of either South 
Korea or the United States. As a result of this blindspot, the particular open-ended nature 
of the Korean War is either erased, or not examined sufficiently. Just as the 38th parallel 
has come to signify the state of perpetual warfare on the Korean peninsula, the seventy-
six prisoners of war who had to navigate their choice of a “neutral country” in the years 
following the ceasefire also embodied the precariousness, the ambiguity, and the 
unresolved nature of the project of decolonization that began in 1945.    
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India’s Recalibration of the Nation-State System for Decolonization 
 Right before he was scheduled to depart from India for Korea to take on his role 
as the Chief Delegate of the Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission, General 
Thimayya met with his two “chief political advisors,” B.N. Chakravrty and P.N. Haksar, 
“senior officers of the External Affairs Ministry,” along with Krishna Menon, and Prime 
Minister Nehru.  Starting with tea, the people at the conference soon focused on the topic 
of Korea.  Thimayya recalled that Prime Minister Nehru “had very little to say at all” to 
him: “I can’t tell you very much […] You’ve heard what I said to the CFI [Custodian 
Forces of India] officers about the significance of our country’s foreign policy and about 
the necessity for maintaining strict neutrality.”  Placing his hand upon the bound copy of 
the Terms of Reference on the table, Nehru continued:  
This is your bible, […] the only guide you will have.  No one can tell you 
what to do or how to do it.  […] Your job is to find some solution to the 
problem that is plaguing the world in Korea.  A solution to that problem 
may mean that similar problems in other parts of Asia can be solved as 
well.  Thus, your job can well mean peace in Asia and perhaps in the 
world.374 
 
Nehru’s instructions as remembered and reconstructed by Thimayya laid out two 
elements that were critical in how India had decided to approach the question of 
“neutrality.”  First, the notion of “international law” or an “international community” was 
to be affirmed – the Terms of Reference, here almost reverentially portrayed, were to be 
the parameters between which Thimayya had to invent “neutrality.”  Secondly, the 
“Korean problem” was brought to the fore as an important case study for the rest of Asia.  
Or as Thimayya himself stated in his memoir, “[T]he basic pattern of the Korean war was 
being duplicated in the other Asian conflicts.  A study of the Korean pattern, therefore, 
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would have equal significance to the problems in Burma, Indo-China, Malaya and 
Indonesia.”375 
 For India, the “Korean problem” at the United Nations – and specifically, the 
POW repatriation controversy – presented an opportunity for an intervention in the 
operations of the international community.  At the crossroads between an increasingly 
bipolar Cold War and indigenous struggles for self-determination, Korea had become a 
high-profile representative of dynamics that were in play all over the Asian continent.  
For Thimayya personally, the significance of the Korean War itself lay in how it 
seemingly heralded a new kind of war: “the significance of the conflicts in Asia is that 
the military is attempting to proselytize on a large scale.”376  The struggle was now over 
each side “proving the superiority of its ways of life.”  “What does history teach us about 
wars in which way of life was a basic aim?” Thimayya asked.  A type of warfare from 
history came to mind: “The Crusades come first to mind.”377 
 What kind of “neutrality” did one have to fashion in front of such an emerging 
pattern of war – a war that was patently ideological? The ideological conflict was on full 
display at the seventh session of the General Assembly, where discussion on the Korean 
question instigated the creation of more concrete proposals on possible resolutions to the 
armistice negotiation impasse.  A special report from the United Nations Command in 
Korea on the current status of the military and armistice activities began the discussion on 
October 18, 1952:  
The differences between the United Nations Command and the 
communists which have prevented the conclusion of the armistice were 
narrowed, by the end of April 1952, to one question: whether all prisoners 
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of war should be returned, by force if necessary.  Final conclusion of an 
armistice under the terms of the present draft agreement now depends 
upon communist acceptance of a solution to the prisoner-of-war question 
consistent with humanitarian principles.378 
  
Having raised the question of how to resolve this issue of the negotiation impasse, the 
United States representative presented a draft resolution, one that was sponsored by 
twenty-one states.  This particular draft resolution was worded to have “the General 
Assembly to affirm the principle of non-forcible repatriation as representing the will of 
that body,” to use the words of scholar Shiv Dayal.  “Notes with approval,” the draft 
resolution stated, “the principle followed by the United Nations Command with regard to 
the question of repatriation of prisoners of war, and the numerous proposals which the 
United Nations Command has made to solve the questions in accordance with this 
humanitarian principle.”  In essence, as Dayal has noted, the draft resolution aimed to 
frame the U.S. policy of voluntary repatriation as a “humanitarian principle,” as a way to 
counter the North Korean and Chinese accusations that such a principle went counter to 
the mandatory repatriation stipulated in the 1949 Geneva Conventions.379   
 However, during the course of the General Assembly session on Korea, three very 
specific draft resolutions dealing with the question of POW repatriation were placed on 
the table by representatives from Mexico, Peru, and India respectively.  The Mexico 
resolution was primarily concerned with the particular categories applicable to the 
prisoners of war, to ensure that the prisoner of war was not rendered “stateless” as a 
result of the process.  Although all prisoners of war who desired repatriation would be 
                                                
378 UN, Document A/2228 (Note dated 18 October 1952 from the permanent representative of the United 
States of America addressed to the Secretary-General, transmitting a special report by the United Nations 
Command in Korea) 
379 Shiv Dayal, India’s role in the Korean question; a study in the settlement of international disputes under 
the United Nations. (Delhi: S. Chand, 1959), 110. 
  271 
immediately repatriated, those who were “desirous of establishing temporary residence in 
other States, would not return to the country of their origin until the coming into force of 
the decisions that, in order to achieve a peaceful settlement of the Korean question.”  
Regarding the states who had already agreed to accept POWs temporarily within their 
borders, the “authorities of that country shall grant them [the prisoners of war] a 
migratory status which will enable them to work in order to provide for their needs,” 
prioritizing state “guarantees for the subsequent protection of their [prisoners of war] 
freedom and their lives.”380  In his follow-up letter to the Secretary-General, Luis Padilla 
Nervo, the representative of Mexico, further explained that this granting of immigrant 
status would enable the POWs to “[raise their] social status by restoring to them the 
dignity that only free work can bestow.  At the same time, a contribution to the progress 
of international law might be made by reaffirming the principle that prisoners of war are 
not to be treated as just a conglomeration of human beings whose fate as the authorities 
may decide at will, but on the contrary, that man’s inalienable right to work out his own 
destiny freely should prevail.”381 
 The Peru resolution focused on creating a Commission that would decide the 
resolution over the POW repatriation issue.382  The resolution proposed a Commission 
composed of delegates from each of the “parties to the conflict,” as well as two delegates 
selected by the General Assembly and one “neutral state,” who was not a member of the 
United Nations.  And notably, the non-UN member “neutral state” would serve as the 
Chairman of this Commission. The Peru resolution, different from the Mexico resolution, 
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did not offer any concrete details on what would happen to the prisoners of war 
themselves – however, it was clear from the working of the resolution, that the Peruvian 
government and delegates were concerned about situating the POW repatriation issue – 
and also the United Nations – within a larger global framework that extended past the 
United Nations’ authority, as evidenced by the inclusion of one non-UN “neutral state.”  
Beginning the resolution with a statement affirming “the desire fo mankind for an 
immediate just and honourable peace,” the writers of the resolution ended with a different 
affirmation: “That in the performance of its functions, the Commission shall be guided by 
the principles of the United Nations Charter and by the Declaration of Human Rights.”  
The Peru resolution was a recognition that the “international community” embodied by 
the United Nations did not, in fact, include all states or groups in the international 
community, but also extended the United Nations’ claims to defining certain universals.  
It was a careful re-calibration of the United Nations vis-à-vis the Korean peninsula and 
the globe. 
 India’s draft resolution very explicitly positioned the 1949 Geneva Conventions 
as its point of departure: “Affirms that the release and repatriation of prisoners of war 
shall be effected in accordance with the Geneva Convention relative to the Treatment of 
Prisoners of War, dated 12 August 1949, the well-established principles and practice of 
international law and the relevant provisions of the draft Armistice Agreement.”383 The 
proposal itself was elaborately detailed, contained seventeen separate steps outlined in the 
process of resolving the POW repatriation issue.  While the Mexico resolution was 
primarily concerned with the state status of the POWs and the Peru resolution was 
focused on balancing a political dynamics and the UN within an overseeing Commission, 
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the India resolution focused almost exclusively on parsing out the step by step process of 
a “Repatriation Commission” that would oversee the actual repatriation of prisoners of 
war.  In the contested draft of the armistice, a “Committee for Repatriation of Prisoners 
of War” was already part of the provisions, and this Committee’s responsibilities were 
primarily logistical.  However, the India resolution made a number of significant 
revisions and changes to the composition and duties of the Committee.  First, the India 
resolution stipulated that there would be four representatives on the Committee: 
Czechoslovakia, Poland, Sweden, and Switzerland.  And secondly, the Committee was 
responsible for providing the following to all prisoners of war: 
7. In accordance with arrangements prescribed for the purpose by the 
Repatriation Commission, each party to the conflict shall have freedom 
and facilities to explain to the prisoners of war depending upon them their 
rights and to inform the prisoners of war on any matter relating to their 
return to their homelands and particularly their full freedom to return. 
 
The India proposal began from the premise that international law must be upheld – in the 
above quote, the proposal insists upon the POWs’ “full freedom to return,” which echoes 
the 1949 Geneva Conventions of mandatory repatriation.  In a sense, all of the meticulous 
details outlined in the proposal held the essential characteristics of later non-alignment – 
the objective of restraining excess by the different powers, which placed India in the role 
of determining when the U.S. or China, or any nation-state representative had “crossed” 
over their proper bounds; and also an assertion of a moral authority to be able to 
determine “excess,” “ideology,” and “nationalism.”  
India’s proposal challenged the U.S. authorities’ claim over the universalisms 
espoused through the United Nations, but the proposal did not pose a challenge to the 
legitimacy of the 38th parallel or to either states on both sides of the parallel. The General 
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Assembly quickly passed the India resolution with an overwhelming majority vote.  
Later, Krishna Menon added new terms that facilitated the overcoming of the impasse 
that still existed at the negotiating table – the choice of a “neutral country” for the 
prisoner of war in the explanation room.  As scholar Rosemary Foot notes, “[t]he 
signature of the Korean armistice agreement in July 1953 has often been linked to the 
Eisenhower administration’s threats, during the final stages of the negotiation, to launch 
nuclear war against the People’s Republic of China (PRC), should there be continuing 
failure to agree to terms,” an idea espoused and circulated by the Eisenhower 
administration itself in the years following the ceasefire.384  However, Foot demonstrates 
that other multiple other factors probably aided the quickening of the signing of the 
ceasefire.  For example, China was to begin its Five-Year-Plan in 1953, and for North 
Korea, the escalation in U.S. bombing especially during the final year of the war had 
been devastating, as the U.S. air bombs targeted wide swaths of land as civilian villages 
along with military targets such as dams and factories were encouraged sites for strafing 
and bombing.  I suggest that India’s particular formulation of “neutrality” offered in the 
form of the Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission and the third choice of a “neutral 
country” also facilitated the signing of the ceasefire in that it provided a space where 
political recognition could be negotiated, deferred, and still remain intact.  Menon and 
Nehru understood that a key issue on the negotiating table was the issue of recognition of 
the People’s Republic of China and the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea at the 
United Nations, with the United States being quite adamant about not allowing a possible 
seat to the PRC or DPRK.  The choice of a “neutral country” enabled the political 
                                                
384 Rosemary Foot, “Nuclear Coercion and the Ending of the Korean Conflict,” International Security, Vol. 
13, No. 1 (Winter 1988-1989), 92. 
  275 
recognition issue embedded in the voluntary repatriation issue to appear less about the 
states’ legitimacy and more about the individual POW’s preference.  It appeared to be 
more about the POW rendering him/herself an asylum seeker or a refugee, rather than 
being about the POW rejecting the state’s claims upon his/her subjecthood. 
 
 
“Repatriation” Explained, Translated, and Performed 
 
The entire proceedings of the Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission and the 
POW complex built upon the 38th parallel hinged upon one concept: repatriation.  The 
most crucial aspect of the “choice” rendered in these “explanation rooms” was the 
moment when the prisoner of war decided through which door he or she would exit – the 
door for repatriation, or the door for non-repatriation: 
After each explanation session the prisoner was asked by the Indian 
chairman of the NNRC committee within each explanation tent if he 
desired to be repatriated.  This question was asked by the chairman 
through an interpreter.  It had been specific in the Armistice Agreement 
that, to avoid misunderstanding, the act of delivery of a prisoner of one 
side to the other side would be called “repatriation” in English.  The 
equivalent words in Chinese and Korean were also specified.385  
 
But the various wars on the Korean peninsula with its disparate array of “prisoners of 
war,” consisting of civilians and military personnel from both sides of the 38th parallel, 
had been complicating the notion of “repatriation” from the beginning of the debate.  And 
in October 1953, when the explanations finally began, the personnel involved in the 
explanations discovered a difficulty: “repatriation” did not mean one, single thing to the 
prisoners of war.  Rather different meanings depending on his or her background.  For a 
south Korean prisoner of war, “repatriation” could also mean going back to the 
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hometown in south Korea.  As Thimayya recalled, “This problem concerned the 
particular choice of words ws[sic] had to use when we asked the prisoner if he wanted 
repatriation.  These Chinese and Korean words that were used to signify the idea of 
repatriation had a literal meaning that suggested vaguely the idea of returning home. […] 
Unquestionably, some confusion did exist in the minds of some of the prisoners.”386   
 Debate over the interpretation of the different stipulations of the Terms of 
Reference had entirely erupted along the 38th parallel.  Building sites and the speed at 
which these compounds were built, the order in which the prisoners of war would be sent 
to the explanation rooms, whether or not prisoners of war would receive “explanations” 
in a collective group or individually – these were only a few of the overwhelming details 
that became a site of intense contestation.  According to the Terms of Reference, the 
“bible” that Nehru had gestured to in front of Thimayya, the “explanation period” was 
mandated to a 90-day period. At the end of the 90-day period, Thimayya reflected upon 
the results: “Explanations were finished.  Out of the 90-day period, ten days were used 
for explanations, and some 3,000 men out of 22,000 had been explained to.  Of these 
3,500 men, less than 150, or slightly more than 4% asked for repatriation.  This was a 
much smaller number than the total who sought repatriation by escape from the 
compounds.”387 The very crux of the issue that had been holding up the ceasefire 
agreement from being signed at Panmunjom for over eighteen months had now boiled 
down only 10 days of “explanations,” where even the “choice” of repatriation or non-
repatriation seemed dubious.   
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Although the primary focus of debates, wrangling, and arguments at the 38th 
parallel was on whether or not “choice,” “free will,” “neutrality,” or “objectivity” were 
properly supported and facilitated by the elaborate setups of the camp and explanation 
rooms, I contend that the actual fundamental concern of all state parties involved was not 
the exercise of “free will” in the explanation rooms, but rather the proper performance of 
the relationship between the state and its subject and the mediation of the international 
community over that particular relationship.  For the 90-day period at the 38th parallel on 
the Korean peninsula, the states of the Republic of Korea, the Democratic People’s 
Republic of Korea, the People’s Republic of China, and the United States found 
themselves in an unprecedented situation in the conduct of warfare: the state had to 
“explain” to a prisoner of war who had rejected repatriation why they should return.  For 
the states involved, their own legitimacy – fragile and tenuous – was tested one by one in 
these individual explanations as the basic relationship between state and subject was laid 
bare and ambiguous.  The prisoner of war, despite heralded as the humanitarian focus of 
all states involved, was rather beside the point in the grand scheme of nation-states and 
the international community. The point was the allegorical performance of the 
explanation room itself, not the choice of repatriation or non-repatriation. 
The explanation room, I argue, was a distilled scene of the nation-state system – 
each represented by a body, some listening, others observing, one talking, but all judging.  
And the setting of the “stage” or the explanation room exemplified these dynamics, as 
evidenced in the following schematic image of the explanation room system created by 
the UNC for the anti-communist Korean and Chinese non-repatriates based on the Terms 
of Reference enforced by the Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission: 
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Figure 5.1: A Map of the “U.N. Command Explanation Area.”  
 
From Sri Nandan Prasad and Birendra Chandra Chakravorty, History of the Custodian Force (India) in 
Korea, 1953-54, Armed forces of the Indian Union ([New Delhi]: Historical Section, Ministry of Defence, 
Govt. of India, 1976).  
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Neutrality, in this map, lay in the carefully calibrated and controlled movements of the 
POWs, punctuated with deliberate repetition of the “explanation” for clarity.  According 
to the map, 250 POWs were first gathered in the holding area, located in the lower middle 
of the map, where “collective explanations were given by loudspeakers.”  Then, Indian 
soldiers took groups of 25 POWs at a time to the intermediate holding area, from where 
POWs were taken one by one to the individual “explanation booths” drawn in the top 
center of the map.  Each explanation booth held a tableau of different actors – the 
prisoner of war sat on a bench accompanied by 2 or 5 Indian guards, facing the 
“explainers,” who sat behind a table.  In the far corner behind another table sat the 5-
member Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission inspection team – composed of 
delegates from Switzerland, Sweden, Czechoslovakia, and Poland, with the head delegate 
from India. In the other corner, sitting on a bench were members of “observers” from the 
United Nations Command.  Neutrality, in the explanation room, lay in the carefully 
calibrated encounters of speaking, listening, and observing – it was a scripted encounter, 
supposedly strong enough to mitigate any “excesses” enacted within the room. 
Each side of the Cold War divide was reserving the ability to pass judgment on 
the maturity and the ability of the Korean to articulate and interpolate its subject.  Which 
Korea would it be – which Korea would be deemed appropriate to join a system of 
nation-state recognition?  It was not just a room, as the POWs understood.  It was a 
frontline competition of the politics of recognition in the Cold War.  And it was a heated 
competition.  On October 22, 1953, General Hamblen, the head of the United Nations 
Command Repatriation Group [UNCREG], received a memorandum from the 
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headquarters of the NNRC. It reported that on October 17, 1953, one of the UNC 
representatives (according to the footnotes, it appears that it was a Lt. Col. William R. 
Robinette) called “the Polish delegate to the NNRC ‘a son of a bitch’ after several 
arguments within the explanation tent.”  The performance aspect of the explanations is 
demonstrated fully in UNCREG’s unpublished history’s rendition of the incident: 
The incident occurred near explanation tent 15.  The explanation to the 
prisoner in that tent had continued for over two hours.  Because all other 
tents had completed explanations for the day, a crowd gathered near tent 
15 to observe the outcome of the interview then in session.  As the 
prisoner left the tent through the non-repatriation door, the crowd surged 
around the prisoner.  The Communists present shouted for the prisoner to 
return to the tent and urged that he make his exit through the repatriation 
door.  At this point a UNC Representative protested to Communists that 
they had no right to try to continue explanations outside the tent.  It was 
during the ensuing melee that the offensive remark was alleged to have 
been made to the Polish representative by the UN representative.388 
 
The willfulness on the part of those involved to perform their roles within the explanation 
room did not diminish the fact that the “choice” made by the prisoner of war had a very 
material and serious consequence.  In fact, when examined more closely, the choice of 
non-repatriation, repatriation, or a neutral country itself was itself a multivalent issue for 
the prisoners of war.  It was not merely about “choosing” a particular state, but rather 
weighing and navigating an ever-shifting landscape of power.  It was a question of 
discerning what was still possible or now impossible in the decolonization project of 
Korea.   
The 38th parallel, as mentioned earlier, was not considered to be a permanent 
border; thus, both states of the Republic of Korea and the Democratic People’s Republic 
of Korea seemed somewhat tenuous.  The 7737 Korean non-repatriate prisoners of war 
that were transferred from the UNC to the Custodian Forces of India at the 38th parallel 
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had also been living behind barbed-wire fences for possibly up to three years – three 
years of negotiating the fraught politics on-the-ground, as categories and populations 
were created, debunked, and reinvented. 389  It is crucial to understand how this particular 
population of Korean POWs who arrived at the 38th parallel in 1953 had been created. At 
its height, the UNC Camp on Koje Island held 173,218 prisoners of war – 151,589 were 
Korean, and 21,629 were Chinese.  The population of 151,589 Korean, which included 
49,309 “civilian internees,” was not a constant one throughout the war.  Two exchanges 
during wartime, mediated under the dictates of the 1949 Geneva Conventions, resulted in 
5,464 Koreans exchanged in Operation Little Swap and later 69,160 Koreans exchanged 
in Operation Big Swap – both exchanges of POWs happened at the 38th parallel near 
Panmunjom. On June 18, 1953, in an attempt to assert authority and sovereignty over the 
anti-communist prisoners of war in defiance of the ongoing Panmunjom negotiations, 
ROK President Syngman Rhee ordered the ROK Army to orchestrate a mass release of 
Korean anti-communist POWs from the camps.  An estimated 27,000 POWs escaped that 
night from UNC camps scattered over the mainland peninsula, adding to the numbers of 
those who had managed to escape before then – totaling 27,063 Korean escapees for the 
war’s duration.  But there were POWs who also died in the chaos and panic as U.S. 
soldiers began firing to frighten the POWs to halt – the investigation reports numbered 
the deaths at 58, and the injured at 75. At the war’s end, a total of 3,105 Korean POWs 
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had died behind the barbed wire, whether of illness, suicide, homicide, accident, or the 
increased U.S. military force.390   
In January 1952, when the U.S. delegate placed the proposal for voluntary 
repatriation on the negotiating table at Panmunjom, the prisoner of war was thrust upon 
the world media stage, as the delegates argued over who could claim the legitimate 
interpretation of the 1949 Geneva Conventions.  The POW, figured as a vulnerable 
subject in the Geneva conventions, became a somewhat paradoxical character in the 
midst of the controversy.  The delegates at Panmunjom, worldwide media, 
representatives at the United Nations – much of the controversy over the prisoner of war 
issue revolved around who was best positioned to articulate what the POW desired.   The 
different groups in charge of the prisoners of war at the 38th parallel were also embroiled 
in this debate.  The 173,218 prisoners of war under U.S. custody had become a 
hypothetical, universalized subject, onto which each party or state could project its 
particular configuration. 
In his 1954 memoir, General K.S. Thimayya made a case for the superior ability 
of India – and Indians like himself – to gauge and understand the prisoners of war, 
explicitly demonstrating the particular “neutrality” of India at work in assessing and 
overseeing the NNRC and repatriation business at the 38th parallel.  He wrote about the 
frustrations expressed by the American officers in charge of the Korean and Chinese 
prisoners of war: “[T]he Americans said that they had tried to screen the prisoners 
thoroughly, but that some of them never were certain in their minds.  ‘These people never 
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know what they want,’ I was told.  ‘Some of them have changed their minds three or four 
times already and now they may have done so again.’”  The American officers essentially 
reduced the seeming fickleness of the Korean and Chinese prisoners of war to a more 
general character flaw among “these people.”  But Thimayya noted that since many of 
the interpreters used by the Americans were either South Korean or Formosan Chinese, 
objectivity was not always achievable.  “It was quite possible,” Thimayya wrote, “that the 
UNC never was able to discover the true wishes of some of the POWs, even though they 
certainly had made the attempt.”391 
General Thimayya offered his own interpretations and observations of the 
motivations behind the actions and choices made by the prisoners of war under the 
custody of the NNRC.  “The truth was that if one of the POWs fitted the propaganda 
picture we never saw him or were able to find him,” Thimayya wrote.  “The majority 
were motivated by fear, not of communism as such but of going home.  The most 
important reason for this fear was that it had been implanted among and taught to the 
prisoners while they were in the camps.”  Thimayya discussed the different factors 
behind the “fear” he had observed: There were rumors that since they had been “captured 
by the enemy,” the communists would behead them if they returned.  Some had been in 
“some kind of trouble in the military units” they had been in during the war.  Others 
faced “various criminal charges” in their hometown.  But there were “other personal 
reasons” – during the three or more years away from home, the prisoner of war had 
become concerned about the changes that may have happened back home during his or 
her absence. “Many disquieting rumors of such changes, of ten by word-of-mouth by 
prisoner captured later, reached the men and fed their feelings of insecurity. […] A 
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prisoner of war may hear that his farm and family had been taken over by another man, or 
that the government had confiscated his farm.392   
  Thimayya’s observation of a possible myriad of reasons behind the actions of 
prisoners of war is significant not necessarily for its accuracy, but for how it reveals a 
two-fold tension in the POW issue.  Thimayya needed to be able to claim to know better 
than the other “non-neutral” countries the motivations and desires animating the prisoners 
of war.  The long stipulated observation he provides also demonstrates the limits of these 
state actors in understanding the motivations of the POWs.  Indeed, the narrative arc of 
Thimayya’s memoir was marked by certain breakthrough moments of understanding 
especially the Korean prisoners of war.  I contend that Thimayya’s memoir, written in 
1954 but not published until much later, reveals how Thimayya was explicitly folding the 
figure of the Korean prisoner of war into the larger narrative of a Nehru-articulated vision 
of decolonization, one that espoused the possibility of a nation-state pedagogical project 
in transforming its subjects and citizens into fully modern subjects.  Thimayya’s 
relationship with the POWs was inflected with a pedagogical overtone, but it was 
ultimately a horizonal, fraternal relationship along the plane of decolonization and the 
rise of postcolonial nation-states’ claims on the structuring of global power and order.393   
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To set the proper stage for the explanations, the “bleak, barren, and blasted piece 
of hell” that Thimayya had seen from the window of his helicopter upon arrival had to be 
transformed.  The Demilitarized Zone itself was a “strip of land 4 kilometres in width 
running across the Korean peninsula.”  Divided into “two equal halves by the Military 
Demarcation Line, the Demilitarized Zone was to be the site of the POW complex for the 
explanation and repatriation proceedings – the northern half was under the Northern 
Command, and the southern half was under the United Nations Command.394  In the 
middle along the DZ was the explanation room system.  On either side of the explanation 
room complex were the POW camps of the non-repatriates who were now under the 
custody of the CFI.  “[B]ounded on the South by the Imjim river and […] dominated by 
hills rising from 1,500 to 1,800 feet,” this area of the DZ was “very heavily mined” since 
it had changed hands many times over the course of the war. 
 In the southern part of the DZ, within “the vicinity of Tong-Jong-ni,”395 the 
22,600 Chinese and Korean prisoner of war non-repatriates from the UNC were housed 
in what Thimayya noted was a “marvelous job of construction.  All the huts were 
prefabricated and every plank for them had been shipped from the United States.”396  The 
compounds had heating and also hot and cold water - the U.S. military was not repeating 
the same haphazard approach used in the urgent quick speed with which the camp on 
Koje-do – this particular camp was very planned.  However, due to space constrictions, 
the enclosures were placed very close together – “Each enclosure had six to eight 
compounds, and each compound was made to house about 500 men.”397  On the other 
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side of the DZ, in the villages of Song-Gong-ni and Palsan-ni, were the lodgings of 359 
prisoners – American, British, and Korean – who had decided not to repatriate.  Although 
they lived with “less luxury than did the south camp POWs,” these POWs “lived 
comfortably” – the Northern Command had whitewashed the small houses in the village 
– “Their quarters, with the neat vegetable patches beside the houses and with pumpkins 
ripening on the roofs, had a pleasant and peaceful atmosphere.”398 
When the “first batch” of prisoners arrived at 0800 in the morning of September 
10, 1953, the 489 North Korean non-repatriates from the Koje-do camp “marched in with 
flags waving and bands blaring[…] shouting, screaming and gesticulating.”399  The flags 
were of South Korea and the United Nations.400  General Thimayya judged that such a 
demonstration, if it did not interfere with the processing, was permissible. Present at the 
POW’s arrival were representatives of the NNRC, press correspondents, and also 
observers from the CPV and KPA.  A sudden melee broke out when some of the anti-
communist North Korean POWs spotted the uniformed members of the KPA-CPV 
observer teams. POWs hurled stones and spat at the observers, as the Indian soldiers 
attempted to hold them back.  Later, according to the official history of the Custodian 
Forces, the anti-communist POWs “explained [to the CFI] that their objection to the 
presence of the Communist observers was based on the fear that individual prisoners 
would be indentified during the process of taking over and then their families would 
harassed or punished by the Chinese and North Korean Govts.”401   
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The anti-communist Korean prisoners of war became the contingent that 
consistently challenged the work of the Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission and the 
authority of the Custodian Forces of India, and thus, Thiamyya accorded these POWs a 
great deal of attention in his memoir.  He detailed their daily lifestyle and practices, 
which were instituted almost immediately upon their arrival. They woke up every 
morning “between three and four a.m., and began the day briskly with a few marching 
songs vigorously accompanied by brass bands.”  Physical training exercises followed, 
and then the POWs sat down to their breakfast.  The camps were “neat and spotless,” and 
the afternoons were usually spent with sports or other classes.  What Thimayya called 
“political indoctrination” classes took place later in the day, and the “last event of the day 
would be a march-past, again with much music, flags, and sloogan-shouting[sic].”402  
Such a disciplined lifestyle also was the creation of a solidified surveillance police 
structure that the POWs had developed during their time in the Koje-do Camp.  Every 
compound had its own “guard tent,” and the ruling organizations – namely the Anti-
Communist Youth League - held trials for offenses, and reserved the right to exercise 
punishment by death.403   
Mass demonstrations, insistence on negotiating the terms of entering the 
explanation rooms, and even kidnappings became part of the daily landscape of the POW 
camp at the 38th parallel.  Notably, Thimayya observed a difference between the Chinese 
and the Korean POWs’ mass organizing: “The Chinese POWs were better disciplined, 
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less noisy, and a bit more rational.  They seemed to me like lost and abandoned children; 
the Koreans seemed like bewildered and angry children.”404 The mass rioting, according 
to Thimayya, was an attempt to garner attention, to “force recognition”: “Sometimes they 
acted like neglected or rejected children, and the clamour they made was an almost 
pathetic attempt to force recognition of themselves as people rather than as pawns in a 
brutal game of politics,” observed Thimayya in his memoir.405  Thimayya attributed this 
level of desperation on the part of the POWs to the fact that “they all were fed up with 
being statistics […T]heir inclination was to try to increase the dissension in the hope of 
attracting more consideration of the individual problems.”406  Thus, he framed the 
challenges the POWs issued to the India-led NNRC not as ultimate challenges to the 
legitimacy of the Indian “experiment in neutrality” but as a necessary element to 
overcome in order to achieve neutrality. He wrote,  
The Chinese and Korean soldiers, like our own, were mainly simple 
village folk, barely literate, and completely unsophisticated. […]We did 
believe that an important function of our neutrality was to find out 
everything we could concerning the true desires of these non-repat POWs.  
By the time we had the whole lot in our custody, we were convinced that 
if anyone was going to begin thinking of these prisoners as human beings, 
it would have to be us.407 
 
Thus, the “true desires of these non-repat POWs” was to be the province of the India-led 
NNRC and the CFI.   
Kenneth Hansen, a Colonel in the U.S. Army Psychological Warfare Division, 
depicted a different portrait of the anti-communist prisoners of war, dubbing them “Anti-
Communist heroes” in his memoir, Heroes Behind the Wire, about his observations and 
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experiences during the PsyWar operations and programs conducted in the POW camps of 
the Korean War.  In a departure from the American officers who, in Thimayya’s memoir, 
had expressed frustration with the prisoners of war, Hansen described the actions and 
choices of the non-repatriate prisoners of war at the 38th parallel as the culminating 
climax of the “valiant and victorious struggle of the anti-communist heroes in Korea.”408  
“For the prisoners of war,” Hansen wrote, “it was a life and death struggle, replete with 
drama and pathos, and yet even to them not without flashes of their irrepressible humor.  
To participate in their ordeal was to become emotionally involved with them, without 
exception.”409  Hansen’s narrative was also one of pedagogy, but it differed from 
Thimayya’s in one fundamental, significant way – the story of the anti-communist POWs 
Hansen provides is one of linear transformation catalyzed by the U.S. Psychological 
Warfare educational programs.  It is a story about liberal enlightenment, aspiration, and 
truth – in other words, the “anti-communist hero” of Hansen’s memoir was a 
universalized subject, one who had learned and acquired the proper behavior and affect in 
front of the Cold War-inflected global order.   
The “choice” of non-repatriation that the anti-communist POW was making was 
supposed to demonstrate the emancipatory potential of the American imperial project.  
According to the logic of the PsyWar programs, the POW’s initial introduction to the 
PsyWar educational programs created in the POW camps were to be the turning point and 
epiphany moment for these Chinese and Korean POWs.  Individual consciousness and a 
sense of historical agency only became possible through the POWs’ reception of 
“objective information” offered by the U.S. educational programs.  In the early days of 
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the war, in October and November 1950, President Truman “ordered the initiation of a 
pilot rehabilitation program for the Korean prisoners of war.  Lieutenant Colonel Donald 
R. Nugent, USMC, who had been an American educator in Japan before and after World 
War II, was named to head the program.”410  The chief instructor of the “pilot 
rehabilitation” program was Mr. Monta L. Osborne, who “pointed out to the POWs that, 
as North Koreans of military age, they had never in their lives received wholly objective 
information.”  Osborne went on to state that under “Japanese domination […] everything 
they had been told had been what the Japanese chose for them to hear,” and then under 
“Soviet rule, they had entered a period in which the information which reached them was 
even less reliable[.]”  In a sense, Osborne was making a connecting thread that ran 
through Japanese colonialism and Soviet foreign occupation – both significant historical 
phases had been collapsed into one continuous era of propaganda.  The North Korean 
prisoners of war “were now to receive, for the first time in their lives,” according to 
Osborne, “completely objective information.”411 
These POWs were supposed to manifest an American-dictated project of 
transformation – from a Korean subject too steeped in Confucian ways of relating in 
society to think independently, to a Korean subject enlightened by American democratic 
ideals, able to conduct or mimic participatory democracy through rational thinking.  As 
scholar Grace Chae has noted in her study of the U.S. military education programs 
conducted behind the barbed-wire fences of the POW compounds, “defense researchers 
in the military argued that the subordinate behavior among Koreans towards their leaders 
reflected a psychology rooted in Confucian traditions that suppressed individual thought 
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and agency.  This discourse regarding their capacity to independently reason was 
significant to the rationale behind POW reeducation programs, which came to be 
regarded as a possible means of reforming prisoners into rationally ‘fit’ subjectivities.”412  
Or as FOD Lieutenant colonel Robert E. O’Brien remarked to the instructors involved in 
the CIE program: “[The Koreans] are a people who have been shunted from one stage of 
oppression to another over the years and always kept in ignorance to prevent 
independence of action and thought.  These few months may be just the spark that will 
motivate them to demanding enlightenment, education, and freedom of action and 
thought.”413  The “choice” to not repatriate was to be evidence of the POW’s own 
American “enlightenment” – a demand for “education and freedom of action and 
thought.” 
According to Hansen, the anti-communist POWs had studied the armistice 
agreement meticulously and rigorously during their time in the Koje-do camp.  Each anti-
communist prisoner of war received the full armistice agreement annex that contained the 
Terms of Reference regarding prisoners of war.  “It was so important a document to the 
prisoners that those who could read it memorized it.  Those who could not read it 
participated in so many discussion groups that they thoroughly knew the sense of it, and 
could point to the numbered paragraph under discussion at any time.”414  Hansen waxed 
almost poetic about the prisoners of war studying the Terms of Reference: “If ever a 
group deserved the U.S. Army slang designation of ‘guardhouse lawyers’, it was the 
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prisoners of war.”  Asserting that the prisoners, “in the end, were more familiar with the 
agreement as to their fate than many of the Indian officers who had the final say as to its 
administration.”415  Such an assertion on the part of Colonel Hansen was essentially an 
argument for the merits of the Psychological Warfare work within the POW camps – 
primarily an “educational” program conducted through the Civilian Information and 
Education [CI&E] section. The anti-communist Korean prisoners of war who were 
publishing and distributing their own compound newspapers – for example, the 
newspaper titled “Flash” specifically dealt with information on the repatriation issue – 
and conducting their own discussion groups on the armistice agreement.  To Hansen’s 
delight, the POWs were now performing “democracy” as taught by the CIE program. 
Hansen’s portrait of the anti-communist POW as the eager pupil of American-
style education certainly diverged from Thimayya’s portrait of the anti-communist POW 
as the confused “child” strategically clamoring for attention.  But this comparison 
between the two portrayals raises a question about how Hansen and Thimayya were 
respectively defining “liberation” via their constructed views of the Korean POWs.  I 
suggest that for Hansen, American-style liberation is in the moment of recognition by the 
Korean POW of the value inherent in American liberal democracy.  In this case, for 
Hansen, witnessing Korean POWs mimicking or performing the gestures of democracy 
was sufficient.  For Thimayya, liberation, as the later section of this chapter will 
demonstrate, was also about nation-building, the education of a subject to become a fit, 
modern citizen.  Thus, in Hansen’s portrayal, the POWs could not possible be “confused” 
because they had to manifest and exemplify the success of the rational thinking espoused 
by the American education programs.    
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 Despite Hansen’s glowing portrayal of the successes of the CIE program in the 
anti-communist POW compounds, the leaders among the anti-communist POWs, 
especially among the Anti-Communist Youth League, expressed certain reservations and 
critiques of the program.  In Chapter Two of this study, I discussed an analysis of 
interviews with twenty-four Korean anti-communist POW leaders in the ACYL 
conducted by the U.S. PsyWar section on the efficacy of the CIE program in promoting 
democracy among the POWs.  One of the POW leaders, Kim Hyung Ha who had been 
the Chief Clerk in Compound 81 in the Koje-do camp and Compound 2 at the San Mudai 
Camp, felt that the “CIE orientation classes have been too neutral [and] feels that the 
instruction should be more strongly anti-communist.”  He mentioned that the POWs 
themselves were “already teaching many of the classes, such as literacy, mathematics, 
etc.”  Another POW leader, Bat Yeung Ho whose hometown was Pyongyang, noted that 
“[m]any of the PWs would like to learn foreign languages but the CIE teacher in the 
compound were not educated enough to give them these course,” and that the “PWs 
would like to use their own teachers with the assistance and supervision of CIE teachers.”  
POW Kim Bock Song proposed that the “CIE should be operated the same as ROK 
schools and colleges,” while POW So E. Seop “desired that they be given more technical 
training” and suggested that they be given “school credits for classes being taught in the 
compound.”416  The POWs themselves view the CIE program more as a resource, rather 
than a teacher or all-encompassing program in anti-communist democracy.  Indeed, over 
the course of the twenty-four interviews in the study, almost all of the POWs voice some 
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criticism or dissatisfaction with the CIE program.  If this was the case, how did the POWs 
utilize the resources of the CIE to fashion their own programs for  
 Hansen and his PsyWar team were not the only ones observing the prisoners of 
war for the duration of the war.  Delegates from the International Committee of the Red 
Cross made regular visits to the camps to note the conditions, register any complaints, 
and ensure that the camp authorities were running the camp in accordance with the 1949 
Geneva Conventions.  One aspect of POW camp life the delegates especially took note of 
was the compound performances put on by the prisoners of war themselves for each 
other. The stage, built by the POWs themselves, often was the central focus of each POW 
compound.  It was the site where the Korean Peoples Army and Chinese Volunteers 
Prisoners of War Representatives Association placed Brigadier General Francis Dodd for 
their first official meeting.  The stage was the site of People’s Court trials in the 
communist compounds, where individual POWs were called upon to do public self-
criticism in front of the other POWs, and disciplinary action could often follow.  In the 
anti-communist POW compounds, the more violent group disciplinary beatings took 
place in the CIE building, where the stage often was located.  And the stage, for both 
anti-communist and communist compounds, was also the site of many entertainment 
performances staged by the POWs.   
The stage was a site of pedagogy created, sustained, and even circulated by the 
Korean prisoners of war.  The performances that were for entertainment value – and 
perhaps the most visible element of POW daily life to outside visitors such as the ICRC 
delegates and PsyWar members – must be seen as part of the larger matrix of sovereign 
claims-making occurring on the ground of the POW camp.  Body and affect were both 
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the terrain upon which a different pedagogy was mapped.  Although not all Korean 
prisoners of war were members of the ACYL, the ACYL was effectively in charge of the 
compounds in which they had established themselves – and as Thimayya had noted in his 
memoir, the ACYL set down a similar structure of a state-like body in the camps on the 
38th parallel.  Surveillance, interrogation, disciplinary beatings, newspapers, educational 
programs, and even meal distribution fell under the jurisdiction of the ACYL. From the 
archival materials available, it is difficult to say that the ACYL also had control over the 
performance department of the compounds.  However, a closer examination of the plays 
reveals a positionality that the POWs projected – and instructed others to inhabit – that 
Thimayya’s and Hansen’s formulations could not encompass.   
In the compound of the prisoner of war, Oh Se-hui, who was discussed earlier in 
this dissertation, dramatic performances were the special forte of Compound 65.  
According to Hansen, the productions varied from one-man acting scenes to plays in 
“four acts and six scenes.”  The prisoners of war “built stage-settings out of cardboard 
and kraft paper boxes, hemp bags, poster paper, paper bags, tins cans and wooden ration 
boxes, dyed with tooth powder, clay, grass, lime and DDT!” exclaimed Hansen, pointing 
at the ingenuity of the anti-communist Koreans.  The list of play names – unfortunately 
only in English translation – that Hansen provided in his memoir run an interesting gamut 
of interests and entertainment.  Plays such as “Bloodstained Sword,” “A Day in Seoul,” 
“Mr. Park Visits Seoul,” “Dear Free Land” clearly referred to the Korean War experience 
itself.  Romance plays also found their way onto the production bills: “Love at the Port,” 
“Son-in-Law Wanted,” “Princess Bell-Flower,” and “White Pearl.”  However, as Hansen 
continued with his list of plays, it becomes evident that the plays were very much geared 
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towards creating a narrative of the Korean nation: “Naivete,” “Justice” “Sword of 
Wrath,” “My Homeland Where the Flowers Bloom,” “For the Cause of my Fatherland,” 
“Sons of the Republic of Korea,” “Going Home,” “Prop of the Republic of Korea,” and 
“Land of Passion.”  Other plays referred explicitly – and perhaps in content described – 
aspects of camp and military life itself: “Quack’s Hospital,” “Leaders,” “Cigarette Butts.”  
Comedies were also part of the roster: “Shanghai Typhoon” and “Foggy Shanghai,” 
according to Hansen were “devoted to the struggles of political exiles during the Japanese 
occupation of Korea.”417 
When the prisoners of war were faced with the situation of the “explanations” that 
would take place at the 38th parallel, they had a few questions.  “Would they receive 
explanations individually or in groups?” – this was the central question, according to 
Hansen.  “Their solution was a series of plays, presented with variations in every Korean 
and Chinese compound,” marveled Hansen in his memoir.  “Compounds with 
particularly exhilarating version – or exceptionally effective actors – toured other 
compounds, presenting their production to wild cheers and applause.”418  The setting was 
almost always invariably the same – “a table presided over by a turbaned actor who, so 
there could be no mistake, wore on his chest a sign proclaiming him the ‘Indian 
Chairman.’” On his left were the Czech and Pole representatives – each “placarded and 
obviously in the role of minor villains.” On his right were the Swedish and Swiss 
representatives – and also a U.N. representative, a U.N. observer, and a U.N. interpreter.  
The Korean POWs – and also the Chinese anti-communist POWs - had staged according 
to the Terms of Reference their own tableau of the explanation room. 
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From offstage entered the communist representative, observer, and interpreter – 
and finally, the communist “explainer” entered and “took his seat.”  “Then, to an 
accolade which was invariably deafening, the HERO strode on stage.” – the anti-
communist Korean prisoner of war entered the tableau.  The “explainer” began his 
“explanation script,” and the POWs, in writing the script, had “considered every possible 
angle which might be employed to persuade” a POW to repatriate to North Korea.  But, 
“the hero had an answer for every approach.”  The answers often “confounded” the 
explainer – and in other instances, the “explainer,” visibly moved by the POW’s 
responses, would exit out of the tent through the non-repatriation door, arm-in-arm with 
the POW.  In “one version, even the Czech and Pole sought asylum.”419 And although 
such a play seemed to fall all too easily within certain categories of mapping communist 
versus anti-communists, these plays are remarkable in the sense that here it was the anti-
communist Korean POW who was the full agent of history on the world stage of political 
change, not the presiding committee assembled by the United Nations or China.  And 
within the context of the previous performances and plays, the actions of the Korean 
prisoner of war were portrayed as a part of a longer teleological history of anti-
colonialism and nationalism.  It was the Korean prisoner of war who would enlighten 
others, and it was the Korean prisoner of war who would embody the South Korean state. 
Hansen’s apparent delight with these dramatized “explanation room” performances 
misrecognized the dynamics of political articulation expressed in these plays.  But the 
aims of the PsyWar section and the POW’s portrayal of the explanation room did 
converge in an important way – the “choice” of repatriation or non-repatriation was not 
exercised, but rather performed in the explanation room.    
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When the Korean anti-communist POWs arrived at the 38th parallel, the tactics of 
the POWs turned towards challenging the NNRC-structured explanations.  Initially, the 
Korean non-repatriate POWs refused to attend the explanations scheduled, and General 
Thimayya held discussions with them over a week-long period. On October 24, 1953, 
Thimayya went out to the compound to meet with the POW leaders.  They presented a 
list of demands to him, which in his memoir, Thimayya called “unreasonable,” “quite 
impossible to meet,” and even “fantastic.”  The POW compound leaders “wanted the 
explanation huts to be rebuilt inside their compounds,” or wanted “their compound 
leaders in the explanation booths and they asked that the explanations be given to five 
prisoners at a time.”420  Thimayya “pointed out […] evidence of intimidation of the 
individuals by the prisoners’ organisation,” and as a result, he believed that only 
“individual explanations” could “guarantee a free choice to the men.”421   
Other demands of the POWs Thimayya considered to be entirely reasonable were 
that POWs who were ill did not have to undergo the explanations – and also they voiced 
a concern about “repeated explanations” – “They did not want to have individual POWs 
subjected to the explanations more than once.  I was in complete sympathy with this 
demand, although the Rules of Procedure did permit the situation.”422 These discussions 
marked a particular turning point in Thimayya’s understanding of the POWs themselves, 
as he began to identify “fear” as a core element motivating the POWs’ demands: 
After talking for hours with the POWs about their demands, I became less 
concerned with the demands themselves and more aware of the fears and 
misunderstandings that caused the prisoners to present these particular 
demands in the first place.  It was quite obvious that the leaders were 
afraid that individuals within their groups might become confused if 
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subjected to too much psychological persuasion from the explainers. The 
leaders insisted that it was the explainers themselves and the approach 
used by the explainers that the prisoners fears, and not the communist 
ideology.423 
 
However, on closer examination the demands and concerns of the POWs that Thimayya 
identified as stemming from a “fear” were more revealing of the POWs’ claiming and 
critiquing the state and subject relationship set up in the explanation room.  Although 
their demands to move the explanation rooms into the compounds may have seemed 
“outrageous,” I suggest that the POWs may have fully been aware of how “outrageous” 
their demands were.  The gesture of making such a demand to the head of the NNRC that 
in turn acted not only as a critique of the DPRK’s claims on the POW as a subject, but 
also asserted the claims of the ACYL – and thus the Republic of Korea by extension – 
upon the POW subject.  The concern about the “approach used by the explainer” and 
pointedly not the communist ideology itself was a strategic condemnation of the DPRK, 
basically an assertion that the DPRK was illegitimate as a state because it used 
manipulative practices to claim its subjects.  
 Thimayya, it turned out, did have one very effective way of breaking the impasse 
in their discussion over the explanation structure and procedures.  “Unquestionably, the 
best agrument[sic] with the POWs was to play on the fear that their future never would be 
settled if they didn’t cooperate with the NNRC and the CFI.”  Although the POW 
compound leaders were attempting to use their position as prisoners of war to make 
claims on the legitimacy of certain states, Thimayya’s statement hit home on an unerring 
reality: the POWs’ position as non-repatriates had rendered them as essentially stateless. 
“They could not go on indefinitely being non-repats and until their future had been 
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decided, they themselves would have no security and their very existence would be a 
threat to peace.”424  This particular fear on which Thimayya honed in had a broad impact 
on the actual performances by the Korean POWs within the explanation rooms, as the 
script of explanation quickly veered off from the staged performances rehearsed and 
performed in the POW camps. 
 On October 31, 1953, when the Korean POWs finally agreed to attend the 
explanations individually, some had been able to bypass inspection with “stone and 
occasionally a knife hidden in their clothes.  They made serious attempts to attack the 
explainers.”425 As Thimayya noted, the North Korean POWs were “more violent than the 
Chinese in the explainers’ huts.”426  Or among the Korean POWs who sat quietly in front 
of the explainer, many of them had “plugged their ears with cotton wool” to demonstrate 
their “refusal to listen to the explanations.”427  A few POWs did engage in exchange with 
the explainer: “For instance, the explainer might ask if he could give the prisoner a copy 
of the message which the Northern Command had for him.  The prisoner would accept 
the leaflet and then blow his nose on it.  Or the explainer might offer a cigarette; the 
prisoner, when reaching for it, would suddenly slap the explainer’s face. “428  At the end 
of the first day of explanations with the Korean POWs, out of 459 POWs who had 
received explanations, 21 elected repatriation.  The next day 483 POWs attended 
individual explanations, and only 19 elected repatriation. 
 As Thimayya had observed, the North Korean POWs utilized much more violent 
tactics than the Chinese POWs, and the particular tactics of the North Korean POWs 
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point to the stakes involved for the Korean POWs in the explanation room and the 
question of repatriation.  Although Hansen interpreted these gestures as transparent 
evidence of the POWs’ desire for nonrepatriation – and thus, an affirmation of a U.S.-
framed anti-communist state – I suggest that these gestures of threats and insults reveal 
the peculiar precarious position of the prisoner of war.  The “choice” of whether or not to 
repatriate had been clearly made by the prisoners of war before entering the explanation 
room.  The explanation room, thus, became a site where the North Korean prisoner of 
war had to perform his own legitimacy.  It was indeed a performance of transparency, 
although one that was different from Hansen’s vision.  The majority of the North Korean 
non-repatriate prisoners of war who were at the 38th parallel after the ceasefire were from 
UNC Camp #1, part of the population that remained on the island after the initial 
voluntary screening had been done to distinguish and separate the repatriates and non-
repatriates.  The non-repatriates had been sent to various camps on the mainland, while 
repatriates had remained on the island.  The North Korean prisoners of war at the 38th 
parallel were a population of POWs who could possibly garner a great deal of suspicion 
under the Republic of Korea because they had “elected” non-repatriation later during the 
war.  Unlike Hansen’s portrayal of the educational enlightenment of the POWs as 
transforming them into universalized subjects, the POWs themselves very well 
understood that they were marked as doubly suspicious for being from north of the 38th 
parallel and for deciding upon non-repatriation late during the war.  The North Korean 
POW who lunged at the DPRK explainer, who explicitly mocked or insulted the 
explainer’s own performance of state legitimacy – this prisoner of war was preempting 
the different ways multiple states embodied by the observers in the room and also by the 
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fellow POWs waiting outside by performing his own “transparency.”  It was ambiguity 
that would mean a certain social – and even possibly physical – death.   
 The claims of the DPRK state on these POWs subjects were also clearly being 
challenged.  After the first two days of expectations, the Northern Command switched 
their own tactics in explanations.  Previously, the explainers had spent 20 to 25 minutes 
per POW in order to process through the approximately 500 POWs that made up the 
population of one compound.  The explainers had “merely read a written statement from 
the Supreme Northern Commander.  If the prisoner then showed interest or asked a 
question a more detailed explanation was given.”  However, with the new version of 
explanations, “the prepared statement was read out continuously, over and over again,” at 
times for a period extending to three to four hours.  “ According to their view, the 
prisoners had been under the influence of the UNC for two or three years, and the 
explainers therefore were entitled to a few hours in which to counteract the UNC’s 
influence.”429 It was a move to invalidate the challenges issued by the POWs’ resistance 
to the explanations by implicitly accusing the UNC of manipulating the “psyches” of the 
POWs.   
 Across the 38th parallel, the United Nations Command explanations commenced 
much later, on December 2, 1953.  Compared to the activities south of the 38th parallel, 
the atmosphere of the UNC explanations seemed orderly and contained.  The most 
prominent, distinguishing feature of the South Korean explanation rooms were the tape 
recorders – there was background music for the explanations.  The recordings had three 
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parts as follows, evidence of Thimayya’s comment in his memoir that “[t]he explaining 
technique of the UN side leaned heavily on the sentimental.”430: 
a) 1st part: A conversation between a boy and a girl, showing their desire to have 
the prisoner in his mother country and amidst his family.  They talked about 
their peaceful land “with streams, and paddy fields, where little calves jump 
about seeking their mothers” and requested the prisoner to “come back to your 
home land and cherished freedom.” 
b) 2nd part: Korean music, generally beginning with the song “I want to go 
home.” 
c) 3rd part: A female voice appearing on behalf of the prisoner’s mother.  She 
complained “that our strange fate does not permit me to reach my boy but I 
am sending a warm message to my son enclosed behind barbed wires without 
liberty.” She went on to tell him the family anguish when they did not find 
him among the prisoners who returned earlier.  “I looked in your room and 
found your sister crying in despair all day long.”  She assured him that no 
harm would befall him if he returned, and then sounded a note of warning: “If 
you keep believing in the North Korean Regime you will be only a half 
matured man.”  The appeal ended with the words “Walk to the fate of 
freedom, picturing your motherland in your mind.”431 
 
The strategy of the Republic of Korea was to present the relationship between the state 
and its subject through familial narratives.  The allegory of the state appeared in the form 
of different family members – as voices of a young boy and girl and an older woman 
were meant to evoke memories and affective ties to siblings and mothers.  The family, 
the motherland, and the state had been collapsed into one, and the ROK explainers were 
presenting the ROK as a naturalized nation-state, whose legitimacy had been already 
established through a genealogy of blood family ties.   
 Surrounded by the sound from the recordings, the South Korean explainers also 
had paid a great deal of attention to their uniforms and dress.  “[Dressed in American 
uniforms of rick material and fine cut,” the explainers “made a show” of their expensive 
watches and “ostentatious” cigarette cases “with such nonchalance as to suggest that 
                                                
430 Thimayya, 190-191. 
431 CFI, 60. 
  304 
everyone in South Korea possessed it.”432 However, the South Korean non-repatriate 
prisoners of war were eager to debate their explainers on this very issue.  In fact, the 
prisoners in the Northern Camp, unlike their counterparts in the Southern Camp, 
“apparently were very anxious to receive explanations.”433  In Thimayya’s opinion, the 
“prisoners were usually more political educated than the explainers themselves,” and 
rejected the sentimental music as a simple ploy.434  They pointed to their POW uniforms 
and “brag that they were made in Korea,” accusing the ROK explainers of being 
“American stooges.”  The prisoners, who according to Thimayya were “usually more 
politically educated than the explainers themselves,” wanted to engage in a debate with 
the explainers about the conditions in South Korea, and often “confused or embarrassed 
the explainers.” 
 Soon, the ROK explainers adopted a tactic that was exactly the opposite of what 
their DPRK counterparts had done.  When explanations commenced, the explainers 
allotted 30 to 35 minutes per POW.  By December 8, 1953, none of the POWs had 
chosen repatriation, and the explainers began quickly dismissing the POW after only 6 or 
10 minutes.  The POWs protested this practice, and “complained that they were being 
treated lightly.”  One particular prisoner “wanted to know much more, for example, about 
South Korea’s Five Year Plan, about economic conditions there, about the reasons for the 
presence of the Americans and so on.”  Heated arguments often broke out, with the 
prisoner refusing to leave, and “in some cases remained for as long as two or three hours” 
until forcibly removed by the CFI.435 
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 In the end, of the 359 communist non-repatriate POWs, only seven chose 
repatriation – five were South Koreans and two were Americans.  According to 
Thimayya, “These seven all claimed that they were real communists and that they left 
only because they did not like the way their camp was being run; they said the 
administration was not conducted along properly democratic lines, and some claimed to 
have been bullied by the camp leaders.”436 (115)  But there was one particular POW 
among the South Korean non-repatriates that Thimayya focused upon in his memoir, 
where Thimayya described him as a “a young South Korean of unusual intelligence.”  
“From the beginning, I felt that he would eventually opt for a neutral country,” wrote 
Thimayya.  As the days passed, Thimayya began to believe that this POW would indeed 
stay in North Korea.  The POW did eventually decide to go to a neutral country, and 
Thimayya recorded the POW’s response to his question about why he had made that 
decision:  
He answered that he did not approve of the North Korea communist[sic] 
regime any more than he did of the South Korean government.  He felt 
that he could not be happy living under either regime.  When he opted for 
a neutral country, his belief in communism was lessened, I think, but it 
had not disappeared altogether.  He told me frequently that he was fed up 
with wars, and he wanted nothing more than to go where there was peace. 
[…] The Korean understood his own motives better, and whatever was the 
strength of his political beliefs, his desire for a peaceful existence was far 
greater.437 
 
For Thimayya, the POW’s choice of a “neutral country” was a choice for peace, an 
affirmation of India’s own policy of neutrality.   
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The 76 POWs Who Chose a “Neutral Country” 
 
Boarding the ship at Inchon harbor to head for India, the eighty-eight prisoners of 
war – seventy-six Korean and twelve Chinese – could still hear the message from the 
South Korean government being broadcasted from “loudspeakers in the surrounding 
hills” to the Korean prisoners of war, “an impassioned plea [for the Korean POWs] not to 
leave with the foreigners but to stay in their own country.”  “The prisoners seemed 
affected by the broadcast,” General K.S. Thimayya noted, “but when we told them they 
could still choose to return they all refused to do so and continued the journey with our 
troops.”438 All eighty-eight prisoners of war had one element in common – all of them 
had made a choice to be neither repatriated to North Korea nor South Korea, neither 
China nor Formosa, but rather to be sent to a “neutral country.” At that moment, they 
were headed to India where they would wait for further information and news about 
which country or countries would be the possible “neutral country.” In other words, the 
“neutral country” was still unknown and undecided – all eighty-eight POWs had chosen 
an idea, an abstraction, not a specific country. 
The “explanations” were not the only thing that demanded an audience of the 
prisoners of war at the 38th parallel – loudspeakers in the POW compounds blared 
programming and announcements, dramas were staged by and for the POWs, educational 
programs that had been developed by the U.S. PsyWar and Civilian Information and 
Education teams continued in the anti-communist compounds, and consistent 
interrogation by POWs of fellows POWs also intensified at the 38th parallel.  When the 
ship departed from Inchon harbor with the eighty-eight prisoners of war and the members 
of the Indian Custodian Forces, Ju Yeong Bok, a former major in the Korean People’s 
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Army, noted a moment of quiet pause, markedly different from the incredible volume of 
programming and announcements that had been directed at the POWs in the camps – 
“When we disembarked from Inchon, the Indian soldiers who had seemed to fill the 
entire deck of the ship went below to their cabins, and the remaining prisoners of war 
[…] threw futile glances at their vanishing fatherland. […] I looked out at the horizon 
until barely a speck was discernible,” Ju writes in his memoir. It would take the strains of 
Indian music coming from the cabins of the soldiers below deck to shake Ju’s focus on 
the horizon – “Now, I noticed that the music did not seem so unfamiliar to my 
accustomed ear.  The sorrowful tone directly entered my soul, it seemed.  Without quite 
realizing it, my body had been placed within Indian culture.”439 At the moment the 
Korean peninsula fades from view, Joo finds that his ear has become “accustomed” to the 
Indian music, and that his body and soul fell into an emphatic consonance with the music.   
Amidst a sense of loss and isolation, there was no expression of fear – rather, Ju 
emphasizes the sense of a measure of the possible, a kernel of the imaginable, for him to 
be able to live in the future landscape of the “neutral country.”  It becomes clear that the 
concept of a “neutral country” was not an empty category for Ju; thus, what did it mean 
for the seventy-six Korean prisoners of war to choose to go to a “neutral country” as they 
lived cordoned off in camps at the 38th parallel in 1953? 
For the prisoners of war who chose a “neutral country,” they would move from 
being one of the most oddly “hypervisible” subjects on the stage of struggles over 
political recognition to then becoming one of the most oddly “invisible” subjects after the 
Korean War conflict receded into the past with the 1954 Geneva Conference on Korea 
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and Indochina, where a different 38th parallel – the 13th parallel – was instituted.  The 
eighty-eight prisoners of war as they waited in India soon discovered that they had 
become essentially stateless persons, and it become incumbent upon the prisoners of war 
themselves to gauge the geopolitical globe, propose possible countries for the category of 
“neutral country,” and then petition the appropriate authorities.  And survival once again 
hinged upon a certain recognition by a state power – only instead of the violence 
experienced in the POW compounds as state-proxy organizations like the Anti-
Communist Young Men group sanctioned and enforced, the question of productive labor 
was on the table for these men in negotiating their future “neutral country.”  
Ju had been able to imagine a sense of his own future intertwined with India 
because India was indeed not “foreign” to Korea.  The encounters between the Indian 
military personnel and the Korean prisoners of war within the POW camps belied an even 
longer history of being embedded in each other’s colonial histories: at one point, two 
Korean prisoners of war called out to Brigadier Gurbaksh Singh of the CFI.  They had 
recognized him from a previous encounter in an earlier conflict – Singh “had been a 
prisoner of the Japanese in Singapore during World War II,” and the two Korean POWs 
had been his guards, working under the Japanese colonial army.440  It was this very 
history that enabled the CFI to communicate with the Korean prisoners of war without 
the aid of interpreters from either the UNC or NC. “Among our own personnel we had a 
number of men who could speak Japanese.  Most of the prisoners, because of their 
experience with the Japanese during World War II, could understand a little of this 
language,” wrote Thimayya in his memoir.  The ability to communicate, however 
rudimentarily, with the POWs became critical when nine Korean prisoners of war, during 
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a simple reprocessing assignment, suddenly broke out of the line and threw themselves at 
the CFI soldiers and asked for repatriation. “These men were terrified of the UN in 
general and of their recent comrades in particular,” commented Thimayya.  The Korean 
prisoners of war trusted neither the United Nations Command nor the ACYL nor the 
Republic of Korea to safeguard their lives.441  
The choice of “neutrality” for the Korean non-repatriate POWs occurred in a 
similar manner.  Choosing neutrality usually did not occur in the space of the explanation 
room, although occasionally a POW did choose a “neutral country” at the end of his 
explanation.  More often than not, the choice of a “neutral country” happened in these 
moments of rather desperate escape.  For POW Ju Yeong Bok, his choice of a “neutral 
country” was exercised when he threw himself at the barbed-wire fence of his POW 
compound, in an effort to escape the constant interrogation and torture the POW 
compound leaders were exercising upon him.  According to his memoir, the POW 
compound leaders had been keeping close surveillance on who might choose repatriation 
or a neutral country.  One night, someone woke up Ju by pulling his head up by the hair – 
they demanded to know who else he knew was intending to choose a neutral country.  
Refusing to speak, Ju was placed under surveillance with POW guards and then subject 
to routine interrogation.442  Indeed, Ju must have seemed suspicious to the anti-
communist non-repatriate POW compound leaders because he had been one of the first 
round non-repatriate POWs sent to the mainland camps, but he had not escaped from the 
camp during Syngman Rhee’s mass organized release of POWs on June 18, 1953.  In his 
memoir, Ju stated that he had purposefully not escaped because he had already decided to 
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leave the Korean peninsula for a “neutral country.”  “I did not like the idea of escaping,” 
he wrote. “Or to put it more precisely, the thought of having my body attached to this 
land and living here made me anxious, and I disliked it.  I wanted to go anywhere far, far 
away. I wanted to use my hands to cultivate land where there was neither red nor white 
[neither communism nor right-wing anti-communism].”443   To the POW compound 
leaders, the choice of a “neutral country” reeked of an ambiguity that could not be 
tolerated. 
On January 14, 1954, Ju was still under POW guard and surveillance.  It was his 
birthday, and snow covered the ground.  The guards were not as alert, he noticed, perhaps 
due to the cold and the snow.  He made a mad run for the fence, startling the guards into 
pursuit.  He saw an Indian CFI soldier running towards him on the other side of the fence.  
“Don’t shoot!” Ju called out in English.  “Don’t shoot!”  When the Indian soldier was 
able to place his hands on Ju’s body, pulling him out of the compound, Ju wrote of that 
moment: “I felt a comfort rise up from a mysterious place deep inside of me.”444  And, 
indeed, this moment marked the end of the very brief first chapter in his memoir, and 
opened what Ju clearly considered to be the important drama of the memoir – his time in 
India as an ex-prisoner of war.   
Ju opened his memoir with a phrase that was suggestive of both statement and 
question: “Why did I choose a neutral country” – “It was a question I had asked myself 
thousands of times over the course of my lifetime,” wrote Ju.  But Ju’s memoir was not a 
straightforward expository narrative providing a definitive answer to this question.  The 
title of his memoir was The 76 Prisoners of War; Ju refracted the question of why he 
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chose a neutral question through a sort of auto/biography of the cohort of the 76 Korean 
POWs who had all chosen a “neutral country.” This particular narrative decision on the 
part of Ju indicated two important facets of how Ju understood his experience as a 
“neutral country” POW.  
First, in terms of understanding why he had chosen a neutral country, Ju’s 
experience with the collective cohort functioned literally and figuratively a pivotal part of 
how, when, and where the “neutral country” was defined.  In their peculiar status of 
statelessness, the prisoners of war clearly formed strategies to make themselves visible to 
different states as viable candidates – they grouped themselves together accordingly.  The 
vision of the “neutral country” was not an individual one, as POWs banded to ensure that 
no one individual would be left stranded.  And it is through Ju’s explication of other 
POWs’ reasonings behind their decisions that the reader is able to glean a sense of Ju’s 
own possible motivations.  Second, Ju and the other POWs were clearly aware of their 
particular status as the POWs who had chosen to go to a “neutral country.”  As “The 76 
Prisoners of War,” they held a symbolic importance for India; however, as time 
progressed, the POWs encountered a series of challenges in the increasing bipolarization 
of the geopolitical landscape.  Ju’s memoir was also a story about the incredibly disparate 
choices the POWs made in the years following the ceasefire.  The search for the “neutral 
country” was perhaps even more difficult than the decision to choose a “neutral country.”   
 After disembarking at Madras, the now ex-prisoners of war and members of the 
Indian CFI boarded a train that transported them to Delhi.  Their arrival at Delhi was 
greeted by a mass of Indian citizens and government officials.  In place of her father, 
Prime Minister Nehru, Indira Gandhi was there to offer an official welcome to the 88 ex
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POWs, making sure to shake each individual ex-POW’s hand.  Before boarding buses 
that would take them to their living quarters, the ex-POWs were split into two groups – 
those who had elected to stay in India as their “neutral country,” and those who had 
elected to go to South or Central America for their possible “neutral country.”445  The ex-
POWs had initially inquired about the possibility of Switzerland or Sweden as their 
receiving neutral countries, but both states had rejected the possibility.  Ju had been a part 
of the group who had hoped to go to Central or South America.   
Afterwards, the ex-POWs arrived at their new living space in the New Delhi 
vicinity – a large, old hospital structure that had been erected by the British colonists. The 
Indian authorities in charge of the ex-POWs held a meeting with them, where the 
authorities made specific suggestions to the ex-POWs on how to organize their days.  
Classes on discipline, customs, public morals, domestic lifestyle, English language 
lessons, and dining manners, and also maintaining an organized daily life based on going 
to bed and rising early were all recommended.446  It was clear that the Indian authorities 
viewed the ex-POWs as citizens-in-training, and claimed responsibility for preparing 
these ex-POWs as proper subjects for whichever nation-state would become their future 
home.  Education – in terms of language, trade, and behavior or composure - was 
considered to be important to transform the ex-POWs into proper subjects of the modern 
nation-state.447 
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However, finding a receiving “neutral country” had become much more 
complicated than anticipated.  General K.S. Thimayya paid a visit to the ex-POWs’ 
residence to convey the difficult news.  The wait for a “neutral country” was most 
probably going to take a long time, much longer than anticipated, conveyed Thimayya.  If 
any of the ex-POWs no longer wanted to wait to see if and which “neutral country” 
would be open to receiving them, then the Indian government would help them return to 
their original countries, whether China or North Korea.  Otherwise, the only thing the ex-
POWs could do in the meantime was to wait.448   
Thimayya’s words of caution about a long wait soon rang very true for the ex-
POWs.  It took at least another two years until August 1956, for the majority of the ex-
POWs to have a “neutral country” destination.  Five months after Thimayya’s initial talk 
with the ex-POWS, General Thorat, who had been the head of the CFI at the 38th parallel, 
came to discuss the situation with the ex-POWs.  The situation had not changed ever 
since Thimayya’s visit, and Thorat suggested that the most effective way to move the 
process forward was to have the ex-POWs petition states where they hoped to settle.  
After a meeting among the ex-POWs themselves, the resulting numbers were 24 for 
Mexico, 22 for Brazil, 6 for Argentina, and 2 for the Dominican Republic.  Ju himself 
had selected Brazil, and noted that the more anti-communist leaning ex-POWs had 
chosen Mexico and Argentina, while the more left-leaning ex-POWs had chosen Brazil 
and the Dominican Republic.  For example, Ju portrayed one particular Korean ex-POW, 
Pak Gi-Chan, as a fervent anti-communist – at this meeting with Thorat, Pak stood up 
and announced that all the ex-POWs must go to Mexico.  Pak most probably considered 
Mexico to be safely anti-communist because of its proximity and also “alliance” with the 
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United States at that time.  The ex-POWs were clearly attempting to read the geopolitical 
landscape of Central and South America. 
Over the next two years, the ex-POWs found themselves in an increasingly 
precarious situation.  After the first round of petitions, Mexico was the only one who was 
willing to accept ex-prisoners of war; however, even Mexico was not willing to take all 
original 24 ex-POWs who had petitioned.  There was constant reconfiguring and 
recalibrating among the ex-POWs, and eventually Brazil and Argentina also accepted a 
number of ex-POWS, although both states reserved the right to refuse the petitions of 
particular ex-POWs.  By early 1956, the ex-POWs had received news about their possible 
destinations, but a collective letter sent by a number of Korean optees for Argentina to 
the United Nations conveyed a sense of their underlying anxiety: 
Most Honourable The U.N. Secretary-general, Dr. Dag Hammarskijoeld 
From Korean ex-prisoners opted for Argentina 
 
It is really very happy that at last we are found our new home in beautiful 
country, Argentina after two year’s waiting.  Firmly we believe that it is 
only due to Your Excellency’s favour and efforts through U.N. 
organization and direct and indirect contact with government concerned. 
[…] 
Sir, in return for your Excellency’s good office and the generous offer of 
Argentine government we will strive for the prosperity of Argentina along 
with her people.   
And it was said that our 57 Brazilian optees would leave here for Brazil on 
February 4. 
We hope that “very soon after that” we shall be able to leave for 
Argentina.449 
 
The letter was signed as being “From all Argentine optees,” but was specifically signed 
by Pak Sang Sin, Lim Ik Kam, Hong Il Seop, and Lee Chol Kyun.  The letter was clearly 
an effort on the part of the ex-POWs to leverage some degree of pressure on the United 
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Nations to ensure that their departure and acceptance by Argentina would happen.  “[W]e 
will strive for the prosperity of Argentina along with her people,” they wrote, as they 
expressed their desire to become proper subjects of Argentina, their willingness to 
become productive citizens, if given the choice.  The situation was a differently inflected 
situation of the explanation room for these former prisoners of war – rather than having 
their subjecthood explained by a member of the state, they found themselves in a position 
of having to explain their viable subjecthood for other states.   
 One major difficulty for a small subset of the ex-POWs was their background as 
officers in the Korean People’s Army.  Two particular ex-POWs, Hyeon Dong Hwa and 
Ji Ki Cheol, had applied for Argentina and Mexico respectively, but were repeatedly 
rejected.  Ji had then tried to apply for Brazil, but because his application went in after 
the initial group of 55 had been sent, Brazil had refused his application also.  In 1957, 
after the majority of ex-POWs had departed India, Hyeon Dong Hwa embarked on a 
letter-writing mission to the United Nations, sending a letters dated April 25th, May 7th, 
October 22nd, and the final one on November 23rd.  He wrote the letters to plead both his 
case and that of Ji Ki Cheol.  In the first letter, Hyeon introduced him by immediately 
distancing himself from the possibility of being associated with communism: 
I am a Korean ex-Prisoner of War who was brought here with Indian 
Custodian Troops in Feb. 1956.  I came to India not because I am a pro-
Communist or admierer of “Nehru’s neutral policy”but because the injury 
which I got during the War and self-grieves were the main reason.450 
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And regarding Ji, Hyeon wrote, “It is beyond my conception that the Government of 
Argentina refuses the entry of one of most ardent anti-Communist fighter among our 
groups.”  He acknowledged that both he and Ji had been in the KPA, but he offered 
evidence of their “wills of fight with Communism.”  He had written a piece in the 
“reader’s column in Hindustan Times in Feb. 11th 1957 issue under the title of ‘Korea 
Election,’” he stated in his letter, and the piece clearly communicated his anti-communist 
beliefs.   
Later, after Lennart Finnmark, the assistant to the Secretary-General, suggested 
that they get in touch with the respective Argentine and Mexican embassies in New 
Dehli, Hyeon reported on his visit with the Argentine embassy, where “Mr. Falco, 
Chargéd affaires of the Embassy, […] frankly told us that his government had refused to 
accept us because we were officers of North Korean army and were regarded as 
Communists.”451  Hyeon then stated, “Thereafter, we did everything in our power to 
obtain the materials that can prove us as anti-Communist and submitted them to him.”  
The case of Hyeon and Ji disappear from the United Nations archive after this final letter, 
and I have not been able to figure out what the fate of these two ex-POWs was.  But the 
series of letters written by Hyeon clearly demonstrates how the ex-POWs, although far 
away from the Korean peninsula, were still compelled to render themselves politically 
transparent in front of each state they wanted to petition.  Being part of the “76 POWs” 
meant something different politically depending from where in the geopolitical landscape 
one was looking. 
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 The ex-POWs had also clearly made a strategy to render themselves visible to the 
state they were petitioning not only as individuals, but as a collective group.  In a letter 
dated March 27, 1956 from Arthur S. Lall, Permanent Representative of India to the 
United Nations, to Mr. Dag Hammarskjold, Secretary General of the United Nations, Lall  
forwarded lists of the men who had “expressed a desire to be resettled” in Mexico and 
Argentina, and asked the Secretary General to forward the lists to the respective 
government representatives.  Both lists provided the names of the petitioning ex-POW, 
sometimes also the ex-POW’s age, and also the background and desired occupation of the 
ex-POW.  And an examination of the lists themselves reveals how the ex-POWs were 
preparing and trying to reinvent themselves for settlement in Mexico or Argentina.  As 
evidenced in the lists provided below, the Korean ex-POWs who had opted for Argentina 
all primarily wanted to work in the engineering sector, whether as a mechanical engineer, 
electrical engineer, or in chemistry.452 
 
List of ex-prisoners of the Korean War who opted for resettlement in Argentina 
 
S. No. Name ISN No. Remarks 
1 Hong Il Seop 148198 Bachelor. Mechanical Engineer. 
2 Han Hyeong Mo 129097 Bachelor. Seaman. 
3.  Yo Zu Fang 711388 Student in China. Electrician. 
Speaks and writes Spanish. 
4. Cheong Lee Ren 715261 Teacher in China and wants to be 
an Electrician. 
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5. Jeong Seong Hi 135578 Trained Electrician who has done 
a complete course at the Reorkee 
Engineering Centre as an 
Electrician. 
6. Lim Ik Kan 123794 Was a University student in 
Korea with Chemistry as his 
subject. Speaks and Writes 
Spanish which he has studied in 
India. 
7.  Jang Ki Doo 39496 He was a student in Korea.  
Wishes to learn a trade in 
Argentina. 
8. Pak Chang Kun 104017 He was a student in Korea and 
wishes to be an Electrician in a 
factory. 
9. Lee Cheo Kyun 95602 A farmer. 
10. Pak Sang Shin 150003 Former Pilot in the Japanese 
Army. In India has learnt 
Stenography in French and 
typing. 
11.  Lee Tek Joo 86571 --- 
 
Figure 5.2: List of ex-prisoners of the Korean War who opted for resettlement in Argentina 
 
 
For the ex-POWs who opted for Mexico, the occupations of poultry farmer and camera 
mechanic were the choices of the majority.  With such specific choices of occupations 
and training, the ex-POWs were hoping to travel with their specific group.  Creating a life 
in a “neutral country” was not an isolated, individual vision at this point – the ex-POWs 
were presenting themselves as a collective specialized labor force and resource to each 
state. 
 
List of ex-prisoners of the Korean War who opted for resettlement in Mexico 
 
S. No. ISN No. Name Remarks 
1 17328 Ji Ki Chol Age 31, was Army officer in 
Korea, wishes to do Poultry 
farming 
2 73526 Kyun Dong Hwa Age 21, was student, wishes to do 
Poultry farming. 
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3.  101619 Jang Ki Hwa Age 27, labourer, wishes to do 
Poultry farming 
4. 25134 Kim Kwon Ox Age 24, was a clerk, wishes to be a 
camera mechanic – repairs etc. 
5. 87932 Han Pyo Koo Age 24, labourer, wishes to be a 
mechanic in any branch.  Has no 
training. 
6. 98654 Jeong Joo Won Age 23, student wants to be a 
camera mechanic, has some 
knowledge of camera. 
7.  12246 Jo Cheol Hi Age 22, student of electrical 
engineering course, wants to be a 
cine-camera-man or a camera 
radio mechanic, good in his work, 
has training in India for 1 ½ 
years. 
8. 108275 Kim Bong Kook Age 36, farmer, wishes to do 
Poultry farming. 
9. 150690 Son Tai Ha Age 22, clerk, wants any labour 
work. 
 
Figure 5.3: List of ex-prisoners of the Korean War who opted for resettlement in Mexico 
 
 
 The choice of a “neutral country” for these ex-prisoners of war had not happened 
simply spontaneously, but rather through debate, conversation, and discussion.  In his 
memoir, Ju Yeong-bok depicted a conversation he had with another ex-POW, Yi 
Shinyeong, whom he had known ever since they met in the UNC Camp at Yongchon in 
mid or late 1952.  They had become close, and according to Ju, Yi very willing followed 
Ju.  At some point, Ju had persuaded Yi to choose to go to a neutral country, but one 
night sometime after Thimayya’s visit in 1954, Yi told Ju that he had decided to stay in 
India, rather than going to a country somewhere in Central or South America. Ju 
reconstructed Yi’s words to him as follows: 
I decided on this after a great deal of thought.  And this is not meant to be 
a reproach in any way to your proposal to go to a neutral country.  
Because I’m not an idiot, I have also thrown away everything ‘north’ and 
‘south.’  We left not because we were mistrustful of others but because we 
believed that we could leave behind the politics and ideologies and go to a 
foreign country where we could farm and have a successful life, no? 
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Yi believed that he would be able to “farm and have a successful life” in India rather than 
in Central or South America.  He called the Indians very “pure and direct,” and 
considered India to be “very democratic.”  India had become the site of his vision of a 
“neutral country.”453  Although initially greatly surprised, Ju said that he wished him the 
best.  Yi soon departed the ex-POW camp hospital, and two years later on February 4, 
1956, ex-POW Ju Yeong Bok left India along with 54 other ex-POWs for Brazil.  By 
August 21, 1956, a United Nations memorandum reported the status of the ex-POWs.   
 
Status of Korean prisoners of war sent to India 
Brazil 55 Arrived in Brazil according to letter from India 
Mission 
27 March 1956 
Argentina 11 Opted for Argentina according to letter from India 
Mission of 27 March 1956; Argentine entry visa 
granted according to letter from the Argentine 
Mission of 17 July 1956 
Mexico 9 Opted for Mexico according to letter from India 
Mission of 27 March 1956 
India 7* Opted for India 
North Korea 4 Returned to North Korea 
China 2 Returned to China 
 88  
* One of these returned to N. Korea according to Note Verbale from India Mission of 17 
August 1956 
 
Figure 5.4: Status of Korean prisoners of war sent to India, dated 21 August 1956 
 
 
The ex-POW who merited the asterisk next to the number 7 under those who had opted 
for India was a young man named “Mr. Lim Sa Seon,” according to a letter dated August 
14, 1956 from the Permanent Mission of India to the United Nations, whose home 
                                                
453 Ju, 176. 
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address was noted as “Won San City Mei Yun Tong.”454  Other ex-POWs later also 
decided to leave their original choice of “neutral country” – a “Mr. Suck-lin Kim” who 
was among the 55 ex-POWs sent to Brazil had requested for repatriation to South 
Korea.455  At the time of the request, he had “been placed on a temporary basis as 
gardener of a Presbyterian Mission in the State of São Paulo.  
 The choice of a “neutral country” was neither assured asylum nor guaranteed 
immigration. The ex-POW was a stateless person, dependent on a discourse of 
humanitarianism to place strategic pressure upon the United Nations and different states.  
The strategies they employed were multiple, and their choices revealed a longer history 
of imagining what a possible future might be.  They exercised as much control as they 
possibly could over the seemingly haphazard structural shifts that determined their 
futures. They had to articulate themselves as proper subjects for an imagined nation-state.  
The demands of decolonization had not ended for them, just as the Korean War itself had 
not ended. 
 
Conclusion 
 In his memoir, The 76 Prisoners of War, Ju Yeong Bok reflected upon the type of 
possibilities neutrality could open up for the politics on the Korean peninsula.  “8.15 
Liberation. The joy of freedom and independence from the oppression of Japanese 
colonial rule had arrived.  But the joy was shortlived,” he wrote. Almost immediately, the 
                                                
454 Dated August 14, 1956 From Permanent Mission of India to the United Nations, from [Miscellany – 
Correspondence and reports concerning the Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission 1954], United 
Nations Archive; New York, NY. 
455 “Request for repatriation by South Korean ex-prisoner of war” Dated 20 December 1956 Mr. V. Stavridi, 
Director, External Services, DPI G.S. Rabinovitch, Director, RIO UNIC from [Miscellany – 
Correspondence and reports concerning the Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission 1954], United 
Nations Archive; New York, NY. 
  322 
divided occupation of the Soviets and the Americans was imposed upon the peninsula, 
and “another chain was tied around the neck of Koreans.”456  For Ju, Korea should have 
been a neutral nation, and at this time of writing this memoir, he also believed that Korea 
should become a permanent neutral nation.  Neutrality, in this case, was a moment of 
Korea’s history before the politics of the Cold War descended on the peninsula and 
coopted the possible futures in Korea.  Ju completed his memoir in 1993, but perhaps 
when viewed through his thoughts on neutrality and Korean history, the choice that he 
made as a young man during the war to go to an undefined “neutral country” was a 
choice to go to a Korea that he believed should have been, one separate from the politics 
of the Cold War.  But as Ju and the other seventy-five Korean prisoners of war very 
quickly discovered upon their arrival in New Delhi, “neutrality” itself had already been 
tempered with the lens of the Cold War, and the vision of the “neutral country” evidently 
eluded more than just a few of them, as some of them elected to repatriate to North Korea 
eventually.  
 Ju Yeong Bok had not returned to North Korea.  For the young man from South 
Korea in this chapter’s introduction who decided not to repatriate, it is most probable that 
he was not able to cross the 38th parallel again.  And although Ju no longer lived in 
Korea, the presence of the 38th parallel and the constant reminder of Korea’s division still 
pained him.  “This book is for my mother and all of the other mothers who had sent their 
sons to the frontline and are still waiting for their return.”  This is Ju’s dedication, and 
both his life and the 38th parallel demonstrated the unending nature of the Korean War. 
                                                
456 Ju, 29. 
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Conclusion 
 
The Afterlives of Perpetual War 
 
                              
 
The wooden slats propped up against the wall in the above photograph had been 
used as floorboards for many years in a small house in a fishing village located on the 
small island of Yongch’o.  When the owner of the house pulled up the floorboards in 
order to install new ones, he noticed large Korean characters written boldly and in black 
on the underside of the boards.  The author of these writings had been Korean prisoners 
of war, and almost every house in the fishing village had these boards forming the walls 
or floors of their home.  The small islands of Yongch’o and nearby Ch’ubong had been 
the site of top-secret POW camps during the Korean War, so top-secret that I did not 
come across any official documentation of these camps during my research visits to the 
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National Archives.  In place of official U.S. military documents, the memories of the 
village residents and the physical, material remnants of the POW camps serve as the 
peculiar embodied archive of a war that has not ended.   
When the prisoners of war were shipped to Panmunjom for repatriation or 
explanation after the signing of the ceasefire in July 1953, the local residents who lived 
near the POW camp carefully disassembled the camp materials, using what they could 
find.  Wire, wooden planks, metal – all were precious commodities during a time of utter 
devastation.  The residents had reassembled and reused these materials – the POW camp 
itself had an afterlife in the hands of the residents as it was transformed into small homes 
and other necessities.  The traces of the POW camp can be found in the writing on the 
wooden planks, a large water reservoir created by the U.S. Army, and stone partitions in 
various states of ruin dotting specific places on the island. 
But why the secrecy around these two prisoner of war camps?  According to the 
histories recalled and told by the villagers, the camps were created to house the most 
fervent communist Korean POWs.  In the light of this study, it seems most probable that 
these camps were installed after the Dodd kidnapping incident, when the U.S. authorities, 
especially camp commander Boatner, prioritized moving the POWs into smaller, more 
manageable compounds.  It was at this time that all anti-communist POWs were sent to 
the mainland, and the paratroopers were sent into the communist Korean POW 
compounds to discipline and punish the POWs for transgressing their position.  It is quite 
possible that the members involved in the Korean People’s Army and Chinese Volunteers 
Prisoners of War Representatives Association had placed there, along with other higher-
ranking officers of the KPA.  But the villagers did not express any fear or disgust at the 
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POWs themselves in their recollections – in fact, one of the POWs had escaped the camp, 
and instead of going far away from the camp, he decided to stay in the surrounding 
village, where he ended up marrying a young woman in the village and became a farmer.  
The U.S. Army, the villagers told me, could not recognize the difference between 
Koreans. 
In other words, as the written-upon wooden planks and the local villagers who 
had grown up around the POW camp could attest, the Korean War had never quite left 
the village.  In fact, the writing on the wooden planks and the figure of the former POW 
who had become a local farmer points to particular ways to pay attention to the current 
lives and afterlives of war.  Because although the Korean War had never quite left this 
village, different legacies from the war were also informing a world of constant warfare 
as the question of decolonization in Asia and the Pacific Islands continued.  The written 
planks and the ex-POW farmer were demonstrations of the limits of the violent project of 
hegemony the United States had embarked upon in 1945 and escalated in 1950.  The 
writing of the POWs was a demonstration of the POWs’ own insistence on articulating 
their own political subjectivities and imaginaries, to cover quite literally the space that 
was supposed to silence them through confinement in a visual, undeniable form their 
presence and voice.  The choices of the ex-POW to make a life under the shadow of the 
POW camp with the local villagers were a demonstration of a Korean subject insisting 
upon his claims to shaping the everyday and the mundane in spite of the constant “state 
of exception” touted by the United States and the newly formed Republic of Korea.  It 
was an insistence to remember and return to the basic questions of self-determination, 
land, and the question of what a liberated life was supposed to look like.   
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From the vantage point of Yongch’o and Ch’ubong, the Korean War appears less 
like the usual textbook map image with the 38th parallel drawn boldly across the 
peninsula and arrows pointing in the direction of military movements back and forth 
across the parallel.  Instead, the Korean War appears more like a shifting matrix 
composed of thousands upon thousands of human encounters, where a more 
encompassing spectrum of historical actors comes into view.  Using the interrogation 
room as the central focus, this study has charted a very different map of the Korean War, 
one that follows a multitude of interrogation rooms and camps invented, mobilized, and 
experienced by a cast of historical actors not often brought together within the same story 
of the Korean War.  The governments of India, Mexico, Brazil, Argentina and Peru 
joined the more familiar parties of the United States, the United Nations, the Democratic 
People’s Republic of Korea, and the Republic of Korea.  The Korean prisoners of war 
themselves were from both sides of the parallel, and sometimes from the farther reaches 
of the Korean diaspora created under the pressures of Japanese colonialism.  The 
interrogators were Japanese American young men, who had lived behind barbed-wire 
fences in the United States not long before the outbreak of the Korean War.  In other 
words, all assumptions about who had held or exercised power, about who had resisted or 
negotiated power, have to be revisited and unsettled in this story of the Korean War.   
This story situates the Korean War not simply within a Cold War binary power 
struggle, but rather within a historical moment when nothing was assured, but many 
things seemed possible, and the old, usual categories and definitions of empire, nation, 
and subject seemed inadequate in front of the changes being wrought.  Liberation from 
Japanese colonialism had come to Korea, and the Korean people had commenced the 
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project of formal decolonization on the peninsula.  The question of global governance in 
the aftermath of World War II loomed large over the world stage of politics as the shaken 
state of the European powers’ legitimacy appeared to cede the power of influence to the 
United States or even possibly India. The United Nations was created only a month after 
U.S. Army personnel had arrived on the Korean peninsula to commence the military 
occupation.  These histories converge upon the prisoner of war issue during the Korean 
War, where defining sovereignty, subjecthood, and liberal governance in an era of war 
and formal decolonization became the stakes of international conflict.  The history of the 
Korean War is one that exceeds the frame of the Cold War.  The histories and the POW 
Camps of the Korean War in the small island villages of Yongch’o and Ch’ubong are 
currently absent from the available declassified records of the National Archives in the 
United States, but the experiences of the villagers on these islands share a history of 
dealing with U.S. militarization, guerilla warfare, and states of emergency with peasant 
farmers in the Philippines at the turn of the century, for example.   
This study has offered a history of the Korean War that has been overshadowed 
by the Demilitarized Zone, the hypervisible legacy from the Korean War and certainly a 
hypervisible reminder that the war has not officially ended.  By beginning with the U.S. 
military interrogation room, the POW camp, and the negotiating table, I presented an 
analysis of the Korean War that charted not the traditional landscape of warfare in terms 
of territory and diplomatic power struggles, but rather the development and practice of a 
key project of warfare in the twentieth-century: making the decolonized subject.  When 
the practices, negotiations, and encounters around the question of subject-making come 
to the fore of a history of the Korean War, both the legacies and the origins of the Korean 
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War bring a genealogy of American liberalism and warfare into sharper focus. The 
interrogation transcripts examined in this study position a legacy of the Korean War not 
simply in the techniques of warfare itself, but in terms of bureaucracy and the logic of 
transparency and liberal governance.   
The term “war” itself evokes horror and images of mass destruction, and “war” 
has undergone a process of gradual institutionalization as “aggressive warfare” in 
particular has been criminalized.  The objective of this study was to demonstrate the 
profound limits of such a characterization of and approach to warfare.  I argue that it 
essentially elides and denies a deeper violence enacted and facilitated by war – the fact 
that “war” is also supposed to produce “new subjects” through its crucible of mass 
violence.  This type of warfare is the warfare articulated and developed by the United 
States in particular throughout the twentieth century and still today.  In order to critique 
U.S. discourses and applications of warfare, I insist that we must also keep in mind war’s 
“productive” capabilities, not simply its “destructive” ones.  The violence enacted on the 
battlefields, through mass airbombings, and via torture in the interrogation rooms must be 
viewed through a larger, implicating lens, where these acts are not simply rendered as 
“immoral,” “evil,” or “irrational.”  Torture and bureaucracy, killings and state-building, 
battlefields and international law – the profound intimacy between violence and the 
languages of liberalism lies at the heart of the analysis in this study. 
Sovereignty holds the central ground on current discussions of U.S. foreign 
interventions, as both the U.S. and other nations invoke the sacred nature of sovereignty 
in their engagement in warfare.  However, my study illuminates how, although 
sovereignty now seems to be an exhausted idiom for state power, the concept of 
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“sovereignty” as used today (and its attendant unwieldy nature perhaps) is a legacy of the 
different struggles over decolonization and the question of what liberation was supposed 
to look like. The institutionalization of warfare during the mid-twentieth century involved 
the creation of a certain flexibility to accommodate the profound structural contradictions 
of colonial rule.  In this study, I have demonstrated how there can be multiple types of 
sovereignties on the ground, with multiple types of demands being placed on the 
individual subject.  The United States, ever in constant disavowal of its own desires for 
sovereign power, fashions a particular claim via sovereign power on the Korean 
individual subject that also bypasses the South Korean state.  Indeed, as argued in 
Chapter Two, the Korean individual subject had to evidence and demonstrate a particular 
subjectivity towards the USAMGIK before the granting of state sovereignty was granted.   
This study provides a historical analysis of U.S. interventionism, of the specific 
moment when the United States was attempting to render its rhetoric and practice of 
intervention as a universalized one of humanitarian aid, not of warfare.  U.S. historians 
have long examined the Korean War as an event that held significance for elsewhere - the 
rise and consolidation of the U.S. military industrial complex, the move from rollback to 
containment as Cold War policy, and the rise of U.S. hegemony within the early Cold 
War period.  In this study, I reflected upon the war itself, to examine the abstracting 
tendencies of war, to analyze how “war” itself can be a universalizing category of 
historical experience – and one whose demand for abstraction has profoundly material 
and devastating consequences.   
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